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Chapter 1
Introduction
Turpe est animam alia cognoscere et se ipsam ignorare.
Anonymus Chasselensis f. 104r
This dissertation presents a study of intellectual self-knowledge in the commentaries on Aris-
totle’s De anima from the 13th and early 14th century. The investigation revolves around the
arts masters’ interpretation of two passages in De anima 3.4 where Aristotle is interpreted to
assume some kind of intellectual self-knowledge, and their discussions on the possibility of
having a science of the soul at the beginning of their commentaries. I will analyse and map the
field of doctrines and identify significant connections among the included commentaries. In
the study I will make use of and develop both quantitative and qualitative methods for analysis
of philosophical texts.
This is a study of a philosophical subject in historical texts that are composed of a wide field
of ideas and arguments. In this way it presents different types of challenges, and in this intro-
duction I will discuss how they are each addressed. It is not only a study of a historical artefact,
as the development of problems concerning self, soul, consciousness, and introspection have
had a strong presence in the history of philosophy, and still do to this day. This means that
to avoid some false assumptions, the creation of non-existing connections, or the influence of
cognitive biases, it will be necessary to map out the philosophical playing field. The treatment
of historical texts itself imports some problems of transmission, availability, and interpretation,
and as the amount of material also makes an exhaustive study impossible within the present
confines, a selection must be made. Finally, the composite nature of the ideas discussed and
presented in the texts studied here raises some challenges of comparison, connection, and inter-
pretation. The introduction will be closed off with a review of the existing research literature,
an outline of the dissertation and a summary of formal details of terminology and references.
The problems of self-knowledge and reflexivity play a pivotal role throughout the history
of the philosophy of mind. Some parts of that history have already been subjected to intense
investigation, but there are still wholly or largely unexplored areas. I will here begin to map
one of those. The main purpose of the study will therefore be to provide an overview of the
philosophical arguments and positions that can be found within the commentaries on Aris-
totle’s De anima from 1250 to 1320. I will do this in a modular way that will make it easy to
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evaluate any material that is not included here in light of the present results, and to expand on
them with the new results that further studies are certain to hold. On the basis of these invest-
igations it will be possible to identify central, influential, and typical points of doctrines within
the corpus, and to recommend texts that may be of particular interest, either in virtue of their
degree of uniqueness, because they provide good representations of the common doctrines, or
because they are of particular philosophical ingenuity or depth.
1.1 The object of study: Intellectual self-knowledge
Terms such as self, knowledge, reflection, awareness and not least consciousness are heavily
loaded. They import a range of meanings and backgrounds that should be distinguished to
avoid too much confusion. I therefore want to establish some terminological distinctions and
point out some of the ambiguity of the most central terms. A most basic distinction is to be
made between self-knowledge and self-awareness.1 Self-knowledge describes knowledge about
one’s own mental acts, such as experiences, thoughts, beliefs, and desires. Self-awareness de-
scribes the identification of oneself, one’s own “I”, as the centre of mental acts. This definition
of self-awareness does not necessarily match the existing literature, as it can be used more
freely to denote a non-cognitive reflexivity. But the purpose of the distinction is to single out
activities that take the mental acts of the agent as their objects from the ability of the agent
to identify herself as a subject of her own activities. Such self-awareness easily leads into
broader considerations of subjectivity and personhood that may not necessarily be implied
by the analyses of self-knowledge that we will encounter. When I refer to mental ‘acts’ it is
important to remember that it does not necessarily imply agency, as receptivity also plays a
crucial role in Aristotelian psychology. This is preferred because Aristotelian ontology has the
act-potency distinction at its core, and the psychology lies (almost entirely) within the domain
of natural science as the science of things capable of change. In contemporary philosophy of
mind you would instead talk about mental ‘states’, but we want to avoid the impression that
the Aristotelian mind is merely a system of active states, because we risk suppressing the role
of potentiality that we will see is crucial.
Self-knowledge centres around the concept ‘self’. I can hardly try to define the term in a
few lines, as it lies at the heart of an ever-growing corpus of philosophy of mind, but an expan-
ded view of the self could circumscribe it as an overarching, coherent, and conscious subject of
mental states (or acts) and agent of intentional acts.2 It would possibly also include a repres-
entation of the internal state of the subject and its relation to its environment. This expansive
definition clearly includes self-knowledge and self-awareness as just distinguished. But all this
need not be implied by the ‘self’ in self-knowledge. At the other end of that spectrum we have
a very deflationary idea of self where the term merely refers to the identity between the sub-
ject and object of an activity. We will see how this merely reflexive sense of self will be much
more to the fore in the following analyses. This engagement with the reflexivity-relation is
possibly occasioned by the restriction on intellectual self-knowledge. In a broader investig-
1 This distinction is taken from Gertler 2011: 2.
2 I can recommend Sorabji 2006 as a longer, historically based definition.
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ation of self-knowledge, that would not only (and maybe not mainly) be pursued within De
anima-commentaries, the deflationary concept of self might not suffice, but as the comment-
ators generally talk about self-knowledge within a more restricted context they also reduce
the ambit of the self that is known by the intellect, and we will see only a few cases where
commentators hint at more expanded notions of the self.
In a way consciousness looms behind all of these discussions, because self-knowledge often
is associated strongly with consciousness.3 Without getting into the most murky question of
what it means when we use that elusive word, I will say that consciousness will only play a
fleeting role in this dissertation. I am ready to accept that there is no developed concept of
consciousness in the works of Aristotle, although many of the components that you would
include in a concept of consciousness can be found in more or less nascent forms, such as
ideas of reflexivity, the identification of persistent personhood, bodily self-awareness and the
like.4 In medieval philosophy we have a very different situation, and reflections of something
similar to our modern conception of consciousness is probably less foreign to them.5 But in
this study we will see that when interpreting the intricate details of Aristotle’s De anima the
commentators very rarely get into the domain of the more expansive concept of consciousness.
Rather they stick to themore detailedmechanics of Aristotelian epistemology.6 Thismeans that
although these accounts of self-knowledge may play into a bigger picture about consciousness,
that picture is not painted out in our sources. This study therefore may provide a piece in a
larger puzzle on consciousness according to the commentators, but cannot even begin to lay
out the whole puzzle based on the sources investigated here.
1.2 Research overview
It should come as no surprise that the amount of research on ancient and medieval philo-
sophy of mind is practically insurmountable.7 When we focus on self-knowledge and related
themes the literature is more limited, but still extensive. I will present the different parts of that
research and highlight the works that are most important to this study. Contemporary philo-
sophy will not play any real role in this dissertation, but I will just remind the reader that the
3 Examples are legio but see most of the articles in Rosenthal 2005. Other examples are Nagel 1974,
Zahavi, Grünbaum, and Parnas 2004, Kriegel and Williford 2006, Kriegel 2009.
4 On this, see Sihvola 2007. There are highly perceptive analyses of consciousness in Aristotle, Ca-
ston 2002 being a prime example, but I would still maintain that although an idea of consciousness
could be stitched together from disparate ideas, it is not developed as a subject in his works.
5 Long (1991, 1999: 573–80) argues that we see a coherent self coalescing already in Stoic philosophy.
Medieval research involving consciousness is not uncommon, for some examples, see Brower-
Toland 2012, Brower-Toland 2013, Brower-Toland 2014, Brower-Toland n.d., Black 1993, Klima
and Hall 2018, Toivanen 2009, Yrjönsuuri 2007.
6 Crystal (2002: 12–7) draws some further distinctions between self-knowledge (which he calls self-
intellection), self-consciousness, and personhoodwith several points similar to the onesmade here,
and which also apply to the present study.
7 Some recent overview anthologies and a few books are Kaukua and Ekenberg 2016, Knuuttila and
Sihvola 2014, Köhler 2008, Remes and Sihvola 2008, Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki, and Remes 2007,
Lagerlund 2007, Bakker and Thijssen 2007, Pasnau 1997, L. Spruit 1994–1995.
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subject of self-knowledge and subjectivity still is a major area of research and development.8
The branch of philosophy of mind and consciousness known as higher-order theory-theories
are also of some interest for the subjects of this dissertation, as they focus on a higher-order
awareness of mental processes as a constitutive element in human consciousness.9 As the sub-
ject is of great public interest, there are of course also a host of popular treatments, of which I
will just recommend a few in particular.10
General introductions to self-knowledge from a historical perspective are not numerous,
but a good handful are available. Introductory chapters in larger works of course often present
a general overview,11 but some introductory journal or anthology articles also exist.12 Whole
anthologies on the subject are also to be found. The most recent, Consciousness and Self-
Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy, is mostly a discussion of Cory’s Aquinas on Human Self-
Knowledge.13 The more general anthology Self-Knowledge, edited by Renz, also has a lot of
articles concerning pre-modern philosophy.14 Shields’s article on self-knowledge in Aristotle,
Remes’s similar article on Plotinus, and Brachtendorf’s on Augustine are especially relevant.15
Of course Perler’s article on the problem in the scholastic literature is also highly relevant, as
it focuses on the same philosophical problems as we do here, and even takes the central pas-
sages in Aristotle’s De anima as a starting point.16 Disappointingly, it does not engage with
any commentaries on the text, but presents the related problems from the theological sources.
When it comes the studies of self-knowledge in ancient philosophy the work of Crystal’s
Self-intellection and its epistemological origins in ancient Greek thought is notable for its wide
historical scope, but also in particular because it takes the central passages that are the focus of
this dissertation as its centre of attention. The earlier Subjektivität und Selbstbewusstsein in der
Antike also has interesting points, but mostly reads as a highly stimulating philosophical es-
say on intellectual self-knowledge from Parmenides to Descartes.17 We should also highlight
8 Gertler 2017 is the place to start, but see also Zahavi 2014, Gertler 2011 and Zahavi 2005, and
Gallagher and Zahavi 2015 for an introduction from a phenomenological perspective.
9 Rosenthal 2005 is a central example, but see Carruthers 2016 for the big (an exceptional) overview.
10 Hofstadter and Dennet 1982 and Hofstadter 2008 are both nice, although not unbiased. Sorabji
2006 is particularly strong on the historical material.
11 Cory 2014: 15–39 gives a historical overview, cf. Lambert 2007: 1–30. Perler and Schierbaum 2014a
presents the philosophical problems involved in self-knowledge. Perler and Schierbaum 2014b is a
collection of primary texts concerning intellectual self-knowledge, although unfortunately it only
contains a single excerpt of an commentary on De anima, namely that of John Buridan.
12 Renz 2017 gives a very general introduction to the specific question of intellective self-knowledge,
Yrjönsuuri 2007 uses the debate between Ockham and Chatton as illustrative of what is assumed
to be a general tendency in 14th century. Toivanen and Yrjönsuuri 2014 presents a range of related
problems and a collection of relevant textual passages (Remes 2014 is the equivalent on the ancient
tradition).
13 Paasch (2018) has a stimulating thought experiment about the self-awareness of an information-
processing machine in that volume. It is however too simplistic in my view.
14 Renz 2017.
15 Shields 2017, Remes 2017, Brachtendorf 2017.
16 Perler 2017.
17 Oehler 1997. The earlier Oehler 1974, which is only on Aristotle, is also very rich on sources.
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the extensive analysis by Perkams.18 Although he focuses on the late ancient period, and in
particular the Neo-Platonic tradition, it is still highly interesting as the starting point is Aris-
totle’s De anima, and his sources are mainly within the commentary tradition. For studies of
self-knowledge in Aristotle, I refer to the literature that is included in section 2.1.3 on page 26
where that is treated more extensively.19
In-depth studies of self-knowledge in the middle ages presents us with a good handful of
monograph studies along with a whole collection of article length treatments. As one might
expect, interpretations of the works ofThomas Aquinas are strongly represented, as three book
length studies and quite some chapters and articles are solely dedicated to self-knowledge and
related matters in the works of the angelic doctor.20 Aquinas will not play any particularly
central role in this study, as I primarily focus on question commentaries on De anima that dis-
cuss the intellectual self-knowledge.21 But in general we can say about this whole contingent
of publications that they find in Aquinas an interpretation of self-knowledge that sticks to the
Aristotelian epistemological model to a very wide extent, but also contains an idea of habitual
self-knowledge that is not found in the texts of the Stagerite. The details of the internal work-
ings, the different roles of different mental powers, and questions of development in the œvre
are however subjected to minute scrutiny and discussion in the literature.
Other 13th century characters that also occur among the common subjects of investigation
in the literature are Peter of John Olivi and Siger of Brabant, while in the 14th century Walter
Chatton and William of Ockham are commonly studied authors.22 But they are not alone,
as some more wide ranging as well as detailed studies of select authors also exist.23 In an
overview article Yrjönsuuri presents a typology of four different categories of self-knowledge,
comprising the bodily self, the sensitive and emotional self, the intellectual self, and the social
self.24 The main attention in the literature still clusters around intellectual self-knowledge, but
other types of self-knowledge have also started to come under scrutiny.25
18 Perkams 2008.
19 Although it is outside the Aristotelian tradition the presentation of related problems in Stoicism
by A. A. Long (1991) is also highly recommended.
20 Books: Putallaz 1991b, Lambert 2007, Cory 2014. Shorter texts: Putallaz 1992, Black 1993, Kenny
1993: 119–29, Brown 2001, Pasnau 2002: 330–60, Martin 2007, Sanguineti 2013, Rode 2015: 37–60,
Cory 2017.
21 We have one quaestio titled “Utrum anima coniuncta cognoscat seipsam per essentiam” which is
ascribed to Aquinas. The authenticity is debated but I accept the arguments of Putallaz (1991b:
305–10) who maintains that is not by Aquinas. On the discovery of the text and literature, see
Cory 2014: 40–1. It is published in Kennedy 1977.
22 Olivi: Putallaz 1991a: 85–133, Rode 2010, Rode 2015: 89–123, Toivanen 2009, Martin 2007,
Toivanen 2013, Brower-Toland 2013. Brabant: Putallaz 1992, Rode 2015: 61–88, Bazán 2016: 245–
52. Ockham: Schierbaum 2014, Brower-Toland 2014, Rode 2015: 223–48, Gamboa 2016; Chatton:
Schierbaum 2016; Chatton and Ockham: Yrjönsuuri 2007, Brower-Toland 2012, Lopez 2016. More
generally Rode 2015: 131–335.
23 See Brower-Toland 2017 on Buridan, and Zupko 2007 which focuses on Buridan but includes doc-
trines of a range of commentators. Brower-Toland n.d. may be highly relevant as a broader intro-
duction, but it has not appeared as of this writing.
24 Yrjönsuuri 2006.
25 Silva 2016, Toivanen 2013, Yrjönsuuri 2008, Kaukua and Kukkonen 2007. Toivanen 2009 focuses on
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We rarely find a clear distinction between texts from the faculties of arts and theology, but
very often the studies present a strong emphasis on theological texts in the analysis of self-
knowledge, while finding publications that incorporate material from the commentary tradi-
tion is more difficult. I know of only a few publications that primarily or only focus on that
part of the tradition. Zupko’s “Self-Knowledge and Self-Representation in Later Medieval Psy-
chology” is the first of those, and aside from the shared view that a focus on the arts masters is
of philosophical interest in itself, it has also had a direct influence on the present study. For the
approach of analysing and categorizing the separate doctrines of a range of commentaries and
to register which are used where has also been adapted as a fundamental part of the approach
of the present study. Another exception to the general rule of the under-representation of the
commentary tradition is found in Brower-Toland’s analysis of Buridan’s view on self-reflection
and the science of the soul, which is based solely on hisDe anima-commentary.26 The only pub-
lication that I know of this kind on 13th century material is by Bazán, his “La cienca del alma
y el conocimiento de si mismo a traves de tres textos ineditos del siglo XIII”. It is an important
study of the problems of self-knowledge based on three texts, two of which are also included
here.27 One of the sources of his study is the commentary that he later published in what is now
one of the important few published texts from the period, the eponymous Anonymus Bazán.
He gives a good coherent exposition of the procedure and elements of self-knowledge based
on those three sources with reference to the same questions as I include in the present study.
Some methods of this study are significantly different form his work, and of course the number
of sources and space afforded for the study is much greater, but some of the observations of
his original article, in particular the first half, will be reproduced and confirmed in the present
study.28
Aside from the early article by Bazán there are thus no in-depth studies of intellectual self-
knowledge in the commentaries on De anima from the 13th and early 14th century. There are
however a few other important works on related matters that must be introduced. In the early
90’s Putallaz published three important studies on intellectual self-knowledge in the 13th cen-
tury. Two monographs on Thomas Aquinas and a selection of important subsequent thinkers
respectively and an article on Siger of Brabant present an extensive study of the problems of
self-knowledge in the latter half of the 13th century.29 This is a highly important study in its
extent and philosophical thoroughness, but the sources are almost exclusive from within the
faculty of theology. Another study of similar extent and ambition is Rode’s Zugänge zum Selbst.
In a certain respect the present study therefore can be conceived as complementary to those
two works, as I aim to cover the material within the commentaries of De anima. But it is also
only in a certain respect complementary, as the present work differs from its predecessors in
the approach to text analysis and also includes substantial amounts of yet unpublished sources.
animal consciousness according to Olivi, but the thorough study also includes sections on general
self-awareness and self-cognition. On this see also López-Farjeat 2016. On subjectivity in political
philosophy, see Toivanen 2016.
26 Brower-Toland 2017.
27 Bazán 1969.
28 The second half of his study is closer to the main focus of Boer 2013: chs. 2–4.
29 Putallaz 1991b, Putallaz 1991a, Putallaz 1992.
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Another important study is Boer’s The Science of the Soul, which does actually focus solely on
the De anima-commentaries and presents an extended analysis of what he calls the science of
the soul in these 13th century texts. Several of the sources of that study are also included here,
and as will be apparent there is some degree of overlap between parts of the analysis. But the
focus of that study is much wider, as it concerns the science of the soul more generally and
also has central analyses of the methodology of the commentators that will not be pursued in
the same way here. This means that his analysis of doctrines and the mapping of the material
within the tradition cannot be executed to the same degree of detail as I have the possibility of
doing here.
1.3 Quantitative and qualitative methods
The method of textual analysis that I use does not differ in substance from the standard pro-
cedure in most works in history of philosophy. The basic approach is slow and close reading
of related texts to identify points of doctrine within them. But in doing this I have used tools
that are still not part of the common tool box of most medievalists. I have used elements of
quantitative analyses and computation as a supplement and enhancement to the conventional
close textual reading. I have also developed the underlying methodology as well as the avail-
able tools further. The theoretical basis and general approach will be presented here, so that it
should be possible for the reader to follow the ideas that form the basis of my work, but also
to construct a mental model of the composition of the developed tools.
Philosophical analysis relies on close and attentive reading of complex texts. By ‘complex’
I do not primarily refer to the often ethereal and sometimes almost incomprehensible nature
of the subject matter, but rather the way a strong philosopher builds his text – not least in the
Scholastic tradition of the high Middle Ages. I possit that the texts are built as trees of argu-
ments. Presenting a single point may require a simple general argument, but each premise will
be supported by arguments, which in turn will be supported by or contradicted by arguments.
These can develop into extended, interconnected, and complicated trees of arguments for or
against detailed points of doctrine. The format of the question commentary, the main text
genre of the present study, further emphasizes this phenomenon through its surface structure.
The scholarly investigation of these texts have therefore, naturally, focused on the present-
ation, constitution, and structure of these arguments in the endeavour to find connections,
similarities, and differences in a textual tradition. That is the traditional approach that we see
unfolded in classical studies of history of philosophy. The scholar who approaches a chosen
text will do so with a knowledge about a range of typical problems within the tradition, and
then investigate how that material handles and interacts with these problems.
Starting from the basic assumption that the texts contain a combination of doctrines I have
developed a way of registering a doctrinal position of a text. In stead of considering a text as a
linear string of words or sentences, constituting points presented in a given procedural order,
I model the idea of the tree of arguments with directed graphs. A directed graph is a network
of nodes (also called vertices) connected by edges with a start and an end node. Nodes are then
used to represent points of doctrine, and the presence of instances of such doctrines in a specific
part of a text. Relations between the different points of doctrine in a given text is indicated by
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Figure 1.1: Visualization of the abstract schema used in the graph database, slightly
simplified.
the direction and type of edges that connect the doctrine instances within the text. So if for
instance a given point is used to support another point, that can be indicated by the types
of connections that are created between the doctrines as they are used in a given text. The
concept of a doctrinal point is admittedly fluid but is considered to be a single, coherent, and
philosophically self-sufficient statement. ‘The soul is immortal’ would be an example, while
‘one thing cannot have two contradictory properties at the same time and in the same respect’
might be another example. Doctrinal points do not have to be self-evident, as they may be
supported by other doctrinal points and attacked by yet other points.
The question commentaries included in this study have been registered within a so-called
graph database, a database designed to handled information represented according to this graph
model. The types of nodes that are central to the data model are the following: Author, Text,
Question, Instance, and Doctrine. The relationship types are:
Wrote An Author wrote a Text.
Contains A Text contains a Question.
Has A Question has an Instance.
Of A Instance is an instance of a Doctrine.
Attacks, Supports, and Uses An Instance of aDoctrine can attack, support, and use anotherDoc-
trine.
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A graphical visualization of this schema can be seen in figure 1.1 on the preceding page. With
these nodes and relations I have created representations of the doctrines present in each of the
analysed texts in such a way that it is apparent how each text contains instances of a finite
number of doctrines. To give an illustration of this, figure 1.2 on the following page shows
a simplified version of the presence in six texts of the idea the possible intellect is similar to
prime matter (= P10 in the inventory of doctrines in section A.1 on page 242). Although the
text on the nodes may be too small to read, it still illustrates the structure of this part of the
graph where six authors (yellow) wrote texts (rose) with questions (pink) that have an instance
(green) of that doctrine (blue).
Similarly, figure 1.3 on page 11 illustrates the different relationship types between doctrines
are used to register the internal structure of a group of doctrines. It is a visualization of a small
part of the graph of doctrines registered in Quaestiones in De anima I–III by John Dinsdale
concerning the possibility of having a science of the soul. The blue nodes represent points of
doctrine, while the green nodes represent an individual instance of that doctrine in the present
text. In some cases the type of instance is written, such asNegative ratio or Refutation, but when
no instance type is indicated it is assumed to occur in the context of the main determination of
a text. From the graph we see that the main doctrine that “There can be a science of the soul”
is supported by two doctrine instances and attacked by one. The two supporting doctrines
are that substantial knowledge can be acquired from accidental properties, and that there is a
distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility. The attacking doctrine is that the
soul is not available to sense perception. What is interesting to note is that each of the positive
doctrines are also instantiated to refute that negative doctrine in the context of the refutation
of the negative ratio principalis. So here we see two different uses of those two doctrines within
that specific text.
With such a registration of the data the following questions become surprisingly simple to
answer:
• Which doctrines support X in the commentaries?
• Which doctrines attack X in the commentaries?
• Which doctrines are used to refute any given negative ratio principales (= an attack)
against X?
• Which doctrines are used by most commentators?
• Which doctrines are most rarely used?
• Which doctrines are most commonly used to refute negative rationes principales?
As the database also contains information about which commentator use which doctrines, it is
also possible to keep track of more complex questions such as these:
• Which two commentators share the greatest or smallest amount of doctrine?
• Do we see any groups of commentators favouring specific groups of doctrines?
10 1. introduction
Figure 1.2: Example graph of the presence of a doctrine in six different texts.
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Figure 1.3: Example graph of arguments given by John Dinsdale on the science of the
soul.
12 1. introduction
• Are there some commentators who share particularly rare doctrines?
• Are there some commentators who present completely unique doctrines?
These registrations will therefore provide the raw data for further quantitative analyses
of relations among the texts in the study, where further explanations and references will be
provided as necessary. So, the data is kept in the graph database, but to perform the analyses I
use small “notebooks” where it is possible to combine plain text explanations in a relatively rich
format with program code so that I can explain the procedure of the analysis as it is developed.
To this I have used a piece of software called Jupyter Notebooks, and all of the notebooks that I
use in the study are available online.30 It is therefore possible to validate my process of thought
and the details of any calculations that I present. By downloading the notebooks repository
it is also possible interact directly with the database by running the notebooks locally.31 Any
results presented in the main analyses of the study that include the database should therefore
be reproducible. But aside from that the notebooks can also be consulted for further details on
the quantitative data presented in the analysis, as well as a good bunch of graphs and lists that
I have used as tools in those analyses but not been able to include in the body text of the study.
The fundamental point in this approach is to atomize the ideas into small chunks that
can then be composed in a near-infinite number of combinations. The given combination and
internal structure of a particular text then represents the doctrines used by that commentator.
It is important to emphasize that these registrations are not designed to mimic, map, or closely
represent the structure of the commentaries. Information about the ordering of the arguments
is generally not preserved in the registration. This means that it is impossible to reconstruct
the linear structure of a text based on the doctrinal graph. Needless to say, such features can
of course be implemented, but that is not part of the conceived design and aim of this current
solution. There are however some exceptions to this restriction, as some context and function
is encoded: It is possible to register how a given instance of an argument is used, i.e. whether
it attacks or supports another doctrine. Furthermore, it is also possible to register whether a
given instance of a doctrine occurs as part of a ratio principalis (either positive or negative), or
whether it refutes such a ratio. But aside from that kind of high-level context information the
registration of doctrines only reflects what sort of ideas make an appearance in a given text.
This also means that there is no encoding of the weight or importance of a piece of doctrine –
all doctrines are created equal in this representation. Finally, the registration does not include
any indication of whether an author endorses or accepts a given doctrine just because it is
registered to appear in the text. It is therefore also not possible to deduce the doctrinal position
of an author from the registered data, only what he talks about. Again, all this is technically
possible, but has not been part of the design of the current database.
The idea of the graph and the powerful mathematical models that underpin the idea have
been known for a long time to be a very powerful model for a myriad of domains such as
30 See https://github.com/stenskjaer/dissertation-notebooks.
31 This will of course presuppose that the user has the required skills to run a Jupyter Notebook and
interact with the database in this way. The database is set to read-only, so it is not possible to make
any changes to the registrations.
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transportation and infrastructure, computer networks, financial transactions, and not least so-
cial networks. But to the best of my knowledge the approach and analyses that I develop and
present here have not yet been applied to acquire this type of knowledge of philosophical texts.
As my study will show, it provides a powerful tool to view and analyse the texts in ways that
are difficult or impossible with conventional means.
1.4 Primary sources
The ambition of this study is to survey the doctrines of the commentaries without being re-
stricted by their publication status. This means that a good portion of the included texts are
yet unpublished. In this section I will outline the procedure that I have followed in the invest-
igation and selection of material and list the included sources.
The selection of material has been conducted according to the following procedure. First I
established an overview of the existing material on the basis of the most recent relevant cata-
logue on commentaries on book three, Mora-Márquez’s “A List of Commentaries on Aristotle’s
De anima III (c. 1200–c.1400)”. I registered all commentaries in that catalogue that contains
one or more questions concerning intellectual self-knowledge, a total of 71 texts. From that list
I compiled an overview of where the manuscript witnesses were kept for all the commentaries
that were still unpublished, and on the basis of that I calculated which parts of Europe would
let me see the most relevant manuscripts in as small a geographical area as possible. On that
basis I planned two trips, first to Great Britain where I visited libraries in London, Cambridge,
and Oxford, and then to Central Europe where I visited libraries in Vienna, Krakow, Leipzig,
Erfurt, and Prague. On the first trip I inspected 32 texts in 33 manuscripts, on the second trip
I inspected 39 texts in 40 manuscripts, so taking into account texts that are preserved in more
than one witness, I inspected a total of 54 texts in 73 manuscripts. At that time it amounted to
76% of the texts that I deemed relevant based on the catalogue survey.
Those investigations were conducted on the basis of the knowledge I had available at that
time. During the project this of course changed in ways that might have influenced the pro-
cedure of material selection. It was not until during the trips that I realized that questions on
the first book of De anima were also highly relevant to the subject of self-knowledge. Had I
known that while compiling the catalogue overview I had used a wider selection of catalogues,
as Mora-Márquez’s catalogue only includes commentaries that contain material on the third
book of De anima. This means that a significant group of texts and manuscripts were not in-
cluded in the initial overview. During my studies I have of course found also information about
texts that are not correctly registered in the existing catalogues, or that I simply was not aware
of at the time of the initial survey.
Let me give an overview of how big a proportion of the texts known to me I have been able
to review. A tally of all the unpublished question commentaries on De anima from the 13th
or 14th century or which I do not know the dating of are 84. Of this my initial survey let me
inspect 54 texts. This means that of the existing material that I am currently aware of I have
inspected more than 60% in situ. Aside from that there are also commentaries that are available
in either modern or early print editions (often early print is available either online or in modern
reprints). Thus, the current number of all question commentaries from the 13th–14th century
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or without a dating known to me ends at 108, and to this we can add 13 texts of which I do not
know the genre. This gives us 121 potential question commentaries (probably less) of which
I have been able to inspect 64. If we limit this to commentaries that are certainly or possibly
from the 13th or early 14th century or texts that I do not know the dating of, this number is
filtered down to 68, of which I have inspected 38.32 So no matter how we filter the quantities,
the current survey includes around 60% of the material known to me. This of course means
that the results of the study cannot claim to be exhaustive, but I will still maintain that they
can give a fair view of many doctrines from the period.
I have limited the texts included to the last half of the 13th century and first part of the
14th century. The ambition was to draw a limit at or around the turn of the century, but
during the investigations I have found that John of Jandun and Radulphus Brito are particularly
interesting, and that it would be fruitful to include them. The study thus extends into the
beginning decades of the 14th century, but the main focus still lies in the second half to the
13th century. In total I include 17 question commentaries which can be seen in table 1.1 on
the facing page. Not all of them cover all three books of De anima, so they are not all included
in all parts of the analysis. Aside from these question commentaries, section 5.2 on page 175
presents a study of a literal commentary of Simon Magister.
32 The number of texts that are not included most certainly contains a good proportion from the 14th
century, as I am also often not aware of the dating of texts that I have only little information about
and not have been able to inspect. So the amount of texts from the 13th or early 14th century is
most certainly lower than the 30 that I have not inspected. I have collected the commentaries that
I deem likely to be interesting, but which I have not had the chance to inspect in section B.2 on
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1.5 Outline of the dissertation
The dissertation consists of four main chapters, this introduction, a conclusion and a collection
of appendices. The chapters 3 and 4 make up the most substantial part of the analysis, as they
survey and map the doctrines concerning intellectual self-knowledge in the commentaries of
the period. The preceding historical chapter paves the way for those analyses by outlining the
main relevant views on intellectual self-knowledge from Aristotle to around 1250. This means
that what we see in the historical chapter does not pretend to exhaust all sources on self-
knowledge, that would be an entire study in itself, but to present the main points of influence
on the 13th and early 14th century texts that are the focus of our attention. Based on the
doctrinal analyses I then present two studies in chapter 5 that move from the wide horizontal
exposition to a deeper dive in two aspects of the tradition. These therefore flow directly from
the material that is gathered in the two central chapters, but highlight a particular subject
of interest. They are only two examples of the many possible in-depth studies that could be
conducted on the material.
In chapter two I first present the problem of self-knowledge in Aristotle’s own works and
then follow the development of the idea within as well as outside the ancient commentary
tradition, the reception in the Arabic sources and the further development in the medieval
sources before 1250. This is not a exhaustive history of the problem of self-knowledge in the
period, but an overview of the elements and ideas that will play a central role in the late 13th
and early 14th century. The two main doctrines that we trace are the idea that the intellect
knows itself purely by its own essence, or that it requires some external stimulus to reflect on
itself.
In chapter three I present the philosophical arguments on intellectual self-knowledge as it
is discussed in the commentaries on book three of De anima. This comprises a range of differ-
ent questions and therefore also a range of slightly different topics within the domain, which is
reflected in the subsections of the argument survey. This is followed by a mainly quantitative
analysis of the material where significant clusters of commentaries are identified based on the
degree of material they share. Finally the typical and atypical doctrines as well as particularly
representative or unique commentaries are identified. In the fourth chapter I handle the ques-
tion of the science of the soul in a similar procedure. The arguments are surveyed and mapped
according to their presence in the different texts, and a quantitative analysis identifies signific-
ant connections among them. This is supplemented by further analyses of the most prevalent
arguments and their contexts, a discussion of the different views on the science of the soul,
and an identification of the most representative and original commentaries in the corpus.
In the fifth chapter I analyse the extensive and philosophically interesting commentary of
John of Jandun. The aim of this chapter is to go into depth with some of the more complex and
intricate parts of his commentary, and to resolve some seeming conflicts among his questions
on self-knowledge, but also simply to show what it looks like when a commentator thinks
long and hard about intellectual self-knowledge. This is supplemented by a closer view on the
literal commentary of Simon Magister in comparison with the roughly contemporary question
commentaries. That is done to cast doubt on the assumption we sometimes see that literal
commentaries are inherently uninteresting in their philosophical content, but I also want to
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use the occasion to cast further light on the question of authorship that engulfs that particular
commentary. It has been attributed to Simon of Faversham, but I will argue that on the basis
of the analysed material there are no strong reasons to believe that he is the author, and that it
is more prudent to maintain the semi-anonymous Simon Magister as the author.
The appendices consist of four different types of material: My draft editions for the parts
of the texts that I have analysed to the extent that they do not already exist in printed editions;
question lists for some of the texts when they are relevant to parts of the study; and the details
of a survey of which commentaries contain initial questions on the possibility of having a
science of the soul or related material in texts that are not question commentaries.
1.6 Conventions, terminology, references
Bekker numbers are used in references to the Greek editions of the works of Aristotle. Titles
and shorthands of classical texts are taken from A Greek-English Lexicon by Liddell and Scott.
In quotations of Latin from already critically published sources I maintain the published or-
thography, but I impose my own classicising orthography and punctuation on quotations from
unpublished material. References to ancient and medieval texts are terse, so when a title of a
work is made superfluous by the context or the texts included, a reference to the author’s name
suffices. The titles and other bibliographical information on all included primary texts can of
course be found in the bibliography, section 6.4 on page 219. Manuscripts are referenced with
shorthands, which are all listed in the bibliography, section 6.4 on page 209. All translations
of Greek and Latin are my own.
All references to the draft editions in section C of the appendix are prefixed with ‘app’
followed by a page and line number. So the reference ‘app 321.27–32’ refers to page 321, lines
27–32 in the appendix.
A range of different vocabularies have been used to describe the elements of a question in a
medieval question commentary. Almost all of the included questions start with a presentation
of the subject of a question followed by two sets of arguments, often against and for the positive
answer to the question. I refer to these primary arguments as rationes principales, and when
necessary I specify whether they are either negative or positive rationes. The magister then
solves the problem in what I refer to as the determination, before he addresses problems still
left by the rationes in what I simply call the refutations.
Self-knowledge is the fundamental term used to refer to a generic kind of insight where
the soul or intellect acquires some sort of knowledge about itself. One of the main aims of the
dissertation is to investigate what that means to the commentators, so the use of the term is
to be understood in a generic sense and neither ‘self’ nor ‘knowledge’ are intended to import
a strong or rigid meaning of either concept. Reflexivity is a fundamental component of intel-
lectual self-knowledge and ‘self-reflexivity’ and ‘self-reflection’ are therefore used to describe
an aspect of that process.
I distinguish between accidental and essential self-knowledge. The term ‘accidental’ does
not mean that the activity is coincidental, but only that it depends on the actualization of
some powers of the soul that require an external stimulus and are therefore according to an
accident of the substance, in Latin they call this per accidens, and in Greek κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
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The term ‘essential’ on the other hand refers to the self-knowledge as a capacity of the soul
according to its essence, and hence something it can engage in without any external stimulus.
Self-knowledge performed by an essential accident of the soul is still accidental as long as it





In this chapter I will give an overview of a part of the history of self-knowledge by focusing
on the reflections of self-knowledge that are developed on the basis of De anima. I will not
restrict myself narrowly to the context of Aristotelian commentaries, as parallel developments
in other traditions of thought play an important role in the later medieval discussion of these
problems. But I will maintain a restriction to material that is part of the attention of scope of
the commentators. This is not a general history of self-knowledge, but merely serves to pave
the way to the subsequent analysis of the text of the commentators.
The starting point will therefore naturally be De anima itself. After a presentation of
the main problems relating to intellectual self-knowledge in Aristotle, we will see how four
of his late ancient commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Philoponus and Ps.-
Simplicius, handled the problem. I will then present an alternative model of self-knowledge
from the Platonic tradition based on some notes on Plotinus himself along with Augustine and
the views presented in the anonymous work Liber de causis. We will then be able to see how
these two different tracks of the problem are found in the Arabic peripatetic tradition, repres-
ented by Avicenna and Averroes. This will pave the way for a presentation of the main Latin
texts on the soul until about 1250, concluding with Albert the Great.
We will see how, after Aristotle, two main branches present two basic views on self-
knowledge as either immediate or mediated by an external species. Interpreters who rely
mostly or wholly on Aristotle will favour a mediated and conditional self-knowledge, while
interpreters with strong sympathies for the Platonic tradition will tend to prefer an immedi-
ate or essential self-knowledge. These two main branches do not engage in any real or strong
conflict, neither do they intertwine in the Ancient or Arabic traditions, but when we arrive at
the 13th century we find examples of both conflicts and combinations.
2.1 Aristotle
Aristotle does not present an actual theory of self-knowledge. Our interpretation is therefore,
as often, gleaned from a handful of passages where side notes and short remarks give us some-
thing, but often very little, to run with. I shall not here try to make all the passages involving
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some sort of self-knowledge come together into a coherent whole. The focus of this study lies
on the medieval commentators’ understanding of De anima 3.4, and in particular 3.4, 329b5–9
and 429b22–430a9, so that will also be the natural focus of this presentation, while I will also
briefly present the other passages that have commonly been associated with self-knowledge.
In this section I do not pretend to present any novel solutions to the many long-standing prob-
lems.1 The focus will of course be on De anima 3.4, but to be able to discuss the problems of
that chapter, it will also be necessary to look to other parts of the work. This section therefore
contains three subsections. First I present the main points of sense perception and higher order
sense perception before the discussion of intellectual self-knowledge itself. But before getting
to that it will also be useful to get an impression of the other passages in the corpus that are
generally considered to present some perspective on self-knowledge.2
2.1.1 Self-knowledge across the corpus aristotelicum
The discussion of self-knowledge that seems to resemble most closely the De anima-passage is
of course the famous discussion of the divine understanding in chapters 7 and 9 ofMetaphysica.
In Metaphysica 12.7 Aristotle describes the unmoved mover, the intended solid basis in the
causal chain of a world in change. In a longer reflection we see that this mover is eternal, actual,
and a substance (ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια, 1072a25–26), in itself good, sought for, and an
object of thought (καλόν; ὀρεκτόν, ἐπιθυμητόν, βουλητόν; and νοητόν 1072a26–30), moving
by being an end but is itself unmoved (1072a30–b14). The activity of that mover consists in
an eternal and unchanged state of knowing (νοῦς, θεωρία, 1072b23–24). This characterization
includes an analysis of the process of thought where Aristotle explains how the process of
knowledge establishes an identity between the knowing subject and the known object. The
understanding understands itself by becoming the object of understanding, and in this contact
it also itself becomes an object of thought such that the thought and the object are the same.3
The chapter is of course highly controversial and complex but we will not delve further into its
full details and their exegetical intricacies here.4
In Metaphysica 12.9, 1074b15–75a10 Aristotle picks up the thread from Metaphysica 12.7
and discusses some particular problems related to the understanding.5 Although the chapter
may purport to treat νοῦς in general, it is clear that it mostly concerns the divine νοῦς discussed
earlier. Aristotle concludes that as it is the most perfect type of being, its essence is a perman-
1 Crystal (2002: 115–52) presents an extensive and much more detailed reading of the relevant pas-
sages that we also touch upon here.
2 Most of these passages are discussed in Oehler 1974 who focuses on the property of relation in
his analysis (cf. also Oehler 1997: 37–75). Shields 2017 provides a more recent overview that
approaches the field from an ethical perspective.
3 Aristotle Metaph. 12.7, 1072b20–21.
4 For starting points, see Laks 2000, Fazzo 2014: 301–343 in particular. Reeve 2000: 149–239 also
provides an independent but stimulating treatment of this.
5 Brunschwig 2000 provides a strong commentary and translation. He conjectures thatMetaphysica
12.9 is an early draft that is later supplanted by Metaphysica 12.7. This is in stark contrast to the
unitary reading in Fazzo 2014, another recent commentary.
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ent active understanding of understanding, the famously opaque νόησις νοήσεως.6 But this
is then challenged by the observation that normally science, sensation, belief and rationality
(or maybe discursive thought, διάνοια) are only about them selves as a side effect (παρέργῳ).
This observation seems to be drawn from the non-divine mental activities, as Brunschwig also
notes.7 So the problem of the aporia that follows is whether that also applies to the divine state
of thinking.
The details of the answer are anything but straight forward.8 But the general strategy is
to say that in some cases of ἐπιστήμη, namely in the theoretical sciences, the parergon-model
does not apply. In the immaterial theoretical sciences the form, the thing, and the understand-
ing are identical, and the understanding (νόησις) and the object understood (τὸ νούμενον) are
one and the same. When that is the case, the reflexive aspect of the process is not a side-effect
(πάρεργον). This distinction is based on the human way of understanding, and it could prob-
ably be extended to the divine parallel.9 So as these chapters clearly indicate, there are many
connections to be drawn and many distinctions to be made between the workings of human
and divine understanding. As the whole following investigation will focus onDe animawewill
see it from that perspective, but a much more extensive analysis of the divine side of things
would of course also be possible.10
Aside from these references to intellectual self-knowledge we also find a similar strain of
reflections on self-knowledge in the ethical works. In fact we find a passage in each of the
three ethical works that revolves around this theme, and it generally involves the necessity of
friends. In Ethica Nicomachea it is argued that as perception includes a sort of perception of
that activity, so does thinking include a knowledge of that thinking which further supports the
fact that the individual exists. Such self-reflection is deemed a good thing and as something
akin to what can be experienced in the identification of oneself with a good friend, friendship
among good men must also contribute to happiness.11 Ethica Eudemia has a similar passage
amounting to a very similar conclusion, but with what seems to be a stronger affiliation to the
model of intellection as identification discussed in Metaphysica and De anima.12 Finally there
is a very similar section of Magna Moralia, where, like in Ethica Nicomachea the pleasure of
self-knowledge is also emphasized.13 All three passages have their own particular problems,
are similar in many ways and different in different ways which are all too complicated to delve
into here.14 But we notice here that there are structural similarities between self-knowledge
and knowledge of others, that self-reflection through friendship brings happiness, and that the
knowledge of oneself as a deep self with ethical agency and an extended history is not foreign
to Aristotle.
6 Aristotle Metaph. 12.9, 1074b15–35.
7 Brunschwig 2000: 291.
8 Aristotle Metaph. 12.9, 1074b38–75a5.
9 Brunschwig 2000: 295–7.
10 Some starting points in the literature are Menn 2012, M. F. Burnyeat 2008, Caston 1999, Reeve
2000: especially chapters 7 and 8.
11 Aristotle EN , 9.9, 1170a14–b19.
12 Aristotle EE, 7.12, 1244b23–45a10.
13 Aristotle MM , 2.15, especially §§6–8.
14 For more in this see Shields 2017, Rahman 1981b: 14.
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Moving on from Metaphysica there are a couple of small side-notes in the Parva Naturalia
concerning reflexivity. In De sensu et sensibilibus he states that no one thing can perceive and
be perceived at the same time.15 But that passage springs from the discussion of the particular
phenomenon of a visual impression of light when pressure is applied to the eye in darkness.
He thus merely discusses that problem on basis of the mechanics of the eye. There is a similar
discussion of reflexivity inDe somno et vigilia 2, 455a15–22where the question is raisedwhether
we perceive our perception (seeing, hearing) with the same sense as the one performing the
primary act of perception. This is also the subject of the famous passage in De anima 3.2,
425b11–25 where the same question is raised.16
2.1.2 First and second order sense perception
In Aristotelian epistemology sense perception is the starting point of all knowledge. In De
anima 3.8 this is clearly stated that knowledge is said to depend on the senses through their
phantasmata in the soul.17 This is also reflected in the two famous passages of Analytica pos-
teriora and Metaphysica sketching the process of knowledge acquisition and a corresponding
epistemological hierarchy.18 When a sense impression on an appropriate organ through the
appropriate medium occurs, for example redness on the eye-jelly through the air, the sensory
organ is affected in such a way that the structure of the relevant form is adopted, which means
that the form of red is realized in the organ.19
When a form of a perceptible object is realized in one or more sensory organs, the ima-
ginative power (φαντασία) may take over.20 This power is not a type of perception, since it
only occurs in some rather than all animals that have sense perception, and unlike perception,
it is not contingent upon the presence of an external perceptible object.21 While the immedi-
ate perception always is true, the φαντασία can be both true and false. This is so because it
involves a judgement of a more general nature than the immediate single perception, namely
of which object an immediate perception belongs to (for instance the ball), and because it in-
15 Aristotle Sens. 2.437a23-b10, cf. Yrjönsuuri 2006: 155–6.
16 Cf. also the note in Metaph. 4.5, 1010b35–36. We will get back to the De anima-passage below in
section 2.1.2 on the facing page, but on this problem a quick reference can be made already here to
Corkum 2010, Perälä 2010, Gregoric 2007: especially 174–92, Johansen 2006, Caston 2002, Kosman
1975.
17 Aristotle DA, 3.8, 432a2–10. See also De memoria et reminiscentia 1, 449b31–540a13. Boer (2013:
49 n. 11) notices, with reference to Cranefield 1970, the medieval dictum that nothing is in the
intellect that has not previously been in the senses (nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu) is
not coined by Aristotle.
18 Aristotle APo, 2.19, 99b34–100a14, Aristotle Metaph. 1.1, 980a1–981a1, cf. APo, 1.31, 87b28–31.
19 Aristotle DA, 2.5, 417a9–b27, and 2.12, 424a17–b3. What exactly this means and at which stage
in the process the physical form of redness disappears is the basis of the famous debate between
Sorabji and Myles F. Burnyeat and their respective advocates. See Shields 2016a: supplement 3
and the extended overview in Cohen 1992 and Caston 2005. It all starts with Sorabji 1979 and the
counterarguments to that in Myles F. Burnyeat 1992. On the important details of affection see in
particular Crystal 2002: 116–23.
20 This is mostly described in Aristotle DA, 3.3.
21 Aristotle DA, 3.3, 427b17–21 and 428a5–10.
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volves ascribing qualities that are perceived by several senses to a single object.22 In this way
phantasia is an effect of perception, but of a less certain and more comprehensive kind. The
content of phantasia, the so-called φάντασμα, then carries and preserves the content of the
perception in a form that makes it available to the abstract processing of the intellect. It is
therefore a basic tenet of the Aristotelian explanation of knowledge acquisition that without
phantasia and the resulting phantasma a material object cannot be known.23
Theassumed passive nature of sense perception gives rise to a question of whether and how
second-order perception is possible.24 On two critical junctures in his analysis of perception
Aristotle feels compelled to take up this problem. As Aristotle starts out the characterization
of perception, he quickly raises the aporia why there is no perception of the perceptions them-
selves. Based on the idea that the sense organs are able to receive the form that they perceive,
they cannot be that already themselves and must therefore by actualized by an external stimu-
lus that is actualized as that quality.25 In the very final chapter on sense perception (De anima
3.2), when the different aspects of a sensory power have been discussed, Aristotle again takes
up the problem, but in a more complex variation. We shall not dive into the extended debate
on the passage, but just conclude that according to Aristotle we do perceive that we see and
hear, and this cannot be by another higher order sense, as that would involve the risk of an in-
finite regress, so the sense powers must perceive their own perception (as either their ability or
activity of perception, depending on interpretation).26 From this we see that Aristotle is aware
of the potential problem and recognizes higher order perceptual awareness as a phenomenon.
These considerations of bodily self-perception are related to the problems of intellectual
self-knowledge, but they do not overlap heavily. The medieval commentators are aware of the
structural similarity between sense perception and intellectual activity, but they never hesitate
to draw a sharp distinction between them based on the immateriality of the intellect. At the
same time a discussion of bodily self-perception is very often to be found in the commentators,
and a study of non-intellectual self-knowledge would also benefit from including those treat-
ments. This is however not the purpose of this study, as the focus lies solely on intellectual
self-knowledge.27
22 Aristotle DA, 3.3, 428b19–25.
23 Aristotle DA, 3.8, 432a2–10 and Aristotle Mem. 1, 449b31–540a13 already cited above. This ultra
short sketch gives the false impression that we have a simple and uncontroversial Aristotelian set
of doctrines on perception. For a more detailed overview, see Shields 2016a: §6, Shields 2016c:
xxxiii–xxxix, Caston 2006: 327–35, and for some of the recent deep dives, see Marmodoro 2014,
Johansen 2012, Polansky 2007: 323–433, Caston 2009.
24 This is a hotly debated topic, and I will keep most of the details out of this exposition. For an
influential interpretation, see Caston 2002. See also Shields 2016b: 263–74, Gregoric 2007: in
particular 174–193, Polansky 2007: 380–402, Johansen 2006, Sisko 2004, Caston 2004.
25 Aristotle DA, 2.5, 417a2–9 and 417a17–18.
26 See DA, 3.2, 425b11–25. Two different but important interpretations are Caston 2002 and Johansen
2006, but see also Perälä 2010 and the above mentioned literature.
27 I cannot give a full survey of the commentaries treating this, but of the commentaries that I have
included here there is relevant material to be found in the following questions: Anonymus Ori-
elensis 33 II.52: Utrum perceptio operationis sensitivae pertineat ad eundem sensum vel ad alium, et
hoc est an visus videat se videre; Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II II.16–17: Utrum sensus particularis dir-
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2.1.3 Intellectual self-knowledge
Aswe have seen, the senses require the presence of an external sense stimulus to realize a sense
perception. In this section we will see how that is also to some extent the case for intellectual
self-knowledge. The treatment of intellectual activity stretches over the chapters 3.4–8, but the
first two are most famous, partly because chapter four presents a relatively coherent exposition
of the workings of the intellect, partly because of the disputed character of almost every single
line of the fifth chapter that expands on the active nature of the intellect. De anima 3.6 seems
to treat the objects of thought, namely truth and falsity of judgements and how that is related
to simplicity and complexity. The two final chapters (3.7–8) contain more or less coherent
reflections on perception and intellection, some of a general nature and some more specific.
Whereas the two first chapters challenge the interpreter by the opaqueness of the exposition,
the final three do so not least due to the fragmentary and doubtful nature of the transmitted
text. Let that be the necessary opening caveat lector for the following analysis.
Aristotle makes the preliminary assumption in the analysis of intellective activity that it
is structurally similar to sensory perception. This assumption leads to the statement that it
must be impassible (ἀπαθές) but susceptible to (intelligible) forms without being itself actual-
ized as an intelligible form.28 The intellect cannot therefore be anything definite before any
actual act of intellection. But since the pure potentiality is a requirement for the intellect to
reflect on any conceivable thing, it must be wholly immaterial and incorporeal (429a21–24).
After a comparison of the intellective power with the powers of sense perception (429a29–b5)
Aristotle reflects on two levels of actuality of the intellect and the possibility of intellectual
self-knowledge (429b5–10). This is followed by a distinction between the objects of perception
and intellection (429b10–22) before two problems concerning the intellect are raised (429b22–
4230a2). The latter of those also concerns intellectual self-knowledge.
Aristotle states that the actuality of the intellect when it becomes any given thing is similar
to the actuality of one who is ἐπιστήμων, someone who has acquired a knowledge (429b5-7).
We have here a hint at the two levels of actuality that is also to be found in other parts of
the work. The soul is the actuality of a body capable of being alive in such a way that the
living being is able to actualize any of the activities included in that form of life.29 When
any such activity is performed, for instance digesting, sensing or thinking, a second level of
actuality is realized. This structure is illustrated in a comparison between having knowledge
as being asleep and actualizing that knowledge (θεωρεῖν) as being awake.30 The idea is further
developed in the presentation of perception in De anima 2.5, and a further, more basic, level
is added: Any living human is a potential knower. Before any knowledge is implanted in her,
she has the mental and physical prerequisites of knowing. Through training and teaching,
this potential knower comes to posses some knowledge, say of grammar, though she does not
ecte suam sensationem percipit and Utrum sensus indirecte possit percipere suam sensationem; Wyle
II.32: Utrum sensus particularis directe cognoscat actionem suam; Dinsdale II.48: Utrum sensu par-
ticulariter percipimus nos sentire ut visu videre aut sensu aliquo aut sensu communi; Jandun II.33:
Utrum sensus particularis cognoscat suam propriam operationem ut visus visionem et sic de ceteri.
28 Aristotle DA, 3.4, 429a15–18.
29 Cf. Aristotle DA, 2.1, 412a27–28.
30 Aristotle DA, 2.1, 412a21–27.
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actualize that knowledge all the time. These two are potentially knowing in different ways, as
the first only has the potentiality of acquiring knowledge (first potentiality), while the second
possesses a knowledge, though without exercising it (first actuality). If she should wish to, she
could at any time exercise the dormant knowledge, and in that case she would in the highest
degree be actually knowing this particular thing, and this state of exercising knowledge is
generally referred to as θεωρεῖν (second actuality).31 The important point is that the knower can
still be in a type of potentiality and become actualized when she wants. How is this possible?
Because the content of the knowledge is already present in the soul in some sense, it only
needs to be put into use. This is the fundamental difference between reason and perception,
the independence from external stimuli.32
That is the background for one of the central passage of our study:
Whenever then it [i.e. the intellect] becomes every thing in the same way as the
knower is said to be in actuality (and this is the case when he is able to exercise it
through himself), then it is still in a way in potentiality, but not in the same sense
as before learning or discovering; and then it is also able to know itself.
ὅταν δ’ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν (τοῦτο
δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι’ αὑτοῦ), ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως,
οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὑτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν.
Aristotle DA, 3.4, 429b5–10
We notice here that the intellect is said to be in actuality in the same way as the knower. And
as per the previous discussion Aristotle explains that this is a case of the first actuality, where
the knower is able to, but does not yet, exercise his knowledge (ἐνεργεῖν). This is at the same
time a sort of potentiality from which the intellect is able to actualize the knowledge, to think,
but is not yet actively thinking.
It should be noted that the text is disputed. All witnesses to the text agree that the final line
(429b9) reads “καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὑτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν”, but in 1885 Bywater suggested altering
it to “καὶ αὐτὸς δι᾽ αὑτοῦ τότε δύναται νοεῖν”.33 This change was motivated by the assumption
that if the knower is able to go from potentially to actually exercising his knowledge, so should
the intellect be able to move from first to second actuality by its own initiative.34 Owens
opposes this emendation calling for great caution when emending a text to make it “conform
to one’s own understanding of the doctrine”, especially so when there has been no reason
to challenge the reading in the whole history of the Aristotelian tradition.35 There may be
arguments in favour of both readings, but on the whole I find that Owen presents a very strong
case. I therefore prefer here to retain the original reading. I see two compelling reasons for
31 Aristotle DA, 2.5, 417a22–29.
32 Aristotle DA, 2.5, 417b19–25.
33 Bywater 1885: 40–1.
34 Ross follows this emendation (cf. his note in the commentary, Ross 1961: 292), while Siwek main-
tains the transmitted text.
35 Owens 1976: 111. Kahn (1992: 373) also calls the emendation unnecessary, while according to
Miller (2012: 320 and n. 42) it makes good sense and anticipates the following aporia at the end.
Crystal (2002: 134) follows Ross and Bywater.
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that: (1) I find Owens’s arguments about the location of the statement in the flow of the text
convincing,36 and (2) throughout the tradition Aristotelian commentators have dealt with and
developed their interpretations of the text in that form. So accepting that form in this historical
study seems the only reasonable approach.
With the reading “καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὑτὸν τότε δύναται νοεῖν” we notice a restriction on the
possibility of self-knowledge. The τότεmakes the addition on self-knowledge a subjunct phrase
of the “ὅταν δ᾽ οὕτως … ἐνεργεῖν δι᾽ αὑτοῦ)” (429b5–7) in parallel with the preceding phrase
“ἔστι μὲν καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως …” (429b8–9).37 This means that only once the intellect has
been actualized as any given intelligible form, is self-reflection possible. But it is unclear what
the δύναται of the phrase means. If we maintain the parallel with the passages on first and
second actuality in book two, this seems to imply that the initialization of the intellectual self-
reflection relies upon the willful act of the intellect itself.38 But that raises the question of who
or what takes the initiative. I am reluctant to accept that there is here a reference to more
than the intellective faculty itself, as we find no indications of that in the context. But we must
admit that it is also problematic to ascribe the intellect power of volition, as we risk to ascribe
different functions to one power, effectively making it two.
So we might not have an immediate answer to how self-reflection is initialized, but we are
also met with further problems about the process of self-knowledge. The intellect (νοῦς) is able
to know itself (αὑτὸν νοεῖν). And without speculating about the relation of the use of this term
here in comparison with the other places in the corpus, I will just pose a simple question: Does
this knowledge include any additional knowledge about the nature of the intellect, its objects,
activities, or substance, or does the intellect merely know itself as the actualization of a repres-
entation of an external object? Once the intellect has been actualized by any given intelligible
form, it becomes that form itself. Then self-reflection is just the act of reflecting on that very
form, which it is actualized as at that very moment. In that sense, any and every type of intel-
lectual reflection is also at the same time and by necessity self-reflection, and there is nothing
more to it than that. Trying to put more significance into this concept of self-knowledge is then
just a conflation of two different types of self-knowledge, namely the more expansive know-
ledge about the soul as a universal and self-knowledge as knowledge of the particular intellect
when it is actualized as, and thereby is, a given form. This reading would solve the problems
of volition and initialization of the process, but on the other hand it completely ignores the
presence of the δύναται. These are some of the central problems that we will also find in the
history of the Aristotelian tradition on this passage.
After a section on the objects of intellectual knowledge as opposed the objects of percep-
tion,39 Aristotle concludes the chapter by presenting and (possibly) solving two objections to
the model of the intellect that he has presented thus far. First he asks (429b22–26): If the intel-
lect is completely impassible, and knowing is a type of reception, change or affection (πάσχειν),
36 Owens 1976: 111–5.
37 Owens (1976: 112–3) also argues that the parallel in syntax supports maintaining the transmitted
reading.
38 The expressions just mentioned are “βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν” (2.5, 417a27) and “ὁπόταν
βούληται” (2.5, 417b24).
39 Aristotle DA, 3.4, 429b10–22. On this, see for instance Frede 2008.
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how can it even know anything? Secondly he asks whether the intellect itself is an object of
knowledge, that is, is it intelligible? For if it is intelligible in itself (essentially), it might then
mean that all intelligible objects are able to reason. The reasoning here seems to be that if every
νοῦς is νοητός, then all that is νοητός is also νοῦς, since those two are one in form. On the
other hand, if it is intelligible by something being added to it, then it is not wholly unmixed
and potential (429b24–29).
Aristotle seems to dispense with the first challenge by maintaining the impassibility of the
intellect and hold that the change it undergoes is non-destructive. He explains that the intellect
receives the forms in the sameway as a tablet when youwrite on it (429b29–30a2), and although
it is not further expanded, this may just mean that no qualities are lost or destroyed, but some
potential merely actualized. The solution to the other objection (430a2–7) rests on a distinction
between howmaterial and immaterial objects are understood. In the case of immaterial objects
of knowledge there is an identity between the knowing subject and the known object, but in
the case of the material objects of knowledge, the intellect is only each of those potentially
(until it receives one of them and becomes actualized). This identity is just what we saw above,
that when the intellect becomes actualized as a given form, it is then able to know it. In this
way an identity between the subject and object is established. Finally, he explains that the
material intelligible objects do not have νοῦς themselves because he has made it an essential
characteristic of νοῦς to be all things potentially, and that cannot be the case for any materially
dependent object (430a7–9).
This final solution establishes two things. The material objects of reason do not have νοῦς,
since they do not possess a power that is completely indeterminate and capable of immaterial
formal reception. And the knowledge of immaterial objects of reason establishes a complete
identity between the knowing subject and the known object. But we are still left none the
wiser, as the question about the content of the self-knowledge still remains. Does this merely
mean that the self-knowledge is nothing more than knowledge of the external object, once
the intellect itself is actualized as such? Or does it mean that the intellect is able to engage in
reflection on itself as an activity separate from the reception of an external form? If we answer
affirmatively to the first question, then that “self-knowledge” is very thin or entirely vacuous.40
But if the intellect is able to engage in self-knowledge as a separate activity, how does that take
place, is it a discursive process, and does it require any further input or knowledge?
An extended analysis and discussion of the problems of this passage is to be found in
Gregoric and Pfeiffer 2015, who also emphasize the point that the aporia is not about self-
knowledge, but about the intelligibility of the intellect. They present a deep discussion of the
problems of the passage that, in many respects, would not have been foreign to the medieval
commentators. But they do however maintain that the intellect cannot only be known re-
flexively, and that the passage here does not concern itself with reflexivity at all. That line
of argument might appeal to some medieval commentators, and some might even bid it wel-
come. When you struggle to find a good way to acquire knowledge about the intellect that
does not involve or require introspection an approach that emphasizes reciprocal intelligibility
40 Crystal (2002) argues for this interpretation. He does not consider the passage in 3.4, 429b5–9 to
be about self-knowledge, so he does not have to worry about the problem of δύναται mentioned
above on the preceding page.
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of even the intellect may be very useful. Other commentators would reject the idea as outright
impossible.41
I have here presented the two central passages on intellectual self-knowledge in De an-
ima. They will be the focus of the analysis of these problems in the commentary tradition.
We have seen how the basic model of formal assimilation in sense perception is also taken
to describe the process of intellectual activity. In the context of sense perception Aristotle is
sensitive to the problem of higher-order awareness, and he maintains the necessity of a dis-
tinction between subject and object, and the requirement of a distinction between those two,
should be maintained insofar as possible. In the domain of intellectual self-knowledge we have
seen how problems arise when both the subject and object of the activity are immaterial. The
interpretation of the passages in chapter 3.4 on self-knowledge has shown that it is difficult to
reach an indisputable conclusion with the notes Aristotle leaves us with. We are left with the
question whether all we have is a deflationary view where the imagined self-knowledge has no
real content aside from that of an external object, or whether self-knowledge of this sort may
actually provide us with any positive content about the intellect (or maybe the soul) itself. It
is also still unclear how the process is initialized, and whether it is always already actualized
during any reflection on external objects. As we will see in the following sections and the rest
of this study, these are also the main questions that make their way up through the tradition.
2.2 The Late Ancient commentaries on Aristotle
The Late Ancient Aristotelian commentators do not generally play a prominent role as direct
doctrinal inspiration in the medieval discussion of self-knowledge.42 Occasional references to
Themistius and Simplicius do occur, while references to Alexander are rare. Themistius is for
example occasionally invoked in prefatory passages for the statement that knowledge about
the soul ought to help us acquire knowledge about the remaining universe, or even that lacking
knowledge about the soul would be unseemly (turpe) when we know so many other things.43
But although the Ancient commentators’ direct influence is negligible, a short presentation
of their position on intellectual self-knowledge is nonetheless warranted as they play a role
through the adaptation or discussion of their doctrines in Averroes. The focus of this section
is more determined by genre than doctrine. I will present the basic position of Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Themistius, Ps.-Simplicius and Philoponus on intellectual self-knowledge. These
authors straddle the divide between the Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic categories, but they are
41 We will get back to some of these problems in section 4.4.2 on page 151.
42 Kessler 2011: 17–18 also notes this.
43 Faversham prologue (e.g. Vat. Lat. 2170: 63ra); Burley prologue (e.g. Vat. Lat. 2151: 1ra); An-
onymus Chasselensis f. 104r (quoted as the motto of the introduction to this study), cf. some later
commentaries such as Anonymus Gandersheim prologue, and Lindor prologue. It goes back to
Themistius Paraphr. DA, 1.26–2.7, cf. Themistius Latinus Paraphr. DA, 2.31–3.40. Hasse (2000: 13–
4) finds this sentiment in the same prefatory context in Gundissalinus De anima, 31.6 and thinks
that he is inspired by medieval authors who also present the idea (Cassiodorus I.534, Alcuin 639
and Ps.-Augustine De spiritu et anima, 779).
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included here to the extent that their doctrines are relevant to the subject of intellectual self-
knowledge.44
When we first look to Alexander, it is important to note that we do not have a commentary
on De anima from his hand, but his own De anima, a more independent treatise that partially
mirrors the structure of Aristotle’sDe anima, provides amplematerial for analysing his position
on the subject.45 It has also been argued that Alexander’sDe anima is based on his commentary
of Aristotle’s text.46 Aside from that we have the so-called De anima mantissa (titled by J.
Freudenthal and accepted by the editor Bruns, also occasionally refered to as the second book
of De anima). Doctrinal differences between the two texts have led to a range of suggestions:
The ascription to Alexander has been rejected,47 to consider it a revised and reworked version
of the material from De anima,48 or to let it precede that work as a product of his youth.49 With
this spectrum of interpretations of De anima mantissa, we will here restrict ourselves to just
his De anima.
After a discussion of the so-called material and habitual intellect (νοῦς ὑλικός and νοῦς ἐν
ἕξει), Alexander presents a discussion of intellectual self-knowledge that seems to clear up some
of the ambiguous details of Aristotle’s exposition.50 Alexander generally follows the structure
of Aristotle’s De anima in this part of the treatise, and in the passage that is parallel to 3.4,
429b5–10 he pauses at the process and mechanics of self-knowledge of the habitual intellect.
The habitual intellect is the intellect that contains representations of objects of perception and
thought. It is able to think on its own accord and grasp intelligible forms in themselves, but
it is also able to reflect on itself.51 The habitual intellect must be a form, he says, since it
becomes that which it thinks, and it thinks of forms. And if it thinks of forms and is itself a
form, it must be able to think of itself.52 The process of knowing then involves two aspects:
The principle of formal adaptation in thinking means that the knowing subject primarily and
in itself (προηγουμένως μὲν καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτόν) becomes the form which it knows. But it also,
accidentally (συμβεβηκὸς δέ), thinks of itself, as it belongs to it to become that which it thinks,
as long as it thinks it. Before thinking is actualized, the subject and object of thought are
different from each other and relative to each other, but during the activity of intellection their
relation is dissolved and they are formally identical. This identity means that the intellect
also clearly thinks of itself, when it thinks of its primary object of knowledge, for it becomes
44 For a recent, short, and informative introduction, see Tuominen 2009: 18–40. We will not touch
on reflexivity in perception in the commentators (or the following tradition in general), but see
Tuominen 2009: 179–82 and Caston 2012a.
45 Caston 2012b: 2–3.
46 Accattino and Donini 1996: vii–x.
47 Moraux 1942, see also discussion in Schroeder and Todd 1990: 6–22 (who also rejects it as a deriv-
ative work).
48 Bazán 1973.
49 Donini 1974: 59–62, accepted by Sharples 2008: 2.
50 Alexander of Aphrodisias DA, 84.21–86.5, 89.9–23. On the thorny problems of his model of the in-
tellect, see the short presentation in Tuominen 2009: 192–4, but also Sharples 2010: 152–4, Tuom-
inen 2010, Sorabji 2005a: 104, Schroeder and Todd 1990: 6–22.
51 Alexander of Aphrodisias DA, 86.14–18, virtually parallel with Aristotle DA, 3.4, 429b5–9.
52 Alexander of Aphrodisias DA, 86.18–20.
32 2. a historical overview
itself that which it thinks.53 The central point to notice here is how the whole explanation
of intellectual self-knowledge relies on the principle of formal assimilation between subject
and object. Alexander also highlights a structural parallel between science and intellect: As a
science (ἐπιστήμη) and that which it is a science about are identical, so are the intellect and that
which it knows.54 It follows straight from these statements that any and every act of thinking
also at the same time involves a type of self-knowledge. But from this also follows the proviso
that the self is exactly identical with the object of thought at that very instance, and nothing
more. This clearly leaves us with a very thin concept of self.55 Alexander is aware of this, as
he emphasizes those very characteristics in his description of the separate intellect which is
thought and self-intellection because of this identity structure.56
When we look at the first proper commentary on De anima that we have, written by
Themistius, we find a different composition of intellects. He argues that the productive in-
tellect is present in each individual and adds an additional perishable passive intellect that is
closely connected to the body to maintain the immortality of the potential intellect.57 But in
spite of those differences his presentation of intellectual self-knowledge is strikingly similar
to Alexander’s. In his parallel to De anima 4.3.429b5–9 he fleshes out a state of the potential
intellect where it becomes able to distinguish general from particular and likens this stage to
someone who has acquired knowledge but not yet actualized it. At this stage it is also able to
think of itself. The intellect is nothing but the thoughts (νοήματα), so as it becomes the same
as that which it thinks of, it also at the same time thinks of itself.58 Just like Alexander, he
also draws up the analogous structure between the intellect and its thoughts in reference to
the science (ἐπιστήμη) and its subject matter.59
The paraphrase that has been attributed to Simplicius (who we will cautiously call Ps.-
Simplicius) presents a radically different picture.60 This lemma-based commentary offers a
much more elaborate exposition, adding a lot of material of a more or less clear Neo-Platonic
bend. After taking the discussion in 3.4, 429b5–9 about primary and secondary actuality to a
whole new speculative level, so to speak, he gives an exposition of how the intellect knows
itself. And here Ps.-Simplicius breaks decisively and explicitly with the Alexandrian interpret-
ation we have just seen: The intellect does not think of itself accidentally as an epiphenomenon
following from the identity structure of intellect and intelligible object, but it also thinks itself
primarily.61 His reasons for this attack on the epiphenomenal interpretation might raise some
53 Alexander of Aphrodisias DA, 86.20–29.
54 Alexander of Aphrodisias DA, 89.21–90.2, harking back to Aristotle DA, 3.4.430a2–5.
55 Sorabji (2005a: 136) very fittingly presents these passages under the heading “Self-awareness as
contentless” in his sourcebook.
56 Alexander of Aphrodisias DA, 88.3–10, 89.21–90.2.
57 Productive intellect: Themistius Paraphr. DA, 102.30–103.19; Passive intellect: Themistius Paraphr.
DA, 105.13–33. Schroeder and Todd 1990: 35–9 and Kupreeva 2010: 408–11 are excellent starting
points for the problems and literature surrounding his noetics.
58 Themistius Paraphr. DA, 95.10–23 (= Themistius Latinus Paraphr. DA, 216.40–217.56), cf.
Themistius Paraphr. DA, 97.29–98.9 (= Themistius Latinus Paraphr. DA, 222.59–223.75).
59 Themistius Paraphr. DA, 95.23–32 (= Themistius Latinus Paraphr. DA, 217.56–218.65).
60 On the authorial question, see Tuominen 2009: 35–6 and Blumenthal 2000: 1–9.
61 Ps.-Simplicius In DA, 230.11–14.
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eyebrows. For how, he continues, should Alexander or we be able to write about the intellect,
when it does not know itself and its own thinking, life, and substance?62 So he basically asks:
How can we have a universal and substantial science about the intellect, if intellectual self-
knowledge is only of the accidental kind that is void of content? This question is not raised by
neither Alexander nor Themistius, so this is the first time that such problems are presented in
a commentary on this part of De anima. When we look at his treatment of the aporiai closing
chapter four of De anima, we find a remarkable characterization of the intellect.63 In his an-
swer to the second aporia, on the intelligibility of the intellect, he emphasizes that the ability
to think itself rests wholly with the intellect itself, when it is at the first level of actuality, when
the intellect has acquired some intellectual content but is not yet actively thinking of it. The
intellect is able, he says, not only to initialize reflection on the external object of thought but
also on itself. This is the characteristic ability of the intellect, to think of itself and initialize
thought.64 When hemoves self-knowledge to the front and center of the activity of the intellect
in this way, it is clear how he must reject the epiphenomenal interpretation of Alexander. This
focus on the necessity and priority of an essential and immediate intellectual self-knowledge
is a decidedly Neo-Platonic trait.65
Finally, when we come to Philoponus’s De intellectu, we return to the epiphenomenal in-
terpretation that is now well known to us.66 The text is a lemma-based commentary on De
anima 3.4–8, and his exposition of 3.4, 429b5–9 is quite clear: When the intellect becomes that
which it knows, then clearly whenever the intellect thinks, it thinks itself.67 He emphasizes
the connection between the principle of formal identity and the subsequent, necessary, self-
knowledge, and he also draws the same parallel between science and that which is known in
relation to intellect and its intelligible objects.68 That the self-knowledge is contentless is also
strongly implied by his explication of the impossibility of thinking multiple things at once.69
He even extends the analysis with an explanation of how this does not mean that opposite
properties are ascribed to the same thing at the same time, as they are not ascribed in the same
way. When the intellect knows its objects, it itself becomes those objects as a consequence
of the primary act of knowing, and hence it only knows itself accidentally. He presents the
following distinction: By itself (secundum se) it knows its external objects because the principle
of formal assimilation is characteristic to the intellect, but it is not by itself, as intellect, that it
knows itself, but because it is also intelligible (viz. after the formal assimilation).70
62 Ps.-Simplicius In DA, 230.14–16.
63 Theauthor’s reflections on the perfection are tangentially relevant to this question, but too complex
to delve into here. See Ps.-Simplicius In DA, 229.1–230.10, 234.20–235.10 and 235.32–236.32.
64 Ps.-Simplicius In DA, 236.18–19.
65 Ps.-Simplicius In DA, 236.32–238.41 shows some of the philosophical consequences of this.
66 Note that the commentary on book three of De anima attributed to Philoponus in Commentaria
in Aristotelem Graeca is spurious, while the so-called De intellectu, which is only transmitted in
Moerbeke’s Latin translation, generally is accepted as his work.
67 Philoponus De intellectu, 21.00–21.2: “Si igitur intellectus est quae intelliguntur, merito utique
intellectus intelligens se ipsum intelligit.”
68 Philoponus De intellectu, 20.90–21.00
69 Philoponus De intellectu, 21.99, cf. 19.53.
70 Philoponus De intellectu, 21.3–18.
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To sum up this section we see three of the four central ancient commentators, Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Philoponus, present an interpretation where intellectual
self-knowledge is nothing more than an epiphenomenon that attends any and every act of
knowing an external object, but itself void of any content. We can even recognize some basic
shared points among the three, namely the accidental nature of this self-knowledge and the
parallel structure of identity between science and its object in comparison with intellect and its
intelligible objects. As we have traced the commentaries here, Alexander makes the intellec-
tual self-knowledge explicitly accidental, where Aristotle is very vague on that point, while the
comparisonwith science also can be found inAristotle. Philoponus also adds a discussion about
how the identity of knower and known does not violate the principle of non-contradiction. In
direct and explicit opposition to this we find Ps.-Simplicius. He denies that the self-knowledge
is accidental and highlights that very ability of the intellect to reflect on itself as its central
characteristic. This doctrine aligns him well with the general Neo-Platonic affiliation that is
apparent in that commentary.
2.3 Outside the Aristotelian tradition
In the Middle Platonic and Neo-Platonic traditions we see a merging of Peripatetic and Platonic
material in a way that cannot be found in the preceding traditions. The texts of Aristotle are a
central part of the curriculum in a Platonic context, and this is also reflected in their doctrines.
For instance, Alcinous’ identification of the activity of the highest metaphysical principle with
self-thinking seems heavily inspired by Aristotle’s νόησις νοήσεως in Metaphysica 12.71 Fur-
thermore, the concept of self-knowledge and self-reflection is fundamental in this tradition.
This makes the whole doctrine exceedingly complex, and sorting out the details of influence
and development lies well beyond the scope of this dissertation.72 We will therefore just high-
light the twomost important sources for intellectual self-knowledge in themiddle ages, Liber de
causis and Augustine, with a short sketch of their common central starting point, the Plotinean
psycho-metaphysics.
With reference to Plotinus we just need to know that in his hierarchy of being the first
hypostasis, which immediately springs from the One, is νοῦς, consciousness or intellect. In this
noetic consciousness, whose prime and essential activity is intellection, the relation between
thinking and thought, subject and object, is central, and the concept of essential and immediate
self-knowledge of the whole intellect by the whole intellect lies at the heart of this process.
This activity involves a looking back (ἐπιστροφή) on the origin of the intellect to get an insight
into its cause and hence itself. This self-reflection and simultaneous look for one’s own cause
cascade down through the hypostases resulting in a similar tendency in the human soul to be
able to reflect directly on itself.73
71 Sharples 2010: 151.
72 For a recent extensive study of this material, I refer to Perkams 2008.
73 Plotinus Enneades, 5.3 is the core text on this (Sorabji 2005b: 139–42 is also useful). Particularly
interesting are also Emilsson 2007: especially 107–23, 141–65, and 207–15 and Crystal 1998, but
see also Aubry 2014 and O’Meara 2010: 306–18.
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Liber de causis is a text with a convoluted, but well traced, history. It is written in 9th
century Baghdad based on Proclus’ Elementatio Theologica, originally titled Kitāb al-Īḍāḥ li-
Arisṭūṭālis fī al-khayr al-maḥd, which should be translated into The book of Aristotle’s explan-
ation of the pure good. It was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in the 12th century
and is preserved in more than 237 manuscripts. We know of 31 commentaries to the text. In
the middle ages is was attributed to Aristotle until 1272 where Aquinas, by the aid of William
of Moerbeke’s recent translation of Proclus’ Elementatio Theologica, established that is was ac-
tually based heavily on that.74 But at that time it had already become a foundational text. The
many transmitted witnesses are of course a testament to that fact, but this is also apparent
from fairly regular references to the text in De anima-commentaries.75 The Latin translation
has been edited by Pattin with an extensive list of textual corrections by Taylor.76
The text is structured as 219 more or less aphoristic statements sorted into 32 sections or
propositiones of related groups. This makes the text a treasure trove of poignant Neo-Platonic
sentiments for any occasion. But it also means that it is easier to identify a general theme than
a sustained argument in the text.77 The first propositiones introduce the first causes, the highest
levels of being and intellect (I–IX), followed by the world of ideas and emanation of forms (X–
XIII), before we focus on the soul in XIV–XV. Any being that knows itself (viz. all intellects
above and including the human), we are there told, knows its own essence by a complete return
to that essence.78 This self-reflection is part of the process of intellection where the identity
between known object and knowing subject is realized, but this does not mean that the self-
knowing substance depends on external objects. The self-knowing return to its own essence
(reditio substantiae ad essentiam suam) is based on the self-sufficiency and self-subsistence of
the simple substance that an intellect is.79
When we move on to Augustine, his connections to the Neo-Platonic tradition are im-
mediately apparent. Just like his predecessors he places self-knowledge front an center in his
description of the human being, which is a structural mirror image of the divine order.80 As we
focus on the human condition here, we will only include his De trinitate whose whole second
part could be considered an extensive philosophical anthropology with a strong psychological
bend. His focus is not as narrowly on intellect but on the more general mens, which often
74 On these details and a host of further literature, see in particular Calma 2016b: 11–5 which also
includes an overview of the commentaries.
75 Cf. also Schönberger 2003: ix–x.
76 Pattin 1967, Taylor 1989. The Latin text of the parallel translation in Schönfeld 2003 includes
Taylor’s suggested improvements.
77 Taylor 1992: 20–1, cf. generally Schönfeld 2003.
78 Anonymus Liber de causis, 15.124: “Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam
suam reditione completa.”
79 Anonymus Liber de causis, 15.128: “Et non significo per reditionem substantiae ad essentiam suam,
nisi quia est stans, fixa per se, non indigens in sui fixione et sui essentia re alia rigente ipsam,
quoniam est substantia simplex, sufficiens per seipsam.” Against this Kaukua (2015: 16–7) seems
to consider this self-knowledge derivative of and contingent upon knowledge of external objects,
and thus comparable with the Aristotelian model.
80 On this subject Booth 1977, Booth 1978, Booth 1979 is particularly stimulating. See also Cory 2014:
18–22, Gioia 2008: 190–218, Sorabji 2006: 212–6, Boulnois 1999: 160–4.
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finds a good translation in mind. This attention to the human psychology in a work of Trin-
itarian theology springs from the interpretation of the less well known through inspection of
something more well known and analogous, in this case the human nature as an imago Dei.81
In book 8 we find arguments to the effect that knowledge about the mind is based on
our own internal and immediate experience of our own mind. From there we can apparently
extrapolate the existence of other minds.82 This imports the idea of the natural, credible, and
direct access of the mind to itself, which is explicated in an often quoted passage in book 9
where Augustine states that just as the mind acquires knowledge about perceptible objects
through sense perception, it acquires knowledge about incorporeals through itself, and that
it therefore knows itself by itself because it is incorporeal.83 The ontological equality of mind
with itself means that its self-knowledge is complete in a knowledge that is co-extensivewith its
being, which means that nothing is hidden or opaque to the mind’s eye in its self-reflection.84
Book 10 presents us with a longer meditation on the mind’s way to knowledge of itself, a
knowledge that covers the whole essence of the soul (or mind) wholly through its own being.85
There is thus in principle nothing of the mind that is inaccessible to the mind itself, but finding
this self-gaze can be challenged by the impediments of mental images and sense impressions.86
Fortunately, such impediments can be overcome, and the bond that the bodily constitution lays
on the soul can be broken. Themind can then also attain complete self-knowledge through self-
presence, as it knows itself as soon as it understands the concepts ‘know’ and ‘self’.87 This sort
of self-knowledge is neither accidental nor partial: The self-knowledge of the mind is complete
knowledge of its own essence.88 Gioia even endeavours to interpret these and similar passages
to attest that the mind essentially is self-knowledge.89
Other things, such as the so-called Augustinian cogito, that the mind concludes its own ex-
istence from its ability to live, think, know, judge and other activities, are also often mentioned
in this connection.90 We also find a distinction between se nosse, as the continuous, transparent
and indisputable self-identification based on the mere self-presence of the soul to itself, and se
cogitare as a discursive reflection over one’s own being.91 But without diving deeper into this
it should be quite clear how we find the idea of substantial and immediate self-knowledge as a
very central motif in the psychology of Augustine.
This short section on self-knowledge outside the Aristotelian tradition has highlighted one
81 Augustine Trin. 9.12.17.
82 Augustine Trin. 8.6.9.
83 Augustine Trin. 9.3.3: “Ergo et se ipsam per se ipsam nouit quoniam est incorporea.”
84 Augustine Trin. 9.11.16, Augustine Trin. 10.4.6.
85 Augustine Trin. 10.3.5–5.7.
86 Augustine Trin. 10.8.11
87 Augustine Trin. 10.9.12 and 10.6.8.
88 Augustine Trin. 10.10.16: “Quapropter dum se mens nouit substantiam suam nouit, et cum de se
certa est de substantia sua certa est”. In Augustine Trin. 10.10.13–16 he argues that this knowledge
makes it possible to conclude that the mind is also immaterial, cf. Nawar 2016.
89 Gioia 2008: 206–7.
90 Augustine Trin. 10.10.14, Augustine 11.26, cf. Matthews 1992, but also Sorabji 2006: 217–21,
Matthews 2002: xxvi–xxix, Boulnois 1999: 166 n. 6.
91 Cory 2014: 20–2, Sorabji 2006: 216–7.
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dominant and general trend: The soul, mind, or intellect knows itself directly and essentially.
This self-knowledge is part of the essence of the intellect and cannot therefore be separated
from its existence, nor does it depend on any external stimuli in its realization. The metaphys-
ical basis of this doctrine is most extensively formulated by Plotinus. We have focused on two
applications of that in Liber de causis and Augustine’s De trinitate. In both texts we find an em-
phasis on the immediate availability and transparency of the soul, mind, or intellect to itself.
As we will see in the subsequent sections and chapters, these ideas will have a tremendous
influence on the debate concerning self-knowledge.
2.4 The Arabic influence: Avicenna and Averroes
In this section I will cover two different types of texts, represented by the two epitomes of
Arabic philosophy in the middle ages, Averroes and Avicenna.92 In Averroes, the Comment-
ator par excellence in the medieval tradition, we find the proper Aristotelian commentary while
Avicenna presents us with a version of the more independent genre of treatises on the soul.
Although only Averroes is a commentator in the strict sense, it is important to note that all
Arabic philosophers take part in the Aristotelian tradition (albeit at varying degrees), as Aris-
totle is one of their main philosophical masters and inspirations and several works of the Greek
commentators were available to them.93 As with the other sections of this chapter, I will only
present a cursory overview of the positions on self-knowledge to the extent that it is relevant
to my general exposition.94
Although it has been argued that Avicenna (980–1037) is a Peripatetic philosopher at his
core, the function and understanding of self-knowledge that we find in him differs markedly
from what we have observed in some of the late ancient Peripatetics.95 We find that expressed
in two central notions of his: The famous idea of the so-called flying or floating man which
presents an idea of non-conscious self-knowledge, and a more reflexive self-knowledge arising
from knowledge of external objects. Avicenna concludes the introductory chapter of his De
anima by invoking a metaphor to illustrate that the soul is an immaterial substance.96 Imagine
a man suspended in a void who receives no perceptual impressions at all and has no experience
of his limbs or body. Would he still know that he exists? Avicenna postulates that he would
readily accept his own existence, but not that it is physical, as he has no impression of any
physical nature, nor that physical properties are necessary to his existence.97 This is presented
92 Respectively Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sīnā in Arabic. As the focus of this dissertation is their reception
in the Latin middle ages, I will refer to them by the names known to their Latin readers and their
texts in the Latin translations.
93 Ivry 2012: 1, cf. Peters 1968: 40–5, with reference to the philosophy of mind.
94 A good place to start on the intellect in the Arabic tradition more generally are Black 2010, Black
2005, Davidson 1992.
95 On Avicenna as a Peripatetic philosopher, see Gutas 2014. For a discussion on the scholarship of
Avicennean noetics, see also Alpina 2014: 131–42.
96 The literature on the flying man is of course vast. A relevant selection: Kaukua 2015: 12–103,
Toivanen 2015, Cory 2014: 24–6, Black 2008, Hasse 2000: 80–91, Marmura 1986.
97 Avicenna De anima, 36.49–37.65.
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as an illustration rather than a proof with the purpose of elucidating the ontological nature
of the soul as more than just the form of the physical body.98 But this is done by arguing
that even robbed of any perceptual input the individual would still be able to perceive her
own essence or self (the Arabic dhat is ambiguous, in the Latin translation we find essentia).99
Although the details of this may be contested, we do find here a testament of an essential and
direct positive cognition of the soul, which is completely independent of perceptual inputs.
Looking to the final and fifth part of Avicenna’s De anima we also find an extended argument
in support of immediate self-knowledge as something independent of any external instrument
or stimulation.100 In the later text transmitted under the title Notes (Ta‘līqāt) we find a long
discussion of self-awareness that is more complex, including both a primitive self-awareness
and higher-order self-knowledge of the state and content of the intellect.101 Although that is
interesting, we must here maintain that the immediate, primitive, and constitutive type of self-
awareness outlined above is the only one we have found to have just a slight influence in the
included commentaries of this study.
In Averroes’s Long commentary to Aristotle’s De anima we find a completely different pic-
ture. Although Avicenna might have a Peripatetic foundation to his philosophy, Averroes is
much more heavily bound to the Aristotelian text. This is immediately confirmed in his com-
mentary.102 In his interpretation of the De anima passage, Averroes is very clear about the
process: When the intellect has come into the state of first actuality, it will know itself, as it is
itself just the form of the things which it abstract from matter.103 Again, this is all based on the
principle of formal identification between intellect and intelligible object.104 With a reference
to Alexander he identifies this self-knowledge as accidental in opposition to the abstract forms,
viz. the immaterial intelligences, who know themselves essentially due to the inherent identity
between subject and object.105 So far this is an interpretation closely aligned with the tradition
from Alexander.
But he says that he also can interpret this in accordance with al-Fārābi. The intellect be-
comes an entity in itself (“erit unum entium”) when it is actualized, and can therefore know
itself by the content that it abstracts from itself insofar as it abstracts content from things that
are outside the soul.106 Although Averroes does not clearly acknowledge it, there is reason to
98 On the nature and purpose of the passage, see e.g. Kaukua 2015: 32–4, Toivanen 2015: 66–7.
99 Toivanen (2015: 67) argues formaintaining the ambiguity, Hasse (2000: 87–9) reads ‘essence’, Black
(2008: 64–5) and Kaukua (2015: 36, and 39–42) read ‘self’.
100 Avicenna De anima, 93.60–98.45.
101 Kaukua 2015: 52–4 translates and discusses a long relevant passage (see in particular the section
[b]), cf. Black 2005: 64–78, along with Avicenna De anima, 98.65–68 and Avicenna 35.8–11. Black
(2008: 78–9) traces this higher-order knowledge as a sort of certitude back to al-Fārābī. On the
Notes, see Gutas 2014: 160–4.
102 We focus here solely on the long commentary on De anima, as that is what our medieval readers
of the 13th and 14th century knew.
103 Averroes 1953: III com. 8, 420.19–21: “Idest, et cum intellectus fuerit in hac dispositione, tunc
intelliget se secundum quod ipse non est aliud nisi forme rerum, inquantum extrahit eas a materia.”
104 For an extensive treatment of this, see Black 1999.
105 Averroes In DA, 420.22–29.
106 Averroes In DA, bk. III, com. 8, p. 420.29–35. Reference to al-Fārābī §§15–16, pp. 72–73.
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consider this a different sort of self-knowledge. To say that when the intellect is actualized,
and thus becomes a determinate entity, it can reflect on itself as if it was an extra-mental en-
tity, sounds very much like a non-accidental, direct or attentive form of self-knowledge, as the
intellect itself then becomes the primary object of reflection. He closes the section with the re-
mark that he will later discuss whether this is possible.107 When he gets to the final aporia inDe
anima 3.4, 430a2–9 he considers it to be concerned with whether knowledge about the intellect
is acquired through itself or by the external object that actualizes it. When Aristotle says that
the intellect is intelligible in the same way as other intelligible things, Averroes takes this to
mean that the intellect is known through its external objects.108 This indicates that he actually
accepts that it should be possible to acquire knowledge about the intellect at the level of second
potentiality. This means that when the intellect is actualized by some external object, it is pos-
sible to consider that actualized intellect as an intelligible object in its own right.109 Although
this may be a question of nuance, it is not necessarily the same contentless self-knowledge that
can be found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Philoponus.
Avicenna and Averroes are among the most important influences in the Latin tradition
and by far the most important voices from the Arabic tradition. Between them they represent
two different positions of self-knowledge. In Avicenna we find a selection of different ideas,
but the dominant, if not only, position in the Latin reception of him is the idea that the soul
as a separate and immaterial substance has immediate and essential knowledge of itself. In
Averroes we first see a very limited, Alexandrian, interpretation of self-knowledge where any
act of intellection entails a concomitant but void self-knowledge. But his discussion develops
into a position where self-knowledge is still dependent on knowledge of external objects, but
which also allows for some positive content about the intellect itself. On that position the
intellect is able to move its attention to itself and become its own object of knowledge, once it
is actualized by a primary object of knowledge.
2.5 Latin tradition through Albert the Great
De anima is introduced as curriculum material in Paris in 1252 along with the logica vetus and
nova.110 But we also find Latin texts dealing with the soul before that demarcation point. Some
of them are independent treatises (often called tractatus) that pull in material from Aristotelian
as well as non-Aristotelian sources, but it is a somewhat rare genre (I know of around 12
examples from the late 12th to 14th century). We do however also have other psychological
texts, including of course some commentaries. In this final section we will go through the
relevant psychological texts until the middle of the 13th century that have the soul as their
107 Averroes In DA, bk. III, com. 8, p. 420.35–36.
108 Averroes In DA, III com. 13 and 15, pp. 427–28 and 434.
109 Black (2008: 79–81) identifies an emphasis on substantial and contentful self-knowledge through
knowledge of external objects in Averroes in a different context, but that lies outside our current
scope.
110 Already in 1255 this was supplemented with all the Aristotelian works within natural philosophy,
ethics and metaphysics. See Denifle and Chatelain 1891: no. 201, p. 228, cf. Dod 1982: 73 and Lohr
1997.
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primary focus.111 A list of such texts until around 1250 is given in table 2.1 on the next page.112
In the chapter I treat the text that contain a significant section on intellectual self-knowledge.
This means that I present the main doctrines on self-knowledge in Dominicus Gundissalinus
(ca. 1115/25–1190), John Blund (ca. 1175–1248), John of La Rochelle (ca. 1200–1245), William
of Auvergne (1180/90–1249), Adam Buckfield (1220–1279/92), Ps.-Adam Buckfield, the figure
Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis (1215–1277), Ps.-Petrus Hispanus (possibly Richard Rufus, from
ca. 1200–1260), and finally Albert the Great.113
Although I focus on texts that have the soul as their proper and main topic, it is noticeable
that these treatises often contain a good portion of theological material. This is probably due to
the fact that Aristotle’s De anima has not yet become an object of focused study and analysis.
The texts are generally more independent treaties that deal with many of the same questions
as Aristotle’s work, but often structured differently and with a wider wiggle room for doc-
trinal variations. The format and content of Avicenna’s De anima is therefore also very often
the template for the treatises. This early period of psychological material is, maybe slightly
derogatorily, sometimes referred to as a period of “Avicennizing Augustinianism”.114 The term
is disputed, but it does reflect the general idea that this is a period where the influence of Au-
gustine and Avicenna is particularly clear.115 As we will see, there are several instances of
treatments or reflections of Avicenna’s flying man, and we will also see a general support for
the essential self-knowledge that characterizes that part of the tradition.116
111 This means that disputed questions, theological treatises, and single questions in Sentence-
commentaries are not included here. We stay relatively close to the commentary genre and context.
112 Hasse 2000 and Toivanen 2015 treat many of the texts listed here, and those works can be very
useful in hunting down more research literature. See also Weijers 2005 on the structure and genre
of some of these texts.
113 I will not go into any detail with Anonymus Bertolensis. It is a very minuscule text used to fill
out a bit more than an empty column in the bible manuscript Vat. Lat. 27: 333v. The text presents
material of the Augustinian tradition (see Bertola 1966: 577), including short notes on essential
self-knowledge reflecting the doctrines of Augustine.
114 The term is coined in Gilson 1929–1930.
115 Hasse 2000: 203–5 suggests a revised definition that focuses narrowly on the identity of the active
intellect and the Christian God.
116 On the flying man, see in particular Toivanen 2015, but of course also Hasse 2000: 80–92.
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2.5.1 Early treatises
Our first encounter is the translator of Avicenna’s De anima, Dominicus Gundissalinus, who
had his floruit between 1162 and 1190.124 He wrote a Tractatus de anima, which opens with
arguments for the incorporeal nature of the soul.125 Right from the start we see that he is
heavily influenced by Avicenna’s De anima, as he uses Avicenna’s flying man experiment as
his first of a range of arguments supporting the incorporeality of the soul. But he also takes the
experiment to indicate that the soul is present to itself and that it knows and perceives (scire and
percipere) itself irrespective of external or bodily inputs.126 We also recognize his Avicennean
influence when he presents four different types of intellect that are parallel to Avicenna’s,
and remarks that whenever the soul reflects on an external object, it also at the same time
is cognizant of its own act of intellection.127 When the intellect only reflects on itself, it is
itself that which knows and the object of knowledge.128 But when it knows an external object,
those three roles are split up: The soul is that which knows, the intellect (intellectus) is that by
which it knows, and that which is known (intellectum) is the external thing, viz. the similitude
of the form retained in the mind.129 These different roles and relations show how immediate
intellectual self-knowledge is a phenomenon different from the knowledge of external objects,
and that he considers the unmediated self-knowledge an essential power of the soul.
In the very beginning of the 13th century John Blund writes his De anima. It has been
dated to between 1200 and 1209. Whether it is written in Paris or Oxford is not quite clear,
but as Hunt points out, that is not terribly important as Oxford is intellectually dependent
on Paris at this point.130 His text shows no knowledge of Averroes but is heavily inspired by
Avicenna, not least in the sections on the intellect.131 But he does not reproduce the flying man
experiment, and has very few thoughts about intellectual self-knowledge. In a short section on
how disembodied souls communicate knowledge he argues that when the soul is disembodied
and hence simple, immaterial, and separate, it sees itself (videt et intuitur).132 This same thing
can happenwhen one disembodied soul looks to another and acquires the knowledge possessed
by that other soul. When it can do that, it can also know itself through the image of itself in
another soul as a mirror image.133 Here we note two things: (1) he does not really present
a well-developed doctrine of intellectual self-knowledge, and (2) what he does say about it
indicates an assumption of immediate and essential self-knowledge.
William of Auvergne was bishop of Paris at the time when he wrote his De anima, and that
124 For a short entry of his life and works, see Pasnau and Dyke 2010: II.864
125 On his De anima, see Hasse 2000: 13–8.
126 Gundissalinus De anima, cap. 1, p. 37.17–32, cf. Toivanen 2015: 71.
127 Gundissalinus De anima, 87.30–88.8.
128 Gundissalinus De anima, cap. 10, p. 89.10–12.
129 Gundissalinus De anima, cap. 10, p. 89.12–26.
130 See the original introduction to the edition (Hunt 1970) along with Dunne’s recent update in Callus
and Hunt 2013, cf. also Hasse 2000: 18–9.
131 Comparison in Hasse 2000: 20–3.
132 Blund De anima, §375, p. 103.15.
133 Blund De anima, §375, p. 103.23–28.
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shows.134 It is a much more theologically focused work than that of for instance John Blund
(although he generally keeps references to Scripture at a minimum), and we find many funda-
mental doctrinal differences from what we are used to in the Aristotelian commentaries. The
dominant doctrine for William is the immediate self-knowledge of the soul. For instance, he
insists adamantly on a very unitary model of intellect where any partition into agent, material
or possible, acquired or speculative intellect is attacked.135 We find two different types of self-
knowledge in his treatise, one occasioned by knowledge about external objects and another
immediate and essential self-knowledge, both of indubitable certainty.
We find the first type of self-knowledge in an argument against the idea that the soul
can know that it does not exist. He argues that when the intellect has some knowledge, it
also at the same time knows with certainty about itself that it has this knowledge, and this
clearly would not be the case if it could know that it does not exist.136 This is a self-knowledge
occasioned by knowledge of external objects, but it is more similar to the higher-order self-
awareness of Avicenna, as William’s point is that aside from the knowledge of the object,
the soul also has an awareness of its own activity of knowing that object. Interestingly, he
also maintains that if you want to reflect on the soul in this way, it will be both easy and
profitable.137 Later, in a description of the substance and properties of the soul we see a version
of self-knowledge that connects closely to the doctrines of Augustine. We know nothing, he
says, with greater certainty than the soul itself, and the individual knows nothing more clearly
and completely than his own intelligible dispositions (which includes veridical properties such
as knowledge, doubt and opinion, as well as affective properties such as joy and sadness). These
properties in the individual are directly observable to the individual itself.138 But this ability can
be challenged, just as we saw in Augustine, by the ingrown corporeal signs and the concretion
of body and soul.139 So we should probably not interpret the higher-order self-awareness as an
Aristotelian doctrine here, as it is probablymore likely to stem from theAugustinian distinction
between se nosse and se cogitare.
John de La Rochelle’s Summa de anima is written in 1235–36 and presents a text that, in a
sense, is rich in Aristotelian content as one of his main sources is Avicenna’s De anima, but he
also peppers it generously with references to Augustine, who is the most prominently quoted
authority in the text (including the now pseudepigraphal Liber de spiritu et anima) and John of
Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa. A final central source is John’s own work Tractatus de divisione
multiplici potentiarum animae, which is especially incorporated into the second half on the
perceptual and intellective powers.140 On the preference of Avicenna over Aristotle (who he
does make a few scant references to) Hasse remarks that it is perfectly in line with a trend in
the period, as Avicenna’s treatise contains fewer doctrinal gaps, but one also wonders whether
134 About William, see the entry in Pasnau and Dyke 2010: II.987, about his treatise in particular
Moody 1975, Hasse 2000: 42–7 and the introduction in Teske 2000.
135 See William of Auvergne De anima, §§2.10–11, 3.3, 5.6–8, 7.3–5 and 7.10–11.
136 William of Auvergne De anima, §1.4, p. 68a–b, cf. §7.11, p. 218a.
137 William of Auvergne De anima, §1.4, p. 68b.
138 William of Auvergne De anima, §3.12, p. 102b. All of chapter 3.12 and 13 focus on this.
139 William of Auvergne De anima, §3.13, p. 103–4, cf. the section on Augustine on page 36.
140 See Bourgerol 1995: 31–3 along with Hasse 2000: 47–51 and Cory 2014: 30.
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he is easier to adapt to the requirements of a monotheist theology.141
The possibility and immediateness of intellectual self-knowledge is assumed without argu-
ment. We see this when he uses the immediate self-knowledge as a premise for the conclusion
that the intellect is immaterial.142 This is elaborated in a subsequent note on the objects of the
intellect: When the intellect has knowledge of itself, it uses itself as the point of comparison,143
Finally, in a discussion of the ontological status of the agent intellect, he presents an interesting
partitioning of the agent intellect according to the content of the knowledge in something re-
miniscent of a emanative scheme.144 In knowledge concerning divine essences and the Trinity,
God himself is the agent intellect, in knowledge concerning created intelligences of the same
ontological level as the intellect itself, viz. angels, they are the agent intellects, but when the
soul is occupied with knowledge about itself, it is able to draw that knowledge directly from
itself by a conversion (conversio) towards itself and is therefore, in that case, its own agent
intellect. The same is the case when it is concerned not with its own essence but material
properties that are received in the soul in the same way as its potentia, habitus, dispositiones
and affectiones.145
These early treatises of Dominicus Gundissalinus, John Blund, William of Auvergne, John
of La Rochelle differ in manyways, but they agree in their fundamental view of self-knowledge.
The intellect or soul is able to reflect on itself at its own accord and independently of external
stimuli. They do not provide much information about the content of such knowledge, but it
is assumed that there is some content to it, and that it may yield insights into the nature of
the soul. Reflections on self-awareness occasioned by knowledge of external intellects can be
found, but it is not clear whether or to which extent it differs from the self-knowledge that the
soul can realize independently of such stimuli.
2.5.2 Peter of Spain and Ps.-Peter of Spain
We have no less than three texts about the soul that are attributed to a Peter of Spain. All three
texts, a treatise and two different commentaries, have been published by Manuel Alonso in the
name of Petrus Hispanus, the later Pope John XXI, who he also believes to be the author of the
famous Summulae logicales. It has been suggested to distinguish the author of the Summulae
logicales from Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis who later became Pope John XXI by referring to
the author of the Summulae logicales as Petrus Hispanus O.P.146 The works in question here
141 Hasse 2000: 50.
142 John of La Rochelle De anima, cap. 112, p. 269.21–23.
143 John of La Rochelle De anima, cap. 113, p. 270.16–18: “Forma ergo qua cognoscitur ipsa anima
uel angelus est ipsa anima racionalis que, cum utitur se ut similitudine, cognoscit se et intelligit
referende ad se.”
144 This is done with references to a passage in Ps.-Augustine that he refers to several times stating
that the soul knows God above it, itself within itself, the angels on par with it and the sublunary
matters below it. See John of La Rochelle De anima, cap. 63, p. 190.1–10, cap. 113, p. 270.24–
25, and cap. 116, p. 279.40–45 quoting Ps.-Augustine De spiritu et anima, cap. 4, p. 781: “anima
cognoscit Deum supra se, se in se, angelum iuxta se.”
145 John of La Rochelle De anima, cap. 116, pp. 270.38–280.75.
146 See Meirinhos 1996, Hasse 2000: 55–60 and J. Spruit 2015.
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are published under the following names by Alonso: Expositio libri de anima, Scientia libri de
anima, and Commentarius in libros De anima.
Gauthier argues that the text published as Expositio libri de anima by Alonso is not written
by Peter of Spain, both based on the manuscripts that preserve the text and its doctrines.147
RegaWood argues confidently that it is by Richard Rufus of Cornwall.148 It is edited by Manuel
Alonso with an ascription to Peter of Spain, and a new edition with Rega Wood as the main
editor is under publication where it is ascribed to Richard Rufus.149 The editions differ in more
than merely the name of the author, as the older edition is only based on Madrid 3314: ff. 68ra–
89rb, which starts abruptly in the exposition of De anima 2.1, 412a21–28, while the upcoming
edition is based on three manuscripts that together present a more complete text. Alonso refers
to this text as an expositiowhile it is the same text as what the editors of the recent edition refer
to as a sententia cum quaestionibus. Alonso dates it to before 1245 and considers it the earliest
commentary onDe anima, as does RegaWood as she even puts it to before 1238, while Gauthier
is less convinced but does not give an alternative dating.150 There is nonetheless no doubt that
this is one of the very earliest commentaries on De anima we have. We will follow Gauthier
in refering to the author cautiously as Ps.-Peter of Spain, though Wood makes a strong case
for attributing it to Richard Rufus. I use and refer to the text in the already existing edition by
Alonso, as the new edition is not published yet.
Aside from this we have another text under the name Commentarius in libros De anima,
and finally Scientia libri de anima. These two texts are still believed to have been written by the
same author, and there is also general agreement that this actually is the Petrus Hispanus Por-
tugalensis who later became Pope John XXI.151 Gauthier considers the Commentarius in libros
De anima, which is also a commentary properly speaking, to be written in Toulouse around
1240 (Wood dates it to after 1247), and the Scientia libri de anima, a much more independent
treatise, to be written between 1250 and 60.152
The Sententiae cum quaestionibus in libros De anima, the text by Ps.-Petrus Hispanus (pos-
sibly Rufus), only deals with self-knowledge very cursorily. There is no discussion of it in the
exposition of 3.4, 429b5–9. But in the exposition of the second aporia he presents a short dis-
cussion of the problem of the intelligibility of the intellect, focusing on the formal aspects of
the argument, but leaving a laconic remark that the intellect is intelligible, and that it is not
intelligible by itself but by another species in it.153 He explains that the intellect is able to know
itself by its own form (per suam formam).154 This would mean that once it is actualized, the
form of the intellect itself becomes available as any other intelligible species to the intellect
147 Gauthier 1984: 236*–237*
148 Wood 2001: 120 and in particular Wood 2018: 63–132. She has also found an alternative recension
of the text to be preserved in Ambros. 4° 312: ff. 19rb–28vb where only the questions of the
commentary are preserved. It is available in an online transcription, see Rufus 2007. She considers
that as one of the most important witnesses to the works of Richard Rufus (Wood 1995: 103).
149 Editions: Ps.-Petrus Hispanus 1952 and Rufus 2018.
150 Alonso 1952b: 64–79, Wood 2001: 153–6, Gauthier 1984: 236*–237*.
151 Meirinhos 1996: 68–9, cf. Mora-Márquez 2014: 210, Wood 2018: xvii.
152 Gauthier 1984: 240*–241*, Wood 2018: 47.
153 Ps.-Petrus Hispanus Exp. DA, in III.4, 429b22–30a9, p. 316.
154 Ps.-Petrus Hispanus Exp. DA, in III.4, 429b22–30a9, pp. 317–18.
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itself.155 This would then be an example of a self-knowledge that is conditional upon the actu-
alization of the intellect by an external species, and in this way it would be close to Averroes’s
view. At the same time his exposition most likely argues that the intellect knows itself by
its own species, which is also in accordance with his views as expressed in other works.156
Ps.-Petrus Hispanus’s remarks on self-knowledge here are thus brief, but nonetheless note-
worthy. As we have seen, the preceding texts on the soul argue for an immediate and essential
self-knowledge, but the author here diverges from that course and returns to Averroes’s in-
terpretation that emphasizes accidental self-knowledge implying a possibility of some positive
content above a mere reflection of the external object.157
Moving on to the Commentarius in libros De anima that is actually by Petrus Hispanus
Portugalensis we find a different presentation.158 He opens the commentary with an exten-
ded treatment of the principles and methods of a science of the soul. He does this in three
problemata which contain 14, 19 and 24 questions, respectively, and stretches over 120 print
pages in Alonso’s edition. Questions 2–9 of the first problema focus on the science of the soul
and self-knowledge. The discussion presented there is very interesting for two reasons. (1) He
presents a wide range of problems and arguments, many of which we also find in later com-
mentaries, and (2) he presents a double doctrine of self-knowledge where the Augustinian and
Aristotelian models are sought unified. This type of unification of the two main branches of
the explanation of self-knowledge is very rarely seen in later De anima-commentaries.
In the first three of those questions he is concerned with whether our knowledge of the
soul is inborn or acquired, and whether the soul is able to know itself.159 First it is argued
from a Neo-Platonic perspective that knowledge about the soul is inborn, while Aristotle is
used to argue that the knowledge must be acquired as the soul is born without any positive
content.160 His solution is to present the doctrine of double self-knowledge: The soul has an in-
born knowledge from the creator of a divine and future good and of itself, but its knowledge of
mundane objects is acquired through sense perception. This is thus an example of the doctrine
of the two faces of the soul, one facing towards the immaterial realm and independent of sense
perception, and the other facing the material world and relying on sense perception.161 This
second type of knowledge is what the philosophers refer to when they think our knowledge
about the soul is acquired. While the first cognitio sui is inborn and God-given, the second is
155 On the distinction between form and species in Richard Rufus, see Wood 2018: 85–8.
156 This is argued by Wood 2018: 85–8.
157 Wood (2018: 88–9) and Etchemendy and Wood (2011: 82) hold that this is the only author known
to hold this position before 1250, but as we will see Albert the Great’s De homine may also present
considerations partly to that effect, although in a more composite and complex theory.
158 See the analysis of Peter of Spain’s use of the flying man argument, which is thematically related
to these problems of self-knowledge, in Toivanen 2015: 75–8.
159 The titles of these three questions (nos. 2–4 of the first problema) are: Utrum cognitio de anima
sit nobis innate vel acquisita; utrum anima se ipsam cognoscat and utrum haec cognitio sit innata
animae aut acquisita.
160 He actually makes a Lockean tabula rasa argument from the passage about the empty writing
tablet in 3.4, 429b29–430a2 (which is not quite the use in Aristotle).
161 This stems from Avicenna De anima, 1.5, cf. Rohmer 1927. Wood 2018: 70 gives both these refer-
ences and notes Peter as a proponent of this view, cf. also Gilson 1929–1930: 106.
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the proper scientific knowledge (cognitio scientifica) about the soul.162 This distinction is traced
through the subsequent questions, where it seems important to him to emphasize the imme-
diate and essential self-knowledge as something prior to the secondary, derived and scientific
self-knowledge.163 These two aspects of immediate and mediated, essential and accidental,
self-knowledge are mapped to the agent and possible intellects giving them each a part of the
responsibility for the different aspects.164
The commentary by Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis is remarkable in its extent and his fa-
miliarity with the Aristotelian material. But it also includes much of the standard apparatus of
a full size sententia-commentary although it is an early text, probably from the 1240’s. Finally,
it also has the extended prefatory discussion of the science of the soul in 57 questions, virtually
a treatise on its own. It is indeed a very learned work. But as we have seen it is also very ori-
ginal, at least in its treatment of self-knowledge. It is intimately familiar with the Aristotelian
doctrines, but there is by no means a wholesale acceptance of them. Peter makes a conscious
effort of defending and maintaining the preserved doctrines of the church fathers and other
authorities by emphasizing the immediate and essential self-knowledge as prior to any derived
knowledge of the soul. At the same time the Aristotelian explanation is also given credit as a
proper scientific knowledge based on observation of external phenomena, and the Aristotelian
division of agent and possible intellect is used to explain this double doctrine of self-knowledge.
But the Aristotelian model never trumps the immediate, essential, and God-given self-presence
and subsequent self-knowledge that the soul will always have of itself. In this way it shows a
unique experiment in reconciling the two fundamentally different branches of self-knowledge
that run through the tradition.
In Scientia libri de anima, which is an independent treatise, also by Petrus Hispanus Por-
tugalensis, we recognize a picture more in line with the tractatus-genre. On the whole the
Neo-Platonic material is much stronger represented, and although there are some elements re-
sembling Aristotelian material, such as the distinction between the possible and agent intellect,
the doctrinal adaptation of the Stagerite’s philosophy does not go particularly deep.165 Where
we saw in his commentary that the possible intellect engages in mediated self-knowledge (to-
gether with the agent intellect), we find nothing of that in the treatise. The agent intellect on
the other hand facilitates self-knowledge and makes essential self-knowledge possible to the
individual.166 The treatise also contains a whole chapter on self-knowledge with a clear Au-
gustinian tendency. He explains that when done right (ductu proprio), the human intellect can
always engage in immediate and essential self-knowledge, but when the judgement or mental
focus of the individual is clouded by his bodily condition, this elevating self-knowledge will be
impeded. The described process of self-knowledge is more a mystical ascension than a rational
endeavour involving a connection with the true self in its purest and most elevated form, and
162 Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis Comm. DA, quaest. pream. I.2, pp. 65-66.
163 Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis Comm. DA, quaest. pream. I.3–5, pp. 67.19–70.27.
164 Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis Comm. DA, quaest. pream I.8–9, pp. 71.28–73.31.
165 Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis Scientia DA, tr. 10, cap. 5, pp. 371–73 and tr. 10, cap. 5, p. 374.
166 Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis Scientia DA, tr. 10, cap. 6, pp. 381.6–16 and tr. 10, cap. 6, pp.
383.7–12. The agent intellect as part of a larger system of separate intelligences, see tr. 10, cap. 7.
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with truths of higher stratospheric intelligences.167 So in comparison with his commentary,
some Aristotelian terminology or basic ideas are present, but no real effort is made at recon-
ciling that with the platonizing theological mysticism.
The three texts by two different authors surveyed here also present a varied picture. Ps.-
Petrus Hispanus presents us with a very early literal commentary where we find a clear return
to a position quite congenial with Averroes’s interpretation (although no reference is made).
The intellect can know itself by its own species once it has been actualized by an external
species, and this self-knowledge might contain some positive content over and above the mere
reflection of the external object. In contrast to this, Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis presents
an Aristotelian commentary and a theological treatise (Commentarius in libros De anima and
Scientia libri de anima). In his commentary on De anima he merges the Aristotelian model of
indirect and mediated self-knowledge with the Augustinian ideal of immediate and essential
self-knowledge. To do this he presents an original double doctrine of self-knowledge that
comprises both aspects and also maps the different types of self-knowledge to the distinction
between agent and possible intellect. In his later Scientia libri de anima this ambition is cast
aside for a thoroughly Augustinian argument of essential self-knowledge.
2.5.3 Adam Buckfield and Ps.-Adam Buckfield
Adam Buckfield was a highly productive Oxonian arts master in the 1240’s, but judging from
the prevalence of his commentaries his work also enjoyed a high popularity during the second
and third part of the 13th century.168 He commented on Physica, De caelo, De generatione et
corruptione, Aristotelis meteorologicorum libri quattuor , De mineralibus, De plantis, De anima,
De memoria et reminiscentia, De sensu et sensibilibus, De somno et vigilia, De morte et vita, De
differentia spiritus et animae, De causis andMetaphysica, mostly in the form of literal comment-
aries that often appear as glosses in the manuscripts of Aristoteles Latinus, but he did also use
the question format. He was a cleric in 1238 and master of arts by 1243, and his period of
lecturing on the Aristotelian tradition has been taken to start at 1238, but the end is uncertain.
As he is known to have a clerical career from 1249, it has been assumed that this marks the end
of his teaching career.169
His Sententia super librum De anima, a literal commentary, has been dated to between 1238
and 1249, and it may possibly be from before 1245.170 It has been discussed whether there are
167 Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis Scientia DA, tract. 10, cap. 7, pp. 398–401.
168 French 1998: 13–4 describes the wide geographical spread of his works in manuscripts throughout
France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Austria and England in a wide range of hands
of varying geographical origin. R. J. Long (2004) even writes that “… before the new translations
of Aristotle began to make their appearance in the 1260s, Adam was by every measure the most
influential English commentator on that philosopher.”
169 French 1998: 23–5, but also Callus 1939: 414–6, Noone 1992: 315–6 (refers this point to Steen-
berghen 1970: 140–3 and Callus 1963: 397, actually its 393). For more biographical information
and further literature, see Weijers 1994: 24–30, R. J. Long 2004, Bakker 2010, Pasnau and Dyke
2010: II.839 but not least also Lohr 1967: 317–24, Wood 2018: 50, and of course French 1998: 21–
62.
170 The date 1245 is given by Pasnau and Dyke 2010: II.839. Wood (2018: 48–54) argues that it is earlier
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one or several redactions.171 Gauthier thinks there is only one redaction with two so-called
redactions that have been mistakenly attributed to Adam but are actually not by him. One of
those is the last part of the Merton 272 witness (15v–22r), the other is the full commentary in
Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b.172 That analysis is reflected in the presentation of the manuscripts
by Weijers and Wood.173 In the following analysis we will pursue that hypothesis and refer to
the two texts as Buckfield and Ps.-Adam Buckfield respectively.174
We will start with Ps.-Adam Buckfield. In his comments on the first passage in De anima
3.4, 429b5–10 he highlights the distinction between primary and secondary actuality and no-
tices that when the intellect is in the first actuality, it is also able to know itself.175 In the later
discussion of the two aporiai he gets back to this. As is common, he first introduces the struc-
ture of the passage, the introduction of the two challenges and their subsequent solution. He
presents the second challenge, which is our main interest here, as a problem of whether the
intellect knows itself through itself or by its own species. He presents the dilemma as follows:
If the intellect knows itself by itself, then it would also be the case that all other intelligible
objects have self-knowledge. If however the intellect knew itself by its own species it would
know itself in the same way as it knows other objects of knowledge through their species. But
then he thinks it will follow that the intellect would not be in a state of knowing when it is
itself known, as it is the case with other objects of knowledge. Alternatively, if it is held that
it is in fact in a state of knowing when it is itself known, then all other objects of knowledge
would also know when they are known.176 The problem thus results from a strict parallelism
between the intellect and all other objects of knowledge. To avoid an infinite regress, it is
argued, the solution is to hold that the intellect knows itself by itself, and not by its species.
This is construed in parallel with the way the intellect knows immaterial substances without
an intermediary species. The essential self-knowledge is supported by the passage where Ar-
istotle explains that in immaterial substances there is an identity between the knower and the
than 1245.
171 Lohr 1967: 320–1 separates the witnesses into three redactions. According to him there are the
following witnesses. Redaction 1: Corpus Christi 111: 252a–294d, Madrid 1067: 73r-76v, Bologna
1180: 24a–53b, Canon. Misc. 322: 1–63v, BNF Lat. 6319: 112r—114r; Redaction 2: Ambros. 2° 318:
174ra–225a (new foliation, old: 173ra-223a), Merton 272: 1r–22r, Jagiellońska 726: 1r–40v, Madrid
9726: 82v, Vat. Urb. 206: 259a–299a, Marciana Lat. VI.1: 130b–161a; Redaction 3: Berlin SB 906:
115a–173b.
172 Gauthier 1984: 247*.
173 Weijers 1994: 25, Wood 2018: 59.
174 There should exist an edition of Buckfield’s text by Powell (1964), but it is not published, and I
have regrettably not been able to get a copy of the thesis, although it surely must contain much
valuable information on this question. I have therefore resorted to transcribing the text myself
from the sources that I have had access to. I provide a transcription of Ps.-Adam Buckfield’s text
in section C.3 on page 273 and a transcription of Buckfield’s text (based on Ambros. 2° 318: 216v–
217v) in section C.2 on page 270. In some places of the latter one or more of the manuscripts BNF
Lat. 6319: 130v, Canon. Misc. 322: 53ra, Vat. Urb. 206: 292v, and Bologna 2344: 48v–49r have
been included to help solve textual uncertainties. Bologna 2344: 24r-53v has been transcribed and
published online as part of the Richard Rufus Project, see Buckfield 2017.
175 Ps.-Adam Buckfield Exp. DA, Bk. 3, lect. 2, app 274.2–10.
176 Ps.-Adam Buckfield Exp. DA, Bk. 3, lect. 2, app 274.17–25.
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known.177
But he is also aware of the alternative doctrine of accidental self-knowledge held by Aver-
roes and others. Both expositions, he says, can be true and hold at the same time. Because
although the intellect knows itself by itself, it is abstracted from itself, and for this process
it needs an external species. Once the intellect has acquired some knowledge by a species
abstracted from an external object, then that species facilitates self-knowledge, because the
intellect can turn on itself and know itself. This exposition is closed with the note that this
external species is not the cause for the self-knowledge, but merely a necessary condition for
it.178 Finally, he points to the closing of the chapter where the distinction between the imma-
terial intellect and the material objects of knowledge steers us around the risk of all objects of
knowledge having reason.179
When we look at the Buckfield’s commentary, we find a very important difference. He
also argues for essential self-knowledge, but Averroes’ diverging view is presented as a point
of conflict. He does not seek to reconcile the two, but merely says that the commentator does
not solve the problem in his suggested way, but rather follows the alternative solution where
the intellect is known through its species. He finds it to be clear that his solution is correct,
and supports it with reference to a certain translation of the text as well as Aristotle’s view at
the closing of the chapter.180 Here we might inject that Buckfield is generally considered to be
a very averroist interpreter of Aristotle.181 Gauthier even finds that his servility to the Com-
mentator diminishes the interest of the work as a predictable and uninteresting vulgarization
that made Averroes more approachable to the masses.182 And Gauthier may be right about this
in most respects, but when we come to this particular conflict between the Averroist and the
Avicennean traditions, he clearly sides with the Avicennean position and explicitly rejects that
of Averroes.183
So according to this reading Buckfield rejects the conventional solution of Averroes and
presents a doctrine of essential self-knowledge. In Ps.-Adam Buckfield on the other hand we
have an arts master from around the middle of the 13th century who, much like Petrus His-
177 Ps.-Adam Buckfield Exp. DA, Bk. 3, lect. 2, app 275.1–8.
178 Ps.-Adam Buckfield Exp. DA, Bk. 3, lect. 2, app 275.9–19.
179 Ps.-Adam Buckfield Exp. DA, Bk. 3, lect. 2, app 275.20–27.
180 The reference to some translation in support of an essential self-knowledge is highly interesting.
Unfortunately the witnesses that I have had access to do not agree about the details. In some places
it reads “nostram translationem”, in others “aliam translationem” and finally “illam translationem”
is also to be found. I have followed my base text, the Erfurt manuscript, which has “nostram” along
with two of the other five included manuscripts, but it may be wrong. See Buckfield Bk. 3, lect. 2,
app 272.16–18, where the readings are listed.
181 On his averroism, see for instance French 1998: 25–6, Bakker 2010. Hasse also often clusters
Buckfield togetherwith PetrusHispanus Portugalensis andThomasAquinas in preferringAverroes
over Avicenna; see Hasse 2000: 68, 75, 106.
182 Gauthier 1984: 248*.
183 Another example of his ambitions of combining the preserved (mostly theological) wisdom and the
challenges of an Averroistic reading of Aristotle is found in his discussion of multiple substances of
the soul in the same De anima-exposition. This is analysed with an edition of the relevant excerpt
in Callus 1939.
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panus Portugalensis, presents a combined interpretation with an ambition of reconciling the
essential and accidental model of self-knowledge. It is hard to determine whether the solu-
tion tends more to the essential or accidental model. It certainly seems at first that he prefers
the essential model of the Avicennian tradition where the immateriality of the intellect itself
is sufficient for self-knowledge. But the concession to Averroes is so strong that he actually
ends up admitting that the external species may not be a cause, but it is after all a necessary
condition for intellectual self-knowledge. But reading the text still gives the impression that
the essential model represents his preferred solution to this phenomenon, although he cannot
reject the authority of the Commentator, and that forces him into an conciliatory position.
2.5.4 Albert the Great
As we move on to Albert the Great we will see that he also seeks to reconcile the Aristotelian
and Augustinian models of self-knowledge, and that he also uses the duality of agent and pos-
sible intellect as a tool to this end. As we will see, Albert distinguishes between different types
of self-knowledge but on the whole his solution is more sympathetic to the Aristotelian model
than the medieval treatises preceding him. I will focus on the two texts on the subject that are
most closely related to the Aristotelian tradition, namely his De homine and De anima.
In the section on the agent intellect of De homine Albert faces the challenge of whether
the agent intellect always knows, perceives and thinks of itself.184 He also takes up the known
passages from Liber de causis (which he attributes to Aristotle) that profess a necessary and es-
sential self-knowledge of immaterial intellects, as well as the known (Augustinian or Platonic)
thesis that when the intellect is always and essentially present to itself, it also always and es-
sentially has knowledge of itself.185 He answers that the agent intellect only has perpetual
self-knowledge in a very limited sense. Neither the possible nor the agent intellect posses a
perfected knowledge by itself, it only exists between the two in unity, and this means that the
agent intellect does not have an actualized perpetual knowledge of itself.186 In the indetermin-
ate state of the possible intellect before knowing a primary object it also knows itself, but only
improperly (improprie). In this context Albert has an interesting interpretation of the light-
analogy. Before any actual intellection the agent intellect is present in the possible intellect in
the same way as light is present in the eye when no colour is present. It is there, but it affects
no change. This latent actuality does not, according to Albert, conflict with the indeterminate
nature of the possible intellect.187
He can thus conclude that although there is this limited self-knowledge, it is indeterminate.
What could be considered real self-knowledge as the intellect’s knowledge of itself as a distinct
intelligible object is only intermittent and contingent upon reflection on external objects.188
184 Albert the Great Hom. 420.8–29. References to De homine and De anima are made to the page
and line numbers of the Cologne edition. The sections discussed here belong under the general
heading De anima rationali.
185 Albert the Great Hom. 420.45–63.
186 Albert the Great Hom. 421.41–50.
187 Albert the Great Hom. 421.55–70.
188 Albert the Great Hom. 421.71–422.17.
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By establishing this distinction he finds the challenges of substantial self-knowledge of Liber
de causis mitigated, and he similarly refutes the assumption of self-presence as constitutive
of self-knowledge by arguing that it is not a sufficient cause, as external objects still need to
actualize the intellect. But he also makes a short reference to the concomitant and necessary
self-knowledge that we have already identified in the early commentary tradition. He quotes
Alexander (as the author of De anima mantissa) for this identity doctrine. But at the same time
he makes the supplementary note that it is not entirely conditioned upon external stimulation
as it is still available to the intellect whenever it wants (quando voluerit).189 This indicates
that the intellect can realize a proper self-knowledge where the intellect becomes the primary
object of reflection on its own accord.190
Finally, we can look to his paraphrase of De anima. While De homine is written in 1241–
42 the paraphrase is around 15 years later (1254–57). In the paraphrase of 3.4, 429b5–9, on
levels of actuality and possible self-knowledge, he clearly emphasizes how knowledge of ex-
ternal objects affects a contentless and concomitant self-knowledge akin to the Alexandrian
also mentioned above.191 But when we look to his discussion of the second aporia in 429b22–
30a9 it is not entirely clear how the intelligibility of the intellect correlates with the preceding
distinctions. He says that it is intelligible by its own intentio, which makes it similar to other
intelligible objects, but that no process of abstraction is involved (unlike other intelligible ob-
jects). The abstraction is not necessary as it is already immaterial and present to itself.192 It
looks like this intentio is not the same as the one realized as the subject of external objects in
the paraphrase of 3.4, 429b5–9 (actually he seems to deny that explicitly in lines 27–31), but as
it is also not based on previous sense perception, we here approach an essential and immediate
self-knowledge.
It should be apparent that Albert presents us with a range of different aspects of self-
knowledge. In the context of a philosophical analysis of the soul he talks about an improper
self-knowledge that is always somehow present in the soul, and a self-knowledge that comes
from external stimuli. When the agent and possible intellect in unison realize a form of an
external species in the intellect it will be able to acquire knowledge about these aspects of the
intellect itself. In this way it might be argued that Albert seeks to reconcile the Augustinian and
Aristotelian model by considering the Augustinian perpetual and immediate self-knowledge a
foundation that enables any intellectual activity, but when it comes to real analysis of the soul
and its properties, the Aristotelian dependence of external stimuli is necessary.
189 Albert the Great Hom. 426.62–427.15.
190 We find different doctrines of essential self-knowledge in a later discussion of his concept of
memory. Albert the Great Hom. pp. 548.23–550.4. We cannot determine here whether this is
in conflict with or merely a complement to the presented doctrines. Cory 2014: 35–7 finds four
different, but co-existing, kinds of self-knowledge, while Lambert 2007: 20 finds them inconsistent.
191 Albert the Great 199.22–69.
192 Albert the Great 203.25–78, this idea is very close to what we just saw in Ps.-Adam Buckfield on
page 50.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have given an overview of the main sources and positions on intellectual self-
knowledge that pave the way for the included De anima commentaries. The sources that I
have presented are Aristotle himself, some of his most prominent Ancient commentators, a
little Neo-Platonic material, Avicenna and Averroes and finally a selection of texts focused on
the soul from the Latin middle ages before the spread ofDe anima commentaries after 1252. We
have seen that there are twomain approaches to explaining intellectual self-knowledge, namely
as something the soul or intellect can engage in on its own accord without any dependence on
external stimuli, or as an activity that is contingent upon a cognition of some external body.
These two positions are extremes on a spectrum, but broadly speaking interpreters of a Neo-
Platonic bend prefer the former while interpreters of a more Peripatetic adherence prefer the
latter.
One could say that the problem of intellectual self-knowledge is present in Aristotle, but
only in embryonic form. He clearly acknowledges the existence of both perceptual and intellec-
tual self-awareness as phenomena. But whereas he presents some discussions of the problems
involved in perceptual self-awareness, intellectual self-knowledge is not investigated as thor-
oughly. This means that we are mostly left with a few asides along with what we can surmise
from his comparison of perception and intellect as well as his short discussion of the more
general problem of the intelligibility of the soul. It is not clear whether only have the thin
concept of self-knowledge as an epiphenomenon of the cognitive process without any positive
content on its own, or whether it actually may be possible to acquire knowledge about the
intellect or soul through introspection. This need not be a binary distinction, but the answer
to that possibility is also left open. There is however not much indicating that Aristotle would
be ready to abandon he assumption that knowledge is predetermined by sense stimuli.
This situation leaves the Aristotelian commentators with a lot to work with. Alexander
of Aphrodisias presents an interpretation that puts a strong emphasis on the epiphenomenal
model: The framework of form assimilation that cognition is based on means that when the
intellect reflects on an external object, it becomes itself that object, and through its reflection
on the object that it has then intermittently become, it also, accidentally, reflects on itself. But
this reflection yields no knowledge aside from that of the external object, and thus provides no
information about the intellect or soul. In broad terms, Themistius and Philoponus follow this
Alexandrian model, while the fourth author writing in the commentary genre, Ps.-Simplicius,
takes a very different approach.
Ps.-Simplicius is heavily influenced by the alternative model of self-knowledge provided
by the Neo-Platonic tradition. Although the idea has a longer legacy, the theoretical founda-
tion of this approach from Late Antiquity is Plotinus. With his highly developed metaphysics
of soul and being, immediate and essential self-knowledge as a property of intellect becomes
very prominent. We saw how that is expressed in Liber de causis where the immaterial sub-
stance returns to itself and has complete knowledge of its own essence. In Augustine this idea
is further developed with the view that the soul or mind is something that, at least in principle,
is completely transparent and available to itself. The basic explanation of this lies in the imma-
teriality of the soul. So although the soul can become impeded by its bond with the physical
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world, it will be able to know itself immediately and completely, once it can free itself from
those shackles.
In the Arabic tradition we find these twomain branches represented in Avicenna and Aver-
roes. Avicenna argues for the immediate and essential self-knowledge of the soul, while Aver-
roes maintains that the intellect cannot know anything about itself without a preceding cogni-
tion of an external object. There are also indications in his commentary on De anima that such
an occasioned self-knowledge actually also has some positive content over and above that of
the external object. This means that such accidental self-knowledge would actually be able to
provide some knowledge about the intellect or maybe the soul more generally.
Finally, we saw how the Latinmedieval solutions before 1250 generally are heavily inspired
by the Avicennian model until around 1240. Around that time the epiphenomenal interpreta-
tion, that has a stronger affiliation with the text of Aristotle, resurfaces. Ps.-Petrus Hispanus
accepts that solution while Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, who is also highly familiar with the
model, tries to incorporate it into the Augustinian model in his commentary on De anima. But
when it comes to his later independent work, the Aristotelian model is completely gone in fa-
vour of complete acceptance of the Platonic solution. We have found a similar pursuit in Adam
Buckfield who, within the confines of an exposition of De anima, maintains the model of es-
sential self-knowledge and explicitly rejects the accidental model that he ascribes to Averroes.
In the related commentary by Ps.-Adam Buckfield we find a rare example of an endeavour to
reconcile the two models. He tries to combine the Augustinian and Averroist approaches in
a single coherent presentation, even within the narrow confines of an exposition of De anima
3.4. Albert the Great finally also struggles with this conflict. In general he is more sympathetic
to the Aristotelian model than Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis, although he does not accept it as
immediately as Ps.-Petrus Hispanus. Like Peter of Spain, Albert uses the Peripatetic model of
agent and possible intellect to establish a distinction between perpetual and intermittent self-
knowledge. But unlike Peter, who prioritizes the perpetual variant, Albert does not accept that
as proper self-knowledge. It is nonetheless still necessary as the antropo-ontological bedrock




questions on De anima 3.4
In this chapter I will (1) introduce the texts and themes concerning self-knowledge discussed
in questions on De anima 3.4, (2) survey the different ideas and doctrines as they occur in the
commentaries, and (3) analyse the network revealed by the material used in the commentaries.
These three objectives cannot be realized in parallel, so the chapter consists of three main sec-
tions. In the first section I give a brief overview of the problems concerning self-knowledge,
followed by a presentation of all the different doctrinal elements that are used in the comment-
aries, and in the third section I draw out the relations between the commentaries that can be
gleaned from the composition of their arguments. This chapter will therefore not contain a
detailed study of any one of the presented commentaries, but rather situate them in relation to
each other based on outlines of their arguments. The first section gives an impression of the
field of problems, the second maps these components to specific applications within the texts,
and the third section finally gives a birds eye view of the network that makes up these texts.
Throughout the chapter I continually refer to the general inventory of doctrines that can be
found in the appendix in section A on page 241. These are merely abstracted from the detailed
analysis, but provided there for reference. Doctrinal points and positive elements are referred
to with a prefixed ‘P’, while arguments employed to attack the accepted doctrines (mostly in the
rationes principales) are prefixed with a ‘N’. The doctrines are also registered in a database by
which it is possible to reveal sophisticated relations within the material and perform extensive
quantitative analyses.1 Those registrations are the basis for the appendix list as well as the
analyses in section 3.3.
The Aristotelian passages that let our commentators raise their questions are De anima
3.4, 429b5–10 and 429b22–430a2. The first passage introduces the distinction between first
and second actuality with relation to the activities of the intellect and present the possibility
1 The registration is performed according to the general principles presented in section 1.3 on
page 7 in the introduction. The Jupyter Notebook that contains the calculations (as well as a lot
of extra details and illustrative graphs) can be found at https://github.com/stenskjaer/dissertation-
notebooks/blob/master/self-knowledge-book-3.ipynb.
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of intellectual self-knowledge. In the second passage he presents the two aporiai, how the
intellect can have knowledge when it is impassive, and whether it itself is intelligible. It is of
course the latter of those two that inspire our commentators. This is not least the case for the
commentators who focus on the problem of essential self-knowledge, as that is also a possibility
that is included in Aristotle’s own discussion of the intelligibility of the intellect.2
The texts investigated in this section are a subset of all the question commentaries con-
tained in this study.3 A commentary has been included in this chapter if it contains one or
more questions concerning self-knowledge in the part of the commentary that deals with the
material from De anima 3.4. This means that this chapter comprises all commentaries within
the period that I have had access to that treat of this question. There is however an exception
to that statement, as Adam Whitby formally qualifies on these given principles, but has been
removed from the investigation. An analysis of his text showed that in both structure and con-
tent it was so different that an inclusion of it would contribute little to the investigation of the
other included commentaries while also not do justice to the nature of his text in itself.4 The
included question commentaries can thus be seen in table 3.1 on the next page. In this group
of commentaries we find an range of different questions concerning self-knowledge. The titles
of the questions can be grouped as follows:
(1) Whether the intellect is intelligible. Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus Assisi, Radulphus
Brito.
(2) Whether the (possible) intellect is able to know itself. Anonymus Digby 55, John of
Jandun.
(3) Whether the intellect knows itself by its own essence/substance or by something else.
Simon of Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, John Dinsdale, Henric de la Wyle.
(4) Whether the intellect can knows its own act of knowing. Anonymus Bazán, Radulphus
Brito, John of Jandun.
(5) Whether the possible intellect can know the agent intellect. Anonymus Bazán, Siger of
Brabant, and Radulphus Brito.
(6) Whether the possible intellect knows the agent intellect with an unchanged and numer-
ically identical intellection. John of Jandun.
2 Both passages are treated more extensively in the preceding historical chapter on pages 26–28.
3 All the included texts and the principles of the selection of them can be found in 1.4 on page 13.
4 To document this conclusion I include my edition of the relevant question in the appendix (sec-
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Context Doctrines Instances Proportion
Determination 34 93 2.74
Attack 28 61 2.18
Refutation 23 62 2.70
All 74 216 2.92
Table 3.2: Number of doctrines and instances in four different context classes.
3.1 Overview
I here give a quantitative summary of the different doctrines of the commentaries, and an
overview of the main argumentative strategies and possible challenges they present. In table
3.2 we find the quantities of doctrines and instances of those doctrines within four different
contexts. From that we see that the amount of doctrines used in a determination of a question
is slightly higher than the doctrines that have only been registered in the context of rationes
principales (i.e. “Attacks” and “Refutations” in the table). We also notice that the attacking
doctrines have a lower instance-to-doctrine proportion than the other two categories. This
means that they are re-used less often across different commentaries than the refutation and
determination doctrines. There is therefore a wider spread of doctrines in the rationes than in
determinations and refutations.
Of course these doctrines are not evenly distributed across the commentators. Half the
doctrines are only used once or twice, while 75% occur six times or less. The upper quartile
(the most common 25%) has a range of 6 to 32 instances of the doctrines, with the idea that
the possible intellect is completely indeterminate before actualization (P4) at the highest end
of the range with 32 instances. As we will see in the following analysis, this and a small group
of other doctrines are highly productive and can be used in different ways and contexts by
the commentators. While we have this small group of doctrines that are very commonly used,
there is also a long tail of doctrines with relatively few instances. These relations are illustrated
in figure 3.1 on the facing page where the amount of instances per doctrine is plotted. When
we look at the distribution of unique and shared doctrines (i.e. doctrines used by a single or
multiple authors respectively), we see however that most authors have relatively few unique
doctrines, as more than half the commentators have only 13.5% or less of their doctrines that
are unique. But we have a small group of commentators, Anonymus Digby 55, John of Jandun,
and Siger of Brabant, and Radulphus Brito, with a high proportion of unique doctrines (between
25 and 60%).5
The main problems of the commentators can be split into four different areas, three con-
stitutive and one peripheral. The constitutive problems are:
5 In fact the frequencies of doctrine instances, the proportion of unique and shared doctrines, and
the absolute frequencies of unique doctrines all seem to approximate a power law of distribution
(figure 3.1 on the next page exemplifies this, but there are more graphs in the online notebook).
Whether this reflects a general tendency of shared and unique doctrines in these texts would be
















Figure 3.1: Doctrine to instance proportions of all doctrines in the chapter. Each bar
represents a doctrine.
(1) Is the intellect intelligible?
(2) Is the intellect intelligible to itself?
(3) How does such self-knowledge come about?
The peripheral question is (4) how is general knowledge about the intellect acquired? This
last question can arise in or be affected by any of the three constitute questions in different
ways. The answer to each of the constitutive questions assumes the affirmative answer of the
preceding, while the peripheral and more general question only assumes an affirmative answer
of the first constitutive question. The commentaries naturally move within a spectrum which
is here artificially demarcated by these presented problems. Any reader of these texts will
recognize that these distinctions are not necessarily reflected in the texts, as the commentators
combine discussions of these different areas of analysis in their work.
Can the intellect be an object of knowledge? Thismost fundamental question is the starting
point of thewhole analysis, but it is not rare to find it postulated or tacitly assumed. And often it
is not even addressed in the part of a commentary that concernsDe anima 3.4, as it may already
have been dealt with in the commentary on book one. As we shall see in the next chapter,
the initial questions of a commentary very often take up questions of method, possibility, and
process of conducting a science of the soul. Some commentators also discuss whether the agent
intellect is intelligible. When it is accepted that the intellect can be an object of knowledge, the
next question is whether that knowledge can be acquired reflexively. That would mean that an
individual intellect is both the subject and object of the act of knowledge. This is a principled
question that focuses on the ontology of the intellect: Is the intellect a substance that has the
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ability of engaging in a reflexive activity? It is traditionally assumed that such substances exist.
The prime mover and the separate intelligences (God and the angels in theological parlance)
are such immaterial substances able to reflect on themselves. But the human intellect is the
first actuality of matter that is potentially alive (or a constitutive part of such a form), which
means that it is closely connected with a body. Does that impose any restrictions on its ability
of self-reflection?
The commentators do agree, when they address the question explicitly, that the intellect
is intelligible and self-intelligible. The simple intelligibility of the intellect is established by
pointing to the fact that it can become any object of knowledge. This means of course that
when it becomes an object of knowledge, it is also itself intelligible. But it does not mean that
the intellect is intelligible unconditionally. The intellect is only intelligible once it has been
actualized by an external object of knowledge. To further support that the intellect is also
intelligible to itself, a commentator may appeal to the phenomenal awareness that we seem to
experience during the processing of intellection. The experience of thinkingmakes the intellect
aware that it is disposed towards such activities and hence must have some faculty that is able
to carry it out. But it can also be argued from a more focused process of self-observation where
the intellect is able to reflect on its own activity. The commentators can be vague about how
that self-reflection is realized, but references to Neo-Platonic doctrines of reflexivity are not
rare.
If we assume or argue that the intellect is self-intelligible, we may ask how that knowledge
comes about. Is it possible to describe the elements, processes, or possible steps involved in the
acquisition of that knowledge? We find discussion of this especially in the question raised by
many on whether the intellect knows itself through its own substance or through something
else. This is a reflection of the aporia that Aristotle himself raises at the end of De anima 3.4,
which is also regularly the occasion for raising the question of self-knowledge in the comment-
aries.6 If the intellect is able to know and understand itself without any external help, either
by perpetually having such a knowledge or by being able to initiate it on its own accord, the
intellect may be said to have an essential self-knowledge. It is then part of the essence of the in-
tellect to have knowledge of itself. That would be a version of the Augustinian and Avicennean
model outlined in the preceding chapter.7 If that is not the case, the self-knowledge will be ac-
cidental and contingent on some factors that lie partly outside the intellect’s power. Such an
interpretation would be more in line with what can be found in some of the Greek comment-
ators, in particular Alexander of Aphrodisias, and later in Averroes and a few of the earlier
medieval commentators.8 The arts masters included here also subscribe to that solution: They
all argue that the intellect knows itself through the intermediate actualization by an external
species.
We may accept that the intellect can be an object of self-knowledge, but how do we acquire
knowledge about the intellect? This is the more general and peripheral question mentioned
above that also makes occasional appearances in this context. Such knowledge can either be
acquired through pure observation of beings possessed with intellect, through introspection
6 The aporia is also treated on pages 28–30 of section 2.1.3.
7 See in particular parts of sections 2.3 to 2.4 on pages 34–37.
8 See in particular sections 2.2 on page 30 and on pages 38–39 in section 2.4 as well as on pages 47–48.
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of the processes of a particular intellect, or through a combination of both. The assumption
that self-knowledge plays into knowledge about the intellect more generally demands that we
are able to explain not only that self-knowledge is possible, but also that it can yield general
knowledge about the intellect. If we want to argue that knowledge about the intellect is ac-
quired solely from self-knowledge, we need to show convincingly that introspection can yield
knowledge of the third level mentioned in the previous section. An alternative strategy would
be to combine introspection with observation of the activities of other beings endowed with
intelligence, and in a combined effort of internal and external observation produce a coher-
ent knowledge of the intellect. Such problems will re-appear in the next chapter where such
discussions in the introductory questions are analysed. As a preface to that treatment we will
see here how it is also a subject within the potentially more narrow discussion of intellectual
self-knowledge in the commentaries on book three.
3.2 Arguments
Here I map the many to the commentaries where they occur. This survey of the network will
show which arguments are used in different contexts and by the different commentators. In
this way some relations within the material will start to emerge. In the next section those
relations will be further expanded and elaborated. The doctrines included can be found in the
simplified list in section A on page 241 of the appendix. To keep the presentation of the doc-
trines as systematic as possible, this analysis contains many highly nested sections. Hopefully
the impediment that gives on readability is made up for in our ability to reference the atomic
parts of this catalogue of arguments. The material is generally organized and presented in
accordance with its relative prevalence in the commentaries.
The section contains four subsections:
(1) Intelligibility and self-intelligibility.
(2) Process of self-knowledge: By external species.
(3) Self-knowledge by own species.
(4) The possible intellect knowing the agent intellect.
The first three sections constitute the core part of this section detailing the arguments of
whether and how intellectual self-knowledge is possible. The last section addresses the more
specific perspective of the relation between the possible and agent intellect.
In the first three sections the arguments of the commentators will be used and analysed
freely across the three, as the separation of the issues into three sections is only partially re-
flected in the sources. The phrasings of the questions analysed in these sections and the com-
mentators presenting them are:
(1) Whether the intellect is intelligible. Presented by Anonymus Bazán and Brito.
(2) Whether the intellect can know its own act of knowing. Presented by Anonymus Bazán,
Brito, Jandun.
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(3) Whether the (possible) intellect is able to know itself. Presented by Anonymus Digby
55, Jandun.
(4) Whether the intellect is intelligible in itself just as its proper object. Presented by An-
onymus Assisi.
(5) Whether the intellect knows itself by its own essence/substance or by something else.
Presented by Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle.
(6) Whether the intellect knows itself by a species. Presented by Anonymus Digby 55.
Each question by any commentator may contain material that could pertain to any of the three
first subsections, but in general the material is distributed in the following way: Items 1 to 4
containmaterial that is analysed in the first and second section. Items 5mostly containmaterial
that is analysed in the second section, while the last item almost exclusively contain material
that pertains to the third section.
Finally, we will treat the more narrow topic of the relation between the possible and agent
intellect in the last section. It is treated in two questions:
(1) Whether the possible intellect can know the agent intellect. Presented by Anonymus
Bazán, Siger of Brabant, and Brito.
(2) Whether the possible intellect knows the agent intellect with an unchanged and numer-
ically identical intellection. Presented by Jandun
3.2.1 Intelligibility and self-intelligibility
It does not follow by necessity from the fact that the intellect can be an object of knowledge
that it can be the object of its own knowledge. Usually these two aspects are treated as one and
the same question by the commentators, but two commentators, Anonymus Bazán and Brito,
at least try to separate them formally.9 We will also see arguments from Anonymus Digby
55, Anonymus Assisi, and Jandun.10 The main conclusion is that all commentators subscribe
to the same basic argument, that the intellect only can be an object of knowledge once it has
been actualized by an external species (P13), which results in the similar limitation in relation
to self-intelligibility (P8). As already pointed out, several of included treatments straddle both
the question of intelligibility and the process of self-knowledge, so they will be covered in both
this and the following subsection.
3.2.1.1 Positive arguments
We will begin with the narrow case of general intelligibility and then move on to the more
typical discussion that includes self-intelligibility.
9 Anonymus Bazán III.9, Brito III.10.
10 The questions are to be found in Anonymus Digby 55 III.11, app 281.2, Anonymus Bazán III.9, pp.
483–85, Anonymus Bazán III.10, pp. 485–86, Brito III.10, pp. 187–191, Brito III.11, pp. 192–193,
Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.2–3, Jandun III.13, app 321.2–3, Jandun III.27, app 324.2.
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3.2.1.1.1 Intelligible through external species (P13)
(1) Any actualized thing can be an object of knowledge.
(2) The intellect is actualized by an external species.
(3) ∴The intellect can be an object of knowledge through actualization by an external spe-
cies.
Anonymus Bazán and Brito present this argument. Brito explains that the intellect potentially
is all intelligible objects, and therefore also itself intelligible, but only in a qualified sense. The
intellect may somehow be intelligible in itself and be some sort of act, he argues, but it cannot
be known unconditionally by us in this terrestrial condition, because our cognition takes its
starting point in sense perception. So because the intellect and its activities are not available to
sense perception, it cannot be known by humans except by its knowledge of something else.11
Anonymus Bazán gives us only a short determinationwhere he focuses on how the intellect
can become any intelligible thing, but leaves out the important qualification that the intellect
only is intelligible once actualized. So although he holds that it is intelligible by an external
species, it is unclear from his determination if the intellect always is actually intelligible in
its state of potentially knowing all objects of knowledge. As his description of the possible
intellect as intelligible is not really qualified, he owes us some stronger arguments to show that
non-restricted intelligibility follows from the potential identity with any intelligible objects.12
In question III.13 Jandun discusses concomitant (i.e. non-successive) and necessary self-
reflection that takes place during the process of intellection (P54). As part of that he quickly
determineswhat he clearly considers the simple part of the question, namely that the intellect is
intelligible to itself, but his argument actually only shows that the intellect may be intelligible.
He says that as the intellect is capable of knowing any thing, and the act of the intellect is a thing
(ens), it can know the act of the intellect (P7).13 That is his laconic answer to the question of
whether the intellect is self-intelligible, but it of course entails the necessity of an actualization
by an external species.14 From this he seems to assume self-intelligibility.
3.2.1.1.2 Self-intelligible through external species (P8)
(1) The intellect is potentially any intelligible object.
(2) When the intellect is actualized by the species of an intelligible object, it can know itself.
(3) ∴The intellect has the capacity to know itself.
This argument is a stronger version of the just presented P13. This provides a very fundamental
argument that every commentator makes implicit or explicit use of. We should notice here
that the minor of the syllogism is the knob of the whole argument and the main challenge.
11 Brito III.10, pp. 187.21–188.33.
12 Anonymus Bazán III.9, p. 483.28–33.
13 Jandun III.13, app 321.27–32 and III.27, app 324.34–37.
14 In the next section we will outline his further arguments for the process of self-knowledge, but it
is also analysed in the detailed study in section 5.1.1 on page 163.
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For it is not yet clear here how the intellect can actually know itself once actualized. We will
here see how these commentators differ slightly in their exposition of this argument, and the
next section will dig into exactly how the different commentators support the minor in this
argument as we analyse their exposition of the process of self-knowledge.
Anonymus Bazán presents the following short syllogism: The intellect is somehow (quo-
modo) in potency towards all objects of knowledge; the act of knowing is somehow intelligible;
hence, the intellect knows its own act of knowing. To this is added a short note on the order of
these activities: First the intellect knows its primary objects of knowledge, but then, second-
arily and consequently, it knows its own act of knowing (P14).15
The other commentators do not hedge their argument as Anonymus Bazán and cut out
the ‘somehow’. Anonymus Assisi simply states that in itself the intellect is only potentially
intelligible as it is receptive to all intelligible forms, but once it is actualized by any such form,
it is also able to know itself. During that argument he makes explicit reference to Liber de causis
(which he knows is by an anonymous author) and its doctrine of reditio completa.16 Anonymus
Digby 55 presents a very similar argument which also includes the idea of the successive order
of knowledge (cf. P14).17
Brito distinguishes his question on self-intelligibility into whether the intellect can know
its own powers and its own activity. He first argues that the intellect engage in an act of
self-observation (P5) which gives it knowledge of its own powers through inspection of its
activities. This of course requires preceding actualization and hence implies that the soul is
self-intelligible through an external species (P7), but also a successive model of self-knowledge
(P14), as the external species provides the required initial actualization of the intellect, although
he does not spell that out explicitly.18 This already implies that the intellect can also know its
own activity, but he supports it further. Given that a superior faculty is more powerful than
an inferior, and given that the power of perception can perceive its own activity, he concludes
that this must also be the case for the intellective power (P53). He further argues, also with
reference to the reditio completa-doctrine of Liber de causis, that all immaterial powers are able
to reflect on their own activity in a complete return to themselves (P5), which differentiates it
from the bodily faculty of sense perception.19
15 Anonymus Bazán III.10, p. 485.30–36. This distinction between stepwise or discursive and im-
mediate knowledge may go back to Aristotle to some extent as we find him describing the non-
discursive and immediate self-knowledge of the divine thought inMetaphysica 12.9, 1075a5–7. But
it is much more developed in the later Neo-Platonic tradition, cf. the sources in Sorabji 2005a: 90–
3.
16 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.25–278.8, cf. Anonymus Liber de causis, XV.124–125. This is based
on the identity of knower and known, and it is emphasized that this self-reflective return does not
require any external support or impulse (Anonymus Liber de causis, XV.126 and XV.128).
17 Anonymus Digby 55 III.12, app 281.7–12. On the successive self-knowledge, cf. also 3.2.2.1.6 on
page 77.
18 Brito III.11, ll. 34–55.
19 Brito III.11, ll. 56–65. We will get back to some further details of Brito’s discussion on page 76.
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3.2.1.2 Challenges to intelligibility
On the question of the mere intelligibility Radulphus Brito and Anonymus Bazán agree on all
three of their rationes, so we will present those arguments first. In the next section we will see
that the challenges to the more typical question of self-intelligibility have a wider spread, and
are more numerous, but that Brito and Anonymus Bazán still run in parallel.
3.2.1.2.1 The possible intellect is not actualized (N21)
(1) All that is intelligible is actual.
(2) The intellect is not actual.
(3) ∴The intellect is not intelligible.
This attack hinges on the definition of the possible intellect as indeterminate. The argument
fails to qualify the indeterminacy, so that is all the commentator needs to do to refute it. An-
onymus Bazán attacks the challenge by stating that the possible intellect is actualized, although
not by itself, but by another species, which then makes it available for intellection.20 Brito
presents the similar argument that the intellect is known by its relation (habitudo) towards the
intellection (of another species) by which it is actualized.21 They thus both refer to the basic
idea of actualization by an external species (P7) as the basis for the refutation.
3.2.1.2.2 Identity of mover and moved (N3)
(1) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect.
(2) If the intellect knew itself, it would be mover and moved in the same time and in the
same respect.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot know itself.
Here we see that although this is formally an argument against self-knowledge, it is also used
in this context of the intelligibility, as those two problems obviously overlap conceptually for
the commentators. Anonymus Bazán and Brito refute the argument in completely parallel
fashion: This argument only holds when you speak of movement in a narrow sense (proprie),
not when it is used metaphorically, as is the case with the type of non-physical movement that
takes place in the process of intellection (P41).22
3.2.1.2.3 Requirement of sense perception (N4)
(1) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
(2) The intellect is not available to sense perception
(3) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
20 Anonymus Bazán III.9, p. 482.5–11 and 483.34–41.
21 Brito III.10, ll. 2–4 and 93–98.
22 See Brito III.10, ll. 1–18 and ll. 93–118 and Anonymus Bazán III.9, ll. 1–25 and ll. 34–59.
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Anonymus Bazán’s answer to this challenge may raise some eyebrows: The intellect is not
available to sense perception (“non cadit sub sensu”) in itself, but its objects are sensible. And
when it has acquired knowledge of those sensible objects, it becomes itself available to sense
perception (P47).23 This should mean that once the possible intellect has been informed by a
species that has its origin in an object that is available to sense perception, which means that
it is material, it becomes itself available to sense perception. Which again would mean that the
possible intellect becomes material once actualized.
This doctrine is not mirrored by Brito. He says that the intellect is not perceptible, neither
in itself, nor by its activity. Instead he refutes the initial argument with the statement that
something can be intelligible by itself or by the knowledge of something else (P1). That which
is intelligible secondarily need not be available to sense perception, as it is sufficient that the
objects by which it is known are perceptible. Fortunately, that is exactly the case for the pos-
sible intellect, and he can therefore maintain its intelligibility as well as its immateriality.24
3.2.1.3 Challenges to self-intelligibility
The preceding short list of challenges to the mere intelligiblity of the intellect is dwarfed by this
more extensive list of challenges concerning self-intelligiblity. In particular Jandun is generous
with his arguments.
3.2.1.3.1 Proper objects (N16)
(1) The intellect knows its objects of knowledge.
(2) The intellect is not its own object of knowledge.
(3) ∴The intellect is not intelligible to itself.
In their subsequent question on the self-intelligibility of the intellect Anonymus Bazán and
Brito address this in parallel fashion: They both return to the distinction between primary
and secondary intellection (P1), holding that the object of primary intellection is the species
of external objects, but that this does not hinder the intellection of those objects in being the
object of secondary intellection.25 And in this way the intellect has knowledge of its own
activity.
3.2.1.3.2 Analogy with sense and sensation (N12)
(1) As the senses stand to sensation, so does the intellect stand to knowing.
(2) The senses cannot perceive their own sensation
(3) ∴The intellect cannot know its own knowing.
23 Anonymus Bazán III.9, ll. 53–59.
24 Brito III.10, p. 190.112–118.
25 Brito III.11 ll. 3–6 and 66-70, Anonymus Bazán III.10, ll. 6–10 and 30–36, mirroring their solution
to the related challenge in 3.2.1.2.2 on the previous page.
arguments 69
Anonymus Bazán and Brito share this challenge with Jandun, and they answer, in almost uni-
son, that the similarity does not hold, as the reason the senses cannot perceive their own activ-
ity is their corporeal nature (P20), while the immateriality of the intellect makes it able to revert
(reflectere) on itself and in this way have knowledge of its own activity (P5).26
3.2.1.3.3 Requirement of sense perception (N4)
(1) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
(2) The intellect is not available to sense perception.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
Brito and Anonymus Bazán both raised the problem in the preceding question and they also
both solve it in the same way as in that context. See the presentation of their solutions above
in section 3.2.1.2.3 on page 67.27 Jandun also presents this challenge. His answer might seem
slightly confusing, but I take him to say that the intellect is not perceptible by itself, nor by its
intellection of perceptible objects, but by having a relation to perceptible objects as an effect
is related to its cause, and this means that it becomes intelligible. I therefore understand this
as an example of the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1).28 This is
confirmed by his parallel refutation in the later question (III.27) that is much more in line with
that of Brito.29
3.2.1.3.4 Infinite regress (N10)
(1) If the intellect knows its own activity, that knowledge constitutes a second order activity.
(2) If that new activity is intelligible, then the knowledge of that constitutes a third order
activity.
(3) From this an infinite regress arises.
(4) Infinite regresses are impossible.
(5) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself by a separate activity.
Brito adds this to his catalogue of challenges, and refutes it with the interesting point that in
the case of the intellect the infinite regress is not a problem, because the intellect can reflect
on itself and its own activity infinitely.30
26 Anonymus Bazán III.10, ll. 17–21 and ll. 50–56; Brito III.11, p. 191.21–25 and 194.83–88; Jandun
III.13, app 321.4–7 and app 322.75–78, but also Jandun III.27, app 324.3–6 and app 327.27–34. See
also 3.2.2.1.2 on page 75.
27 Brito III.11, ll. 7–12 and 71–74, Anonymus Bazán III.10, ll. 37–49.
28 Jandun III.13, app 321.8–11 and app 322.79–323.6.
29 Jandun III.27, app 327.35–328.4.
30 Brito III.11, ll. 13–20 and ll. 75–82.
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3.2.1.3.5 Simultaneous act and potency of the same thing (P49)
(1) The same thing cannot be in act an potency at the same time and in the same respect.
(2) That which is able to know is potentially that which it knows.
(3) That which knows is actually that which is known.
(4) Thus, the intellect would be both in act and potency at the same time and in the same
respect.
(5) ∴The intellect cannot know itself.
Jandun presents this challenge and solves it with reference to the double nature of the intellect.
It is in act and potency at the same time with respect to its own knowing, but for different
reasons (rationes). It is a receptive potency with respect to its possible nature and a active
potency with respect to its active nature.31
3.2.1.3.6 Identity of mover and moved (N3)
(1) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect.
(2) If the intellect knows itself, it will be mover and moved at the same time and in the same
respect.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot know itself.
This similar argument was also raised in the above section on intelligibility (cf. 3.2.1.2.2 on
page 67), and is here given by Anonymus Digby 55 and Jandun. Anonymus Digby 55 argues
that this objection only holds for the composite act of physical movement, not for the simple
act of intellection.32 Jandun on the other hand argues very briefly that the intellect does not
move itself by its own species, but by another species, and thus an example of the distinction
between primary and secondary intelligibility and actualization (P1).33
3.2.1.3.7 Self-movement is impossible (N28)
(1) What cannot move the intellect cannot be known.
(2) Nothing can move itself.
(3) ∴The possible intellect cannot know the possible intellect.
This argument, that is almost identical to the preceding, is presented by Jandun.34 He refutes
it by holding that the mediating external species solves the problem of self-movement. As he
presents it, the problem of self-movement would still hold if the intellect were held to know
itself by its own species.35
31 Jandun III.27, app 328.5–11.
32 Anonymus Digby 55 III.12, app 281.13–15.
33 Jandun III.27, app 328.33–34.
34 Jandun III.27, app 324.24–29.
35 Jandun III.27, app 328.33–34.
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3.2.1.3.8 Accidents do not act on their subjects (N27)
(1) Knowledge takes place by an affection of the intellect.
(2) Accidents cannot affect the subjects in which they are properties.
(3) An act of intellection is an accident of the intellect.
(4) ∴The act of intellection cannot affect the intellect, and hence it cannot be known by the
intellect.
Jandun presents this objection that is related to the problems of self-affectionwe see concerning
the mover and the moved. He argues that knowing is an affectation; accidents do not act on the
subjects to which they belong, and since it is implied that an act of intellection is an accidental
property of the intellect, the act of intellection cannot act on the intellect. He does not give a
refutation to this objection.36
3.2.1.3.9 Multiple simultaneous objects of intellection (P49)
(1) Simultaneous knowledge of object and act of knowing results in multiple simultaneous
objects of knowledge.
(2) The intellect cannot have multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot have a simultaneous knowledge of its own act of knowing.
Jandun presents this argument. He does not present a refutation but simply states that the
simultaneous knowledge of multiple objects is actually what happens, so this amounts to a
rejection of the minor.37 He considers the question of whether multiple things can be known
at the same time through different acts of intellection to be a more difficult problem which he
suggests to postpone to a commentary on Metaphysica.38
3.2.1.3.10 Comparison with other objects of knowledge
Jandun collapses two arguments into a single argument in a double-edged presentation. The
first argument is Aristotle’s own (N18):
(1) All intelligibles are intelligible by the same form.
(2) The intellect is intelligible and has reason by one form.
(3) If 2 then all intelligibles are intelligible by the same form as the intellect.
(4) If 3 then all intelligibles have reason.
(5) 4 is false.
36 Jandun III.13, app 321.12–15.
37 Jandun III.13, app 321.16–23 and app 323.7–13.
38 As it turns out, he cannot wait that long as he gets back to the problem in the later question III.32.
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(6) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
This is presented to reject the possibility of substantial self-knowledge.39 The other branch of
his argument holds that the consequence of the alternative accidental self-knowledge is also
absurd (N22):
(1) The intellect is known in the same way as other objects of knowledge.
(2) Other objects of knowledge are not self-intelligible.
(3) ∴The intellect is not self-intelligible.
In the refutation the first part of the argument is addressed by the doctrine of accidental
self-knowledge that requires actualization by external species (which makes the intellect self-
reflexive), while the second part is addressed by distinguishing the intellect from other objects
of knowledge by its immateriality.40
3.2.1.3.11 No self-reception (N38)
(1) The possible intellect only has knowledge by reception of the species of the object.
(2) Nothing can receive its own species.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot have knowledge of itself.
Anonymus Digby 55 presents this challenge, which holds some interesting perspectives, be-
cause it addresses the question whether the intellect knows itself by its own species or by the
species of some external object. He gives it as a follow-up on the challenge about mover and
moved (3.2.1.3.6 on page 70), but he barely gives an answer. His answer is simply that it is
solved in the same way as the first challenge.41 By this he must mean that yes, it is true that in
the physical world the principle holds that only that which lacks a property can receive it, but
that it does not hold for the intellect. If that is his intention, it should imply that he thinks the
intellect actually receives its own species. As that is the doctrine he presents in the following
question in his commentary, we will get back to that below in section 3.2.3 on page 87.
3.2.1.3.12 Essential self-intelligiblity by immateriality (P23)
(1) A species is not required to know immaterial substances.
(2) The intellect is an immaterial substance.
(3) ∴The intellect is intelligible in itself.
39 This is also used by Dinsdale, see 3.2.2.2.5 on page 84.
40 Jandun III.27, app 324.14–23 and app 328.12–24.
41 Anonymus Digby 55 III.12, app 281.16–20.
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Anonymus Assisi gives this argument, which does not actually attack the self-intelligibility,
but rather the doctrine of its accidental self-intelligiblity. As Anonymus Assisi phrases his
argument it is a matter of whether the intellect is separable, not separate. But we also see that
it effectively amounts to the same as he supports the minor, that the intellect is separable, by
pointing out that it is a substance that is immaterial in itself (substantia simpliciter immaterialis).
It is refuted by maintaining the initial potentiality of the possible intellect.42
3.2.1.3.13 Essential self-intelligible by self-identity (N25)
(1) The intellect is identical with that which it knows when it knows.
(2) That which is known is intelligible.
(3) The intellect knows by its own essence.
(4) ∴The intellect is intelligible by its own essence.
Anonymus Assisi presents this variation on the preceding argument in support of substantial
self-knowledge. He does however not succeed as he forgets the further qualification that the
intellect knows (and thus actualized as its object of knowledge) by its own essence. Without this
crucial point, all that follows is the transference of the intelligibility of the object of knowledge
to the subject in the act (P8). We know that this is his intention of the argument from reading
his refutation where he argues that the intellect is not a known thing according to its essence
in such a way that it would be always possible to know it.43
3.2.1.4 Summary
In this section I have analysed the doctrines of five commentators on the intelligibility and
self-intelligibility of the intellect, Anonymus Bazán, Brito, Jandun, Anonymus Assisi, and An-
onymus Digby 55. The doctrines we have analysed have been spread across eight questions by
these commentators. The distinction in the analysis into intelligibility and self-intelligibility
reflects this distinction into two different questions in the latter two of these three.
Anonymus Bazán, Brito, and Anonymus Assisi answer the question whether the intellect is
intelligible, and they all argue that it is intelligible through actualization by an external species.
In the questions on self-intelligibility that are presented by Anonymus Bazán, Brito, Jandun,
and Anonymus Digby 55 the same basic argument is used. Anonymus Bazán and Anonymus
Digby 55 also explicitly separate the knowledge of the primary object and the intellect itself into
two separate and temporally distinct activities (P14), while the same idea is a clear implication
of the analysis of Brito. Unlike the other commentators Jandun emphasizes that the intellect
knows itself and its primary object of knowledge by one single act of knowledge in one of his
two questions, but in the other question he presents a successive model of self-knowledge.44
42 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.4–7 and app 278.34–36.
43 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.8–11 and app 278.37–279.10.
44 Compare Jandun III.13, app 322.50–59 and Jandun III.27, app 326.16–25. This apparent conflict is
treated in the later in-depth study in section 5.1 on page 161.
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Finally, Brito and Anonymus Assisi agree in connecting the reflexive properties of the intellect
once actualized with reference to Liber de causis.
When we turn to the challenges of the commentators we see a much wider range of ma-
terial. Unique objections are the norm rather than the exception, but we see Anonymus Bazán,
Brito, and Jandun share two challenges that involve sense perception (N4 and N12). The first
of those, that the intellect must be available to sense perception, is the most popular argument
in this group of commentaries, as it is instantiated a total of six times by the three authors
(two times each, as they all have two questions on the subject). Anonymus Bazán and Brito
also share among them the challenge of what the proper object of knowledge for the intellect
is (N16), the challenge of the identity of mover and moved (N3), and the requirement that any
object of knowledge is actualized (N21). The remaining eight challenges are only presented
by one of the commentators, and in all but one case that commentator is Jandun Anonymus
Assisi differs from the others in his challenges, which are all unique within the group and they
do not argue against intelligibility, but rather for substantial self-knowledge. His solutions are
however not doctrinally different from the other commentators.
3.2.2 Process of self-knowledge: By external species
A large group of commentators make the process of self-knowledge, and namely the conflict
between the essential and accidental model of self-knowledge, the very explicit focus of one
of their questions. A common way to raise such a question is to ask whether the intellect
knows itself by its own essence (or substance) or by something else (Simon of Faversham,
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, John Dinsdale, Henric de la Wyle).45 But treatments involving
this focus are by no means limited to questions with that particular phrasing. Anonymus
Assisi presents a question that places itself between the two problems of whether and how the
intellect knows itself.46 As his question is whether the intellect is self-intelligible by itself, it
has a lot in common with the discussion in the other commentaries treated here. Similarly, it
is not uncommon in questions concerning the intelligibility of the intellect or parts of it to find
detailed expositions of the process that establishes such self-knowledge. The commentators
that are included systematically here are thus: Simon of Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170
II, John Dinsdale, Henric de la Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, Radulphus Brito, and John of Jandun.
Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, and Wyle present many of the same
points. Anonymus Assisi and Brito approach the problem from a different angle and also
present a different group of arguments, but they also share material with the four other com-
mentators. Generally all commentators support the solution that the intellect knows itself
through actualization by an external species (P3), as they emphasize the potentiality of the
possible intellect prior to any external stimulus.
45 Anonymus Digby 55 has a very similar phrasing, but he presents a substantially different doctrine
and is therefore treated separately in section 3.2.3 on page 87.
46 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, as already mentioned in section 3.2.1 on page 64.
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3.2.2.1 Solutions
3.2.2.1.1 Potentiality of the possible intellect (P4)
(1) What is known must be in act.
(2) The possible intellect is not in act until it knows something else.
(3) ∴Therefore the possible intellect cannot be known until it knows something else.
Several commentators find it important to emphasize the potentiality of the intellect anterior
to any particular act of knowing. For that makes them able to deny that the intellect has
essential self-knowledge, because it would contradict the minor which has strong support from
the authority of Aristotle. This is also a way to show under which circumstances the intellect
can actually be known.
Brito, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, Faversham, and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II all support
this general principle.47 But we also note some more detailed correspondences. Anonymus
Assisi, Dinsdale, and Faversham connect it to a passage in Metaphysica 9.9, 1051a29–31 that
supports the idea that intelligibility requires actualization (P31), while Dinsdale, Faversham,
and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II also compare this to the correlated phenomenon in objects of
vision (P26). Brito, in his determination to the question of the intelligibility of the intellect
(cf. section 3.2.1.1 on page 64), uses this argument to refute a dubium that questions how the
possible intellect can ever be known, as something potential cannot be known, only something
actual. Finally, Jandun also uses this strategy to argue against the doctrine of essential self-
knowledge.48
3.2.2.1.2 Self-reflection (P5)
Some commentators report on the ability of the intellect, once actualized, to turn on itself and
know its own activity. The commentators of this period do not really get into reflections on the
concept of attention or mental focus, but the idea seems very close. Anonymus Vaticani 2170
II, Dinsdale, and Wyle present this idea that the intellect knows itself through some process
of self-reflection, while Faversham only makes a short aside on the reflective abilities of the
intellect under its terrestrial conditions.49 AnonymusAssisi and Brito also present this doctrine,
and they also make direct references to the doctrine of reditio completa of Liber de causis.50
47 Brito III.10, ll. 71–88, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.25–278.2, Dinsdale III.15, app 313.26–314.47,
Faversham q. 11, p. 335, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 301.17–24.
48 Jandun III.27, app 325.30–326.15.
49 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 301.25–37, Dinsdale 99.19–24, Wyle III.10, app 307.33–38,
Faversham q. 11, p. 336.
50 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 278.3–8, Brito III.10, p. 193.62–65. This tendency was already men-
tioned above in section 3.2.1.1.2 on page 65. For some recent analyses of those doctrines in differ-
ent but related traditions, see Cory 2017. Compare also the doctrines here with those of Brito (?)
Quaest. super Lib. de causis, q. 20, p. 374–48. Correspondences between them are consonant with
the hypothesis that he is the author of the commentary, cf. Costa and Borgo 2016: 287–97, Costa
2013. See also Anonymus Erffordensis Quaest. super Lib. de causis, qq. 26–27, pp. 447–452.
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3.2.2.1.3 Knowing the substance from observation of accidents (P2)
We regularly find an expansion of the details about how the intellect knows itself, often in
connection with the above mentioned doctrine of self-reflection. Commentators point to the
procedure of getting to know the essence of the intellect based on observations of its activities
and objects. Aristotle presents the approach in De anima 1.1, 402b9–22 and 2.4, 415a14–22, and
we will also see how it plays a prominent role in the following chapter on the science of the
soul. The commentators presenting this doctrine are Brito, Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale,
and Jandun.51 To give an example Dinsdale explains that when the intellect knows an object
through its species then it can return to its own act and from that proceed to its power, and
further from that power to its essence.52
Brito also goes more into how such self-reflection takes place and seems to argue both
for the possibility of a vague knowledge acquired from a general sort of self-observation, and
a more detailed knowledge (albeit maybe not exhaustive) gained through the this procedure
of knowing the substance through the accidents. He argues that the power (habitus) of the
intellect can be known both by its inheritance in the subject and through the nature of the
intellect itself. The first point of that distinction is made phenomenologically, arguing that
anyone who perceives himself to perform some activity can immediately conclude that he is
disposed towards that activity, and that also goes for the workings of the intellect. The second
point is supported by something very close to the procedure of knowledge acquisition from
accidents. Since any knowledge of a power depends on observations of interaction with the
object of that disposition, the intellect can arrive at a knowledge about its power through its
knowledge of its objects.53
This argument also includes a remark on the status and type of that knowledge. In general
you cannot have a knowledge about a disposition without knowing what that disposition is.
But that requirement, Brito states, does not hold in the case of the soul in general. This point is
made in a similarly phenomenological way: Youmay know that you have a soul without having
a proper grasp of what the soul is (P71). The soul is not itself the principle of its activities
unless it has some powers making it able to realize the activities, and hence when someone
knows of the activities of the soul, he can conclude the existence of the powers supporting
those without having a clear concept of the substance of the soul itself.54 This is an example of
the problematic relation between the self-knowledge acquired through introspection and the
general knowledge of the soul as a universal that will be the focus of the following chapter on
the science of the soul.
51 Brito III.10, p. 188.34–39; Wyle III.10, app 307.33–38; Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 278.9–15;
Dinsdale 99.24–100.1; Jandun III.27, app 326.16–25.
52 Dinsdale III.15, 99.24–27: “Secundum quod intellectus noster intelligit obiectum per speciem potest
redire super suum actum, et ab actu potest procedere ad suam potentiam, et a potentia ad essentiam
…”
53 Brito III.11, p. 192.34–45, cf. III.10, pp. 189.89–92.
54 Brito III.11, 192.46–55.
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3.2.2.1.4 Prime matter (P10)
A point that is often, but not always, made in the connection with the argument about the
potentiality of the possible intellect is the idea that the intellect is akin to prime matter, as it
is pure potentiality before any active knowledge.55 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Faversham,
Brito, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, and Wyle all present this point.56 Brito explains that the
possible intellect cannot be known in its initial potentiality, but once it has been actualized
by an intelligible object it can distinguish between the informing part (the object) and the
informed part (itself as subject). So first the composite is known and subsequently they can be
distinguished as with matter and form.57
3.2.2.1.5 Chain of being (P12)
Dinsdale, Faversham, Wyle, and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II all note, either in connection with
the potentiality of the possible intellect or the comparison with prime matter, the relation
between the human intellect, the separate intelligences and the prime mover.58 The prime
mover, they say, knows itself and all other subordinate beings by its own substance, while the
immaterial intelligences know themselves by their own essence but other entities by their spe-
cies (Dinsdale says similitudines, Wyle rejects knowledge through species), and finally that the
human intellect is not in act by itself and hence only termed possible. They therefore conclude
that although the intellect has the ability to know in itself, it does not have the ability to be
known in itself.59 Later in his determination Faversham returns to these distinctions and de-
scribes how the human soul in the afterlife may have an existence similar to that of the separate
intelligences as an eternal substantial self-knowledge (P46).60 Interestingly, Anonymus Assisi
avoids this problem, as he considers it to lie outside the purview of natural philosophy.61
3.2.2.1.6 Successive self-knowledge (P14)
A relevant question to raise is whether the intellect and the primary object of knowledge are
known simultaneously or successively. Doctrinally this model fits very well together with the
55 For a related understanding of this in the discussion about the substance of the soul according to
Anonymus Bazán and Anonymus Vennebusch, see Boer 2013: 142–4.
56 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.25–278.2, Faversham q. 11, p. 335, Brito III.10, p. 189.71–88,
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 301.17–24, Dinsdale III.15, app 313.26–314.47, Wyle III.10,
app 307.16–32. Brito even gives the reference to Aristotle Phys. 1.7.191a7–12.
57 Brito III.10, p. 189.71–88.
58 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 301.17–24; Dinsdale III.15, p. 99.12–19; Faversham q. 11, p.
335; Wyle III.10, app 307.16–32.
59 For instance Faversham: “Et quod ita est, intellectus noster habet quod intelligat sed non quod
intelligatur nisi per aliud.” Faversham q. 11, p. 335.
60 Faversham q. 11, p. 336. Note his use of abstraction: “Et haec sunt vera de intellectu coniuncto
corpori, quia cum abstrahitur tunc potest seipsum intelligere per essentiam suam quia ad hoc quod
aliquid actu intelligatur non requiritur aliud nisi quod sit abstractum et praesens virtuti intellectivi
(sic).” Emphasis mine, but Sharp’s addition of ‘(sic)’. The abstraction of the intellect is both onto-
logical, separating the soul from its material body, and epistemological, providing the immaterial
representation of the intellect. Is this a pun or a philosophical point?
61 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 278.16–33.
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procedure of acquiring substantial knowledge from accidents. A relatively straight forward and
short presentation of that point is made by Anonymus Assisi who points out that the primary
object of knowledge facilitates the knowledge of the intellect itself, which is therefore known
after the primary object as been known.62
In his question on the intelligibility of the intellect Brito also addresses this, but more ex-
tensively.63 According to him many present the following argument in favour of simultaneous
knowledge of both objects (P49): When several objects are known by the same principle of
intellection they are known simultaneously, and since that is the case for the intellect and its
objects of knowledge, they are known at the same time. They argue that if the thing is both
principle of intellection (principium intelligendi) and act of both things, then they are known
simultaneously (as it must be accepted that two objects actualized by numerically the same
cause will be actualized simultaneously). That is proved, he says, in the case of privation and
relation (e.g. father and son have that predicate by the same relation). Thus they consider the
major supported, while the minor is supported by the following argument: The same act of
knowing is the principle of intellection belonging to the intellect (where it is present as in a
subject) and belongs to the thing in the same way as an agent.64 It has not been possible to
identify examples of this argument before Brito, but it might be similar to the later argument
of Jandun (presented below in 3.2.2.1.8).
Brito argues against this position by cleverly distinguishing the modes of intellection gov-
erning the two different relations. He acknowledges that what has the same principle of in-
tellection will be known simultaneously, but only if the two objects have the same object of
intellect in the same way, eodem modo. And this is not the case for the intellect, as the activity
of knowing is the principle of intellection of the thing primarily and actively, while it is only
the principle of intellection of the intellect itself secondarily and subjectively.65 He does not
elaborate any further on the meaning of ‘actively’ (active) and ‘subjectively’ (subiective), but in
the presentation of the dubium he mentions that the principle of intellection is in the intellect
as in a subject, while it belongs to the thing like an agent.66 This must mean that the intellect
contains an intellection which first and foremost is directed at an external object. Once this
connection is established, it can then secondarily turn on itself as the subject of that intellection
and from that acquire knowledge about that activity and ultimately its substance.
Finally, we have the curious case of Jandun. In his second of two questions addressing
intellectual self-knowledge in the possible intellect we find an elaborate and explicit state-
ment of this doctrine of successive self-knowledge.67 In that connection he also writes that
the reason some think that self-knowledge is co-occurrent with knowledge of the primary ob-
jects of knowledge is because the interval is very short.68 In the earlier question on whether
the possible intellect can know its own act of knowing (III.13) he actually argues that the two
62 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 278.16–33.
63 Brito III.10, p. 188.40–59.
64 Brito III.10, p. 188.46–56.
65 Brito III.10, pp. 188.60–189.67.
66 Brito III.10, p. 188.53–55.
67 Jandun III.27, app 326.16–25.
68 Jandun III.27, app 327.12–19.
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objects (the primary object and the knowledge of that primary object) are known by a single
act of knowing. Later, in section 5.1.1 on page 163, I will argue that this is a different, uncon-
scious, type of self-knowledge, and thus not the same as he refers to when he ascribes to other
commentators the idea of simultaneous self-knowledge.
3.2.2.1.7 Knowing is a blocking activity (P24)
Jandun presents the argument that if the intellect had an essential power of self-knowledge, this
would block for the possibility of knowing any other objects. The assumed premise here is that
an essential self-knowledge is also a permanent, uninterrupted activity. And if it were accep-
ted that the intellect can only engage in a single act of knowing at any time, then this essential
self-knowledge could be a permanently blocking state, making any other acts of knowing im-
possible.69 This argument is also presented in the context of the challenge that the intellect
might know itself through an innate species which in effect makes it close to essential self-
knowledge (P60, cf. 3.2.2.2.8 on page 85).70
3.2.2.1.8 Simultaneous knowledge of act of knowing and primary object (P54)
As just described Jandun presents the doctrine that the possible intellect entertains two sim-
ultaneous objects of knowledge, its primary object as well as the act of knowing that object.71
This act of knowing the primary object is known through the act itself, thus constituting a
simultaneous knowledge of the object and of the act. This doctrine is presented in the first of
two questions that focus on intellectual self-knowledge in Jandun’s commentary.72 The view
presented there is that during the act of knowing the simple structure of the intellect res-
ults in a concomitant self-reflection, but that phenomenon lies outside the scope of individual
awareness. As already mentioned this apparent conflict with his later doctrine of successive
self-knowledge will be discussed in the later study.
3.2.2.1.9 Essential self-knowledge results in no self-knowledge (P67)
This paradoxically sounding argument is presented by Jandun who argues that if the intellect
were in a constant state of self-knowledge, it could never receive a knowledge of itself, because
the intellect must be stripped of the form which it shall be able to receive and thus know. This
of course cannot be the case if it is in a constant state of self-knowledge and hence a constant
actualization of its own form. He maintains that this must be false by presenting a radical and
demanding statement: Every rational individual (quilibet intelligens) has a personal experience
of knowing the proper substance of one’s own possible intellect, its difference from its power,
from the agent intellect, and from the intelligible species received in it. Notice how this ar-
gument revolves around a phenomenological description of personal observation of internal
activities and elements (and a rather radical one at that).73
69 Jandun III.27, app 325.11–29.
70 This is also something we will get back to in section 5.1.2.1 on page 165.
71 Cf. also 3.2.1.3.9 on page 71.
72 Jandun III.13, app 322.50–59.
73 Jandun III.27, app 325.11–29.
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3.2.2.1.10 Necessary for a science of the soul (P72)
Intellectual self-knowledge can be viewed as a necessary condition for the possibility of a sci-
ence of the soul. Faversham only makes the very cursory remark that without introspective
self-knowledge no science of the soul would exists.74 This indicates that to him such intellectual
self-knowledge is at least a necessary, if not sufficient, requirement for such a science.
3.2.2.1.11 Different from a science of the soul (P18)
Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, and Jandun each in their way distinguish between im-
mediate self-knowledge as a result of simple reflection or introspection and the much more
complicated and arduous task of acquiring certain knowledge about the intellect. On the one
hand we have the particular self-knowledge occasioned by the individual intellect knowing
its own activity, and on the other hand we have the subtle and detailed knowledge about the
nature of the intellect. The challenges of acquiring the latter is the explanation why so many
go so terribly wrong in that enterprise.75 Wyle makes a similar but not identical point when he
says that in a particular way the soul can have knowledge of itself according to its substance.
As a science consists of knowledge about the essence of an object, the science of the soul could
be seen as a sort of intellectio secundum essentiam, but he emphasizes that such knowledge is
acquired through multiple reflections, and that it does not pertain to the question at hand.76 It
thus seems that these authors consider the knowledge resulting from self-reflection somehow
incomplete (cf. P71).77
3.2.2.1.12 Threefold knowledge from one species (P52)
Anonymus Assisi presents the very interesting point that the same species causes three dif-
ferent acts of intellection in the intellect: The knowledge of the object, the particular single
material instantiation of it, and the intellect. The object, which must be a universal, is known
through abstraction from the phantasm and representation as species in the intellect. But, he
says, if the intellect traverses from the known object to its species, from there to the phantasm
and further to the singular sensible object from which the whole process starts, then that par-
ticular is known. Finally, if the traversion moves from the known object, to the act of knowing,
then the intellect knows itself. All three acts of intellection spring from the same intelligible
species.78
3.2.2.2 Challenges
Two challenges are widely across the texts, but aside from those it is not uncommon to find
challenges only presented by a single or few of the commentators.
74 Faversham q. 11, p. 336.
75 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 302.1–9; Dinsdale III.15, app 314.48–55; Jandun III.27, app
327.20–25.
76 Wyle III.10, app 308.5–8.
77 The relation between intellectual self-knowledge and the science of the soul will be explored fur-
ther in the following chapter.
78 Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 278.16–33.
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3.2.2.2.1 Identity of knower and known and substantial self-knowledge (N5)
(1) In immaterial substances the same thing is knower and known.
(2) The intellect is an immaterial substance, and identical with itself.
(3) ∴The intellect knows itself by itself.
Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, and Wyle face the chal-
lenge of the identity between subject and object in the process of knowing. Faversham and
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II present the following structurally identical argument: In the imma-
terial substances the same thing is knower and known; the intellect is an immaterial substance;
hence, the same thing is knower and known in the intellect. Using the conclusion as a major
they continue: In the intellect the same thing is knower and known; the intellect knows by its
own substance; hence, the intellect knows itself by its own essence. Wyle is not as close to the
two as they are to each other, but his argument is virtually the same.79
Although it might look like they beg the question by using the statement that the intellect
knows by its essence as a premise, that is not actually the case. Notice the difference between
the premise stating that the intellect knows by its own substance without consideration of the
location or type of object. That is provided by the major, which collapses the subject and object
into one entity. That makes the following reasoning possible: The intellect knows its object
by its own essence; the same thing is knower and known (subject and object); hence, intellect
knows the intellect by its own essence. So although the truth of the minor is only postulated,
it is a valid argument.
This is more than we can say about Dinsdale’s solution. He arrives at the identity of the
knower and known in the intellect by the same argument as his colleagues, but he does not
include the premise that the intellect knows by its own essence, and hence simply concludes: In
substances separate frommatter the same thing is knowing and known; the intellect is separate
from matter; hence, the same thing is knower and known in the intellect, hence the intellect
knows itself by its own essence.80 The additional conclusion does not follow from the premises.
In their refutations Dinsdale and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II basically agree that although
the major is true, that in the immaterial knowing intellect there is an identity between subject
and object, they deny that that always is the case for the human intellect. Since the intellect
need to be actualized by an external species before this identity can take place, it is not in
that state by its mere substance. In his argument Dinsdale also adds a comparison with the
external senses.81 Wyle gives the fresh reply that the identity between knower and known
actually supports the idea of self-knowledge by an external species: When the intellect becomes
identical with the form of an external object it is exactly by that identity that it knows itself.82
In this way they all argue that there is no identity between knower and known before the
intellect is actualized by the external species (P25).
79 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 301.3–5, Faversham III.11, p. 335, Wyle III.10, app 307.2.
80 Dinsdale III.15, app 313.9–11.
81 Dinsdale III.15, app 315.1–8, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 302.11–12.
82 Wyle III.10, app 308.9–13.
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Faversham approaches it differently. He follows the others by making the actuality of the
intellect conditional upon external stimuli and that makes it able to know itself. But he actually
denies the minor of the first argument, that the intellect is an immaterial substance. Because
that is only the case in the sense that it does not have matter itself, but since it is the act of
matter, the identity between knower and known does not follow.83 If the implication of the idea
of identity between knower and known is an elucidation of formal identity between knower
and known, that would be a controversial thing to deny in such an offhanded fashion. But
based on the way he qualifies his refutation in comparison with the mode of human intellect,
Faversham probably rather understands it to describe a complete identity of the intellect with
itself, and thus a complete, immediate, non-discursive self-intellection. To deny the intellect
that ability is a lot less radical.
3.2.2.2.2 Human intellect and separate intelligences (N8)
(1) The separate intelligences know themselves by their own substance
(2) The intellect is similar to the separate intelligences
(3) ∴The intellect knows itself by its own substance.
Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Anonymus Assisi, andWyle present another
close variant that compares human intellect and separate intelligences. Anonymus Vaticani
2170 II andAnonymusAssisi argue that things of the same genus share the samemode of know-
ing, and since the human intellect and the separate intelligences belong to the same genus, they
also have the same mode of knowing. But since the separate intelligences know themselves
by their own substance, so does the human intellect.84 Similarly, Dinsdale and Faversham con-
nect the two types of intellects. Dinsdale focuses on the intelligibility of the two entities, while
Faversham more accurately focuses on their shared intellective nature. Wyle gets back to the
idea of identity of knower and known in immaterial substances (P22). Finally, Anonymus As-
sisi uses this to argue that the human intellect is intelligible (rather than known) by its own
essence. But all five commentators use the same minor, that the intelligences know them-
selves by their own substance.85 So although formally these five arguments may differ, as their
premises differ slightly in focus and formulation, they are functionally very similar in their
focus on the shared species and hence shared mode of knowing.
Dinsdale, Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II refute this by pointing
out that the intellect and the intelligences are more different than they are alike: The human
intellect is determined and limited by its terrestrial existence.86 This means that where imma-
terial intelligences are always in act, the human intellect is only fully actualized once it has
received an external species and hence cannot be engaged in the eternal act of substantial self-
knowledge.87 To this Faversham adds some further reflections on the ontological differences
83 Faversham III.11, p. 337.
84 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 301.6–7, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.18–19.
85 Faversham III.15, p. 335, Dinsdale III.15, app 315.9–12, Wyle III.10, app 307.12–14.
86 That is actually all that Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II says (app 302.13–14). From there we need to
fill in the rest ourselves.
87 Dinsdale III.15, app 315.9–12, Wyle III.10, app 308.23–27, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 279.15–21.
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between the human and separate intellects as well as the prime mover, and Wyle toys with the
idea of essential self-knowledge in the afterlife (P46) as did Faversham in an earlier part of the
question (cf. 3.2.2.1.5 on page 77).88
3.2.2.2.3 Infinite regress (N10)
(1) If the intellect knows its own activity, that knowledge constitutes a second order activity.
(2) If that new activity is intelligible, then the knowledge of that constitutes a third order
activity.
(3) From this an infinite regress arises.
(4) Infinite regresses are impossible.
(5) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself by a separate activity.
Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Brito, and Jandun share the challenge of the infinite
regress.89 It is here curious that Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, and Brito refute the
challenge by simply saying that it is no problem in the case of matters of the intellect (P32). To
quote Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II almost in full: “De infinito concedo, quia infinitum se con-
vertere potest super suam operationem, et hoc non est inconveniens cum sit immaterialis sed
neccessarium.”90 As earlier mentioned Brito also says that in the intellect the infinite regress
is not a problem because it can reflect infinitely on itself and its activity.91 Jandun does not try
to refute this as he chooses another route in his argument, accepting simultaneous knowledge
of multiple objects (P49) and thereby avoiding this dilemma.
3.2.2.2.4 Neither by own nor external species
Wyle is the only author that has been registered to give this argument. He holds that the
intellect cannot be known by either its own nor an external species.92 Knowledge by own
species is excluded because that would (probably) mean that the species is created by the power
of imagination (virtus phantastica). He leaves out parts of the argument, but we can imagine
that this would be problematic because it would need to be based on a sense impression, and
since the intellect is immaterial, that cannot take place (which would make it a version of
N4, and hence very close to the argument presented below in section 3.2.2.2.6). On the other
hand, self-knowledge by an external species is excluded because when something is known
by the mediation of a species, there must be a proportionality between the thing known and
the species representing it. That requirement cannot be fulfilled if the intellect should know
88 Faversham III.11, pp. 336–37; Wyle III.10, app 308.23–27. Notice that while Dinsdale says that
the intelligences know themselves through inborn species, Faversham reserves that for another
discussion.
89 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.12, app 301.11–14; Brito III.11, p. 191.13–20; Jandun III.13, app
321.33–322.49; Dinsdale III.15, app 313.16–22.
90 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 302.17–18, cf. Dinsdale III.15, app 315.17–31.
91 Brito III.11, p. 191.13–20 and 193.75–94.82.
92 Wyle III.10, app 307.7–11.
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itself by another species, as it would never be a representation of it (N23). Against this it is
argued that the intellect knows itself by an external species, but that there is no requirement
of proportionality as the content of the species is irrelevant. All that is required is some (any)
species that can actualize the intellect to make it available for self-reflection.93
3.2.2.2.5 Intelligibles and intellects (N18)
(1) All intelligibles are intelligible by the same form.
(2) The intellect is intelligible and has reason by one form.
(3) If 2 then all intelligibles are intelligible by the same form as the intellect.
(4) If 3 then all intelligibles have reason.
(5) 4 is false.
(6) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
Dinsdale uses the argument.94 To refute this he explains that we need to distinguish between
actually and potentially known. So when an intelligible species is actualized in an intellect it
is actually known, and due to the formal identity in knowing the intellect is also that species,
which conversely means that that species is intellect. In that case what is intelligible is also
at the same time intellect. But that only holds in that particular case. Sticks and stones are
potential objects of knowledge by having a species that can be abstracted and actualized in an
intellect. So the physical objects can never become intellects.95
3.2.2.2.6 Intellect cannot be abstracted (N13)
(1) Human knowledge is based on phantasms abstracted from sense perception.
(2) The intellect cannot be abstracted from matter
(3) ∴The intellect cannot be known through an abstracted species.
Dinsdale gives this argument. He counters it pointing out that the intellect does not know
itself based on its own species, but based on its actualization through the species of its proper
and primary objects of knowledge.96
93 Wyle III.10, app 308.14–22.
94 Dinsdale III.15, app 313.5–8.
95 Dinsdale III.15, app 314.56–63.
96 Dinsdale III.15, app 313.16–22 and app 315.17–31.
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3.2.2.2.7 Self-knowledge by self-presence (N32)
(1) Knowledge requires presence of the known object to the knowing subject
(2) The intellect is present to itself by itself.
(3) ∴The intellect knows itself by itself.
Dinsdale and Anonymus Assisi present this argument.97 They both basically answer that al-
though that may be true, the intellect is not united with or present to itself as an object of
knowledge, as the proper objects of knowledge of the intellect are the species of external ob-
jects.98 It might also be argued that the mere presence of the intellect to itself is not sufficient,
as it also must be actualized, not merely potential, and for that it needs an external species.99
3.2.2.2.8 An innate species (N17)
(1) Some things are known by an innate species
(2) The intellect is one of the things that is known by an innate species.
(3) ∴The intellect knows itself without the need of an external species.
Faversham presents this argument in his determination while Wyle appends it to his question
after the treatment of the last ratio principalis. Faversham presents two refutations against that
idea, whileWyle makes do with a single. Faversham argues that the idea of inborn species runs
counter to the principle that all knowledge has its origin in perception, which further means
that all knowledge must be based on phantasms abstracted from sense data. If that principle is
broken, it can be argued that the possible intellect acts independently of the agent intellect, as
it has no need for its process of abstraction, and that violates the idea that the agent is more
noble than the patient. They both argue that if the intellect contained an innate species by
which it could know itself, the possible intellect would always know itself, but that cannot be
allowed, as that would make it impossible for the intellect to know any other things, as it can
only know one thing at a time (P24).100
3.2.2.2.9 Diversification of act according to object (N29)
(1) The act of knowing is determined by the nature of the object of knowledge.101
(2) The primary object of knowledge and the act of knowing have two different natures.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot know both types of objects.
97 Dinsdale III.15, app 313.16–22, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 277.12–17.
98 Dinsdale III.15, app 315.13–16, Anonymus Assisi q. 15, app 279.11–14.
99 Faversham argues in that way in his discussion of self-knowledge in the afterlife. See Faversham
q. III.11, p. 336.
100 Faversham III.11, pp. 335–36, Wyle III.10, app 308.28–33.
101 Cf. Averroes In DA, ad III.4 429b10–14, com. III.9, p. 422.36–50.
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Jandun presents this challenge to his own doctrine of multiple simultaneous objects of one act
of intellection. He refutes the challenge by maintaining that the diversification only occurs
with two objects with the same mode of being. But the act of knowing a primary object is an
immaterial abstraction from that primary object, which he holds results in the merging of the
knowing of that act and the reflexive knowledge of that primary act of knowing.102
3.2.2.3 Summary
In this section the basis of all the included commentaries has been that the intellect, in one way
or another, depends crucially on a actualization by the intelligible species of an external object
to engage in the act of self-knowledge. We have seen how some doctrines have been relatively
prevalent while others only have singular occurrences. Some of the relations between the
commentators based on those doctrines will be discussed further in section 3.3 on page 95, so
here we will just sum up the main observations on dominant and rare doctrines.
As all commentators included here argue for a model where self-knowledge is conditioned
by an external species, it is maybe not surprising that the point most of them share is the em-
phasis on the potentiality of the possible intellect (P4). While six commentators have been
registered to present this point explicitly it is implied by the line of thought of all the com-
mentators here. A good portion of the commentators also highlight that the immateriality of
the intellect enables it, once it has been actualized, to reflect on its own activity (P5), and five
likewise argue that it is able to acquire knowledge about its own substance through an ob-
servation of its activities and the objects of those activities (P2). Two final points of doctrine
that the commentators favour are that the possible intellect bears a structural similarity with
prime matter (P10), and that it takes up the lowest place in a hierarchy of intellects stretching
from the prime intellect who knows itself (and possibly everything else) by its own essence,
over the separate intellects who know just themselves essentially, to the human intellect which
only knows itself through the mediation of an external species (P12). Both these points occur
in four of the included commentators. Finally three commentators note that the process of
acquiring knowledge about the substance of the intellect is a procedural and stepwise activity
(P14) and that the type of knowledge acquired by intellectual self-reflection is different from
the universal science of the soul (P18)
There are also a handful of points that are only found in a single of the included comment-
aries. Here we can highlight the idea presented by Jandun that a certain type of self-knowledge
is always concomitant to knowledge of external objects (P54). Also the point Faversham seems
tomake that intellectual self-knowledge is a necessary condition for the universal science of the
soul stands out, as does that of Anonymus Assisi who holds that a single species can occasion
three different types of knowledge – including knowledge of the particular (P52).
As in the previous section we notice briefly the more flat distribution of different points
made in the rationes principales and other challenges of the commentaries. Only four argu-
ments occur in more than two of the commentaries, namely the comparison of the intellect
with other immaterial substances (N5), the related comparison between the intellect and other
intelligences (N8) – which are made by exactly the same five commentators – and the challenge
102 Jandun III.13, app 322.66–74, cf. section 5.1.1 on page 163.
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of the infinite regress (N10) which four of the commentators face themselves with. Finally,
Faversham and Wyle also address the question of self-knowledge through an innate species,
an idea that is basically a species based version of essential self-knowledge. The remaining
nine different challenges are only presented by a single or two of the included commentaries.
3.2.3 Self-knowledge by own species
A more rare alternative to the idea of self-knowledge by an external species suggests that the
intellect, and namely the possible intellect, is known by its own species (P30). We only find one
strongly held instance of such an argument in the commentaries that have been investigated
in this chapter, namely Anonymus Digby 55.
But the text itself has an atypically structure. The initial question is whether the intellect
knows itself by a species (per speciem). He first presents two rationes against that position,
followed by one in favour referring to the authority of Averroes. His determination is ex-
ceptionally short, as it only consists of a single clause. His refutations on the other hand is
where his actual doctrinal content is to be found. It is not entirely clear when the refutation
of the first ratio principalis ends and the second takes over, but together they present an ex-
tended discussion of the doctrinal challenges of his position with several chained arguments
and counter arguments. For that reason it seems most fruitful to present his challenges and
solutions together.
He presents the following initial rationes principales against the possibility of knowing the
intellect through a species:
(1) Based on the dictum of identity between knower and known in immaterial substances it
is argued that if the intellect is known by a species, it is known by itself, which cannot be
allowed (N30). As stated here the argument is invalid as the intellect does not necessarily
known itself by itself if it knows itself by a species. It reflects the initial phrasing of
the question, whether the intellect knows itself by a species (unspecified), but from the
following discussion we can conclude that what is intended is to restrict it to its own
species.103
(2) The second ratio is quite deficient, as both the major premise and the conclusion are
omitted, but it is not too tough to reconstruct. The conclusion should of course be that
the intellect cannot be known by a species, so if we supply the major premise that a
species is more simple than the thing it is abstracted from, that aligns pretty well with
the minor that the intellect has no species simpler than itself by which it can be known
(N35).104
To these rationes the commentator presents an extended argument where, in my judge-
ment, he answers both questions together in a discussion based on arguments and counter
arguments. He argues that the intellect is known by a species that is always present to it in
103 Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, app 282.6.
104 Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, app 282.4–5.
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some sense, although it is not always actualized. Once it is actualized however, the intellect im-
mediately (quam cito) knows itself.105 Initially he is unclear about the nature of the species that
facilitates the intellectual self-knowledge, but when he moves into the domain of the second
ratio it becomes clear that the argument implies that the species by which the intellect knows
itself is its own species. This is further supported by the answer to that challenge, namely that
what is in act is more simple than what is in potency, which means that it should be possible
to abstract a species from an actualized intellect that is more simple than the species of the
intellect that is not yet actualized. His final note makes it clear that it knows itself through
its own species. The agent intellect, he says, abstracts the species from the possible intellect
which is already present in it in its state of potentiality. Hence, the intellect knows itself by a
species abstracted from itself.106
So the species by which the intellect knows itself is clearly not an external species, but the
species of the possible intellect that is abstracted. He does however hold that this process is not
entirely independent from external stimuli, since an external species is required to actualize the
possible intellect in the first place.107 He does therefore clearly not support a model of essential
self-knowledge. But the intellect always contains a species, no matter if it is actualized or still
only in potency.108 That species must in some way be its own species or a species representing
itself. Because once the possible intellect has then been actualized by an external object of
knowledge, its own species becomes actualized too, and the agent intellect can then abstract
it. That species is then fed to the possible intellect, we must presume, and thereby enables its
self-knowledge.
This is a somewhat puzzling solution. Two questions quickly arise: (1) If the intellect
always contains this species that is used in self-knowledge, how can it be completely potential?
(2) If the intellect always and necessarily acquires self-knowledge as soon as (quam cito) its own
species is actualized, does that then result in (a) multiple simultaneous acts of intellection, or
maybe (b) an epi-phenomenal self-knowledge concomitant to every act of intellection? To
address the first question, it is not quite clear which status our commentator imagines the
species has when the possible intellect is not actualized, but he explicitly says that it is (or may
always be) present to the intellect just like other intelligible species.109 But if it only contains it
to the extent that it contains any other intelligible species, maybe its potentiality can still be
maintained. The second question centres around the circumstances under which the species
becomes the focus of the intellect’s reflection. We cannot say anything about that based on the
questions from the commentary that has been put under scrutiny here. Wemight be tempted to
conjecture that the agent intellect does not abstract the species of the possible intellect unless it
is somehow put into focus by a wilful act, but the text gives no indications about those details,
so any explanation would only amount to speculation.
As this doctrine is related to the one described in the preceding section some notes of
105 Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, app 282.20–23.
106 Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, app 282.35–283.2.
107 Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, app 282.35–283.2.
108 This doctrine is similar to that of Richard Rufus and may be inspired by him, cf. Wood 2018: 86–9.
109 Anonymus Digby 55 q. 13, app 282.20–23: “[…] intellectus possibilis intelligit se, licet sit ei semper
praesens sicut aliae species intelligibiles, tamen hoc species […]”, my emphasis.
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comparison will be in order. First one might ask whether it even makes any difference if the
intellect is known by its own or another species. If we assume themodel of formal identification
during the act of knowing, it would be fair to point out that the species of the intellect and
that of the external object of intellection become identical. Or to be more explicit: Before
the act of intellection the possible intellect is indeterminate, but once it receives and becomes
actualized as the species of an external intelligible object, then it is itself that species which
it through that process has an knowledge of. Here we may speculate whether that is actually
how Anonymus Digby 55 imagines the process of knowing takes place, as he makes a point
out of distinguishing the two species. His final note emphasizes how some external species
is involved in the process of self-knowledge in some derived way as that external stimulus is
required for the actualization and hence abstraction of the species of the possible intellect itself.
We may also want to note some of the things that we do not find in Anonymus Digby 55.
We do not find any mention of or hints at any process of reflection in his commentary. That
makes it a bit more difficult than usual to imagine exactly what constitutes the self-knowledge,
but maybe it is merely the actualization of the species of the intellect through abstraction. After
all he says that as soon as that species is actualized, it knows itself. But this also means that
we have an even fainter impression of what the content of the knowledge may be. Does it
present the intellect with any sort of universal knowledge about itself, or does it merely state
the fact that it is at that specific point in the middle of a process of intellection? Some of
the other commentators also present the idea of the Aristotelian procedure of acquiring sub-
stantial knowledge from accidents, which gives us an impression of some possible acquisition
of universal knowledge about the intellect, and some even discuss some of the challenges of
acquiring a scientific knowledge about the intellect.110 But such reflections are also entirely
absent in Anonymus Digby 55. So although some similarities clearly seem to connect the two
approaches, they also present so many differences that it is fair to conclude that there are
substantial differences of doctrine between them.
3.2.4 The possible intellect knowing the agent intellect
Finally, we will treat this more narrow topic on the relation between the possible and agent
intellect. It is treated in two questions:
• Whether the possible intellect can know the agent intellect. Anonymus Bazán, Siger of
Brabant, and Radulphus Brito.
• Whether the possible intellect knows the agent intellect with an unchanged and numer-
ically identical intellection. John of Jandun
The treatments are so different that although they nominally seem to treat the same problem
they share very little material. We will see yet again that Brito and Anonymus Bazán present
a rather similar text, while there are some clear doctrinal connections between the solution of
Siger of Brabant and Jandun. We see that the phrasing of the questions are different, but of
course that need not reveal anything about the doctrinal content, as Siger of Brabant’s solution
110 See sections 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76 and 3.2.2.1.10 to 3.2.2.1.11 on page 80.
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has much more in common with Jandun than the other two. In the later in-depth study in
chapter 5 we will get back to the solution of Jandun.
3.2.4.1 Solutions
3.2.4.1.1 Agent intellect is intelligible (P65)
• The possible intellect is able to know any intelligible object.
• The agent intellect is an intelligible object.
• ∴The agent intellect can be know by the possible intellect
The possible intellect potentially is all objects of knowledge, and if we accept that the agent
intellect is intelligible, then the possible intellect should be able to have knowledge of it. Al-
though this solution seems to beg the question of the intelligibility of the agent intellect, that
is the first of two arguments presented by Anonymus Bazán.111 This is almost identical to the
argument he presents earlier to show that the possible intellect is intelligible.112 Here, fortu-
nately, he also elaborates a bit on the process by which the agent intellect is known in the
following argument.
3.2.4.1.2 Agent intellect known through its products (P9)
The Aristotelian principle of deriving substantial knowledge from accidents, which we have
seen at work in the whole chapter, is also applied in this context. Brito and Anonymus Bazán
both argue that the possible intellect arrives at a knowledge about the agent intellect by ob-
servation of its activity. The activity of the agent intellect is to abstract intelligible species
from phantasms, an activity that the possible intellect is familiar with through knowledge of
the products, the abstracted species. So through an analysis of the abstracted objects the pos-
sible intellect can acquire a positive knowledge about the agent intellect.113 Siger of Brabant
presents a similar idea, cf. section 3.2.4.1.7 on page 92.114
3.2.4.1.3 Self-reflexivity of immaterial substances (P5)
(1) An immaterial substance is self-reflexive.
(2) The human intellect is an immaterial substance.
(3) ∴The human intellect is self-reflexive.
Siger of Brabant presents the now well known idea, but he adds a further requirement of pres-
ence of the object of knowledge to the knower. This is however always guaranteed by the unity
of agent and possible intellect.115
111 Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 500.35–40.
112 Anonymus Bazán III.10, p. 485.30–36, mentioned above in section 3.2.1.1.2 on page 66.
113 Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 500.40–46; Brito III.15, p. 221.11–15.
114 Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 45–76.
115 Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 1–11.
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3.2.4.1.4 Transference of properties from agent to patient (P68)
(1) The efficient cause of a property possesses the property itself.
(2) The agent intellect causes potentially intelligible objects to be actually intelligible.
(3) ∴The agent intellect itself is intelligible in act.
Siger of Brabant uses the light-analogy, because light itself must be visible as it makes other
objects visible.116
3.2.4.1.5 Agent intellect the most suitable object of knowledge (P75)
Jandun argues that the intellect has a natural disposition and desire to acquire knowledge of
the agent intellect and other immaterial substances. Actually, he says, it would seem less apt
to have knowledge about material objects, as they are not even actually but only potentially
known. And so much the more should it have an aptitude to know substances that are actu-
ally known, and that is the case with the immaterial substances which are already known by
themselves in their immateriality. It is only in accordance with nature, that when the intel-
lect strives for knowledge about relatively ignoble objects, namely the material substances, it
should strive so much more for and be able to attain knowledge about the more noble imma-
terial substances.117
3.2.4.1.6 Possible and agent intellect joined by constant knowledge (P40)
Siger of Brabant holds that the possible intellect always knows the agent intellect, but that state
of intellection never extends down to the individual humans. Together the agent and possible
intellect constitute the separate intellect,118 and as it is in a constant state of self-knowledge, the
possible intellect thereby also knows the agent intellect.119 But the separate possible intellect
is only connected with the individual human during her reflection on a given phantasm, and
she cannot therefore experience the perpetual self-knowledge of the separate intellect.120
Jandun presents a similar doctrine in the second part of his determination on the question.
He goes into some details about the ontological structure and relation between the agent and
possible intellect and presents the premise that any thing that always is conjoined or united
with an knowledge of an object, also always will posses that same and numerically identical act
of knowing. He argues then that the possible intellect always is united with a knowledge of the
agent intellect. That is the case, he says, because the agent intellect always has a concomitant
knowledge of itself. He finds support for this in both Aristotle and Averroes, pointing out the
identity between knowledge and its object in immaterial substances (P22). Hence he holds
that, when the agent intellect is always united with the possible intellect, the possible intellect
116 Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 12–15.
117 See Jandun III.30, app 329.23–33.
118 Cf. Siger of Brabant q. 15, p. 58.42–43.
119 Siger of Brabant q. 13, p. 44.27–45.44.
120 This constitutes the explanation of how intellective states are individuated in his monopsychist
model. See the full arguments in Siger of Brabant qq. 14–15, pp. 46–60 cf. q. 7, pp. 22–24.
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also always has the same constant (and hence numerically identical) knowledge of the agent
intellect as it does itself.121
3.2.4.1.7 Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect not available to humans (P29)
Siger of Brabant argues that as the separate possible intellect is only connected with the indi-
vidual human during her reflection on a given phantasm, she cannot experience the perpetual
self-knowledge of the separate intellect.122 Jandun most likely also takes this same position.123
But Siger of Brabant does however also allow some human knowledge of the agent intellect.
As the abstract universals are made available to the individual by the power of the agent in-
tellect in the reflection on sense data, this gives the individual an experience and knowledge
of the agent intellect.124 This way of knowing the agent intellect therefore is similar to the
explanation given by Brito and Anonymus Bazán above (3.2.4.1.2 on page 90).
3.2.4.2 Challenges
Several of the challenges are already familiar from the preceding material on the general intel-
ligibility and self-intelligibility of the intellect.
3.2.4.2.1 Requirement of sense perception (N4)
(1) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
(2) The intellect is not available to sense perception
(3) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
This is given by Anonymus Bazán, Brito, Jandun and Siger of Brabant. Both Anonymus Bazán
and Brito give the typical refutation of this in other contexts, that it is true that what is known
primarily must have its origin in sense perception, but not when something is known sec-
ondarily. That is the case with the agent intellect which is known through its activities and
products.125
Jandun and Siger of Brabant both present a version of this argument as a challenge to
their doctrine of a perpetual self-knowledge of the separate intellect.126 But they answer them
differently. Jandun says that phantasms are required to establish an initial knowledge of an
object, but the soul is also able to reflect on subjects that are entirely immaterial. He argues
that such activities make up the very substance of the intellect.127 Siger of Brabant does not
121 See Jandun III.30, app 329.34–330.4.
122 This constitutes the explanation of how intellective states are individuated in his monopsychist
model. See the full arguments in Siger of Brabant qq. 14–15, pp. 46–60 cf. Siger of Brabant q. 7,
pp. 22–24.
123 This is discussed in the following case study in 5.1.3 on page 170, in particular on page 173.
124 Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 45–76.
125 Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 499.6–11 and 500.47–56; Brito III.15, pp. 221.16–222.23 and 224.68–78.
126 Siger of Brabant q. 13, p. 44.19–22; Jandun III.30, app 329.5–14.
127 Jandun III.30, app 330.31–38.
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address this challenge specifically but just says generally that it shows why the state of self-
knowledge is not available to humans.128
3.2.4.2.2 Requirement of abstraction (N13)
(1) Human knowledge is based on phantasms abstracted from sense perception.
(2) The intellect cannot be abstracted from matter
(3) ∴The intellect cannot be known through an abstracted species.
Anonymus Bazán and Brito present this, and as in the requirement of sense perception, they
also both answer that this does not hold when something is known secondarily, as is the case
with the agent intellect.129
3.2.4.2.3 No experience of self-knowledge (N24)
(1) We sense our state of sensation, so we should also know our states of knowing.
(2) We do not experience any higher order knowledge.
(3) ∴ Higher order knowledge does not take place.
Siger of Brabant gives this, and refutes it in the same manner as the previous by stating gener-
ally that it only goes to show thatwe have no access to that perpetual state of self-knowledge.130
3.2.4.2.4 Agent intellect has no knowledge (N26)
(1) The power of the agent intellect is abstraction of universals.
(2) Abstraction of universals cannot be intelligible, because then the agent intellect would
know the universals itself.
(3) ∴The power of the agent intellect cannot be known.
Anonymus Bazán argues that the power of the agent intellect is to abstract universals from
phantasms, but that cannot be an intelligible process, because that would imply that the agent
intellect would have knowledge of the phantasms. He will not accept this because he postu-
lates that the agent intellect cannot contain knowledge in itself. To this he gives the confusing
refutation that it does not follow that just because something has a potency towards an activity
that it immediately actualizes that activity. And thus, that just because abstraction of phant-
asms is a potentially intelligible process, that it is also actually known.131 This may be true, but
it is not clear how that answers the initial objection.
This challenge is also addressed by Brito, but in a different way. It looks like he splits up
the challenge into two and modifies the arguments along to way to make them more coherent.
They are therefore presented separately below.
128 Siger of Brabant q. 13, ll. 76–80.
129 Anonymus Bazán III.16, p. 499.12–19 and 500.57–61; Brito III.15, pp. 222.24–29 and 224.79–86.
130 Siger of Brabant q. 13, pp. 44.23–26 and 46.76–80.
131 Anonymus Bazán III.16, pp. 499.20–500.31 and 500.62–501.73.
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3.2.4.2.5 Power of agent intellect not intelligible (N39)
(1) If the intellect is known, then its power is also known.
(2) The power of the intellect cannot be known.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot be known.
Brito argues for the impossibility of knowing the power differently. It cannot be known, he
argues, because its power is to make potential objects of knowledge actual objects of know-
ledge, and that would mean that the possible intellect would know all objects of knowledge
simultaneously, which also is impossible.132 In this way he avoids the awkward statement that
phantasm abstraction cannot be an intelligible process because that would imply that the agent
intellect had knowledge about the phantasms.
To this he answers that although it is true that the possible intellect can know the power
of the agent intellect, that does not imply that it has a positive knowledge of the content of
all possible phantasms. Just as knowing that someone has an ability of producing all things
does not mean that he actually produces all things.133 This is a very elegant solution because it
distinguishes between a power and the products of that power. This is then further accentuated
by also emphasizing the difference between having a knowledge of a power and realizing the
products of that power.
3.2.4.2.6 Simultaneous knowledge of all phantasms (N37)
(1) If the possible intellect could know the agent intellect, this would be through its abstrac-
tion of phantasms.
(2) The agent intellect abstracts all phantasms.
(3) ∴The possible intellect cannot contain all phantasms at the same time; hence, the pos-
sible intellect cannot know the agent intellect.
This is the second leg of Brito’s split of Anonymus Bazán’s confused argument.134 In his re-
futation he again puts his finger on the exact point that is relevant in both these challenges,
the relation between potential and actual by distinguishing a power from its product. Hav-
ing knowledge of the agent intellect is possible by the presence of all and any phantasm in
the phantasia, and because the possible intellect has a higher order knowledge of itself know-
ing an abstract object, it can move into a knowledge of the abstraction (“potest discurrere in
cognitionem abstractionis”). To acquire this knowledge, there is no requirement that all phant-
asms are present in the phantasia at the same time, but only that any phantasm is. Because a
reflection on the abstraction of any phantasms by the agent intellect provides an insight into
the nature of that power and the entity that exercises it. We notice here that the crucial link
is the process of intellectual self-knowledge or introspection of the possible intellect: When
it knows that it has a knowledge of an abstract object, it is able to reflect on the process or
activity that brought this object about.
132 Brito III.15, pp. 222.35–223.43.
133 Brito III.15, p. 225.88–92.
134 Brito III.15, p. 222.30–34.
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3.2.4.3 Summary
Anonymus Bazán and Brito present two very similar arguments, but we see that the latter finds
some more elegant formulations and solutions of some of the challenges. Both the positive
doctrine and the challenges make use of points that are also known from the other questions
on the intelligibility of the intellect and the process of self-knowledge. Jandun and Siger of
Brabant on the other hand present a very different case. They hold that the agent intellect is in
a constant state of self-knowledge, and that the possible intellect is always connected with the
agent intellect through that act of knowledge. This means that the possible intellect always has
one and the same knowledge of the agent intellect. They both hold that this perpetual state of
self-knowledge in the separate intellect never reaches the level of human knowledge. Siger of
Brabant does however also allow for the possibility of knowing the agent intellect, not in this
absolute and perpetual way, but in a way similar to the one found in Anonymus Bazán and
Brito.
3.3 Clusters and analysis
In the preceding section I have given a detailed exposition of the different doctrines across the
included commentaries. In this section we will use that data to move to a high-level analysis of
general clusters and relations among the texts. I will also give an overview of themost common
doctrines that we find in the material. Themain points of this section are already present in the
preceding section, but as the level of detail is so high that they are difficult to identify, we will
here analyse the material differently and pull out connections that are only opaquely present
there.
3.3.1 Clusters
This presentation is more abstract than the preceding, as it does not take into view the content
or philosophical implications of each of the doctrines, but view them summarily and com-
pare which commentators share a smaller or larger proportion of the doctrines. Two types of
visualizations are used, the proportional clustermap and the binary doctrinal matrix, and they
both deserve some introduction. The proportional clustermap shows how big an overlap there
is between the doctrines used by any two authors included. This is done by calculating the
proportion of shared to non-shared doctrines that any commentary has with any other com-
mentary. This results in an array of proportions that can be viewed as a signature of that
particular commentator within the corpus, as the array of proportions will be unique to his
particular combination of doctrines.135 To give an example, see the proportional shared ma-
terial for John Dinsdale in table 3.3 on the next page. Such an array gives an indication of how
close a commentator may be to any of the others. These different arrays are then plotted in a
matrix where each field represents the commonality between the two correlated commentators
by the hue of the colour. The matrix is mirrored along the top left to bottom right diagonal
135 If any other commentator contains exactly the same doctrines, they will also have exactly the same
signature.
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Name Proportion
John Dinsdale 1.00
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2 0.63
Henric de la Wyle 0.40
Simon of Faversham 0.38
Anonymus Assisi 0.35
Radulphus Brito 0.24
John of Jandun 0.16
Anonymus Bazan 0.15
Siger of Brabant 0.04
Anonymus Digby 55 0.04
Table 3.3: Relative distribution signature of all doctrines of John Dinsdale.
and can therefore be read vertically as well as horizontally. This of course means that the left-
right diagonal shows the complete identity of each commentator with himself. The rows and
columns of the matrix are arranged in such a way that the commentators that have the most
similar proportional signature are clustered together. This is illustrated further by the so-called
dendrogram that is to be found at the top and left edges of the matrix. At the leaf ends of the
dendrogram we find each unique commentary (or a combination of two or more, if they have
completely identical profiles). At the higher levels of the dendrogram groups are compared.
The shorter the branches are before a split, the closer the relation is. Figure 3.2 on the facing
page is an example of such a clustermap, and as soon as we have explained the binary doctrinal
matrix, we will move on to the interpretation of that particular map.
The binary doctrinal matrix shows which doctrines each commentary contains, and is
therefore simpler to interpret and explain. This matrix does not compare the commentators
in the same way, but rather shows which commentators has been registered to use which doc-
trines. This is also presented in a matrix where the commentators are clustered according to
the relative proximity of their shared doctrines. Figure 3.5 on page 101 is an example of this
matrix type. Aside from showing the clustering of commentators, the matrices can also be used
as complete indices of which doctrines are used by which commentator. A detailed compar-
ison of the two diagrams will reveal that they do not create identical clusters. This is because
the proportional values of the commentators does not map directly to the doctrinal points pos-
sessed by each commentary but is a more condensed (less detailed) representation of how big a
proportion of material each commentary shares with each other. I present two binary doctrinal
matrices, one of the determination doctrines and one of the rationes and refutation doctrines.
Let us have a look at the proportional clustermaps. In the first map in figure 3.2 on the fa-
cing page we immediately notice the very deeply coloured group in the top left corner, consist-
ing of Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Wyle and Dinsdale. The strong hues of the col-
oured fields indicate that these four are closely related, which in particular is the case for Wyle,
Dinsdale and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II. The other main group contains some subgroups. An-
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Figure 3.2: Proportional clustermap of determination doctrines.
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Figure 3.3: Proportional clustermap of rationes doctrines.
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Figure 3.4: Proportional clustermap of all doctrines.
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onymus Assisi and Brito cluster together, with Anonymus Bazán as a weaker connection, and
Anonymus Digby 55 as a connection to that three-person group (mostly due to similarities
with Anonymus Bazán). Jandun and Siger of Brabant also cluster together, although rather
loosely. In the second map in figure 3.3 on page 98 we find both continuities and differences
from the determination distributions. Aside from the big group of five commentators in the
left side and the more loose cluster in the right side, we notice that the two radical outliers,
Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant, who clearly have almost no rationes and refutation
doctrines in common with the others. The biggest group consists of Anonymus Vaticani 2170
II, Dinsdale, Anonymus Assisi, Wyle and Faversham, and the smaller consists of Brito, An-
onymus Bazán, and Jandun. This means that in this part of the texts Jandun is grouped closer
to Anonymus Bazán and Brito, while Anonymus Assisi has moved into the distinct group of
four closely connected commentators in the determination material.
These changes are maintained when we cluster the texts across the different contexts of
the doctrines in figure 3.4 on the preceding page. Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant
remain distinct outliers, while Anonymus Bazán and Brito maintain a strong connection in a
group that also loosely includes Jandun (notice how the leg of the dendrogram reveals that he
is almost as distinct from all the others as Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant). In the
other corner we have the big group of five commentators where in particular Dinsdale and
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II form a strong cluster, while Wyle and Faversham are a bit closer to
each than Anonymus Bazán and Brito, and finally Anonymus Assisi is the outlier within that
group.
The binary doctrinal matrices contain more information, and we cannot dive into an ex-
tensive analysis. But in the matrix of determination doctrines (figure 3.5 on the next page) we
see a good hand full of longer “rows” across the matrix where four or more commentators share
a piece of doctrine, which constitutes a major group in the central columns from Faversham
to Brito.136 In particular the connections between Faversham, Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani
2170 II, and Wyle confirm the close connection between them in the clustermaps. But we also
notice a few rows of unique doctrines, in particular with Jandun and Brito, but the corres-
pondences between him and Anonymus Bazán are also worth noticing. When we look at the
matrix of rationes doctrines (figure 3.6 on page 102) the overall impression is different, as the
doctrines are more spread out. In this way the two binary matrices also confirm the general
introductory observation on page 60 that the commentators have a stronger tendency to re-use
the same doctrines in the determinations than in the discussion of rationes principales. Here
we find two groups of shared doctrines in the top right and bottom left corner which reveal the
connections we have already seen in the proportional clustermaps. But it is also interesting to
note the longer “columns” of unique doctrines by Jandun, Brito, and Anonymus Digby 55. This
explains why in particular Jandun ended up as a relative outlier in the proportional maps, in
spite of the fact that he also presents the most typical doctrines used by some of the others.
136 Some labels may seem to belong to the wrong category, this is partly because the rationes matrix
also registers refutations, and they are registered in the inventory of positive doctrines. Further-
more, it does occasionally occur that an author uses a doctrine that is registered in the appendix
as a rationes doctrine within a determination context.







































































P30: Self-knowledge by own species, once actualized by external species
P72: Self-knowledge necessary for a science of the soul
P46: Essential self-knowledge in the afterlife
P22: Identity of knower and known in immaterial substances
P68: Transference of properties from agent to patient (e.g. light and the visible object)
P54: Concomitant higher-order knowledge
P75: Agent intellect the most venerable object of knowledge
P60, N17: Self-knowledge by innate species
P67: Essential self-knowledge results in no self-knowledge
P74: The intellect is intelligible like any other thing
P24: Knowing a blocking activity
P40: Possible and agent intellect joined in constant knowledge
P29: Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect not available to humans
P23, N40: The intellect has essential self-knowledge
P52: Three types of knowledge from one species
P7: The intellect is self-intelligible
P14: Successive self-knowledge
P13: The intellect is intelligible
P8: Intellect intelligble through external species
P65: The agent intellect is known like any other object
P9: Agent intellect known through its products
P71: Vague, incomplete self-knowledge possible
P53: Superiority to sense-perception
P48: Internal experience of own mental faculties
P33: The intellect can observe its own activity
P2: Substantial knowledge from accidents
P3: Self-knowledge through external species
P4: Possible intellect completely indeterminate before actualization by an external species
P5: An immaterial substance is self-reflexive
P10: Possible intellect similar to prime matter
P18: Self-knowledge different from the science of the soul
P31, N33: Intelligibility requires actuality
P26: Analogy with vision: Only things visible in act can be perceived







Figure 3.5: Binary doctrinal matrix of determination doctrines.







































































P25: No identity of knower and known before actualization of possible intellect
N8: Similar to separate intelligences
P4: Possible intellect completely indeterminate before actualization by an external species
N5: Identity of knower and known impossible
P77, N4: Intellect not available to sense perception
N10: Knowing the act of the intellect risks infinite regress
P32: Infinite regress not a problem in the intellect
N23: No species proportional to the intellect
P46: Essential self-knowledge in the afterlife
P60, N17: Self-knowledge by innate species
P24: Knowing a blocking activity
P56: Material objects can never become intellects
N32: Essential self-knowledge by self-presence
P3: Self-knowledge through external species
N18: All intelligibles become intellects if intellect is intelligible
N29: Diversification of knowledge according to object
P62: Diversification only a problem with same mode of being
P78: The intellect can know completely immaterial things
N22: Material intelligibles cannot know themselves
N41: Multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge impossible
P49: Multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge is possible
N27: Accidents cannot affect their own subject
N28: Nothing can move itself (knowledge is being-moved)
N20: No simultaneous act and potency
P64: Act and potency with different respects
N24: No experience of higher-order knowledge
P29: Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect not available to humans
P30: Self-knowledge by own species, once actualized by external species
N35: Nothing simpler than the intellect, hence no species abstraction
N30: No essential self-knowledge, so not self-knowledge by own species
P59: Only material things cannot receive their own species
P70: Only physical movement requires difference between mover and moved
N38: Nothing can receive its own species
P23, N40: The intellect has essential self-knowledge
N25: Essential self-intelligibility by self-identity
P8: Intellect intelligble through external species
N3: Identity of mover and moved impossible
P7: The intellect is self-intelligible
P43, N16: Intellect not its own proper object of knowledge
N13: No abstraction of the intellect
P35: Knowing a power does not mean knowing its products
N37: Knowing agent intellect means knowing all phantasms
N39: Power of the agent intellect not intelligible
P33: The intellect can observe its own activity
P48: Internal experience of own mental faculties
P47: Intellect is perceptible after actualization
N26: Agent intellect has no positive content
P5: An immaterial substance is self-reflexive
P1: Primary and secondary intelligibility
N12: Analogy with sense and sensation
P20: Bodily senses are not reflexive
P41: Only restriction of identity in physical movement
P13: The intellect is intelligible







Figure 3.6: Binary clustermap of rationes doctrines.
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3.3.2 Typical material and representative commentaries
Having thus identified the different clusters of commentators, we will continue the summary
of the most important tendencies within the material in this final section. I will identify the
commentators that may occupy a central position in the corpus and have another look at the
most striking outliers. This will lead us to a survey of the most commonly used doctrines
in the context of determinations and rationes, and finally we will also have a look at which
commentators tend to present a high proportion of unique doctrines.
Table 3.4 on the following page contains the most popular doctrines (i.e. top one third)
and the number of times they are used. Based on this list it is relatively easy to present an
approximation of a standard explanation within this tradition. The intellect can be known, but
it does not have immediate, essential, or perpetual self-knowledge. Just like prime matter, the
possible intellect is completely indeterminate before it is actualized, and this provides the main
premise for the universally accepted doctrine of self-knowledge through the actualization by
an external species. The requirement of an actualization by an external species is what leads
a lot of the commentators to describe the self-intelligibility of the intellect as a secondary or
indirect self-intelligibility. This means that the intellect is also self-reflexive by virtue of its
immateriality, but not unconditionally or essentially, but only once actualized, and in this way
it differs from all other intellects. The human intellect therefore takes up the lowest position
of the immaterial and self-reflexive substances in the chain of being, and is the only one that
does not posses essential self-reflexivity and hence essential self-knowledge. As the intellect
is not its own proper object of knowledge it must however know itself according to the same
principles as it knows its primary objects of knowledge. So, according to many, this reflexivity
enables the intellect to reflect on its own objects, activities, powers, and hence acquire know-
ledge of its substance. And this is also often described as a successive process, as the intellect
does not acquire immediate and full self-knowledge once actualized. Notice that this is not a
question of transparency or opaqueness, as that is rarely discussed by the commentators, but
rather a question of whether its is an instantaneous or procedural phenomenon.
As this list also includes doctrines that are used in discussions of rationes principales, we
might also want to quickly highlight some of the most commonly used. The most often in-
voked doctrine is used by Anonymus Bazán, Jandun, Wyle, Siger of Brabant, Faversham and
Brito in 12 different invokations. The doctrine holds that the intellect is not available to sense
perception, and is generally used to attack the intelligibility of the intellect in different vari-
ations.137 The two other most commonly used attacks are different versions of the same idea
of comparing the human intellect with immaterial substances or intelligences that have es-
sential self-knowledge (N5 and N8). They are both used by five different commentators, who
actually happen to be exactly the same for both doctrines, namely Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II,
Anonymus Assisi, Dinsdale, Wyle and Faversham. Finally we find two other doctrines which
each are invoked four times, the first of which is the point that the same thing cannot be mover
and moved, which would be violated if the intellect could know itself (N3).138 And finally, we
find the often interesting argument that intellectual self-knowledge implies a risk (or even a
137 See 3.2.1.2.3 on page 67, 3.2.1.3.3 on page 69, and 3.2.4.2.1 on page 92 for the main uses.
138 See 3.2.1.2.2 on page 67 and 3.2.1.3.6 on page 70.
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Count Description Label
13 An immaterial substance is self-reflexive P5
12 Primary and secondary intelligibility P1
12 Intellect not available to sense perception P77, N4
11 Possible intellect completely indeterminate be… P4
11 Self-knowledge through external species P3
9 Substantial knowledge from accidents P2
7 Intellect intelligble through external species P8
6 Possible intellect similar to prime matter P10
6 Great chain of being and the intellect P12
5 Similar to separate intelligences N8
5 Identity of knower and known impossible N5
4 Bodily senses are not reflexive P20
4 Knowing a blocking activity P24
4 Self-knowledge different from the science of t… P18
4 Identity of mover and moved impossible N3
4 Intellect not its own proper object of knowledge P43, N16
4 The intellect is self-intelligible P7
4 Successive self-knowledge P14
4 Knowing the act of the intellect risks infinit… N10
4 Analogy with sense and sensation N12
3 Self-knowledge by innate species P60, N17
3 The intellect has essential self-knowledge P23, N40
3 No abstraction of the intellect N13
3 Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect no… P29
3 Self-knowledge by own species, once actualized… P30
3 Agent intellect known through its products P9
3 Intelligibility requires actuality P31, N33
3 Infinite regress not a problem in the intellect P32
3 No identity of knower and known before actuali… P25
3 Analogy with vision: Only things visible in ac… P26
3 The intellect is intelligible P13
Table 3.4: Top one third of determination doctrines according to popularity.
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necessity) of an infinite regress (N10).139
As we can see with these different reiterations of the doctrines that are spread across the
corpus, the same names seem to pop up all the time. It is therefore also very tempting to ask,
who gives themost representative presentation of this selection of common doctrines. Or to put
it differently, are there some commentators that would be good exemplary sources for the most
common doctrines within the corpus? Of course that is easy to calculate when information
about which doctrines each commentator uses. We do this by combining two measurements,
(1) how big a proportion of the most popular doctrines a commentator presents, and (2) how
high his concentration of those doctrines is. The first measurement indicates the proportion
between the intersection of the popular doctrines and the total doctrines of a commentator
and the total amount of popular doctrines. The second measurement indicates the proportion
between the same intersection of popular doctrines and total doctrines of the commentator and
the total number of doctrines used by the commentator. So the first measurement indicates the
representation of popular material, while the second indicates how strong their concentration
is in the commentary. The Venn diagram in figure 3.7 on the following page can help illustrate
the two measurements. Let X represent the set of popular doctrines, Y the set of doctrines
used by a commentator, and X ∩ Y the intersection between the two sets. Then the first
measurements indicates the size ofX ∩ Y in relation toX , while the second indicates the size
ofX ∩ Y in relation to Y . This combination is intended to counteract high outliers caused by
low numbers of registered doctrines.
In table 3.5 on the next page these measurements are presented along with the average
of the two. We see that the four commentators with the highest mixed score are Anonymus
Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle, and Brito. This also shows how the average of the two val-
ues balances extremes in the measurements, as Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II only contains the
doctrines that are among the most popular and thus has a concentration of 1, while he only
has a lower proportion of them than some of the others and therefore ends around the same
averaged score as them. Brito is an example of the opposite tendency, as he is the one with the
highest proportion of the popular doctrines, but since he also has many other, less common or
unique, doctrines, his average score is a bit lower. We also notice that aside from Jandun, Siger
of Brabant, and Anonymus Digby 55 all the commentators are relatively close in their scores,
and are therefore all more or less good places to start for a reader who wants to get a relatively
concentrated but representative impression of the doctrines of the tradition. Furthermore, a
low score on this measurement is not indicative of an uninteresting text, as this is also partially
a measurement of to how high a degree a text lies at the doctrinal average of a corpus. This
means that a commentator might provide an unrepresentative example text, although he actu-
ally has a high proportion of popular doctrines, as the popular doctrines may be spread more
thinly. The prime example of this is Jandun. So to investigate that phenomenon more, we can
return to the distribution of unique doctrines in the commentators.
In the first section of this chapter we had a prefatory view on the distribution of doctrines
and noted that generally most commentators have relatively few doctrines that are not shared
with any other commentators (half the commentators have 13.5% or less unique doctrines).
On the other hand there is a small group of commentators with much higher proportions of
139 See 3.2.1.3.4 on page 69 and 3.2.2.2.3 on page 83.
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Name Popular Concentration Average
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2 0.39 1.00 0.69
John Dinsdale 0.52 0.84 0.68
Henric de la Wyle 0.45 0.88 0.66
Radulphus Brito 0.61 0.68 0.65
Simon of Faversham 0.39 0.86 0.62
Anonymus Bazan 0.48 0.75 0.62
Anonymus Assisi 0.42 0.81 0.62
John of Jandun 0.52 0.50 0.51
Anonymus Digby 55 0.16 0.50 0.33
Siger of Brabant 0.13 0.50 0.31
Table 3.5: Proportion of most popular doctrines by commentator.
X YX ∩ Y
Figure 3.7: Venn diagram of X , Y , and X ∩ Y
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Unique Shared Sum Proportion
Anonymus Digby 55 6 4 10 0.60
John of Jandun 14 18 32 0.44
Radulphus Brito 7 21 28 0.25
Siger of Brabant 2 6 8 0.25
Anonymus Bazan 3 17 20 0.15
Anonymus Assisi 2 14 16 0.12
John Dinsdale 2 17 19 0.11
Simon of Faversham 1 13 14 0.07
Henric de la Wyle 1 15 16 0.06
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2 0 12 12 0.00
Table 3.6: Unique, shared, total and proportion of unique and shared doctrines.
unique doctrines. AnonymusDigby 55, Jandun, Siger of Brabant, and Brito all have 25% ormore
unique doctrines. The values for the whole corpus are apparent in table 3.6, and from that we
immediately notice that the reason Anonymus Digby 55 has such a high proportion of unique
doctrines partly is that relatively few doctrines have been registered for him. However Jandun
and Brito would be candidates for some interesting reading as they both seem to present more
elaborate texts and have a good chunk of unique doctrines (based on the amount of registered
doctrines). As we have already investigated the texts, we know some of the reasons for this.
An inspection of the binary doctrinal matrices (figures 3.5 to 3.6 on pages 101–102) will reveal
how both have a small handful of unique determination doctrines and in particular Jandun has
a large chunk of unique doctrines used in discussion of rationes principales.140
In figure 3.8 on the next pagewe see this data in a different visualization, a scatterplot where
each commentator is located in the plot according to his degree of uniqueness and proportion
of common doctrines. We see how Jandun and Brito both have a high degree of uniqueness
and commonality (in different proportions), while some concentrate around the lower middle,
as they share a lot and have a relatively low degree of unique material. Finally we see Siger of
Brabant and Anonymus Digby 55 have high and very high degrees of uniqueness, but a very
low proportion of common doctrines. From this a reader could navigate according to interest
to identify the kind of commentator he is looking for.
Finally, the attentive reader will have noticed long ago that there are also a couple of com-
mentators who seem to be at the low end or in the fringe of every calculation we execute.
These commentators are of course Siger of Brabant and Anonymus Digby 55. In the propor-
tional clustermaps we have seen how they consistently have become the outliers who had none
or only very weak cluster partners. This is partly due to real doctrinal differences, at least on
the part of Anonymus Digby 55. In section 3.2.3 on page 87 I have analysed his text separately
140 Counting the number of doctrines in thematrices will not necessarily fit with the number of unique
doctrines, as the same doctrine can have more than one instance, but will still be registered as a
unique doctrine when it is only used by a single author (which is exactly the case for Jandun).
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Figure 3.8: Scatter plot of uniqueness and commonality of commentators.
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as I interpret him to be the only one who actually gives a strong and unambiguous presentation
of the idea that the intellect knows itself by its own species, and in such a way that the species
is not necessarily completely indeterminate before actualization. On the other hand we have
seen how Siger of Brabant actually has quite some doctrinal similarities with Jandun on the re-
lation between the agent and possible intellect and their perpetual occupation with intellectual
self-knowledge. This also explains why he clusters together with Jandun in the clustermap of
determination doctrines (figure 3.2 on page 97). And although he also has connections with
many of the other commentators (see figure 3.4 on page 99) they are still so weak in compar-
ison with the other close connections that we have seen in this chapter that he ends up as the
outlier.
3.4 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to (1) introduce the texts and themes of self-knowledge dis-
cussed in questions on De anima 3.4, (2) survey the different ideas and points of doctrines as
they occur in the commentaries, and (3) analyse the network revealed by the material used
in the commentaries. This has been undertaken in three sections, one corresponding to each
partial aim. 10 texts comprising a total of 17 questions on self-knowledge have been invest-
igated. They span a range of different subjects within the domain from the intelligibility and
self-intelligibility of the intellect, the self-knowledge of the intellect (often explicitly the pos-
sible intellect), whether the intellect has essential or accidental self-knowledge, to questions of
whether the agent intellect can be known and in which way the two intellects are ontologically
related.
After an initial quantitative and qualitative overview of the main doctrines I presented
the detailed survey of all the different registered doctrines. This was done in a way where
the abstract arguments were not disconnected from the exposition of their use by the com-
mentators. We investigated the problems involved in the intelligibility and self-intelligibility
of the intellect as it is presented in eight different questions by the five commentators Brito,
Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus Digby 55, Anonymus Assisi and Jandun. We saw there the first
presentation of the fundamental guiding principle of these commentaries: The intellect is inde-
terminate before an actualization by an external species, which means that it is both intelligible
and self-intelligible through an actualization by the reception of an external species. We saw
how this discussion of intelligibility involves other doctrinal points such as the idea of reflex-
ivity of immaterial substances and the self-intelligibility as a successive procedure. And finally
we saw how Jandun presents a rather different view in one of his questions, as he holds that
the intellect always and necessarily has some sort of self-knowledge as soon as it represents
an external species by being actualized by it. The main objections to these questions revolve
around the requirement of sense perception in the Aristotelian epistemology, the impossibil-
ity of self-movement or simultaneous act and potency of the same subject, and other similar
challenges of subject-object identity.
The second, and major, subsection sketched the treatments of the seven commentators
Faversham, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle, Anonymus Assisi, Brito, and Jandun,
who go into the details of intellectual self-knowledge, very often by refuting the idea of es-
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sential self-knowledge directly, and always with an endorsement of the idea that the intellect
knows itself through actualization by an external species. The process is often explained as the
Aristotelian acquisition of knowledge about a substance through observation of the objects of
its activities, which yields knowledge about its powers which in turn reveal what kind of sub-
stance they belong to. In this way the intellect, it is argued, knows itself in the same way as it
knows other things. There is however the difference that the dependence of sense perception
is only indirect, as the intellect can engage in self-reflection, provided that it is actualized by a
primary object of knowledge. So it differs from the other types of intellects that can engage in
essential self-reflection, and it therefore occupies the lowest tier of intellects on the big scala
naturae. Some therefore also emphasize the successive nature of the procedure in this con-
text as well. Challenges are often either presented as a general challenge of the intelligibility
of the intellect, as already presented, as arguments in favour of essential self-knowledge, or
as challenges focusing on the impossibility of an identity between subject and object of an
activity. The argument of the risk of an infinite regress is also regularly presented, but most
commentators do not consider such regresses a problem in the domain of the intellect.
In opposition to this big central group of commentators, we have the most significant out-
lier in this corpus, Anonymus Digby 55. He argues that the intellect knows itself through its
own species. The difference consists in the idea that although the intellect is not actualized it
is still not completely indeterminate, as it has some sort of species of its own. This conception
of the species clearly imports features from the idea of a substantial form that lets Anonymus
Digby 55 struggle with the question of how the intellect can have a form if it is completely in-
determinate. Unlike the majority of commentators he further argues that the intellect knows
itself immediately once actualized by the reception of an external species, although it takes
place through a process of abstraction of its own form-species. This idea of self-knowledge
therefore involves two species, the proper species of the intellect, which cannot be abstracted
and known before it is actualized by a species of a primary object of knowledge.
Finally, we saw how a smaller contingent of commentators, Anonymus Bazán, Siger of
Brabant, Radulphus Brito, and John of Jandun, also tackle the problem of whether and how
the possible intellect knows the agent intellect. Their solutions differ, as Jandun and Siger of
Brabant present the monopsychist idea that the agent intellect is perpetually engaged in an
act of self-reflection which is then reflected in the possible intellect by virtue of their eternal
connection in the separate intellect. However, this type of knowledge of the eternal activity of
the intellect never extends down to the level of human intellection, although they are ready to
accept that human also get knowledge of the agent intellect, but in a more indirect way through
observation of its activities. That procedure is the only solution presented by Anonymus Bazán
and Brito.
The final section of the chapter investigated connections and tendencies within the texts
that all these different points of doctrine reveal in a combined quantitative and qualitative
approach. The registration of all the doctrines, and some details of their contexts, makes it
relatively simple to identify doctrines used by two or more commentators. Based on such
correlations I presented two types of visualizations to highlight clusters and give an overview of
the distribution of doctrines in the texts. Those analyses clearly revealed a strong group of five
commentators, Anonymus Assisi, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle, and Faversham
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who have an overwhelming tendency to share a big proportion of their doctrines. In particular
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and Dinsdale as well as Dinsdale andWyle were found to be closely
connected. But it also showed that Anonymus Bazán and Brito bear a strong likeness to each
other, while Anonymus Digby 55 and Siger of Brabant are the most distinct outliers in the
corpus. Finally, Jandun was also somewhat of an outlier, not so much due to his difference in
fundamental doctrines, but rather because of a wide spread of doctrines and a higher degree
of unique material that means that he has relatively less in common with any one of the other
commentators.
Not all connections can be investigated fully within the limits of this study, but some fur-
ther connections can be suggested for further study. In the texts of Brito and Anonymus Bazán
there is an asymmetric relation between the two where almost all of the doctrines presented
by Anonymus Bazán were also to be found in Brito’s text without the inverse being the case.
The connection and historical relation between those two texts is interesting and an interest-
ing subject for further studies. The two texts share the subject and general structure of each
their three questions concerning self-knowledge. A hypothesis for further investigation would
be that Brito used the commentary of Anonymus Bazán (or another very closely related text)
in the development of his own commentary, but I also showed how he uses it productively.
When the material present in his source of inspiration is more or less unproblematic it can be
taken over without many changes, but when he notices philosophical problems or incoherent
arguments, he does not hesitate to develop the material into a stronger and more coherent
form.
Finally, the registration of doctrines across the texts made it possible to make some well
founded suggestions for good commentators to read to get a representative and relatively con-
centrated impression of the common doctrines of this corpus. Based on those analyses I would
recommend the texts of John Dinsdale, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II or maybe Wyle as good
starting points for the interested casual reader or maybe a class curriculum. If a reader on the
other hand is looking for a rich commentary that includes the standard doctrines of the tradi-
tion but also presents a high degree of originality (or at least uniqueness), Radulphus Brito or
John of Jandun would be the place to start.

Chapter 4
The science of the soul and
self-knowledge
Is intellectual self-knowledge the same as knowledge of the soul as a universal? Does acquisi-
tion of knowledge about the soul take place in a way different from intellectual self-reflection?
If they are different, what sort of endeavour is the so-called science of the soul? Those ques-
tions will be the focus of this chapter. The question ‘can there be a science of the soul’ or an
equivalent is almost universally present in question commentaries of the 13th and early 14th
century. In this chapter we will see some different treatments of that question with intellectual
self-knowledge as the central point of attention. This will show how the commentators viewed
the relation between intellectual self-knowledge and the science of the soul.
We could imagine a distinction between (1) the knowledge of the soul as a universal, and
(2) the process that takes place when an individual intellect reflects on itself. Given such a
distinction, the first point provides the content of the science of the soul, that is, the soul as the
defining form of any sort of living being. This may only be considered self-knowledge in the
sense that it tells something about the kind of thing the individual intellect is just as any other
intellect. Since the particular soul is an example of the universal concept of soul, knowledge of
the soul as a universal also provides knowledge of the individual soul, but it tells nothing about
any distinctive features of that particular soul. Whether there can be a science of the soul is
of the most general nature, and it therefore has a natural place in the prefatory sections of a
commentary on De anima. On the other hand, the particular intellectual self-knowledge that
is introduced in De anima 3.4 might represent a more restricted aspect of the complete soul,
as it only concerns the self-reflexivity of the intellect. The relation between these concepts of
self-knowledge will be the subject of this chapter.
The procedure followed in this chapter is similar to the preceding chapter. I give an over-
view of the doctrines used by the commentators, which is followed by a detailed exposition of
the doctrines and counter arguments as they occur in the commentaries.1 After that I will draw
some general connections based on quantitative analyses of the material, before the chapter is
closed by three shorter analyses on selected subjects within the material.
1 All doctrines listed in the appendix, section A on page 241.
114 4. the science of the soul and self-knowledge
The science of the soul is normally the main subject of the commentaries on book one, as
the historical parts of the book are often discussed cursorily or skipped entirely. Interesting
questions will therefore have to be left aside, as we keep a clear focus on the main subject,
the relation between intellectual self-knowledge and the science of the soul. I therefore only
analyse the initial question on whether there can be a science of the soul, as that regularly
includes reflections of self-intelligibility, reflexivity, and occasionally the relation between self-
knowledge and scientific knowledge. Other questions on particular aspects of this subject
would be relevant places to expand this study further. Examples of that could be questions on
acquisition of substantial knowledge through observation of accidents, or discussions of the
difficulty and certainty of the science.2
The chapter will show that most commentators explicitly accept Aristotle’s suggested ap-
proach of starting from an analysis of the objects, activities and powers of the soul. They also
generally present the idea that a science is defined by a group of formal principles that must be
fulfilled, and that indeed they can be fulfilled in the case of the study of the soul. But they do not
agree on how big a role intellectual self-knowledge and introspection can play in the science
of the soul. John of Jandun is an example of a commentator who tries to keep introspection
to a minimum, while Simon of Faversham on the other hand may even consider it a necessary
condition for a scientific knowledge about the soul. Most commentators are however to be
found between those two extremes, and it is generally difficult for the commentators to keep
intellectual self-knowledge completely out of the picture.
The overview of the arguments presented also reveals some interesting connections among
the commentators. The most striking connection is between John Dinsdale and Anonymus
Orielensis 33 who present two texts that are doctrinally virtually identical. Wewill also see that
Simon of Faversham, Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II present
texts that have many shared points of doctrine, although they also differ on central points. I
argue that they present a group of representative commentators to read to get an impression
of the most commonly used arguments in the tradition. The connection between Anonymus
Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Vennebusch, and Anonymus Bernardini, which is already known
in the literature, will also be confirmed here. Finally there are some commentaries, such as that
of Henric de la Wyle, that stand out in comparison with the remaining corpus.
Every question commentary from the 13th or early 14th century that I have inspected raises
the possibility of having a science of the soul among its very first.3 I selected a subset of those
commentaries for further study in the following way: When a commentary that is included in
the preceding chapter has been available, it has been included. Aside from that I have chosen
commentaries of which I already had made partial studies, and often transcriptions, as well as
some already published commentaries. I have sought to cover the period from around 1250
to the early 14th century. When questions cover more subjects than just the question of the
science of the soul, I only focus on the relevant part in the analysis (this is in particular the
case for Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Anonymus Vennebusch). The texts included in the
chapter are listed in table 4.1 on the next page.
2 Boer 2013: 92–121 in particular contains a interesting and relevant study some of these points,
including some of the same commentators as I study here.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































116 4. the science of the soul and self-knowledge
Context Doctrines Instances Proportion
Determination 21 67 3.19
Attack 16 69 4.31
Refutation 18 63 3.50
All 47 213 4.53
Table 4.2: Number of doctrines and instances in four different context classes.
4.1 Overview
From table 4.2 we see that I have identified 21 different determination points of doctrine in the
context of determinations. The determination doctrines have been registered to be used a total
of 67 times in the texts, yielding a mean frequency around 3.2 uses per doctrine. When we look
at the attacking and refuting rationes principales, we generally find fewer doctrines with more
or less the same frequency of use. I have registered 16 attacking and 18 refuting doctrines, and
we notice how the attacking doctrines have a higher instance-to-doctrine proportion than the
other contexts. But also how all the proportions here, and the attacking doctrines in particular,
have a higher proportion than in the preceding chapter (see table 3.1 on page 60). This indicates
that the collection of arguments used is smaller here than in the preceding chapter. This is
probably mostly an effect of the smaller range of problems raised than in the preceding chapter
where the questions cover a wider range of themes.
As in the preceding chapter we see a very unequal but similar distribution. Half of the doc-
trines are used only once or twice, while 75% are used less than six times. The upper quartile
on the other hand has a high frequency with an average of almost 15 instances, and the chal-
lenge that the soul is not available to sense perception and the distinction between primary
and secondary intelligibility are the most frequently used doctrines.4 Unique points do occur
among the commentators, as half the commentators have 10% or more of their doctrines that
are unique. But in particular Jandun, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Wyle have four unique
doctrines each and a relatively high proportion of around 25% of their complete doctrines. The
amount of unique doctrines is however slightly lower than in the preceding chapter.
At the beginning of De anima Aristotle is very conscious about the methodological chal-
lenges of the projected science. He discusses where to start the scientific investigation of a
subject and suggests looking at the activities and objects of the substance under investigation
to get to know it better.5 He does not there state explicitly the problem that maybe the soul
is not directly or fully available for sense perception. But later, in book two, that seems to be
part of his motivation for considering the approach based on activities and objects necessary,
as the objects and activities precede the powers.6 In the introduction this leads him to state that
not only is knowledge of an essence important in knowing the accidental attributes of a sub-
4 This is aside from the base doctrine that there can be a science of the soul, which is registered a
high amount of times, but disregarded in the numbers as it caries no particular interest.
5 Aristotle DA, 1.1, 402b9–16.
6 Aristotle DA, 2.4, 415a14–22.
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stance, but it also works the other way around: The accidents can be very helpful in knowing
the essence of a substance, because statements about properties also give us information about
their substance.7 A hypothetical definition of an essence can then be tested and confirmed to
be good when it is able to explain satisfactorily the accidents of the substance. He also treats of
how the intellect can be known, as it is unclear whether it is a proper attribute of the embodied
soul or something separate. Averroes is interested in the problem because of his attention to
the separability of the material (later termed ‘possible’) intellect.8 But neither of the two really
get into the methodological challenges it involves. Albert the Great on the other hand goes
more into it, but also his discussion is not particularly elaborate. The power of the intellect, he
says, lies in its ability to not limit its conclusions to the sensible objects, but rise above those
to the realm of the immaterial comprising the first cause, the separate substances as well as its
own essence.9
That view, that the essence of the soul can be revealed through an investigation of its
powers, expressed in its activities and their objects, is a fundamental part of the explanation
themedieval commentators give. We are already familiar with the approach from the preceding
chapter, where it was also found to be a central part of how the intellect acquires knowledge
about itself through self-reflection.10 But they also appeal to one or more points that we have
not seen in the preceding chapter. Typically they will argue that a science is established by a
subject with properties that can be ascribed to the subject according to established principles,
and that the definition of the soul works as this principle of ascription.11 They might also
want to discuss different definitions of science, whether the knowledge of the soul qualifies as
one of those, or whether it can answer one or more of the four types of scientific questions
that Aristotle lists in Analytica posteriora 2.1. Some also doubt whether the knowledge that
we have about the soul can be considered a science strictly speaking, while others may even
claim that it is a fully demonstrative science. But one thing that they almost all accept is that
intellectual self-knowledge plays a part in the acquisition of this science, but some ascribe it
more importance than others.
The challenge that they most commonly raise is how there can be a science about that
which cannot be the object of sense perception. The credo of the Aristotelian empiricism
makes them raise this fair challenge to which the solution generally is that although we can-
not perceive the soul directly, indirect perception is possible through the effects of the soul,
its activities. The commentators may also present other related problems revolving around
the problem of the immaterial nature of the soul, and the intellect in particular. The intellect
may be presented as the most difficult thing to get knowledge about for those exact reasons.
Another strain of challenges focuses on the problem of potential self-identity that may arise
when the subject and object of the science are identical, but solutions to that often point out
7 Aristotle DA, 1.1.402b10–3a2. Boer (2013: 46, n. 4) refers to an article on this titled Knowing
Substances through Accidents. Aristotle’s De anima I.1, 402b17–22, in the Medieval and Renaissance
Commentary Tradition by P.J.J.M. Bakker, but it is nowhere to be found.
8 Averroes In DA, bk. 1, cap. 12, pp. 17–18, ll. 36–70.
9 Albert the Great Lib. 1, tract. 1, cap. 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 36–5.
10 With the inventory reference P2, analysed in section 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76.
11 This stems from Analytica posteriora, in particular chapters 1.10 and II.3.
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how the soul is known through an intermediate knowledge that establishes a distance between
the two entities. Finally they may also argue that some of the requirements of a proper science
are not fulfilled, which may either be refuted or conceded with a modification of the extent to
which our knowledge about the soul is a science.
4.2 Arguments
In this section we will see document in detail how the individual doctrinal points are used by
the commentators, which commentators use which arguments, how they differ and who are
similar. We will also present their negative rationes principales and their refutations. As in the
previous chapter there is a full registry of the doctrines included here in section A on page 241
where each number is prefixed with either a ‘P’ for positive doctrines or ‘N’ for negative doc-
trines. In the next section (section 4.3) we can then see which relations and tendencies these
different compositions of doctrines reveal.12
4.2.1 Positive points
4.2.1.1 Subject, properties, principles (P6)
A science requires (1) a subject, (2) properties ascribed to the subject, and (3) the principle ac-
cording towhich the properties are ascribed to it.13 The investigation of the soul fulfills all these
three requirements. The definition of the soul can be used as the principle by which the prop-
erties are ascribed to the subject.14 This is presented by Wyle, Faversham, Brito, Anonymus
Vaticani 2170 I, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Jandun, Anonymus
Orielensis 33, and Dinsdale.
Dinsdale provides us with a great example of how such an argument can look like:
Dicendum quod cum scientia sit habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem, et ad
demonstrationem tria requirantur (scilicet subiectum, passio, et principium per
quod ostenditur passio de subiecto), ubi est invenire ista tria, ibi contingit ponere
scientiam. Nunc autem anima quoddam subiectum est cuius sunt multae pro-
prietates et passiones, ut patebit inferius. Sunt etiam principia per quae istae
passiones probari possunt de anima. Si enim accipiatur quod quid est animae pro
12 Boer (2013: 48–57) also gives an high level categorization of some of the doctrines of this corpus,
presenting arguments of imperceptibility, simplicity, and potentiality, mostly with reference to
Anonymus Vennebusch, Anonymus Bazán, and Brito. He also gives (pp. 58–65) a comparison of
the doctrines of Brito and Jandun where it is possible for him to go into a bit more detail about
those connections that I can do here.
13 This is based on Aristotle APo, I.28, 87a38–87b4.
14 The assumption of these three elements stems from Aristotle APo, 1.10, 76b13–22 where what I
refer to as ‘subject’ is the γένος, the ‘properties’ are πάθη, and the ‘principles’ are ἀξιώματα. The
terminology used here is modelled on the medieval terminology, where the three elements are
called subiectum, passiones (or proprietates) and principia.
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medio, per ipsum concludi potest propria passio eius de anima, et ita de anima
potest aliquid sciri sive esse aliqualis scientia.
It should be argued that when science is a state acquired through demonstration,
and three things are required for a demonstration (namely a subject, an attribute,
and a principle by which the attribute is ascribed to the subject), where those
three are present one can hold there to be a science. But now the soul is some
subject to which belongs several properties and attributes, as we will see below.
There are also principles by which those properties can be proven to belong to
the soul. For if the definition of the soul is accepted as the middle term, then the
proper attributes of the soul can be ascribed by that, and in this way we can know
something or have a some sort of science about the soul.
Dinsdale I.1, app 310.18–24.
In his determination Dinsdale is relatively brief as he outlines how the soul is a subject with
several properties which are ascribed to the soul by using the definition of the soul as a middle
term.15 But his argument lacks any further specification of which attributes he refers to or
a demonstration of how the definition can act as this middle term in the ascription. He also
does not flesh out what the principles by which the properties are ascribed are. In their de-
termination of this question Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale are very similar, also on
these points, but although Anonymus Orielensis 33 is a bit more verbose, he leaves no notes
about how the definition is used as a principle for property ascription.16 But he explains that
the subject is something intelligible with properties such as knowing and reflecting (intelligere,
speculari). The principle is another certain definition by which those properties are ascribed to
the subject.17
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I Includes this as one of three ways in which a science can be
obtained.18 The other two are by definition and division.19 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II briefly
notes that the soul can be known when it is in act and thus has parts and properties. He seems
to argue that the intellect has a principle in itself according to which the properties are ascribed
to the subject. He singles out the principle of passivity and activity in the intellect as the cause
of many of its activities, and thus such a principle of ascription.20 Although Faversham only
gives this argument as his positive ratio principalis, he provides more details in an outline of
how each part of the soul has different parts and activities.21
Jandun adds more details, but he also shifts the requirements slightly. He adds that the
subject is a thing that can be known as a universal, and that it has parts, properties, and prin-
ciples according to which the properties are ascribed. The soul is an intelligible thing as it is
15 Dinsdale I.1, app 310.18–24.
16 There is a problem with the text, and a possible lacuna, in that exact passage where some details
may be given.
17 Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.21–33.
18 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.29–33.
19 Cf. section 4.2.1.6 on page 125.
20 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, app 299.13–24.
21 Faversham I.1, app 332.25–36.
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in act, and because of the intellect’s ability to become anything. This, he holds, shows that it
is intelligible as it itself is part of the class of all things. The argument must be that everything
the intellect can know is intelligible; it can become all things by knowing them; it is then itself
included in that class; hence it is itself intelligible.22 The soul contains parts and properties,
he continues, through its activities, namely vegetation, sensation and intellection. Finally the
principle according to which they are ascribed to the subject is the definition of the subject
itself, and the soul even has a general definition as well as subordinate definitions according to
its special activities.23
Just like Jandun, Brito makes the point that the soul in itself is intelligible as it is a thing in
virtue of being in act.24 Further, the vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul are easier to get
to know through immediate observation of their effects. But it is different with the intellect,
because that is known after its actualization by another object of knowledge. Here Brito gives
a smaller presentation of his doctrine of intellectual self-knowledge, including a presentation
of the question of simultaneity of the different objects of knowledge.25
Wyle uses this doctrine as his only constitutive argument for the science of the soul, and
includes an interesting distinction in his presentation. As is generally held, he announces that
the definition of the soul will be the medium by which properties are ascribed to the subject
of investigation. But he then distinguishes between the definition considered as a simple form
without reference to the hylomorphic composite that it actualizes. This leads him to conclude
that there can be a science of the soul considered in itself and another science of the animated
body, which considers the form in a composite.26
In one of his positive rationes principales Anonymus Mertonensis 275 argues that there can
be a science about that which has causes. That is a paired down version of this present argu-
ment, as the ascription of properties to the subject by the definition gives causal explanations
of the properties.27
4.2.1.2 Substantial knowledge from accidents (P2)
Knowledge about accidents can lead to knowledge of that to which they belong. Many ac-
cidents of the soul (operations and their objects) are evident to us. This position is held by
Anonymus Giele, Anonymus Bernardini, Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Orielensis
33, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, Anonymus Vennebusch, Dinsdale, Jandun, Brito, Faversham.28
22 This is the same argument as he uses later to establish the intelligibility of the intellect, cf. the
preceding chapter on page 65, and on page 163 in the following chapter.
23 Jandun I.1, app 318.7–24.
24 Brito I.1, p. 269.18–21.
25 Brito I.1, 269.22–70.23.
26 Wyle I.1, app 305.6–15. This is an interesting intermediate position in the question of the subject of
the science as either the soul as form or the enmattered soul. Boer 2013: 71–92 delves into debate.
27 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.30–31.
28 Curiously enough Anonymus Bazán does not include this doctrine in this context, but in a later
question (Anonymus Bazán I.5, ll. 39–49) he outlines this doctrine from both an a priori and a
posteriori perspective. Starting from the essence of the soul and from there analyzing its powers,
activities, and objects is the former and more difficult, but includes an idea of internal experience
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Anonymus Orielensis 33 provides us with a good example:
Accidentia, eo quod non sunt entia nisi in alio, ipsa praecognita manuducunt
in cognitionem eius cuius sunt. Sed multae sunt operationes artificiales nobis
manifestae quae non possunt procedere nisi a potentia intellectiva. Haec enim
immediate fluit a substantia animae, propter quod huiusmodi operationes nobis
manifestae statim ducent in cognitionem animae.
Preconceived accidents, insofar as they are not anything except in something else,
lead to a knowledge of that to which they belong. But many artistic activities are
evident to us which cannot have any other origin than an intellective power.
For they flow directly from the substance of the soul, and because of that such
activities, which are evident to us, immediately lead to a knowledge about the
soul.
Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.34–292.2.
Accidents must belong to a subject, he explains, and the soul exhibits a range of activities as
accidents that are readily available for observation. These must be caused by an intellective
power and thus lead directly to a knowledge about the soul. This means that the knowledge
of the soul is indirect, as it is derived from the observation of its accidents. This then also
constitutes one of the most common ways of solving the problem of the imperceptibility of the
soul and the intellect in particular.29
Dinsdale is very similar to Anonymus Orielensis 33 in wording and details of this argu-
ment.30 Anonymus Giele states that as accidents belong to a subject, they cannot be known
in themselves but through knowledge of them we get knowledge about the subject. The ac-
cidents that Anonymus Giele points out are sensation (vision and hearing specifically) and
intellection.31 Faversham includes this explanation of the science in an extended exposition
of the mechanics of an introspective process completely along the lines of the procedure of
substantial self-knowledge in the previous chapter ( 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76).32 The presentation
of Anonymus Vennebusch is similar in his presentation.33 Finally, Jandun also gives an ex-
tended discussion of how the intellect can be known through its accidents, which includes a
distinction between accidental and essential perceptibility.34 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and
(“de illis quae sunt experimenta in nobis”), while the procedure starting from the objects is easier,
as it starts with what is most apparent. Boer 2013: 107–8 describes this.
29 Cf. 4.2.2.3 on page 129.
30 Dinsdale I.1, app 310.25–311.2.
31 Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 19–32. He adds the highly interesting note that intellects which do not
reveal themselves in activities available to the senses cannot be known according to this procedure
(logica nostra) of empirical observation and must remain hidden by nature, naturaliter occulta ( I.1,
ll. 33–37).
32 Faversham I.1, app 333.18–334.5. It is curious to note it in his question on self-knowledge he does
not outline this process, although that is a very typical point to include in that discussion.
33 Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [2], p. 94, ll.60-68.
34 Jandun I.1, app 319.1–27.
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Anonymus Bernardini embed the argument into a discussion of the different ways in which
something can be intelligible.35
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I discusses this procedure extensively.He declares there to be two
ways in which substantial knowledge can be obtained. When the intellect observes that some
operations proceed from a thing, it makes conjectures (coniecturatio, coniecturare) about which
sort of substance these operations belong to and differentiates the different substances based on
their operations. Through such a hypothetical procedure and observation of accidental proper-
ties the intellect distinguishes different objects and arrive at a definition of their essence.36 This
looks like a discussion of how empirical inferences are made in the psychological science, and
might be an expansion of what he imagines to take place during the acquisition of knowledge
from accidents, which is presented immediately after those reflections.37
As part of Jandun’s discussion of this doctrine he raises the challenge that if the intellect is
only intelligible accidentally (once actualized), then the science is also only accidentally pos-
sible. His answer to that is that when something is known through the knowledge of something
else, and that mediating object of knowledge is known according to its own species, the direct
relation propagates back to the causing subject. So the powers of the soul, such as percep-
tion and nutrition, are themselves available to sense perception through their proper objects
and acts, not accidentally but by necessity. And since the knowledge acquired through the
necessary perceptibility leads to knowledge about the imperceptible essence of the soul, the
knowledge is not accidental.38 This is an interesting point, as it shows how Jandun may argue
that the knowledge that is based on introspection may have a weaker scientific grounding than
the empirical observation of accidental activities. Because unlike sensation and nutrition the
activities of the intellect are accidental as they rest on the condition of its actualization by an
external stimulus.
4.2.1.3 Proper and improper science (P15)
Knowledge acquired through observation of effects is not a proper science because it does not
proceed according to causes. There is a contrast between this doctrine and the arguments that
a science is constituted by a subject, its properties (which include effects) and a principle for
ascribing the properties to the subject in P6. AnonymusMertonensis 275, AnonymusOrielensis
33, Wyle, Dinsdale, and Faversham present the doctrine.
Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale also mirror each other closely on this point, when
they argue that the knowledge acquired in that way is not a science properly speaking, because
it does not analyse the substance according to its causes (but rather, we infer, from effects).39
Dinsdale also adds that this was the reason Aristotle refers to the knowledge about the soul as
35 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.12–19, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 35–64. We will get
back to this again in section 5.2.2 on page 180.
36 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.37–296.15.
37 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 296.16–22.
38 Jandun I.1, app 319.1–27.
39 Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.34–292.2, Dinsdale I.1, app 310.25–311.2.
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a historia rather than scientia.40 That point about historia is also made by Faversham.41
Wyle makes this point in his distinction between three types of science (see section 4.2.1.6
on page 125) and makes it clear that the proper science is one that provides knowledge about
a subject, but he does not go into how it is realized.42 Finally, Anonymus Mertonensis 275
presents this point of doctrine in one of his rationes principales.43
4.2.1.4 Soul known through self-reflection (P11)
An incorporeal thing can reflect on itself, and by virtue of that we can have a science of the soul
(although it may not be a sufficient requirement). The argument is presented by Anonymus
Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, Brito, and Faversham.
Faversham argues that the soul is immaterial and hence self-reflective, and it is important
for him to emphasize that the immateriality excludes the risk of knowing some parts of the soul
while not knowing others. A possible implicationwould be that the self-reflecting soul acquires
a complete knowledge of itself during the process and thus might be completely transparent
to itself.44 He does however make it very clear that the soul’s self-reflexivity is still conditional
upon the preceding actualization of it by an external species. The procedure through which the
knowledge is then acquired is the well-known acquisition of substantial knowledge through
observation of accidents (P2).45 And one might fairly raise the question whether this procedure
does not exactly fall prey to the challenge he presents of knowing some partswhile not knowing
others.
Similarly Anonymus Mertonensis 275 bases his exposition on this doctrine. The simplicity
of the soul means that it is essentially equipped with an ability of knowing itself through self-
reflection.46 It is however not a power that it can realize on its own accord, as it is dependent
on an external intermediary species, at least in this terrestrial existence. In the separate exist-
ence of the afterlife, essential self-knowledge may be a possibility (without a requirement of
externally occasioned actualization).47 In a similar vein Anonymus Bernardini notes that the
identity of knower and known should facilitate a science through self-reflection.48 The bulk of
his determination is however spent analysing types of intelligibility and arguing that the soul is
known through observation of its effects. Still, some of his refutations of initial challenges seem
to imply an emphasis on an introspective science of the soul.49 Both commentators also present
a version of this argument in their positive rationes principales, and Anonymus Bernardini even
makes an explicit reference to the 15th proposition of Liber de causis on the complete return to
40 See Aristotle DA, I.1, 402a4.
41 Faversham I.1, app 336.15–18.
42 Wyle I.1, app 304.34–305.5.
43 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.18–21, covered in section 4.2.2.16 on page 138.
44 Faversham I.1, app 333.1–17.
45 Faversham I.1, app 333.18–334.5.
46 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.9–11.
47 But the note about self-knowledge in the afterlife is made in the following sub-question on innate
self-knowledge. See Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 288.2–7 and app 288.30–33.
48 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 32–34.
49 See 4.2.2.4 on page 130 and 4.2.2.11 on page 135.
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itself of the immaterial substance.50
Afinal example of a commentator who relies primarily on this is Anonymus Bazán, who in-
cludes this in his only argument. The self-intelligibility of the intellect once actualized supports
the minor premise of his argument that the intellect is intelligible. With themajor premise, that
there can be a science about everything intelligible, this establishes the possibility of the sci-
ence of the soul.51 What we notice here is that this might entail that self-reflection is sufficient
for establishing a full science of the soul according to this commentator.
Brito includes this point, but unlike Anonymus Bazán who uses this as part of his only
argument, Brito mentions it as a side note addressing some details of the intelligibility of the
intellect. Subsequently he moves on to arguments about the soul as a subject with parts and
properties.52 Similarly, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I makes this his third point in an explanation
of the procedures of the science of the soul. He argues that the intellect is dependent on external
stimulation to acquire a first actuality (although he does not use that term), but once that is the
case, he explains, it is able to realize activities that are unavailable to it before actualization,
because then it acquires a reflexive ability and can thus turn and iterate on itself and thus
acquire knowledge about itself.53
4.2.1.5 The intellect especially difficult to know (P19)
Knowing the intellect is particularly difficult, as it not intelligible through observation. De
Boer argues that the seed of this distinction is to be found in Anonymus Bazán’s treatment of
the difficulty of the science, which is developed further by Brito and will set the agenda for the
14th century.54 But in our selection we see that Brito is by no means alone in developing this
idea, as it is used by him as well as Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Faversham, and Jandun.55
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II is possibly the commentator who has the most focus on this
with two mentions of it in his determination and one in the discussion of the rationes.56 His
solution is to point to themechanics of the possible intellect: Once it is actualized by an external
species, it can be the object of knowledge. In a short section of his determination Brito is rather
close to Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II on this point, referring to the mechanics of the intellect and
raising a problem about it intelligibility. But he also raise the problem of simultaneity, which
is not at all mentioned by Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II.57 Faversham, who is often doctrinally
close to Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, also notes this difficulty, but in a much less emphatic way,
as he just includes a short note on it in his positive ratio principalis.58 Finally, Jandun makes
this point in his discussion of how knowledge about the soul can be drawn from observation
50 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 20–24, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.32–33.
51 Anonymus Bazán q. I.1, ll. 30–35.
52 Brito I.1, pp. 269.25–70.12.
53 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 296.23–31.
54 Boer 2013: 109–12.
55 From De Boer we also learn that Anonymus Bazán also presents this doctrine in his later question
on the difficulty of the science of the soul (I.5, ll. 74–78).
56 See Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, app 299.13–16, I.1, app 299.25–36, I.1, app 299.8–11.
57 Brito I.1, pp. 269.25–70.12.
58 Faversham I.1, app 332.25–36.
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of the accidents of the soul.59
4.2.1.6 Three meanings of science (P21)
The term ‘science’ can refer to the knowledge about a subject, a conclusion of a demonstra-
tion or the properties ascribed to a subject. Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I and Wyle present this
point. Wyle holds that the proper meaning of science is the first of those three meanings which
represents knowledge about a subject, as that is the proper object of knowledge.60 Anonymus
Vaticani 2170 I argues that science can be by definition, division or demonstration. He does not
designate one of these as a proper or more accurate meaning of science, but explains how the
soul can be known in all three ways.61 According to his presentation the knowledge through
a definition is the knowledge obtained by the definition of the essence. There can also be a
science of the soul based on its parts, and finally based on a demonstration. The demonstration
is the familiar approach from section 4.2.1.1 above based on the ascription of properties to a
subject according to the principles dictated by the definition of the substance.62
4.2.1.7 Four questions of a science (P61)
There are four questions of a science, namely si est, quia est, quid est, and propter quid, or in
English the whether, that, what and why a thing is.63 There is a science for any thing to which
there can be given an adequate answer to all these four questions. Jandun thinks that this can
be done for the soul and outlines how each of the four questions are answered.64
4.2.1.8 Form and perfection (P80)
The idea is that there can be a science about the form and perfection of a natural thing; as the
soul is the form of a living body, it should be possible to have a science about it. This point is
made by Wyle in his positive ratio principalis.65
4.2.1.9 No science of the separate soul (P45)
Brito raises the challenge in his determination that since the human soul is an actualization
of a body, can there ever be a science about the soul in itself? This he accepts as he says that
although truth, faith and the Philosopher hold that the intellect is separable from the body, a
59 Jandun I.1, app 319.1–12.
60 Wyle I.1, app 304.34–305.5.
61 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.18–20 for the distinction.
62 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.18–36.
63 Those are of course from Aristotle APo, II.1, 89b23–25, but cf. also Aristotle APo, I.13, 78a22-23.
The questions quia and propter quid are τὸ ὅτι and τὸ διότι in Greek. The remaining two are εἰ
ἔστι and τί ἐστιν, which the Latin tradition knows as si est and quid est. Barnes translates these as
‘the fact’, ‘the reason why’, ‘if something is’, and ‘what something is’ in his second edition of the
translation of the Analytica posteriora: Aristotle 1993: 48.
64 Jandun I.1, app 318.25–40.
65 Wyle I.1, app 304.29–33.
126 4. the science of the soul and self-knowledge
study of the soul as a separate substance falls within the purview of the divine science. The
natural science of the soul only observes it insofar as it is an actualization of a body.66 This
should however not be a problem as he seems willing to accept that all the activities of the
soul, including the intellect, can be studied through the ensouled body.67
Anonymus Vennebusch presents a distinction between the soul viewed from the perspect-
ive of its separation compared to its role as the perfection of the body. Under the first viewpoint
the soul, or rather the intellect, is on par with the separate intelligences, and that perspective
does not concern the natural philosopher but rather the metaphysician.68 But when viewed as
the perfection of the body the natural philosopher can investigate the soul through an analysis
of its accidents and their effects (P2).69
4.2.1.10 Four requirements for a science (P79)
Anonymus Steenberghen is unique in presenting the view that four requirements must be
fulfilled for there to be a science about a thing. (1) The subject must be a universal, (2) which,
as such, is incorruptible, (3) and has its own parts and properties, (4) and that it constitutes a
knowledge that has an intellectual immediacy in the reflection on the subject. He of course
argues that all these requirements are fulfilled with respect to the soul.70
Some of these requirements can also be found in other commentaries, in particular in the
discussion of the rationes principales. The assumption that a science is about a universal is
raised in the challenge that there can be no science of the soul, as any soul is a particular and
any science is about universals (N11 covered in section 4.2.2.2 on page 128). The main point
used in the refutation of that challenge is that a particular can serve as the exemplary instance
of a universal (P16). Similarly, we find the argument about incorruptibility in challenge N14
which is treated in section 4.2.2.9 on page 134. Finally, the idea that the subject must contain
its own parts and properties is treated in challenge N7, which is treated in section 4.2.2.15 on
page 137. But it is also part of the argument presented in the positive doctrinal point P6, the
most wide-spread idea that a science is constituted by a subject which is ascribed properties
according to its definition.71
The fourth point, that the knowledge of the science must have an intellectual immediacy
with respect to the subject, has not been registered in this chapter, and warrants a note. The
commentator writes:
[…] item cognitio subiecti est principium cognitionis propriae passionis, cum su-
biectum ponatur in ratione eius : ideo subiectum debet esse tale quod eius cognitio
primo occurrat intellectui in scientia illa.
66 Brito I.1, 270.24–71.7.
67 Cf. Boer 2013: 87–8.
68 This goes against the view of Boer (2013: 87) that Anonymus Vennebusch is unconcerned by the
question of the subject of the science.
69 Anonymus Vennebusch q. 1[2], ll. 54–62.
70 Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 16–34.
71 See section 4.2.1.1 on page 118.
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[…] further, the knowledge of the subject is the principle of knowing the proper
attributes, when the subject is possited in its definition. The subject therefore
ought to be of such a nature that knowledge of it immediately presents itself to
the intellect in the science.
Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 25–28.
The phrasing and meaning is difficult to parse, but I interpret this to mean what I have already
suggested, that the definition of the subject presents itself immediately or easily to the intellect
in the process of knowing the subject. This implies that the definition includes a natural or
intuitive appeal to the natural philosopher.
The commentary of Anonymus Steenberghen is interesting in virtue of this idea that the
definition of a subject must be intellectually meaningful and immediate. But as we have seen
it also collects a range of points that are mostly presented as general assumptions about the
nature of a science in the rationes principales, and presents these in the determination proper.
4.2.1.11 The stronger principle of attribution (P44)
That which is the reason of a property possesses that same property to at least the same degree,
and because the soul facilitates science about everything other than itself, a science of it must
also be possible. This doctrine is rooted in the passage on the demonstrative syllogism in Ana-
lytica posteriorawhere it is said that we ought to know the premises better than the conclusion,
because that which causes a property to inhere in a subject itself inheres in it to a higher de-
gree.72 Anonymus Vennebusch and Anonymus Mertonensis 275 give us this argument in their
positive rationes principales, holding that since the soul is that by which we know other things,
so much the more ought we to be able to know it.73
4.2.1.12 Identity of knower and known (P22)
Nothing is more certain than when the knower and known are identical, and as that is case for
the soul and its knowledge of itself, there must be a science of it. The idea of identity of knower
and known can be used to support as well as attack the possibility of the science of the soul,
as we will see in a following section.74 Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis 275
give us this argument in each one of their positive rationes principales.75
4.2.1.13 Certain science about simple subject (P57)
The science about a simple subject must be certain, and as the soul is simple, the science about
it must be certain, and from this Bernardini seem to conclude that it must be possible to have
a science about it.76
72 Aristotle APo, I.2, 72a29–30.
73 Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [1], 15–19, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 I.1, app 285.28–29.
74 Cf. 4.2.2.6 on page 131.
75 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 27–30, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 286.1–3.
76 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 25–26.
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4.2.2 Negative points
In the previous section I have presented and discussed the ways in which each commentator
makes use of the range of positive doctrinal points. We will now proceed to the challenges
presented by the commentators, and how they deal with them.
4.2.2.1 Soul not intelligible to us (N1)
(1) The subject of a science must be intelligible.
(2) A soul is not intelligible.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
As is clear from the general argument, this can be a catch-all for a range of different arguments
to the effect that the intellect cannot be known. Five authors present this as a independent
argument, but as their way of supporting the minor generally corresponds with one or more
of the other existing negative arguments, we will register them here as well as in one of the
relevant following sections. Often they will give two or more arguments to support this overall
claim. Commentators presenting this argument are Dinsdale, Anonymus Bazán, Anonymus
Orielensis 33, Brito, Wyle, and Jandun.77
Like the others Wyle of course delivers refutations of the three challenges, which are
treated below, but he also presents a counter point to the general challenge. He argues that
the thing that you can raise a question about (dubium) is intelligible, otherwise you could not
reflect on it (P55).78 For this to not be tautological we will have to distinguish dubitable from
intelligibile, so that he basically says that “whatever you can doubt about is intelligible.” It is
however still hard to see the strength in the argument unless we understand intelligible in a
more liberal way than ‘that which can be known’.
4.2.2.2 Soul is a particular (N11)
(1) A science must be about universals.
(2) A soul as the form of a body is a particular.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
The discussions of Anonymus Giele, Faversham, and Jandun are rather close on this point,
arguing that as the soul is the form of a specific being it is also itself a particular, and hence
cannot be the object of a science.79 They also agree in the refutation that there is nothing
standing in the way of the same form being both the actualization of a given substance and the
subject of a study of the form considered as a universal (P16).80
77 Jandun I.1, app 317.17–29, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 6–11, Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.3–6,
Brito I.1, 268.3–17, Wyle I.1, app 304.7–8, Dinsdale I.1, app 310.4–7.
78 Wyle I.1, app 305.26–32.
79 Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 9–17, Faversham I.1, app 332.11–12, Jandun I.1, app 317.6–10.
80 Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 54–58, Faversham I.1, app 334.37–335.2, Jandun I.1, app 319.29–34.
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Wyle supports the minor differently by saying that universals are abstracted from multiple
singular sensibles, but as the soul is not sensible, there can be no universal about it.81 This
support for the minor makes it quite similar to the sense perception argument in section 4.2.2.3.
He refutes the argument by pointing out that just like in the case of genus and species, the soul
can be considered as a universal without being sensible itself (P36).82
4.2.2.3 No sense perception (N2)
(1) Science can only be about that which can be known, and scientific knowledge can only
be acquired through sense perception.
(2) The soul is not available to sense perception.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
Jandun, Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale use this as one of their three arguments to
support the challenge that the intellect is not intelligible (cf. section 4.2.2.1 on the preceding
page).83 Also Anonymus Bazán presents this as a supporting doctrine to the main point about
the unintelligibility of the soul, but without the three-in-one structure of the other mentioned
commentators.84
Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, Anonymus Vennebusch, Anonymus
Giele and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I do not use this as an embedded argument about the un-
intelligibility of the soul, but effectively it amounts to the same conclusion.85
A significant group of the commentators sharpen this objection by stating that not only
is the intellective soul imperceptible, but so is any of its activities. We find this in Anonymus
Giele, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Faversham, and Brito.86
A solution to the challenge is to distinguish between that which is perceptible in itself
and that which is so indirectly through something else. Colours, sounds and other percept-
ible phenomena are of course examples of the first, while privation and the soul is held to be
examples of the latter. As the activities of the soul can be available to sense perception, the
soul is thereby also perceptible, albeit indirectly.87 This refutation is of course a reflex of P2
(substantial knowledge from accidents).
A similar approach is based on the distinction between primary and secondary intelligib-
ility (P1). Brito provides us with an example (with a similar parallel in Anonymus Bazán)
81 Wyle I.1, app 304.3–6.
82 Wyle I.1, app 305.16–25.
83 Jandun I.1, app 317.17–29, Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.3–6, Dinsdale I.1, app 310.4–7.
84 Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 611.
85 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.8–10, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 3–5, Anonymus
Vennebusch I.1 [1], ll. 4–6, Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 6–8, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app
295.4–8.
86 Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 8–10, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.4–8, Anonymus Vaticani
2170 II I.1, app 299.8–11, Faversham I.1, app 332.17–21, Brito I.1, 268.3–9.
87 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 66–68, Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.21–22, Anonymus
Vennebusch I.1 [2], ll. 69–82, Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 292.3–11, Dinsdale I.1, app 311.3–9.
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when he argues that the intellect need not be perceptible, because when it becomes intelligible
through its own knowledge of something else, it is only required that that primary object of
knowledge is perceptible.88 This is a version of the argument for the intelligibility of the intel-
lect (P8) that we have already seen in the commentaries on book three.89 Anonymus Vaticani
2170 II and Faversham also seem to follow this approach, but they just argue briefly that it
is sufficient that the object or mover of the intellect is perceptible. As we have seen in the
previous chapter this structure of indirect intelligibility is a basic component of intellectual
self-knowledge. Although these commentators choose a version that implies the possibility of
self-knowledge, it is still important for them to maintain the reference to the perceptibility of
the objects.90
We find a slightly different focus in the solution of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, who simply
argues that the intellect is a reflexive power, and can therefore observe itself by something
else.91 This still involves the same structure of secondary knowledge, which is especially clear
in the closing of his determination as well as the refutation of the objection itself.92
Anonymus Giele shares the point about secondary intelligibility, but he is also more careful
in his refutation to address that specific challenge of the imperceptibility of the activities of the
intellect. He argues that the activities of the lower faculties, such as the productive activities,
reveal the existence of a directing intellective faculty.93 He thus incorporates both approaches.
In a similar vein, Brito notes that this concept of secondary cognition does not apply for the
vegetative and sensitive parts of the soul, as their activities can be readily observed (and are
thus primarily intelligible).94
4.2.2.4 No science without phantasms (N2)
(1) All knowledge is based on phantasms.
(2) The soul is not a phantasm and phantasms are not produced from it.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
This very close relative of the argument about sense perception is presented by Anonymus
Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, and Wyle. The two arguments are so alike that they
have been registered under the same main doctrine of imperceptibility (N2), but are however
presented separately here as Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Anonymus Bernardini actually
give both arguments. To Wyle, who does not present the argument of sense perception, it may
very well just be his version of that argument. The minor is supported by the fact that the soul
88 Brito I.1, 271.21–72.1, Anonymus Bazán I.q, ll. 36–44.
89 Cf. section 3.2.1.1.2 on page 65.
90 Faversham I.1, app 335.7–9, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, app 300.6–8.
91 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 296.33–35.
92 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 296.23–31, cf. I.2, app 297.16–24.
93 Anonymus Giele I.1, ll. 38–53.
94 Brito I.1, 272.1–3.
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is simple and hence does not produce any phantasms,95 or by the fact that the soul does not
present itself in phantasms.96
As in the argument about sense perception a possible solution is to refer to knowledge
acquired from accidents (P2): As the activities of the soul can produce phantasms, so can the
soul.97 It is here curious to note that although this would also be the obvious solution for An-
onymus Bernardini, he actually rather argues that the challenge does not apply to the soul,
as it is not known through phantasms.98 This of course implies a stronger emphasis on a sci-
ence based on intellectual self-knowledge rather than observations of the perceptible effects
of the soul. But this does not fit his main determination, where that is exactly the preferred
approach.99
Another solution to the challenge that we saw in the above sense perception argument
was based on the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1). That is the
solution chosen by Wyle.100
4.2.2.5 Act and potency (N20)
(1) The same thing cannot be in act and potency at the same time and in the same respect.
(2) The object of knowledge is in act with respect to the knowing subject, and the knowing
subject is in potentiality with respect to the object of knowledge.
(3) ∴The intellect cannot know itself.
Brito presents this objection, which is really an argument about self-knowledge.101
The challenge is obviated by denying that the intellect is potency and act in the same
respect (P64). Brito argues that the intellect knows by the potency of the possible intellect,
while it is intelligible through the actualization of the possible intellect by the knowledge of
an external object. This means that it is in act and potency in different ways. We may accept
that, but might also want an explanation of how the possible intellect can be in potentiality
with respect to knowing itself while it is in act by an external species.102
4.2.2.6 Knower and known (N5)
(1) No thing can be known by itself because there must be a difference between the knower
and the known.
(2) In a science of the soul the same thing would be knower and known.
95 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.15–17, Wyle I.1, app 304.14–18.
96 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 16–18.
97 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.25.
98 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 78–79.
99 Cf. section 4.2.1.2 on page 120.
100 Wyle I.1, app 306.8–12.
101 Brito I.1, 268.10–17.
102 Brito I.1, 272.4–10.
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(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
This is presented by Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I.103 He refutes it by the distinction between
primary and secondary act of knowing (P1), and the secondary act of knowing is explained to
be the act of self-reflexion.104
Jandun presents the following close relative of the argument:
(1) In immaterial substances there is identity between the science (scientia) and the thing
known.
(2) The substance and the science of the soul cannot be identical, as one is a substance and
the other is a quality.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
This is not completely identical, but can be considered under the same heading. The minor is
supported by the passage in the end of De anima 3.4 where Aristotle points out this identity
in immaterial substances.105 Jandun argues that since at least the intellective part of the soul is
immaterial, this challenge holds.106
In his refutation Jandun gives us an interesting small Forschungsbericht on this problem.
He only addresses the challenges raised by the major about the identity of knower and known
in immaterial substances, which can be qualified in a couple of different ways. What he wants
to show is that in the human intellect a complete identity between the knowing subject and
the known object does not occur (making it an example of P1). Some argue, he says, that
it only holds for separate intellects who primarily know themselves and subsequently other
things, such as God and the intelligences, and since the human soul is not one of those, it
does not apply to it. He gives two reason why that is not a valid argument which both focus
on the identity of a science about a subject and that subject: (1) The knowledge exposed in
Metaphysica 12.7 and 12.9 is not identical to God, and similarly (2) knowledge about the agent
intellect is not identical to the agent intellect. Others have argued, he continues, that the
identity between science and the separate substance only holds for the substances that are in
act, which again should solve the problem regarding the intellect. But as the potentiality of the
intellect only applies to the possible intellect, that does not work either. He therefore modifies
the first solution to hold that the identity of subject and science only holds for the science that
the separate intellects have about themselves (since they know themselves primarily), but it
does not hold for the science we humans have about them. This solves the problem with the
identity of God and the knowledge exposed in Metaphysica 12.7 and 12.9. And since the soul
does not know itself primarily (cf. P1), we avoid the necessary identity.107
He also adds another argument to show that the problem of identity does not arise for the
human use of the intellect. He argues that unlike the separate substances, which are completely
103 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.12–15.
104 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 297.16–24.
105 Aristotle DA, III.4, 430a4–5.
106 Jandun I.1, app 317.35–318.4.
107 Jandun I.1, app 320.14–28.
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separate in both their substance and activities, the agent intellect is only separate in substance,
while the human utilization of the agent intellect relies on the body.108
4.2.2.7 Mover and moved (N3)
(1) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same respect.
(2) That which is known is mover with respect to that which knows it.
(3) If there were a science about the soul the same thing would be mover and moved.
(4) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
This is presented by Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale.109 Jandun and Wyle both use this
as one of their three arguments to support the thesis that the intellect is not intelligible (cf.
section 4.2.2.1 on page 128).110
Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33, and Wyle refute this with a distinction between move-
ment as the act of an imperfect thing and a perfect thing. The movement of the imperfect thing
must be known to be physical movement, where the mover and moved cannot be identical (ex-
cept if one of the properties is accidental, such as the sailor moving the ship and himself at
the same time). The movement of the perfect being, which we must assume is immaterial, is
however not a physical movement and therein lies the solution, as the immaterial substances
are recognized as self-movers without any problem of identity.111
Both Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale connect this point with the reflexivity of the
intellect, they also draw a distinction between the essential self-knowledge of the separate
intelligences (including the prime mover) and the human intellect, which requires the actual-
ization through an external species before it is able to reflect on itself.112 As it is presented in
the short note by Anonymus Orielensis 33, it may look like self-reflection is a necessary (con-
comitant) consequence of the primary act of knowing, but as it is at the same time couched in a
language implying awareness (percipit, apprehendens), there is no indication that he considers
it an unconscious process.
Wyle distinguishes between reflecting on the intellect of somebody else and on one’s
own intellect. To avoid the problem of self-movement in that case he refers to the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary act of knowing and the discursive nature of this self-
knowledge.113 Jandun also refutes this (and the other two objections that he uses to argue
against perceptibility) in a blanket argument pointing to the distinction between primary and
secondary knowledge (P1).114
108 Jandun I.1, app 320.29–38.
109 Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.15–18, Dinsdale I.1, app 310.8–11.
110 Jandun I.1, app 317.17–29, Wyle I.1, app 304.9–13.
111 Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 292.31–293.4, Dinsdale I.1, app 311.10–21, Wyle I.1, app 305.33–
39.
112 Dinsdale I.1, app 311.10–21, Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 292.31–293.4.
113 Wyle I.1, app 305.40–306.7.
114 Jandun I.1, app 319.40–320.6.
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4.2.2.8 Knowing things most manifest (N9)
(1) The things most manifest by nature cannot be known by the intellect.
(2) The soul is among the things most manifest by nature.
(3) ∴The soul cannot be known by the intellect.
The argument generally involves a reference to the passage in Metaphysica where the sight of
the night owl in daylight is compared to the powers of the intellect in relation to the things
most evident by nature.115 Some things may be evidently true (φανερώτατα) by their nature,
but it can be very difficult for our system of knowledge acquisition to verify that truth.116 This
is presented by Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, Anonymus Orielensis 33
and Dinsdale.117
The argument is countered by modifying the major to hold that these things most manifest
are not inaccessible to the intellect but merely more difficult to access (P17). The analogy to
the night owl is maintained by saying that like the owl cannot perceive the sunlight directly,
it can however perceive its effects, the light of the moon. And similarly with the intellect, it
cannot have direct knowledge of these imperceptible objects (including separate substances)
but only indirect knowledge, through their effects. And among these unavailable objects the
soul is the one most adequate for human knowledge and hence the best known in this class of
things most manifest in nature but least manifest to us.118
4.2.2.9 Soul is corruptible (N14)
(1) There is no science about corruptible things.
(2) The soul is corruptible as the form of a corruptible body.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
This argument is related and similar to 4.2.2.2. Jandun and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I argue
that the corruption of the body is the result of the corruption of the form, which should then
reveal the soul to be an inappropriate object of scientific knowledge. Much like in 4.2.2.2 this
challenge is handled by saying that although the soul of a particular person is corruptible, it
can be analysed as a universal (P16).119 For Jandun this includes the point that the corruption
of the soul is only accidental and irrelevant to the definition of the universal.120
Anonymus Steenberghen establishes the minor of the argument in a similar way by ar-
guing that the corruption of the body results in the corruption of the form.121 He refutes it by
115 Aristotle Metaph. II.1, 993b9–11.
116 Cf. also Aristotle Phys. I.1, 184a16–23.
117 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.25–27, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 11–15, Anonymus
Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.10–14, Dinsdale I.1, app 310.12–14.
118 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.32–34, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 71–77, Anonymus
Orielensis 33 I.1, app 292.20–30, Dinsdale I.1, app 311.22–312.4.
119 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 297.3–15.
120 Jandun I.1, app 319.35–39.
121 Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 12–14.
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arguing that the soul is only partly an actualization of matter. The intellect, he points out, is
not the actualization of any part of the body, and in virtue of this immateriality the soul is not
corruptible, and hence a possible subject for a science (P66).122 If he maintains a strict formal
unicity, this of course raises the problem of what happens to the powers that are realized in the
body (perception, nutrition) in the unenmattered state. But that unicity is one way to avoid
the otherwise inconvenient consequence that the science of the soul can only concern itself
with the intellective part of the soul. Another possibility would of course be to simply reject
or modify the major of the argument.
4.2.2.10 Denudation of the intellect (N15)
(1) The intellect ought to be stripped of its object of knowledge before knowing it.
(2) Nothing can be stripped of itself.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
Jandun uses this as his second of three arguments to support the thesis that the intellect is not
intelligible (cf. section 4.2.2.1 on page 128).123 All three are refuted with reference to the same
distinction between primary and secondary act of knowledge (P1).124
4.2.2.11 Continuous and temporal (N6)
(1) All human knowledge is a continuous and temporal process.
(2) The soul is neither continuous nor temporal.
(3) ∴The soul cannot be intelligible.
This is presented by Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Bernardini, Wyle Anonymus Ori-
elensis 33 and Dinsdale.125
Anonymus Orielensis 33 presents two arguments to refute this.
(1) The intellect may start its investigations fromwhat is continuous and temporal, but from
there it can proceed towards atemporal matters such as the substance of the soul itself
(P34).
(2) Although the object of the knowledge may not be temporal, the analysis of it is still
temporal as human intellection is a discursive process (P42).126
122 Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 56–66.
123 Jandun I.1, app 317.17–29.
124 Jandun I.1, app 319.40–320.6.
125 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.11–14, Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 6–10, Wyle I.1, app
304.19–23, Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.7–9, Dinsdale I.1,
app 310.15–16.
126 Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 292.12–19.
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Here Dinsdale makes the same point as Anonymus Orielensis 33’s first, but much more briefly
by simply stating that not all objects of knowledge need be continuous and temporal.127
Anonymus Mertonensis 275 on the other hand presents a single argument similar to An-
onymus Orielensis 33’s second, holding that the activity of the intellect is continuous and tem-
poral although its essence may not be (P42).128 Anonymus Bernardini differs, as he argues that
it only applies to things known through a species, which is not the case for the soul (P38).129
This implies a more introspective approach to the science of the soul.
Wyle also presents a variant of Anonymus Orielensis 33’s first argument along with his
own unique argument that the soul itself is atemporal but it is also the actualization of some-
thing temporal (P34), and in that respect it can be studied in the same way as other material
objects of knowledge.130
In each their way we see here that the commentators expose the weakness of the initial
challenge, namely the confusion of the objects of the soul’s knowledge and the process through
which it acquires this knowledge.
4.2.2.12 No universal about the soul (N19)
(1) A science is about a universal.
(2) Universals are abstracted from sense perception, but the soul is not available to sense
perception.
(3) ∴There can be no universal (and hence no science) about the soul.
Anonymus Vennebusch andWyle present this argument, related to N11, where it is argued that
that there can be no science about the soul because it is a particular and a science must be about
a universal. The argument takes the same major, but the minor differs as it focuses on the role
of sense perception in the formation of universals, and is therefore very similar to the minor
of N2 about the imperceptibility of the soul.131 The refutation given by Wyle holds that not all
universals have to be abstracted directly from material objects (P36). Anonymus Vennebusch’s
refutation is identical to that presented against the argument about sense perception: Although
the soul is not directly perceptible, it is perceptible in virtue of its accidents, its powers and
activities (P2).132
4.2.2.13 The soul does not exist (N36)
(1) There cannot be a science about that which does not exist.
(2) The soul does not exist.
127 Dinsdale I.1, app 312.5–7.
128 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.23–24.
129 Anonymus Bernardini I.1, ll. 69–70.
130 Wyle I.1, app 306.13–19.
131 Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [1], ll. 7–12, Wyle I.1, app 304.3–6.
132 Anonymus Vennebusch I.1 [2], ll. 83–91.
arguments 137
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
Jandun gives this (we must admit, slightly odd) argument, and supports the minor by holding
that everything that has existence is either in the soul or outside it. But as he astutely points
out, nothing can be neither inside itself nor outside itself, hence the soul cannot exist.133 He
refutes this by accepting that the soul is in a certain sense outside itself. Not in such a way that
it is different from itself, but because its being does not depend on its own operation (P51).134
The point must thus be that the soul (or parts of it) have independent subsistence regardless
of the activity of the embodied soul, and can therefore be considered to be outside itself in a
restricted sense (P51).
4.2.2.14 Indeterminacy entails unintelligibility (P4)
This presents a negative use of the indeterminacy thesis of the possible intellect:
(1) There cannot be a science about that which does not have an intelligible form or species.
(2) The intellect does not have an intelligible form because it is nothing in act before it
knows.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the intellect.
This is presented by Faversham and Anonymus Bazán with reference to the potentiality of
the possible intellect.135 They refute this as if it were a question on intellectual self-knowledge,
arguing that once the intellect has been actualized by a primary object of knowledge, then it can
be an object of knowledge. This is of course an example of the distinction between knowledge
by primary or secondary act of knowledge (P1), and in this argument it is considered enough
to support a proper science of the soul.136
4.2.2.15 Parts and properties (N7)
This is the negation of the idea that a science is based on the ascription of properties to a subject
according to established principles:
(1) A science must be about a subject with properties which are ascribed according to a
specified principle.
(2) The soul is simple and hence does not have any specific parts or properties.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
133 Jandun I.1, app 317.30–34.
134 Jandun I.1, app 320.7–13.
135 Faversham I.1, app 332.4–10, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 12–17.
136 Faversham I.1, app 334.17–36, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 45–51.
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The argument takes as its starting point the principlemostwidely used in the determinations.137
Brito argues that the major does not hold for the soul with four arguments: (1) The soul has no
specific parts, as all activities are a product of the whole.138 (2) The soul is simple and cannot
have parts. (3) To say that the soul becomes angry is similar to saying that the soul weaves and
builds, which is not true as it is the whole composite, the human, hence it also does not become
angry.139 (4) Finally, that which has properties is the subject of those, but such subsistence is
only possible through matter, and as the soul is immaterial, it cannot be the subject for any
properties.140 The challenges are countered by the point that although the soul might not have
any properties when considered as a separate substance, it does in virtue of constituting the
form of the body soul composite, and although some activities of the soul have no connection
to matter, others do. And it is this complete composite that makes it a possible object of a
science (P27).141 That the soul is here known by its activities in virtue of it being the form of
the body makes it an example of the doctrine of knowledge acquisition from accidents (P2).
Faversham, Anonymus Bazán, and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II make the same point, but
present it as a single argument, that the soul is simple and hence cannot be the subject of any
parts or properties.142 Anonymus Steenberghen is similar to these as he does not include any
reflection of the idea of ascription of the properties through the definition of the subject. Like
Brito he refutes this by arguing that the soul has parts in virtue of its embodied activities.143
The refutation of Anonymus Bazán is simple enough, as he argues that although the soul may
be simple in its essence and integral parts, it is composed of different powers, which satisfy the
requirement of the objection (P63).144 The refutations of the two others are a bit more murky.
But a comparison of the language and structure of the two passages indicates that they present
the same basic argument. They argue that it should not be a problem that the intellect is simple
for there to be a knowledge about its essence, and further that for there to be a knowledge about
the essence of a subject, it does not have to be a subsisting subject, as long at it still is the subject
of properties (P39).145
4.2.2.16 Science proceeds from causes (N31)
(1) All science proceeds from causes.
(2) The soul is not known through its causes.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science of the soul.
137 See section 4.2.1.1 on page 118.
138 Cf. Aristotle DA, I.1, 403a7–12.
139 Cf. Aristotle DA, I.4, 408b1–15.
140 Brito I.1, 268.18–69.4.
141 Brito I.1, 272.11–73.2.
142 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, app 299.4–7, Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 18–27, Faversham I.1, app
332.13–16.
143 Anonymus Steenberghen I.1, ll. 5–11 and 44–55.
144 Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 52–60.
145 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, app 300.1–5, Faversham I.1, app 335.3–6.
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Anonymus Mertonensis 275 invokes the doctrine of substantial knowledge from observation
of accidents (P2) to support the point that the intellect is not known through an investigation of
its causes. This is therefore an example of the distinction between proper and improper science
(P15) discussed above in section 4.2.1.3 on page 122.146 He refutes the argument with the point
that the description of a science proceeding from causes answers the propter quid-question,
while the procedure starting from observation of accidents answers the quia-question, and it
is therefore just a different understanding of science, but a science nonetheless.147
4.2.2.17 Self-knowledge (N34)
(1) If there were a science of the soul the intellect would be able to know itself.
(2) The intellect cannot know itself.
(3) ∴There cannot be a science of the soul.
Anonymus Mertonensis 275 supports the minor through the analogy with sense perception,
which is not self-reflexive. The solution to this challenge is of course to reject the analogy with
reference to the material nature of sense perception in opposition to the intellect, which hence
can be reflexive (P11).148
4.3 Clusters
In the preceding section we have seen how each of the positive and negative doctrinal elements
are represented in the different commentaries. In this section we will draw out the tendencies
of the composition of doctrines and analyse them from a quantitative perspective. This will be
based on the general assumptions and methods sketched in section 1.3 on page 7 and section
3.3.1 in the preceding chapter. I have already given an overview of the general quantities
on page 4.1 on page 116, and here I present more detailed identifications of likely clusters of
commentators based on the relative amount of shared doctrines among them. In doing so the
distinction into positive doctrines and negative doctrines in the inventory is maintained, but
as we have seen of course the positive doctrines can also be used as refuting points for the
challenges, so double entries across the divide will occur. This will not have any influence on
the quantitative conclusions.149
The two primary arguments (P6, P2) make up the standard explanation of how the science
of the soul is known, while the other arguments rather apply different perspectives on the
presentations. That goes for the points concerning proper and improper science (P15), that the
science implies self-reflection (P11), and that the intellect is particularly difficult to know (P19).
146 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 285.18–21.
147 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.29–31.
148 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.26–28.
149 The Jupyter notebook can be found on https://github.com/stenskjaer/dissertation-notebooks,
where the calculations can be verified in all their detail, and extra data and graphs can also be
found.
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Figure 4.1: Proportional clustermap of determination doctrines.
The challenge that it is impossible to obtain knowledge about immaterial substances from sense
perception is the dominant doctrine in the rationes. But we also often see challenges to the basic
idea that a science is about a subject ascribed properties by an established principle (N2 and
N7).
As in the preceding chapter wewill make use of the proportional clustermaps and the binary
doctrinal matrix to visualize the connections between the commentators.150 Themap based on
positive doctrines in figure 4.1 only reveals one very strong cluster and some other more loose
groups. Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale are completely identical in their determination
profiles, which means that they have an identical relation to the remaining corpus. In the
map they therefore only have a single leg of the dendrogram. They are clustered with Wyle
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Figure 4.2: Proportional clustermap of rationes doctrines.
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Figure 4.3: Proportional clustermap of all doctrines.
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with whom they constitute a small group. Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis
275 make up one of the three high level groups of the corpus along with Anonymus Giele
and Anonymus Vennebusch. The other main group contains Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and
Jandun, and Faversham and Brito who together make up two small groups of relatively close
commentators. These four also clustered together with Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I. Aside from
Anonymus Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale, Brito and Faversham have the closest connection in
this selection of doctrines. Finally, Anonymus Steenberghen and Anonymus Bazán make up a
distinct group that shares the least with the other texts.
A comparison of that map with the map of rationes doctrines in figure 4.2 on page 141 as
well as the sum of all the doctrines in 4.3 on the preceding page is however very interesting,
as we see that only few of the clusters are maintained across the two contexts. This indicates
that we have a collection of commentators who differ relative little in their composition of
doctrines. That general impressions is also confirmed when we look at the map of all the
doctrines (figure 4.3 on the facing page), which generally gives a bland and undistinguished
impression. The clustermap of all doctrines in particular makes it difficult to distinguish any
groups. This reveals a relatively high similarity, all things considered, across the questions
investigated here. The interesting exception is Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33, and Wyle
who constitute a stable group across all three sets of doctrines, and also here group together
with Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis 275. The only other stable character
is Anonymus Steenberghen who remains an outlier in all the maps.
We can get a bit more detail to these clusters by looking at the doctrinal matrix in figure 4.4
on the next page. First of all we notice the spread of the two most prevalent pieces of doctrine,
claiming the acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents (P2) and the requirements
of a subject ascribed properties according to an given principle (P6). Further we see that the
distinction between proper and improper science (P15) and the distinction between primary
and secondary intelligibility (P1) are the next two most common arguments. Finally we see
two “rows” at the top of commentators who share the idea of a science acquired through self-
reflection (P11) and that the intellect is particularly difficult to know (P19). Between these
dispersed chunks there is a collection of doctrines with only a single or few instances. The
map of rationes doctrines shows a bit more coherence, but also some tendency towards unique
“columns” of doctrines. By far the most common doctrine in that context is the objections that
the soul is not available to sense perception (N2) and the twomost commonmodes of refutation
which again are the doctrine of acquiring substantial knowledge from observation of accidents
(P2) and the distinction of primary and secondary intelligibility (P1).
To close this section of quantitative analysis, we can also apply the identification of central
and representative commentaries that closed the preceding chapter. There I showed how a
combined frequency of the most common doctrines used by a commentator and how highly
concentrated those doctrines are in his set of doctrines gives us an impression of which text is
themost representative of thematerial of the corpus.151 In table 4.3 on page 146we see from the
column ‘Popular’ that Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33 andWyle are the commentators with
the highest proportion of the most common doctrines (the top 33%), while we find the highest
concentration of the popular doctrines in Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33, and Anonymus
151 See the description on page 105.

















































































































P11: Science through self-reflection
P19: Intellect especially difficult to know
P80: Science of form and perfection
P21: Three meanings of science
P76: Science requires intelligible essence or definition
P79: Four requirements of a science
P37: Science about a substance which contains parts and properties
P45: No science of the separate soul
P27: Soul has parts and properties in virtue of its embodied activities
P22: Identity of knower and known in immaterial substances
P57: Certain science about simple subject
P44: The stronger principle of attribution
P5: An immaterial substance is self-reflexive
P50: Science from observations of accidents is also science
P61: Science by answering (four) scientific questions
P73, N1: Soul not intelligible to us
P69, N2: Soul not available to sense perception
P1: Primary and secondary intelligibility
P15: Proper and improper science
P2: Substantial knowledge from accidents

























































































































P2: Substantial knowledge from accidents
P1: Primary and secondary intelligibility
P69, N2: Soul not available to sense perception
P6, N7: Science about subject, parts or properties, principles
N6: Knowledge is continuous and temporal, but soul is simple
N9: Things most manifest in nature are opaque, so no science of the soul
P17: The soul is difficult but not impossible to know
P73, N1: Soul not intelligible to us
N3: Identity of mover and moved impossible
P28: Perfect mover can move itself
P34: Knowledge may proceed from temporal to atemporal matters
P39: Subsistence is not a requirement as long at it is the subject of properties
P31, N33: Intelligibility requires actuality
N20: No simultaneous act and potency
P27: Soul has parts and properties in virtue of its embodied activities
P66: Intellect is incorruptible
N19: No universal about the soul, as it requires sense perception
P36: Not all universals are abstracted from sense perception
P58: Atemporal soul the actualization of temporal body
P55: Soul intelligible as object of dubium
P42: Objects of knowledge need not be temporal, but analysis is
P50: Science from observations of accidents is also science
N34: Intellectual self-knowledge is impossible
P5: An immaterial substance is self-reflexive
N31: Science proceeds from causes, so no science about the soul
P51: Soul does exists as something outside itself (in certain sense)
N36: No science about the non-existent
N15: Nothing can be stripped of itself
P63: Soul is simple in essence but has different powers (partes potentiales)
P38: The soul is not known through phantasms
P16: Form of particular can be studied as a universal
N11: Soul is a particular, so there can be no science about it
N5: Identity of knower and known impossible







Figure 4.5: Binary doctrinal matrix of rationes doctrines.
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Popular Concentration Average
John Dinsdale 0.60 0.92 0.76
Anonymus Oriel 33 0.60 0.86 0.73
Henric de la Wyle 0.60 0.67 0.63
John of Jandun 0.55 0.69 0.62
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 1 0.45 0.75 0.60
Simon of Faversham 0.45 0.75 0.60
Radulphus Brito 0.40 0.73 0.56
Anonymus Giele 0.25 0.83 0.54
Anonymus Bernardini 0.35 0.64 0.49
Anonymus Mertoniensis 275 0.45 0.53 0.49
Anonymus Bazan 0.25 0.71 0.48
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2 0.20 0.67 0.43
Anonymus Vennebusch 0.20 0.50 0.35
Anonymus Steenberghen 0.15 0.43 0.29
Table 4.3: Proportion of most popular doctrines by commentator.
Giele. But because Anonymus Giele only has a low proportion of the popular doctrines, he
scores lower than about half of all the commentators. When the figures are averaged out, we
find that the commentators with the highest combined proportion and concentration of the
popular doctrines are Dinsdale, Anonymus Orielensis 33, and Wyle, but Jandun, Anonymus
Vaticani 2170 I, and Faversham are right behind them.
We can of course also plot the commentators in a scatter plot according to their degree of
uniqueness and commonality (how big a proportion of the common doctrines they have). The
scatter plot in figure 4.6 on the facing page shows us some distinct outliers. The most distinct
of those has already been identified above, as Anonymus Steenberghen gives us the text with
the highest degree of uniqueness and also the lowest degree of common doctrines (15% as we
see in table 4.3). We also notice the three dots at the bottom of the plot with no uniqueness
and a spread on a spectrum of commonality representing five commentators where Anonymus
Orielensis 33 and Dinsdale have the highest commonality among them. This confirms that they
may be representative of the whole corpus. Jandun on the other hand stands out as the one
with highest combined uniqueness and commonality, which may make him interesting as a
commentator who reflects a high proportion of the common doctrines, but also shows a high
degree of originality. Anonymus Mertonensis 275 and Wyle are similar to him in that respect.
4.4 Analyses
The categorization of doctrines that leads to these quantitative groupings of the preceding
section are good for revealing high level tendencies and relations between the commentaries.
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Anonymus Oriel 33, John Dinsdale
Anonymus Steenberghen
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 1, Simon of Faversham
Anonymus Vat. Lat. 2170 2, Anonymus Vennebusch
Henric de la Wyle
John of Jandun
Radulphus Brito
Figure 4.6: Scatter plot of uniqueness and commonality of commentators.
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They can therefore be very useful starting points for further in-depth studies of the separate
texts or groups of texts. But as the high level clustering is based on general points of doctrine,
they do not reflect the detailed differences that may hold between different presentations of
the doctrines. But what is more important to note is that this general comparison also does not
take into account which philosophical implications a specific combination of doctrines may
entail. This is what this final section will delve into.
We cannot go into all the areas of interest that the range of commentaries opens up, but in
the three following subsections I will pursue some of the most striking and relevant relations
and observations. First I will of present four general categories of challenges that we find
in the rationes, as well as the most prevalent doctrines used in refuting the different types of
challenges. This will include an articulation of which challenges are the most interesting to the
problem of intellectual self-knowledge. Subsequently I will lay out the spectrum of how big
a significance the commentators ascribe to introspective self-knowledge in the science of the
soul. The final and third subsection will summarize the range of different views on the status
and type of science we can have about the soul.
4.4.1 Types of challenges
The overview of challenges in section 4.2.2 provided a long and somewhat unwieldy list of
points. In this section I will present some general observations that can be made based on the
material. I will outline which types of arguments have been found, which doctrines we have
found to be most prevalent in the refutations of the challenges, and which arguments involve
particularly interesting points on self-knowledge.
As the list of challenges is ordered by relative prevalence, it can be difficult to spot doc-
trinal connections between them. One way to analyse these challenges is to sort them into the
following four general fields of problems:
Identity problems The challenges concerning identity of knower and known (N5), act and
potency (N20), and mover and moved (N3).152
Problems of perception The challenges concerning the imperceptibility of the soul (N2) due
to its unintelligible nature (N1) and its correlate that it does not occasion phantasms, that
it is simple and atemporal (N6), and finally that it belongs to the things most evident by
nature but most obscure to us (N9).153
Scientific method A science is knowledge acquired by causal explanations of a thing (N31),
or by analysis of part and properties belonging to a subject (N7). A science must also
be about incorruptible universals, but that does not include the soul, as it is either a
particular (N11) or corruptible (N14).154
152 See sections 4.2.2.5 (N20), 4.2.2.6 (N5), and 4.2.2.7 (N3).
153 See sections 4.2.2.3 on page 129 (N2), 4.2.2.1 on page 128 (N1), 4.2.2.11 on page 135 (N6), 4.2.2.8 on
page 134 (N9).
154 See sections 4.2.2.16 on page 138 (N31), 4.2.2.15 on page 137 (N7), 4.2.2.2 on page 128 (N11), 4.2.2.9
on page 134 (N14).
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Ontology of the soul The soul must be stripped of that which it is about to receive (N15),
it does not exist (N36), it is only in potentiality before having any knowledge and thus
not a possible object of knowledge (P4), and a science assumes the possibility of self-
knowledge, which is not possible (N34).155
The most obvious of these groups is the first concerning problems of identity. Sometimes
the argument of that category seem so close that it is difficult to determine whether they are
different arguments or different statements of the same basic argument. In such cases a com-
parison of the refutations can be helpful. For instance the answer to the challenge about mover
and moved can be addressed by a disambiguation of the term ‘movement’ with respect to dif-
ferent types of beings. In Jandun’s solution to the challenge about knower and known, on the
other hand, we find a discussion of different types of intellects, which is quite different from
distinguishing all intellects from all material things. Finally, the challenges of act and potency
compared with knower and known may both be solved by reference to direct and indirect
knowledge, but in that case it is not clear enough to say that they are actually identical.156 It
is therefore clear that although the challenges all put pressure on the identity of subject and
object, they present different aspects of that structure.
The objections based on problems of perception are the most widely used. Among them the
main argument on the imperceptibility of the soul must be considered the standard argument
in these questions, as everybody use that or a close variant based on phantasms. The argument
may also be considered one of the strongest arguments against the science of the soul, as it
looks like a violation of the empiricist ambitions of the Aristotelian philosophy of science.
There are however, as our commentators demonstrate, ways to handle this that either involve
a reference to knowledge acquired from accidents or by a distinction between primary and
secondary knowledge. The objections that focus on the methods of scientific knowledge could
present some strong challenges. This aligns well with the tendency of arguing that knowledge
of the soul may not qualify as a proper science, and it would be possible for commentators
to raise problems about the necessity of a propter quid knowledge.157 The connection to that
type of knowledge is however not made, but many rather find different ways to support the
possibility and sufficiency of proceeding from accidents to substances. Finally, the group of
questions focusing on the ontology of the soul are neither common nor particularly strong.
Each of them are only presented by a single commentator, and are also each in their own way
dispensed with in relatively simple ways.
If we take a step back from the thematic groups, we can also see which doctrines are most
often used in refuting the objections across the board. The two points that must be considered
standard solutions are:
(1) The acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents (P2).
(2) The distinction between primary and secondary act of knowing (P1).
155 See sections 4.2.2.10 on page 135 (N15), 4.2.2.13 on page 136 (N36), 4.2.2.14 on page 137 (P4), 4.2.2.17
on page 139 (N34).
156 See the mention of Brito’s solution of the simultaneous act and potency in section 4.2.2.5 on
page 131.
157 On the proper science, see section 4.2.1.3.
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The first is mostly used in the context of problems relating to perception.158 But it is also used to
address problems concerning themethods of the science as we find it included in the arguments
refuting both the idea that only propter quid science is a real science, and the challenge that
the soul does not have parts or properties.159
The latter of the two has a more diverse application. It is found to refute objections about
the problems of perception and the absence of phantasms,160 as well as the identity problems
of knower and known and mover and moved,161 but also the ontology of the intellect, namely
potentiality of the possible intellect and denudation before knowing.162 Only the challenges
about the methods of scientific knowledge have not been refuted with this argument.
The first of these two points is also one of the most used in the positive doctrines, while the
latter is not really present in quite the same way in that part of the commentaries. But it is a
correlate to the argument about the intellect’s self-reflexivity once actualized, as the main point
is how the act of knowing is the consequence of a preceding act of knowing. One doctrine from
the positive doctrines that is almost entirely absent in the rationes is the view that science is
characterized by the ascription of properties to a subject according to a certain principle. This
is only seen as the starting point arguing that this principle does not hold for the soul, and that
is refuted by reference to knowledge from accidents.163
When we turn our attention to objections that have a strong tendency to include special
material on intellectual self-knowledge the attention centres around the first category about
problems of identity. In their nature they all focus on the potential pain point of a doctrine
involving reflexivity in a framework that considers sense perception the starting point of know-
ledge production. Two of the three are solved by a reference to the difference between primary
and secondary acts of knowing, which is strongly connected to intellectual self-knowledge in
this context.164 But it is more interesting to note that they also give the occasion, as already
mentioned, to include reflections on the place of the human intellect in relation to other types of
intellects. These are not reflections that we would normally expect in such methodological dis-
cussions, but some apparently cannot resist the temptation that these problems of self-identity
raise.
The commentators who include such reflections are Jandun, Anonymus Orielensis 33 and
Dinsdale, the latter of whom also raises the point in his questions to book three.165 Wyle also
presents similar arguments in his commentary on book three, but he draws a clear distinction
between what takes place when a person reflects on his own intellect and what happens when
he reflects on any other intellect. There is no conflict of mover andmovedwhen Socrates thinks
about the intellect of Plato, but when he thinks about his own, the problem occurs. He does
however not dwell long on it as it is solved by a reference to the primary and secondary act of
158 See the examples in sections 4.2.2.3 on page 129 and 4.2.2.4 on page 130.
159 See sections 4.2.2.15 on page 137 and 4.2.2.16 on page 138.
160 Sections 4.2.2.3 on page 129 and 4.2.2.4 on page 130.
161 Sections 4.2.2.6 on page 131 and 4.2.2.7 on page 133.
162 Sections 4.2.2.10 on page 135 and 4.2.2.14 on page 137.
163 Section 4.2.2.15 on page 137.
164 See sections 4.2.2.6 on page 131 and 4.2.2.7 on page 133.
165 Dinsdale III.15, p. 99.12–19, cf. section 3.2.2.1.5 on page 77.
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intellection.166
To summarize, a general view at the different objections reveals four different categories
of challenges. The two most common categories concern the problems of sense perception
and self-identity. The objections based on problems of sense perception are by far the most
widespread, as every commentator included here uses at least one of those objections in his
discussion. The problems of self-identity stand out because they are very similar in structure
and argument, and because they give some of our commentators the opportunity to present
some rare discussions on self-reflection and self-knowledge that we have seen to be more typ-
ical in the commentaries on book three. Finally we have observed how the two doctrines
focusing on the acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents (P2), and the distinction
between primary and secondary act of knowing (P1) are the most commonways of refuting the
challenges raised in the rationes principales. What is particularly interesting is how they both
(but especially the latter) can be applied in quite different arguments across the categories.
4.4.2 Self-knowledge in the science
As only some parts of the soul are available to sense perception (those that have necessary
properties that put them in a causal relationwith physically observable phenomena) we need to
explain how parts of the soul that do not have such properties can still be objects of knowledge.
Facing that challenge, a commentator might resort to using intellectual self-knowledge, but it
is not the only possible solution. In this section I will present three approaches ranging from
the what seems to be the effort by John of Jandun to keep self-knowledge to a minimum, over
a balance between regular proceedings of a science and self-knowledge in a smaller group of
commentators to a very strong focus on self-knowledge by Simon of Faversham.
4.4.2.1 Keeping self-knowledge to a minimum
In his analysis Jandun seems to make an effort to show how there can be a science of the soul
that does not directly involve intellectual self-knowledge. Although he gives three different
explanations for how it must be possible to have a science of the soul, it is difficult to find
any explicit mentions of introspection. We find similar tendencies in Dinsdale and Anonymus
Orielensis 33’s solutions where intellectual self-knowledge is also kept to a minimum in the
determination. It does however come out slightly stronger in their discussion of the rationes
principales.167 In this comparison we will keep the focus on Jandun.
First he presents the now well known doctrine P6 (treated in section 4.2.1.1 on page 118),
that there can be a science about a subject with properties ascribed to it according to specified
principles.168 But his second point is unique among the commentators, as he argues that there
can be a science about that which can be given a satisfactory scientific explanation.169 This can
166 Wyle I.1, app 305.40–306.7.
167 See Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.15–18 and app 292.31–293.4 as well as Dinsdale I.1, app
310.8–11 and app 311.10–21.
168 Jandun I.1, app 318.7–24.
169 Doctrine P61, registered in section 4.2.1.7 on page 125.
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be done, he holds, when the four different types of scientific questions can be answered, namely
the that, why, what and whether (quia est, propter quid, quid est and si est).170 Jandun argues
that it is possible to give a convincing demonstration of all these questions with respect to the
soul, and that there therefore must be a science of the soul.171 But the problem of course still
remains about the parts of the soul that have no apparent physical manifestations. The intellect
is neither available to sense perception by itself, nor by being the cause or some activity that
is available to sense perception (unlike nutrition, growth, and perception). That is, he says,
except if we would say that it is available to sense perception by having a relation (habitudo)
to something that is sensible by itself. If we grant that, we might consider the intellect among
things available to sense perception, as it has a stable relation to the phantasms.172 It is however
unclear whether he himself accepts that solution, and he also expands and supports his position
it with reference to the distinction between primary and secondary intelligibility (P1). That
distinction is a fundamental component in the self-intelligibility of the intellect, and hence
in intellectual self-knowledge. So although he does not explicitly refer to intellectual self-
knowledge, the constitutive doctrine is present.
In the rationes principales, where the question of self-knowledge also creeps up, he tackles
it in the same way. As part of his third ratio he includes the argument about the mover and the
moved as a potential challenge for the science of the soul (N3).173 This is an typical problem of
self-knowledge as the challenge of self-movement only applies in the case of reflexivity. But
in his refutation he simply reverts to the distinction between primary or secondary intelligib-
ility without making it explicit whether that actually involves introspection on the part of the
intellect.174 Finally, his fifth ratio also includes a problem of self-identity (P22) which is closely
connected with problems of self-knowledge.175 But he refutes the question with a distinction
between the separate intelligences and the workings of the human intellect to show that self-
identity does not play a role in the process of scientific knowledge acquisition that he has laid
out.176
In Jandun’s solution to this problem we notice how he shies away from tackling the ques-
tion of self-knowledge head on. This looks like a way of avoiding what may seem difficult to
avoid, that the science of the soul has to include some activity of introspection. He presents an
argument that puts its main emphasis on the formal requirements for a science and shows how
those are fulfilled in the case of the soul. According to his argument the science can primarily
be acquired through observation of the activities and effects of the soul and from that arrive at
conclusions about its essence. When he gets into the area of self-knowledge, namely when it
comes to acquiring knowledge about the intellect, he merely states that this is done through a
secondary and indirect act of knowing, but does not take the final step in determining whether
that involves an act of introspection. This same strategy of toning down these aspects of the
170 Cf. Aristotle APo, 2.1.89b23–25 and section 4.2.1.7 on page 125.
171 Jandun I.1, app 318.25–40.
172 Jandun I.1, app 319.1–12.
173 Treated in section 4.2.2.7 on page 133.
174 Jandun I.1, app 319.40–320.6.
175 Treated in section 4.2.2.6 on page 131.
176 Jandun I.1, app 320.14–28.
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science is also applied in his discussion of the rationes principales. The reader may therefore
easily be tempted to wonder whether he actually wants to keep points about self-knowledge
out of the analysis insofar as possible.
This does however not mean that Jandun rejects self-knowledge as a phenomenon, which
should be apparent from the preceding chapter and the following in-depth study in section
5.1. But he establishes a clear distinction between the intuitive version of self-knowledge that
introspection yields and a fully developed science of the soul.177 He is optimistic about how
strong the science of the soul can be, and even holds that it can be considered demonstrative
when executed properly.178 So what he probably tries to do is to keep the influence of the
less secure introspective self-knowledge to a minimum in order to maintain the rigour of the
science of the soul.
4.4.2.2 A necessary or sufficient requirement
In another group we find a mixture of well established principles of a demonstrative science
and elements of reflexivity. Brito, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II
are examples of this. These commentators present the argument about subjects, properties and
principles (P6), but they also emphasize how the process involves intellectual self-knowledge.
Some argue that some elements of the soul are readily available to observation and thus to
scientific study through the accidents of the substance in conventional fashion (P2), but as that
is not possible in the case of the intellect we see the idea that the intellect is more difficult to
know than any other parts of the soul.179 This problem of the intellect is then solved by the aid
of intellectual self-knowledge, and references to the central elements of Aristotle’s presentation
in book three are often included. Both Brito and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II go into each their
exposition of how the intellect is known, and their procedures closely reflect the doctrines of
intellectual self-knowledge that we have seen in the preceding chapter.180
Faversham is another commentator who notes the particular difficulty of knowing the in-
tellect, but his solution shows a different point of focus. It does include a reference to P6
about the subject, its properties and the principles of ascription. But it is put into his positive
ratio principales where he, unlike most commentators, allows himself to expand a bit on the
possibility of having the science in this context. This is also the place where he includes the
note about the difficulty of knowing the intellect.181 But his complete determination, which is
longer than that of most commentators, focuses entirely on intellectual self-knowledge. His
exposition starts with a reference to Proclus holding the reflexivity of immaterial substances.
This leads him to establish how the soul must be immaterial itself, and thereby he can conclude
that due to the reflexivity of the intellect we can acquire knowledge about the soul through our
177 Jandun III.27, app 327.20–25. We get back to this in the following section 4.4.3 on the following
page.
178 Jandun III.27, app 327.20–25.
179 Brito gives a very succinct statement of this view in Brito I.1, 269.22–26, but see also Anonymus
Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.37–296.15 and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, app 299.13–16.
180 Brito I.1, pp. 269.25–70.12, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II I.1, app 299.25–36.
181 Faversham I.1, app 332.25–36.
154 4. the science of the soul and self-knowledge
own soul.182 It may look controversial when Proclus is invoked to guarantee the possibility of
the science. But he immediately emphasizes that this self-reflexivity is based on the preceding
actualization of the intellect by an external object of knowledge. Once the soul has acquired a
knowledge about sensible objects, it knows of itself that it has this knowledge, which leads to a
knowledge about its powers and ultimately its essence, a process of which he gives a lengthier
exposition.183
Self-reflection here stands front and centre in his explanation of how the science of the
soul is achieved. Although he also mentions acquisition of knowledge through observation of
accidents,184 it plays no central role in the description of the science. It is rather a procedure that
is incorporated into the introspective approach, as we have already seen that the soul acquires
knowledge about itself through observation of its own activities and powers. Unlike some of
his colleagues he does not imply that any part of the science is acquired through observation of
other ensouled beings. That would be a good approach in getting knowledge about the faculties
of nutrition and sensation and seems to be the implication of the reference to some powers of
the soul as available to sense perception. But in Faversham’s text it is very hard to see how he
would not consider intellectual self-knowledge acquired through introspection as a sufficient
requirement in acquiring a universal knowledge about the soul. In his discussion of intellectual
self-knowledge in the questions to book three he even says explicitly that introspection is a
necessary condition for the science of the soul.185
A sceptic might ask Faversham whether the reflection of the intellect on its own activity
also gives information about the other parts and aspects of the soul. He might also ask whether
intellectual self-knowledge is a sufficient requirement for establishing a universal science. Is
the knowledge demonstrative, and is there any ideal of it being so according to Faversham? But
actually Faversham is ready to concede that our knowledge of the soul is not a science in the
strict sense, but merely a historia.186 Hemay on the other hand ask Jandunwhether he imagines
that it would be possible to have knowledge about the soul without any kind of introspection.
Faversham would argue that without that we could hardly attain any knowledge about the
internal life and activity of the intellect that never is expressed in any external activities such
as mathematics or first philosophy. This is the challenging balance that these commentators
need to strike, and as we see here, it is difficult not to include some concept of reflexivity in
that endeavour. This question of the status of the science will be the focus of the final section.
182 Faversham I.1, app 333.1–17, which finishes: “Et ideo per animam nostram possumus habere cog-
nitionem de anima.” (“And thus by our soul we can have a science of the soul.”)
183 Faversham I.1, app 333.18–334.5.
184 Faversham I.1, app 332.25–36 and app 336.4–14.
185 Faversham q. 11, p. 336, cf. section 3.2.2.1.10 on page 80. The focus has here been on Faversham,
but Anonymus Bazán would be another example of a commentator with a very clear emphasis
on the role of intellectual self-knowledge.Anonymus Bazán I.1, ll. 30–60. The two questions are
doctrinally very close.
186 Faversham I.1, app 336.15–18.
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4.4.3 Is there a science about the soul?
Having looked at the commentators’ different answers to whether there can be a science of the
soul in these different ways, a question still remains. What sort of science is the science of the
soul? Do the commentators give us any information on this, and if so, do they agree about the
answer? Is the science demonstrative? That will be the topic of this section. Some talk about
demonstrative science explicitly but may either reject or accept that our investigation of the
soul is of that sort. And their reason for accepting or rejecting the power and procedure of
the science also present a range of different view. They do however all agree that there can be
some sort of science about the soul.
As we have already seen, almost all commentators present us with one or both of the
following doctrinal points: (1) The soul is a subject which we ascribe properties by use of the
definition of the soul, and (2) we get to know the substance of the soul through observation of its
accidents. By these two points they argue that there can be such a science, but they rarely stop
at this.187 Some will reflect on different types of science, others on more specific requirements
of a scientific knowledge, or whether what we get to know about the soul qualifies as a science
properly speaking.
The distinction between knowledge from observations of effects of a substance, namely the
accidents, and knowledge of the causes resulting in such effects can be distinguished as scientia
quia and scientia propter quid, respectively. This distinction is made clear in a short refutation
by AnonymusMertonensis 275 to the objection that there can be no science of the soul, as a real
science is based on a knowledge of the causes resulting in the properties of a substance, and that
is impossible with regard to the soul. He accepts that assumption, but notes that a propter quid
science is only one type of science. The soul can therefore be known through its effects, and this
scientia quia also qualifies as a science.188 These distinctions of course go back to the beginning
ofAnalytica posteriorawhere four types of questions in a science are identified.189 We therefore
readily see that the knowledge starting from observation of accidents is the scientia quia, but
it is not always made clear whether the first procedure of ascription of properties through
the definition establishes a propter quid science. The sentiment can however be found to be
strongly implied in some commentaries, and yet others make the connection explicit.190
Five commentators have been registered to mark out a distinction between proper and im-
proper science, often with the point that the knowledge about the soul may not be considered
a science in the proper sense.191 Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33 find that a knowledge
acquired from accidents cannot be considered a science in the strict sense. They both argue
that proper knowledge is a knowledge of the causes, and that is not fulfilled by the mentioned
approaches.192 That is why, as Dinsdale and Faversham see it, Aristotle rather calls the invest-
igation of the science a historia. Dinsdale does also accept that it can be considered a science
187 The only really good example in this collection is Anonymus Mertonensis 275 I.1, app 287.12–19.
188 Anonymus Mertonensis 275 I.1, app 285.18–21 and app 287.29–31.
189 Aristotle APo, 2.1, 89b23, cf. also 4.2.1.7 on page 125.
190 See Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I I.2, app 295.29–33.
191 Cf. section 4.2.1.3 on page 122.
192 Dinsdale I.1, app 310.25–311.2.
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by extension (extensive).193 We notice here how both Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33
argue that knowledge producing demonstrations can be made by ascription of attributes to the
subject. But this procedure does not imply to them a propter quid science, nor that the science
can be consider scientific in the more strict sense.
Wyle also draws the distinction between proper and improper science in a separation of
science as either a knowledge about a subject, about conclusions in a demonstration, or about
properties of a subject. He identifies the first kind of science as the proper science. But he
also argues that our knowledge about the soul is an example of such a proper science. And
he furthermore argues that this is acquired through exactly the procedure of attribution of
properties to a subject by use of its definition as the principle of the attribution.194
It is not clear in Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33 whether there is a conceived dif-
ference between knowledge acquired in this way and the knowledge of a substance through
observation of its accidents. But it may be that they consider the two approaches to go to-
gether, as the accidents observed to belong to a substance are ascribed to it by its definition,
thus effectively combining the two. But if that is the case then they must have a different idea
of what qualifies as a proper science than Wyle, as that is exactly the procedure that warrants
the proper science according to him. It is thus also curious how Dinsdale and Anonymus Ori-
elensis 33 argue against a proper science of the soul while they both make it clear that a science
is acquired through demonstrations (this implies that the use of demonstrations in a science
is not all it takes for it to be a fully demonstrative science). Anonymus Orielensis 33 is most
explicit as he says that a knowledge (cognitio) of the soul is possible, both properly speaking
an extensively (proprie dicta et extensive), and most properly speaking a science is acquired
through demonstration. He also accepts that the process of that demonstration is the ascrip-
tion of properties to the subject with the definition as the middle term. And he thus states that
this makes it possible to have certain knowledge (certa cognitio) about the soul.195
With Jandun we see that he also presents a further specification of the science, as he ad-
dresses the four types of scientific questions directly. And he actually argues that each of these
four types of questions can be answered in an investigation of the soul. What is maybe most
interesting is that the propter quid question, the explanation from causes, which was rejected
by Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33 to be found within psychology is entirely possible
according to Jandun. The propter quid question describes the cause of a property inherent in
a subject, as he puts it (causa inhaerentiae passionis ad subiectum). And that is done through
the ascription of properties to a subject by means of its definition. So where Wyle does not
explicitly draw this connection but still holds that this process is what supports a proper and
robust science of the soul, Jandun holds that this process leads to propter quid science. In a
passage in his commentary on book three he even goes as far as saying that the substance of
the soul is known demonstratively (demonstrative).196
That passage, where Jandun refers to the knowledge as demonstrative, is however also
interesting because we find a connection to Dinsdale. Jandun’s point in that paragraph is that
193 Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.34–292.2, Faversham I.1, app 336.15–18.
194 Wyle I.1, app 304.34–305.15.
195 See Anonymus Orielensis 33 I.1, app 291.21–33, cf. Dinsdale I.1, app 310.18–24.
196 Jandun III.27, app 327.20–25.
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there is a difference between the sort of knowledge that the intellect gets about itself through
mere self-reflection (which is even called intuitive, intuitiva) compared to the psychological
science properly speaking. And that exact point is also made by Dinsdale and Anonymus
Vaticani 2170 II.197 Although they do not call the introspective self-knowledge intuitive (but
Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II calls it confused), it is also important for them to point out that
the scientific endeavour is much more arduous, time-consuming and complex than mere self-
reflection.198
This need not be a direct conflict on the part of either commentator here. Jandun is the
only one who says that the knowledge is acquired demonstratively, and is thus clearly different
from the mere result of introspection. Dinsdale draws a similar distinction, but that may not
mean that the science is as robust as it is according to Jandun, as it is not a propter quid science
in his view. So although he does try to separate the merely introspective and more thoroughly
scientific investigation of the soul, the distinction is not as sharp as in the later Jandun. This
might also reflect the mention we made in the previous section that where Jandun seems to
make quite a bit of effort of keeping introspection out of the practice of a science of the soul,
the same tendency can be seen in Dinsdale, although it is realized less stringently.199
In these different perspectives on the status, type and procedure of the science of the soul
we see some tendencies and a puzzle. The commentators want to confirm that there can be
a science about the soul, but they may modify the concept of science in different ways. And
although they do not often reflect on whether that science is demonstrative, we find reflections
on the strength of the science. Some hold that the investigation of the soul can be a demon-
strative science properly speaking, mainly by holding that the knowledge is a propter quid
knowledge describing the causes for which the soul has the properties it does. This is often
supported by the ascription of properties to the subject by use of the definition as the middle
term. Jandun and Wyle take this position. Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33 on the other
hand hold that as we can only get knowledge about the soul from observations of its accidents
or effects, it is not a science properly speaking. But it is unclear what exactly that means as
they argue, at the same time, that the procedure of property ascription by the definition (and
thus the propter quid science) is also possible with regards to the soul. Anonymus Vaticani
2170 I is similar to these two in the sense that he accepts that there can only be a quia science
about the soul, but he still considers that a science. Finally, Faversham seems content to reject
this idea of propter quid science and even maintains that although we may have a cognitio or
historia about the soul, it is not really a scientia.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have investigated different answers to the question whether there can be a
science of the soul in 14 commentaries. The investigation has been structured in four main
sections. First I have given an overview of the most common problems and points of doctrine
197 Cf. section 3.2.2.1.11 on page 80.
198 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II III.11, app 302.1–9, Dinsdale III.15, app 314.48–55.
199 See section 4.4.2.1 on page 151.
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in the commentaries followed by an inventory of all the positive and negative doctrinal points.
The threads from all the data were then gathered in the more general section on clusters and
connections among the texts, based on the doctrinal content of them all. Finally I have given
three small topical analyses that focus on specific philosophical or structural details of the
chapter.
When we look at the view of the commentators, we see two doctrines that will be found in
the majority of the commentaries. They both focus on the procedure of the science and argue
that there can be a science about a subject to which properties can be ascribed according to an
established principle, the definition of the soul. This is pulled from the Aristotelian character-
ization of the demonstrative science in Analytica posteriora. They will also very often accept
that it is possible to attain knowledge about the substance of the soul based on observation of
its accidents. Only two commentators do not mention either of these two. One is Anonymus
Bazánwho gives a very short determination, the other is Anonymus Steenberghen, who gives a
more extensive determination along a different trajectory which indicates that he might agree
with these principles although he does not mention or incorporate them.
Two other main positive points have been found in a bit less than half the commentators.
One argument holds that the soul is indirectly available to sense perception, which is cognate
to the thesis that substantial knowledge about the soul is acquired through observations of
its accidents. The other argument holds that self-knowledge or reflexivity is a constitutive
component in the science about the soul, either because it proves the intelligibility of the soul
or because it provides a way of attaining the knowledge itself. Finally there are some doctrines
that occur between one in every third or fourth but in such a way that it looks like a tendency.
They focus on problems of the science with a distinction between proper and improper science
and the point that the intellect is particularly difficult to know. Finally there is a handful of
ideas that are only presented by one or two commentators.
What is then the position of self-knowledge within this somewhat varied field of comment-
aries commentators? Themain problem of the possibility of the science asks howwe can know
anything about something that is not available to sense perception. The problem is solved by
reference to knowledge of a substance through its accidents, which can be available to per-
ception. But even if this ambition is maintained and an approach based on sense perception is
advocated, it may still be unclear whether the will suffice. Some commentators raise the point
explicitly that the intellect is more difficult to know than the rest of the psychological powers.
They may present the argument that neither its activities nor its products are available to sense
perception. And it is certainly hard to see whether it would be possible within this framework
to give a full description of the powers and workings of the soul, and in particular the intellect,
without employing introspection. The commentators do not agree on the solution to this prob-
lem. I have argued that we find a spectrum in the texts spanning the texts that limit the extent
of intellectual self-knowledge to a minimum in their description of the science to those who
consider it a necessary or maybe even a sufficient condition for the science. At the one end
Jandun was used as the main example of the ambition to reduce the influence of intellectual
self-knowledge as far as possible, while Faversham occupied the opposite end of the spectrum.
When we looked at the different challenges that the commentators present themselves
with I found four different categories, where two mostly deal with what could be considered
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theory of science (perceptibility and scientific methods), while the two others are related to
problems about self-identity and other details about the ontology of the soul in particular. The
problems of self-identity are interesting as they inherently address a variant of the problem of
self-knowledge. And in this context of a discussion of the science it is notable that the challenge
sometimes gives the commentators the chance to reflect on the position of the human soul
in the chain of being based on the different types and conditions for self-knowledge across
different types of intellects.
Finally, the analysis of the concept of science that we find the commentators to present
also gives some of the same indications. In different ways a group of commentators discuss
whether the science of the soul is a proper science, what type of science it is, and whether it
is demonstrative. Some may even argue that it is not a proper science, but merely a historia
based on introspection, although they still strive to maintain that in some ways that may be
particularly difficult, good, solid, and substantial knowledge can be had about the soul. Others
will argue that there can be a demonstrative, or propter quid, knowledge about the soul. Jandun
is again interesting, as he is a proponent of that view, and also seeks to reduce the role of self-
knowledge in the definition of the proper science of the soul. It should thus be clear that to
most of the commentators the problems of self-knowledge and the question whether there can
be a science of the soul are intimately connected.
The doctrines revealed a range of interesting relations among the commentaries. The most
notable is between Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33 who share virtually every single
doctrine. Further studies of those texts would be highly interesting. Another group, that of
Anonymus Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Vennebusch, and Anonymus Bernardini was already
known in the literature, and here it has been confirmed that they also tend to follow each other
doctrinally. I believe that a closer comparison of the three would however reveal that although
Anonymus Mertonensis 275 may be closer in structure to Anonymus Vennebusch, it shares
more doctrinal material with Anonymus Bernardini in their first question. That demonstration
has however not been pursued here. In the clusters we have also noticed a few outliers, namely
Anonymus Steenberghen and Wyle who do not fall into any clear or strong groups and who
also not share many of their doctrines with other commentator. We therefore also see that both
commentators present unique doctrines in both the positive and negative points.
Finally, one of the quantitative analyses indicates that the group of Faversham, Brito,
Jandun present us with three commentaries that together contain the highest concentration
of doctrines that are most commonly used. They therefore provide us with three good exem-
plary commentaries for studying this tradition, as they present us with the most important
doctrines and problems. But they are also all three strong commentators and thinkers who
try to give fulfilling, coherent, and often also original answers to the problems they discuss.
There is no indication that there is any particularly strong connections among those three,
as they happen to discuss the same central problems, but often reach different results. Each
in their way they therefore provide interesting starting points of views on these problems of




In this chapter I will present two smaller studies of selected topics within the material laid out
in the preceding chapters. Where the preceding chapters have provided at high level overview
of the selected tradition, the following two sections are examples of in-depth studies that can
be done on the basis of the presented results. We will see the doctrines that have been laid out
and analysed in the preceding chapters reappear, but in this section we can take the liberty of
going into more details and draw connections that the survey chapters must suppress.
5.1 Jandun’s three ways of knowing oneself
John of Jandun’s extended and complex reflections on intellectual self-knowledge contain a
wealth of interesting philosophical points, problems, and perspectives. He presents three ques-
tions that may seem similar in some respects, but I will argue that they present three differ-
ent cases of self-knowledge. Each of these cases responds to a particular aspect of Jandun’s
model of the intellect. The three perspectives on self-knowledge that we will see are: (1) a
self-knowledge that is part of the process of human knowledge but never rises to the level of
human awareness, (2) a self-knowledge that is a conscious and attentive procedure, and finally
(3) an unchanging state of self-knowledge in the agent intellect that is reflected in the possible
intellect. Where the first case lies below the level of human awareness, the last lies above and
outside the reach of the human condition, at least insofar as it concerns the philosopher.
The Quaestiones super libros De anima of Jandun is a long text. It contains a total of 92
questions with 13 on book one, 37 on book two, and 42 on book three, where virtually every
question on book three is concerned with the intellect. Three full questions are entirely dedic-
ated to the problems of self-knowledge, and are phrased as follows:
• Question 13: Whether the possible intellect can know its act of knowing when it exists
in the intellect.1 This question is prefaced with the lemma “Cum autem sic singula fiant
et cetera” from De anima 3.4, 429b5.
1 Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam intellectionem existentem in eo. Transcription on
page 321.
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• Question 27: Whether the possible intellect can know itself.2
• Question 31: Whether the possible intellect always knows the agent intellect with a
numerically identical intellection.3
Right before the big question on the necessity of the agent intellect, Jandun inserts a short note.
He quotes the lemma “someone might raise the question” (“dubitabit autem aliquis”) from De
anima 3.4, 429b22 and writes that this is an appropriate context to discuss whether the possible
intellect can know itself. That question, he says, belongs to the section in 3.4, 429b5–9 where
Aristotle declares that once in a certain state of activity the intellect becomes able to know
itself. But Jandun finds it to be more practical and clear to postpone that discussion until the
agent intellect and its relation to the human soul have been presented.4 And sure enough,
question 27 is found after the general analysis of the nature and role of the agent intellect. The
question on the self-knowledge of the agent and possible intellect concludes the questions on
chapter five.5
Since Jandun connects these questions of self-knowledge to the nature of the intellect, I
will briefly outline his more general model of intellect before we move into the details of self-
knowledge. He does not accept that the intellective soul (anima intellectiva) is the substantial
form of the human being, because that would make it extended and thus corruptible. The in-
tellect does therefore not give existence to the human soul, but it realizes the act of intellection
within the soul. It thus provides the essential activity without providing it being.6 There is
thus one intellective soul that is actualized in the so-called cogitative soul of every individual
human during the act of knowing, but the act of knowing will be diversified according to the
phantasm that occasion the act.7 The separate intellective soul is composed of the agent and
possible intellect which function analogously tomatter and form respectively as a single, separ-
ate substance.8 The two components that make up the individual human are thus the cogitative
soul which places it in the species of human, and the intellective soul which makes it capable
of knowing.9 The two components are present in the same subject and are united in being
but different in essence.10 Because of this separation of both the possible and agent intellect
2 Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere seipsum. Transcription on page 324.
3 Utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem eadem intellectione numero. Tran-
scription on page 329.
4 Jandun 1480: p. 243a–b: “‘Dubitabit autem aliquis.’ Hic potest quaeri utrum intellectus possib-
ilis possit seipsum intelligere, et haec quaestio habet locum super illam partem ‘Cum [p. 243b]
autem sic singula fiant.’ ubi Philosophus dicit ‘et ipse autem seipsum tunc potest intelligere.’ sed
commodius et clarius poterit expediri postquam visum fuit de esse intellectus agentis et quomodo
intellectus agens se habet ad animam humanam. Ideo usque tunc differatur.”
5 For a complete list of the questions of the commentary, see table D.7 on page 375.
6 All of his question III.5 deals with this, but see in particular Jandun 1480: pp. 171a and 173b–75a.
7 Jandun 1480: q. III.7, especially p. 190a.
8 Jandun q. III.26, especially pp. 263a–265a.
9 On this see in particular Brenet 2009.
10 This is of course superficial, and does not do justice to the complexity of the subject, but more
information can be found in Kuksewicz 1968: 204–19, which of course is more superficial but also
more approachable than Brenet 2003, but see especially particular pp. 41–59 and 340–71 of that
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into a single, separate substance shared among all humans, Jandun is traditionally referred to
as an “Averroist”. Especially Brenet attacks the idea that this merely means that he is a direct
representative and loyal reporter of the doctrines of Averroes in the early 14th century, and
thus expresses significant and justified warnings against ascribing the predicate of “Averroism”
based on a binary evaluation of the ontological status of the possible intellect.
5.1.1 Knowledge and concomitant self-knowledge
When we start with question III.13 the first determination contains five sections. First Jandun
declares how he thinks the intellect can be an object of knowledge. He then presents what
looks like two equally unpalatable solutions to the problem, followed by his positive answer,
before he finally addresses the challenges raised by the two alternative solutions. The doctrine
he presents basically holds that the possible intellect realizes one act of knowing throughwhich
both the primary object of knowledge and that act itself is known.
First Jandun declares that the intellect can know its own act and generally any act belong-
ing to it, regardless of whether it is primary or secondary. This is shown by the simple syllogism
that the intellect can know any ens; the intellect itself is an ens; therefore the intellect itself can
be known by the intellect (P74).11 Jandun thereby seems to find it sufficiently supported that
the intellect can be an object of knowledge.
Jandun raises a challenge by presenting two scenarios which seem to be mutually exclus-
ive and both result in unacceptable consequences. The basic question is “If I know an act of
knowing a stone, does that constitute a new act of knowing?” Given a positive answer, it con-
flicts with the idea that the act of knowing is determined by the nature of the thing known
(N29).12 But this would mean that since the stone and the knowledge of a stone are two differ-
ent natures, the knowledge of them should also be different. And then you cannot know the
stone and your knowledge of it as one and the same act. On the other hand, if the knowledge
of the stone and the higher order knowledge of that act are different, then we risk running
into an infinite regress of acts of knowing (N10). If the higher order knowledge is a separate
act, that act could then again be known by another separate act, and so on ad infinitum. Both
these possibilities seem completely absurd to Jandun.13 So the dilemma Jandun sets up here is
the conflict between the potential risk of an infinite regress, if the acts are separate, and two
different objects of knowledge for the same act of knowing, if it is unitary.
Jandun openly admits that he considers this a tough question. He has only found very few
who have delved properly into the problem, and he is in doubt if he can give a definite answer.
So for the moment he says that he will proceed according to what seems most probable, but
be at liberty to change his mind and say something else, if he gets a better idea at some later
point. He ends up answering the problem in favour of the idea that a single act contains both
work too.
11 Jandun III.13, app 321.27–32.
12 Jandun finds support for this in Averroes’s commentary on De anima 3.4, 429b10–22 where dis-
tinctions are drawn between a material thing and the knowledge of it. See Averroes In DA, comm.
III.9, p. 422.36–50 (ed. Crawford).
13 Jandun III.13, app 321.33–322.49.
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a knowledge of the primary object and a reference to or knowledge of that act itself (P54). He
says:
Possem itaque dicere quod intellectus intelligit intellectionem lapidis existentem
actu in eo, sed non alia intellectione simpliciter sed eadem, ita quod intellectio
lapidis existens in intellectu est intellectio lapidis et intellectio sui ipsius, et intel-
lectus ista intellectione denominatur intelligens lapidem et ipsammet intellectio-
nem.
I could then say that the intellect knows the act of knowing the stone existing in
the intellect, but not by a completely different act of knowing but by the same,
such that the act of knowing the stone existing in the intellect is a knowledge of
the stone and a knowledge of itself, and by this act of knowing the intellect is
said to know the stone and the knowledge itself.
Jandun III.13, app 322.50–59
What makes something else know is also itself known, and it is known by itself, not by some-
thing else superimposed on it. So the knowledge of the stone is itself also at the same time
knowledge of that very act of knowing.
We returnwith Jandun to the first horn of the presented dilemma. Canwemaintain a single
act that knows more than one nature? First he points to the accepted doctrine that an act of
knowing is itself known.14 This leads him to the diversification of knowledge according to the
thing known. He concedes the truth of the doctrine when it concerns objects of knowledge that
share the same mode of being. So when two material objects, or two immaterial objects, are
known, this will result in two different acts of knowing. But when two objects are of different
modes or being and one is an abstraction of the other, this is not the case. So the knowledge of
the object and the knowledge of that act are a single act. This happens because the knowledge is
abstracted from and caused by the primary object of knowledge, through its phantasm (P62).15
Jandun does not give us much more, so how can we use that to keep the number of acts
on exactly one and still maintain a knowledge of the primary object as well as some reflexive
knowledge of that act itself? It may help to remember the basic model of the possible intellect.
Once the intellect receives an intelligible species, it becomes that species. This also means
that when the possible intellect becomes what it knows, it also in a certain sense knows itself
when the external object is known. In this way the knowledge of the primary object and the
knowledge of the intellect itself are in effect one and the same act. In knowing a material
object there will therefore never be more than a single act, which has the external object as
its primary knowledge. But because knowing is to be the thing known, and an act is always
identical to itself, the act of knowing an object will also always know itself. So formally any
act of knowing also knows itself. The possible intellect actualized by a species is therefore not
only intelligible but also known and knowing.
With this solution Jandun does not consider the problem raised with the infinite regress
relevant because it was raised in the alternative horn of the dilemma where you have two
14 Jandun III.13, app 322.60–65.
15 Jandun III.13, app 322.66–74.
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different acts of knowing. The challenge of the infinite regress took as starting point the pro-
duction of separate acts of knowing in an infinite chain. But his single act model remove that
risk? If a knowledge of an external object always results in a simultaneous knowledge of that
very act, why then would a knowledge of that knowledge not arise? Is it any different if an act
of knowing one object automatically engenders another object of knowledge? One strategy
to address this would be to point to the single object of knowledge. The knowledge of the
external object is not an object, but only a secondary relation resulting from the mechanics of
the intellect knowing the external object. The self-reference that the identity of subject and
object is does not entail any new acts or objects, and the regress therefore never even begins.
We notice a couple of distinct features of the self-knowledge in this solution. According to
the analysis I have presented here, the possible intellect knows itself as part of the process of
knowing any other external object. This means that the intellect always acquires this type of
self-knowledge or self-reflection as a concomitant feature of all knowledge. It is also notable
that the knowledge is not characterized, in Jandun’s presentation, by any kind of discursion,
procedural analysis, or reflection, nor is there any hint of it being an act of volition. Based on
that it would also seem natural that the process is not part of the scope of mental awareness.
Consciousness is a volatile and elusive idea in these texts, and referring to it without warrant
from the texts may even be anachronistic. But based on the analysis of the concomitant self-
knowledge, one would expect that this is a wholly unconscious process, and that expectation
is also reflected in the presentation, as Jandun gives not hints that the process should entail
any kind of mental awareness of the reflexivity.
5.1.2 The process of intellectual self-knolwedge
In question III.27 Jandun presents a completely different view on self-knowledge. There he
argues that the intellect can be an object of knowledge, and that it cannot know itself by its
own substance but rather by the aid of an external species which facilitates self-knowledge
through observation of accidents. Jandun determines the question in three sections. First he
establishes how, in his view, the intellect can be an object of knowledge. Secondly he argues
that it cannot know itself by its own substance, and finally he presents the way in which it
actually does know itself. The first point is the one we have already seen in the other question,
namely that the intellect has the ability to know anything within its primary object, which is
anything that has being, ens, and since the intellect itself qualifies for that, it is a possible object
of its own knowledge (P74).
5.1.2.1 Self-knowledge requires external species
Jandun’s overall claim is, as is completely common in the tradition, that self-knowledge re-
quires the actualization of the intellect by an external species.16 He argues that the intellect
cannot know itself by its own essence as follows: If the intellect knew itself by substance, then
it could not receive anew a knowledge of itself; the intellect must be able to receive anew an
knowledge of itself; hence the intellect cannot know itself by its own substance. The argument
16 See the survey of the views in section 3.2.2 on page 74.
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is not presented in exactly this syllogistic form, but I will maintain that it is the basic argument
of his text. Both the major and minor premise in this argument need some expansion.17
The major premise is supported by a more elaborate argument. First he will show that if
the intellect were known by itself without any sort of intellection added to it, then it would
follow that this intellection would be the same as its substance.18 He supports this by arguing
that it is accepted that in the form of a syllogism the consequence is closer to the extremes than
the extremes are to each other. Here extremes must mean the subject of a major premise and
the predicate of a minor premise, which constitute the unconnected extremes of an argument
of the form A is B; B is C; thus A is C. Now consider the intellect and the object of knowledge
to be extremes in such an argument. If the intellect and intelligible object are completely one
and the same, and the possible intellect in itself is knowing and that which is known, then it
follows, according to Jandun, that the self-knowledge of the intellect is the substance of the
intellect.19 If that were the case, then the intellect would not be receptive to a knowledge of
itself, because nothing can be receptive to something of the same species as it already is (N38).
So this means that if the intellect knew itself by its own substance, it would not be able to
receive or initiate a knowledge of itself.
The minor, holding that it must be possible for the intellect to receive or initiate a new
knowledge of itself, is supported by an interesting appeal to experience. He says that anyone
who is in the act of knowing (“quilibet intelligens”) experiences in himself that he in some
way knows the proper substance of the possible intellect and its difference from its power as
well as from the agent intellect and the intelligible species received in the intellect.20 To expect
this type of experience, with such a demarcation of the different constitutive elements of the
process, seems very optimistic. With the complete and extensivemodel of Aristotelian epistem-
ology and psychology, this may be what Jandun experiences when he reflects on the process of
intellection, but to suppose that it reflects the phenomenology of any thinking subject seems
excessive. Nevertheless, this appeal to experience looks like Jandun’s main argument to show
that the intellect must be able to initiate a new act of self-knowledge.
But the doctrine that the intellect must be able to initiate anew the act of self-knowledge
includes an important and more well known corollary.21 He raises the question whether the
possible intellect engages in an act of self-knowledge independently of the human condition. In
his monospychist model the possible intellect is a substance completely separate from the hu-
man soul, that is then utilized by the human during the act of cognition. So does that mean that
17 The argument is an instance of P60, and this particular argument is also registered in P24 on
page 244.
18 “[…] si intellectus possibilis esset intellectus per seipsum sine quacumque intellectione sibi super-
addita, sequeretur quod in ipso sua intellectio esset idem cum sua substantia.” Jandun III.27, app
325.4–6.
19 Jandun III.27, app 325.11–29: “Medium est propinqius extremis quam extrema inter se – hoc bene
manifestum est; cum ergo intellectus et intelligibile se habeant sicut extrema, et intellectio sit sicut
medium inter ea, sequitur quod si intellectus et intelligibile sint omnino unum et idem, sequitur
quod intelligere fit idem cum eis, et sic si intellectus possibilis secundum seipsum est intelligens et
quod intelligitur, necesse est quod intellectio sua sit substantia sua, et sic patet consequentia.”
20 Jandun III.27, app 325.11–29.
21 Jandun III.27, app 325.30–326.15.
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the possible intellect knows itself in this separate state? No, he answers, because the possible
intellect still needs the input from phantasms to evaluate its own activity. He acknowledges
that the separate possible intellect may be a substance in some sort of act before engagement
with human phantasms, but that is not sufficient for its self-knowledge. This then highlights
the potentiality of the possible intellect and the priority of external sense data.
A counter argument presents a compromise between the two models where the intellect
can be in act by itself but not known by itself due to the restriction on a reception of an external
species. It seems that Jandun sees an epistemological conflict in this suggestion. He probably
finds this indefensible because it would result in two different sources of actualization of the
intellect, itself and the external species. Here the counter argument holds that the reception of
the external species should condition the intellect towards having a knowledge of itself as well
as the external object. But when the intellect is already actualized, the most obvious object of
its knowledge would be itself. Jandun does not spell this out but the idea must be that all that is
required for the intellect to know something is that it is itself actualized as a form of the object.
And if, somehow, the intellect is actualized – probably as itself in some indeterminate way –
then it is itself a much more obvious object of knowledge than any other external species. How
should an external species be able to dispose it more towards self-knowledge than it already
was in the prior state of act? So in this way he returns to the classical doctrine that if any
external species should dispose the intellect towards self-knowledge, it can only happen if the
intellect is completely potential and indeterminate before the reception of that species.
In summary, we see that in his refutation of essential intellectual self-knowledge Jandun
presents the doctrine that the intellect can only engage in self-knowledge once it has been
actualized by an external species. We recognize this as the doctrine that is universally accepted
in the preceding commentaries on De anima. But the arguments used have not all been seen
before. The main argument, that the intellect needs to be able to initiate or receive anew a
knowledge of itself, is known.22 But the inclusion of the phenomenology of introspection that
supports this idea has not been found in any of the preceding studied commentaries. In the
discussion of the corollary, Jandun also digs deeper into the doctrine of the potentiality of the
possible intellect before the act of intellection. This gives him the opportunity to address a
model that seeks to maintain the act of the intellect, in some way or degree, but still makes
the self-knowledge rely on external stimuli. That argument has not been registered in the
preceding commentaries treated in this study.
5.1.2.2 Discursive process of self-knowledge
How does the intellect then actually know itself? Jandun gives an extended version of the
acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidental properties. This is also a very common
piece of doctrine in the preceding commentaries.23 But as we have just seen in the preceding
section he also includes significant observations from experience and gives them high author-
ity. This exposition stands in clear contrast to the idea of concomitant self-knowledge that is
presented in the earlier question III.13.
22 Faversham touches on this problem too, cf. 3.2.2.2.8 on page 85.
23 Cf. section 3.2.2.1.3 on page 76.
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The initial presentation is clear and explicit, so in stead of paraphrasing I prefer to quote
him:
Nunc videndum est modus per quem intellectus possibilis perveniat ad intelligere
seipsum, et breviter credo quod modus est quod prius intelligat aliquod intelligi-
bile per eius speciem receptam, quodcumque sit illud, deinde considerat istam
speciem in se receptam de novo, et postmodum considerat potentiam receptivam
illius speciei, et tandem considerat substantiam subiectam illi potentiae et illi spe-
ciei receptae;
We should now consider how the possible intellect arrives at a knowledge of
itself, and stated briefly I believe that it first knows some object of knowledge
(whatever it could be) by its species, and then it considers that received species
in itself anew, subsequently it considers the power receptive of that species, and
then it considers the substance underlying that power and received species;
Jandun III.27, app 326.16–25
The is a clear but complex example of the acquisition of substantial knowledge from accidents.
It contains the following steps: (1) An external object of knowledge is known by the reception
of a intelligible species in the possible intellect; (2) the possible intellect reconsiders that species
in away that is probably different from the original reflection; (3) it can then turn its attention to
its own power of species reception; (4) and this finally leads to a consideration of the substance
that has that power.
At the second step we note that the ens under investigation is not the intellect actualized by
the species, but rather the species itself. This gives amore sophisticated presentation, because it
means that it is notmerely the intellect that can be observed by itself once it has been actualized.
It is rather the species that actualizes the intellect that gets under scrutiny at first. From there
the Aristotelian induction is the standard procedure to arrive at substantial knowledge, which
is then applied to the intellect itself here. In the subsequent discussion Jandun makes it clear
that the agent intellect is the efficient cause behind the act of knowing, but the species that
represents the external object is also used – although in a different way – to acquire knowledge
about the intellect.24
This focus on the species means that the move between point one and two must result in a
change in the epistemic role of the intelligible species. It moves from being a representation of
the external object under investigation to becoming itself the object of investigation. We also
see that the normal model of knowledge by actualization of the intellect through a species is
here suspended, so although the intellect changes its view on the species this does not result in
a new species. This must be because the intellection by species assumes a material object as the
primary object of knowledge, and that is then represented through a phantasm and finally the
intelligible species. When the representation of external object becomes itself the starting point
of the investigation, the requirement that the primary object of intellection is material is not
upheld anymore. So it looks like the actualized intellect is available to the intellect in a much
24 Jandun III.27, app 326.26–35.
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more direct way than the external objects of sense perception, because once it is actualized
there is no need for a representation, it is just there and available for reflection.
Right after the above quote, Jandun continues:
[…] nec oportet dicere quod simul intelligat omnia illa, sed cognitio rei cuius
species informat intellectum continuabitur per aliquod tempus, et in fine illius
temporis incipiet considerare speciem illam receptam, et illa consideratio erit per
aliquod tempus, deinde in fine illius temporis incipiet intelligere potentiam su-
sceptivam illius specei, et postea continget ut intelligat substantiam subiectam
illi potentiae et specei et sic intelliget seipsum.
[…] and it is not fitting to say that it knows all these things simultaneously, but the
cognition of the thing whose species informs the intellect persists for some time,
and at the end of that time it [i.e. the intellect] begins to consider that received
species, and that consideration endures for some time, and then at the end of that
time it begins to know the power receptive of that species, and then it holds that
it knows the substance underlying the power and species and thus it knows itself.
Jandun III.27, app 326.16–25
Here hemakes an important point of saying that (1) self-knowledge is constituted by a stepwise
procedure, and (2) each step in the process constitutes a temporally separate activity. But
how this actually works is still not clear. Like all of the preceding commentators studied here,
Jandun does not delve into the language of attention ormental focus. But reading his exposition
of this process of the steps the intellect takes towards a knowledge of its own substance, it is
difficult not to get the feeling of a mental spotlight that is moved from one aspect of the intellect
to another. Finally, we must assume that Jandun considers these acts to be conscious states of
the subject of the intellect, as parts of his analysis are based on reports on the experience of
the process.
In the subsequent discussion he spells out the process further. The species that the intel-
lect turns its view on conforms to the quiditas of the object represented, and this disposes and
actualizes the possible intellect towards knowing that quiditas. The species is in the intellect
in the same way as a form that inheres in and perfects a subject or matter, and that is also
what disposes the intellect towards knowing itself.25 He emphasizes, with reference to Aver-
roes, that this means that the self-knowledge is only accidental and contingent upon external
stimulus, but also that this does not mean that the external species is the essence of the intel-
lect considered absolutely. Only once the intellect receives the species does it become able to
know of its own workings.26 But even given these extra details the answer to the questions on
attention and mental focus are still left unanswered.
5.1.2.3 Two answers, two phenomena
In question III.13 Jandun reflects on the conditions under which two different objects of know-
ledge result in a single act of knowledge with two different aspects. The idea seems to be that
25 Jandun III.27, app 326.26–35.
26 Jandun III.27, app 326.36–327.11. He refers to Averroes In DA, comm. III.8, p. 420.19–24.
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an act of knowing also always knows itself. This partly follows from the dictum of the iden-
tity of the knower and the known in the process, but also from how knowing is actualized:
When the knower becomes that which it knows, it also ipso facto knows itself when it knows
the primary object of knowledge. One single act of knowing knows the primary object, but
also includes a self-reference constituting the knowledge of the act itself. This might just be a
product of the ontology of the intellect. And in that case, it may be asked whether it is just an
epiphenomenon of the act of knowing that always takes place, but never includes any sort of
conscious awareness of the structure. Jandun certainly does not make any hints of a mental
presence when this phenomenon takes place.
His second treatment of the problem is quite different. In a longer answer he first shows
how he thinks the intellect can be intelligible to itself. He then argues that the intellect cannot
know itself by its own substance. And finally he argues that it rather knows itself through a
stepwise process starting from the primary object of knowledge. He outlines this process that
begins from the primary objects of knowledge, and by progressively higher levels of abstraction
the intellect moves towards a knowledge of its own substance. During this turning from the
primary knowledge to higher order knowledge, the temporal and epistemological difference
is underlined. The movement from the primary object of knowledge will always require the
presence of some external object. The self-reflection, on the other hand, is only occasioned by
the external thing and could never be initialized entirely on its own, and does not involve a
species representation of the intellect as object.
We see that the two answers are fundamentally different. The first answer presents what
amounts to an epiphenomenal and unconscious self-reflexivity. The second answer however
presents us with a self-knowledge that is an introspective and attentive process through which
the intellect can acquire a knowledge of itself, and which has a definite and positive content
that goes beyond the mere content of the primary object, as it informs the intellect about its
own activities and working. It may be argued that the first answer presents a version of self-
knowledge that is a mere artefact of the ontology of the intellect and how it interacts with
its primary objects of knowledge: In the act of knowing the knowing subject and the known
object become identical. If this is all the self-knowledge amounts to, then is the content of
that intellection anything aside from that object? Does that reflect our intuitions about what it
means for the intellect to know or reflect on itself? Maybe not. And that might be part of the
explanation why he gives a different answer in the second of the two questions. That treatment
gives a stronger case for the type of self-knowledge that actually provides the intellect with
some positive information about itself. The second treatment may therefore better reflect the
experience of self-knowledge that is a conscious and attentive act.
5.1.3 The possible intellect knowing the agent intellect
In this section we will see how Jandun explains the connection between the possible and agent
intellect and which influence that have on knowledge and self-knowledge of the two. The ele-
ments of the argument are already surveyed in section 3.2.4.1 on page 90, but here we can relate
that better to the remaining part of the commentary. Basically he argues that (1) the possible
intellect ought to have even better knowledge of the agent intellect than any other objects of
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knowledge, as that is a more noble object and more suited to its own nature. (2) Further, the
agent intellect is in a constant state of self-knowledge and the possible intellect is united with
the agent intellect through that act of knowing.27
Like in his other questions on intellect and self-knowledge, Jandun first presents the struc-
tural circumstances on which he finds that he can present his doctrine, and then he dives into
the more detailed exposition of its content. He therefore first argues: the possible intellect is
suited to knowing forms realized in matter through the mediation of the agent intellect; the
agent intellect is already actually known, as it is an immaterial substance; hence, the possible
intellect ought to be so much more suited to know the agent intellect, as it is at a higher state
of perfection than its normal objects of knowledge.28
He then elaborates that idea. First he establishes that the possible intellect knows the agent
intellect through a kind of strong connection with it:
Illud cui semper est coniuncta vel unita intellectio alicuius intelligibilis eadem
numero semper intelligit illud intelligibile intellectione eadem numero – haec
est omnino manifesta; sed ipsi intellectui possibili semper est unita intellectio
intellectus agentis, quia ipse intellectus agens est suamet intellectio sui ipsius
secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem hic: “In ipso enim scientia est eadem
rei scitae.” Cum igitur intellectus agens sit semper unitus intellectui possibili, sicut
perfectio naturalis suo perfectibili, ut patet ex praeostensis, sequitur quod semper
est unita intellectio intellectus agentis, et per consequens semper ipsum intelligit.
That to which a knowledge of some intelligible object is always connected or
united always knows that intelligible object with the numerically identical know-
ledge – this is entirely obvious; but a knowledge of the agent intellect is always
connected to the possible intellect, because the agent intellect is its own very
knowing of itself according to Aristotle and the commentator on this passage:
“For in it scientific knowledge is the same as the thing known.” Thus when
the agent intellect always is united with the possible intellect, just as a natural
perfection with that which is perfectible, as is apparent from the preceding, it
follows that the knowing of the agent intellect always is united [with it], and
consequently that it [i.e. the possible intellect] always knows it [i.e. the agent
intellect].
Jandun III.30, app 329.34–330.4
From this initial paragraph I want to highlight three things: (1) The agent intellect apparently
contains some knowledge, intellectio, as a perpetual knowledge of itself, (2) the agent and pos-
sible intellect are always united, and (3) the self-knowledge of the agent intellect rubs off on
the possible intellect. We also note that the knowledge that the possible intellect acquires is
not of itself, but of the agent intellect.
27 See sections 3.2.4.1.5 to 3.2.4.1.6 on page 91.
28 Jandun III.30, app 329.23–33.
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The self-knowledge of the agent intellect is established by the connection made at the end
of De anima 3.4 between the science and the thing known.29 Jandun does not connect the agent
intellect here with the supreme intellect in Metaphysica 12.9, but it is clearly accepted that the
agent intellect is in a perpetual state of self-thinking. Further, it is also taken to be evident that
the agent and possible intellect are always united. When we accept those two assumptions,
we can consider the idea that the possible intellect somehow takes over the self-knowledge
of the agent intellect. The argument for this is found in the first part of the quote and states
that a unity with an act of knowing transmits that knowledge to the united subject. This must
be very similar to the doctrine of knowledge as form reception. That unity between the two
types of intellect is clearly the basis. But we may still raise some questions. Which relation
holds between the agent and possible intellect in this unity? And what consequence does this
purported knowledge of the agent intellect have on the indeterminacy of the possible intellect?
Jandun goes into further detail in the following paragraph. In a somewhat wrinkled sen-
tence he concludes the corollary of the stated doctrine, i.e. that the possible intellect does not
know the agent intellect by an intellection that is different from that by which the agent in-
tellect knows itself. He gives two reasons: First, that would mean that one and the same thing
had two simultaneous and different intellections of the same object. Secondly, it is also hard to
imagine how the possible intellect, which is primarily potential, should realize a lasting activ-
ity on its own accord without any external informing act or cause.30 The first remark is the
most interesting, because that includes some of the familiar problems of simultaneity and the
subject and object in intellection. It reveals two things: (1) He considers the agent and possible
intellect to be one and the same thing, unum et idem. (2) The doctrine he rejects is that one
subject knows one object through multiple, or diverse, acts of knowing. This is elaborated at
the end of the paragraph where Jandun decides that the possible intellect is always united with
an intellection of the agent intellect by which the agent intellect knows itself. So the possible
intellect knows the agent intellect by always being united with the very knowledge by which
the agent intellect knows itself. Here we notice that what is known by both the agent and the
possible intellect is the agent itself. To put it differently, the possible intellect does not have a
knowledge of the act of self-knowledge that the agent intellect is engaged in. We can see that
because it is maintained that there only is a single object, and a higher-order knowledge of the
act of self-knowledge of the agent intellect in the possible intellect would probably constitute
a new and separate object.
The ontology of the two intellects is still not quite clear. At the end of the paragraph he
says that the intellection of the agent intellect that is united with the possible intellect is not
the substance or essence of the possible intellect. This may serve to maintain a separation
between the two, and maybe also the indeterminacy of the possible intellect. Because it would
be hard to accept that the possible intellect essentially is a reflection on the essence of the agent
intellect. In the following paragraph we learn a bit more about this structure.
Some might argue, Jandun says, that aside from the knowledge of the agent intellect that
is conveyed on the possible intellect by its ever conjoined intellection of the agent intellect, the
unity of agent and possible intellect also sprouts another intellection which does not belong
29 Aristotle DA, 3.4, 430a19–20.
30 Jandun III.30, app 330.5–12.
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to the substance of the agent intellect, but follow from the union of the two. We should then
inquire, he says, why the existence of that intellection should be necessary, when the possible
intellect has a sufficient knowledge of the agent intellect from its substance. He does not give
an answer but leaves it up to the student to fill in that blank himself.31 From the challenge we
learn that the act of self-knowledge in the agent intellect is its essence, and that that essence
perfects the possible intellect. The perfection of the possible intellect is certainly what leads
to the knowledge of the agent intellect in the possible intellect. This then reveals that there is
only a single object, the essence of the agent intellect itself, which is known.
As Jandun works with a monopsychist model of intellect, this all takes place in a separate,
unitary intellect. The agent intellect is always engaged in a knowledge of its own essence, and
because the two are connected in the way they are, that knowledge, which is the essence of the
agent intellect, also takes place in the possible intellect. This all sounds somewhat mystical, and
almost has a smell of essential self-knowledge. The possible intellect always has an immediate
knowledge of the agent intellect, and since we are at this immaterial level no external stimuli
or phantasms are involved. It is therefore hard not to ask how this process is related to human
knowledge.
The final paragraphs of Jandun’s question gives us some ideas. First he remarks that the
perpetual knowledge in the possible intellect of the agent intellect does not apply to (denom-
inat) any individual human being. The activity does not depend on a phantasm belonging to
any particular human being, or any phantasm in general. In the monopsychist model of in-
tellect this means that the connection between a thought and my experience of myself having
that thought is established through the phantasm in the individual human who then connects
with the separate intellect. Both the possible and agent intellect are not part of the substance
of the human soul, but they are present as an aggregate in the human soul during an act of
knowing. Jandun’s point is now that this does not take place in this particular type of knowing;
the possible intellect does not need the input of a human phantasm to engage in this. But since
these phantasms supplied by the individual is what makes a given thought personal, this must
also mean that it is a process that takes place without any interference from or awareness in a
human being.
It therefore looks like the human beings are barred from this type of self-knowledge, but
Jandun leaves a backdoor open for the possibility of such experiences. He does this with an
enigmatic comment that it does not befall us completely at the onset or in the middle of philo-
sophy, but maybe as a complement.32 This is also hinted at in the refutation of the only ratio
31 Jandun III.30, app 330.17–24: “Si quis autem diceret quod non solum intellectus possibilis intelligit
intellectum agentem intellectione qua ipse intellectus agens intelligit seipsum, et quae est sub-
stantia intellectus agentis perficiens intellectum possibilem, sed etiam quadam alia intellectione
quae sequitur immediate unionem intellectus agentis ad possibilem, quae quidem intellectio non
est ipsa substantia intellectus agentis, sed consequens unionem intellectus agentis cum possibili,
tunc inquirendum est quae esset neccesitas essendi huiusmodi [huius MSS] intellectionem, cum
intellectus possibilis sufficienter intelligat intellectum agentem per eius substantiam. Hoc autem
tibi perficiendum reliquo.”
32 Jandun III.30, app 330.25–30: “Immo etiam intellectio similis huic intellectioni, scilicet qua intelligit
intellectus agens, non contingit nobis perfecte in principio generationis philosophiae nec in medio,
sed forte in complemento, et de hoc debet inquiri in consequentibus.”
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principalis to the question. The ratio argues that knowing the agent intellect cannot be possible
because that would imply a human knowledge that does not require any sense data. He ac-
knowledges that doctrine, but also says that Aristotle does note deny that the human intellect
might have some incorporeal and eternal activity, and that it be some essential activity, and
that is what this is actually about. Although he does not admit so himself, we are clearly now
moving into the domain of theology. And the conclusion of this analysis must also be that yes,
maybe in some way such self-knowledge may be available to the human intellect in some state
of being, but under normal circumstances, it is not part of the human experience.
5.1.4 Conclusion
In this section we have found three different types of self-knowledge in the questions of John of
Jandun. First we saw a self-knowledge that I have argue is tightly connected with the structure
of the possible intellect. The possible intellect is completely indeterminate before it knows
anything, and when it is actualized it then knows the form that it has been actualized as. This
means that when the possible intellect knows an external object by being that object itself, it
also in a way knows itself. This self-knowledge always takes place during the act of knowing
of any external intelligible object. This may be considered a fundamental consequence of the
mechanics of the human intellect.
The second treatment is quite different. Here we find, I argue, his reflections on how it
is possible to engage in an attentive and conscious reflection on the workings of the intellect.
Once the possible intellect has received and been actualized as a species of an intelligible object,
it is somehow possible for the intellect to focus on the species, not as a representation but as
the type of thing that the intellect itself is receptive to. This gives the intellect an impression
of its own receptive power, which again yields some knowledge of the subject of this power.
This finally gives rise to a knowledge of the substance of the intellect itself. This is not itself
sufficient to constitute scientific knowledge, as it is more akin to an intuitive self-knowledge
than to the analytical investigation of the essence of the intellective soul in science. But it does
provide the intellect with some knowledge about itself.
Finally we have seen a discussion of how the possible intellect can know the agent intellect.
Here the focus moves yet again to a different phenomenon, namely a relation between the pos-
sible and agent intellect independently of the human individuals that may engage with them
intermittently. The possible intellect and the agent intellect are always intimately and inextric-
ably connected, and the agent intellect is always engaged in a perpetual self-intellection. This
state of self-intellection and the perpetual entanglement of the two intellects mean that the self-
intellection of the agent intellect is also realized or delegated to the possible intellect, which
thereby acquires a knowledge of the agent intellect. This state of perpetual self-knowledge
may be available to humans, but the analysis of the circumstances of that experience is rather
a theological than a philosophical endeavour.
So we have seen three very different views on self-knowledge. The first presents the om-
nipresent but unconscious self-knowledge that the mere mechanics of the intellect entails, the
second is an analysis of conscious and attentive self-knowledge that humans can engage in,
and the third presents a mostly supra-human self-intellection that the ontology of the possible
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and agent intellect together realize. Despite these differences we have also seen how some
problems seem to lie at the heart of the concept of self-knowledge across this spectrum. The
doctrine of the identity of the knower and the known, and the structure of the intellect invari-
ably leads to questions of the subject and object of knowledge. We have seen in this section
how the number of both subjects and objects can be difficult to keep under control. But the
possibility of distinguishing between the object and the act of knowing means presents an-
other vector of problems within this field. In all three questions we have seen how these three
dimensions of subject, object and act have been at the heart of Jandun’s investigations.
5.2 Simon Magister, a literal commentary
It is commonly noted that whereas question commentaries generally discuss specific philo-
sophical problems, the literal genre aims to present and interpret the Aristotelian text more
fully.33 This may even include the notion that that literal commentaries are downright bor-
ing, that they add little of value to the interpretation of the works of Aristotle, and that they
do not reveal the doctrinal position of the commentator himself.34 In this section I will take a
look at these presumptions by comparing a literal commentary with the roughly contemporary
question commentaries.
So far the prime focus of attention in this study has been the question commentaries. This
was where the whole idea for the investigation started, and the format of the question com-
mentary also yields very well to a doctrinal study due to the manner of presentation and the
relative separation from the details of textual exposition. But the exclusion of the literal com-
mentaries has also had some practical reasons. Spanning both literal and question comment-
aries in the main analyses would have been too time consuming to execute successfully within
the framework of the project. Nevertheless, I did inspect and evaluate quite a large selection
of literal commentaries in the course of the study, and it would seem lopsided to pretend that
they do not exist as an alternative approach to the analysis of Aristotelian texts. In this section
I will therefore give a single example of a highly interesting commentary. I will present the
literal commentary of Simon Magister in light of the doctrines that have already been ana-
lysed in the question commentaries. This gives us the opportunity to ask how the two types
of texts are related, and see some examples of what can be found in a literal commentary. As
there is some dispute about whether the author of the literal commentary ascribed to Simon
Magister actually is Simon of Faversham, this will also be an opportunity to investigate that
problem further and see if a doctrinal analysis of this material, that we now have a relatively
good contemporary overview over, can help move the discussion further along.
33 Weijers 2002: 24, Wolf 1966: 38–9.
34 All three assertions are made in Flüeler 1999: 503.
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5.2.1 Simon Magister and his text
In the manuscript Leipzig UB 1359 we find two commentaries that are explicitly ascribed to a
Simon Magister, preceded by a single anonymous commentary and followed by a commentary
on De generatione et corruptione by Giles of Rome. The content thus looks as follows:
• ff. 1r–23ar: Anonymus, Expositio in Analytica Posteriora.
• ff. 24r–43ar: Simon Magister, Expositio in Topica.
• ff. 44r–77v: Simon Magister, Expositio in De anima.
• ff. 78r–93v: Giles of Rome (unattributed), Expositio in De generatione et corruptione.
The first anonymous commentary may also be by Simon, but there is no explicit ascription, so
it must be considered only a possibility so far. The name Simon Magister is also mentioned as
the author of the works Quaestiones super secunda parte Doctrinalis moderne and Notabilia de
art dictandi, both preserved in other manuscripts, but whether this has any connection to the
Simon of this manuscript is uncertain.35
Grabmann first attributed the text to Simon of Faversham along with the other commentar-
ies of themanuscript.36 Glorieux, Markowski, andWolf follow that attribution.37 Longeway is a
bit hesitant, but reasons as follows: Wolf argues convincingly that the De anima-commentary
is by Faversham, and if that is true, the Topica is most likely by him too. The base premise
that Wolf presents convincing arguments for the ascription is however not true, as he gives
no arguments but merely takes over the attribution of Grabmann.38 Mora-Márquez lists the
Topica-commentary as Faversham’s, but makes no reference to either of the other two in her
article about him.39 Köhler is also inclined towards attributing it to Faversham.40
Lohr on the other hand suggests to withhold judgement on the question as the attribution
is ambiguous, and there is some partial overlap in sources between the commentary on De
anima and some other commentaries (on Petrus Hispanus’ Summulae logicales, on Martin of
Dacia’s Tractatus de modis significandi, and a Quaestiones super II minoris Prisciani).41 Weijers
follows this recommendation, as does Mora-Márquez in her catalogue of commentaries on
book three of De anima, as mentioned above.42 This cautious attitude seems initially wise, and
35 Weijers 2012: 94–5.
36 He shows no doubt about the authorship, see Grabmann 1933: 21–3. It has later been shown,
according to Weijers (2012: 94), that the final commentary on De generatione et corruptione is by
Giles of Rome (although she does not list it in among his works in Weijers 1996).
37 Wolf 1966, Glorieux 1971: 358 (in a mistaken reference to the manuscript signature as 1559, and a
similarly mistaken reference to the text as a question commentary), Markowski 2012: 83.
38 Longeway 2012: §2. Wolf includes small parts of SimonMagister’s text in his study of Faversham’s
theory of intellect.
39 Mora-Márquez 2018: §2. In Mora-Márquez (2014: 215, DA16) the De anima-commentary is how-
ever ascribed to Simon Magister.
40 Köhler 2008: 47, n. 154.
41 Lohr 1971: 135–6, Lohr 1973: 139–40.
42 Mora-Márquez 2014: 215, Weijers 2012: 94–5.
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as the following analysis will show, the text contains a connection to Faversham’s text, but
no conclusive evidence in favour of the attribution has been found. We will therefore keep
referring to him as Simon Magister.
Dating the text involves one challenge in particular. There is no real catalogue registration
of the manuscript, but a short registry entry has been made. That note presents no description
of the content, but it dates the manuscript to between 1301 and 1315.43 That dating may be
done on palaeographical grounds, or based on the date that is found in the explicit that closes
our commentary. It reads as follows: “Expliciunt dicta magistri Simonis super librumDe anima
scripta anno Domini moccco [erasure]”. The erasure contains the last part of the date, but it is
difficult to establish for certain what it says (see figure 5.1 on the following page). It might read
“iiiio” (quarto) followed by some final material that does not belong to the date (a suggestion
could maybe be “amen”). The problem is however that it might look like the final chunk is
closed by an “o”, making it a ordinal number too. This would mean that the preceding number
cannot be “quarto”, as it must be in the tens rather than the ones, which the final chunk would
be. In that case the first erased number could be “xxo”, although that seems like a stretch
considering what is still readable. When the text is dated in the literature it is however put at
or before 1304. This probably goes back to Grabmann who reads the date as 1304 with some
confidence, but he also (as the only one I have seen) notes the erasure and admits that he cannot
read the final material.44 Grabmann also finds it most likely that the text itself was dictated
in 1304, and most certainly by Faversham. The fact that the explicit mentions ‘dicta’ that are
‘scripta’ at the given date could suggest the date of the dictation, but I do not find that wording
strong enough to consider that to be certain (regardless of what the date might be). So given
only this explicit the existing conclusions about the date of the manuscript, and certainly the
text, seem to me to rest on assumptions that are not that solid. In my view that explicit gives
us only a very uncertain terminus ad quem for the text, but not necessarily the exact time at
which the commentary has been taught.
I do however find that we can say something about the period of the text. The text is most
certainly from the later part of the 13th century or slightly later. We will see that the com-
mentator routinely refers to Liber de causis as an anonymous text and knows that it is different
from Proclus’s Elementatio Theologica. This puts it after 1372 when Aquinas discovered the
relationship between those two texts.45 We also find, on folio 44vb, a reference to a comment-
ary on De anima by Giles of Rome. If that commentary is Giles’ Expositio in libros De anima,
then the terminus post quem is around 1274, where that text has been dated to.46 This aligns
well with the later observations that I will present that the commentary incorporates material
from commentaries from that same period. Theoretically it could be from any time after 1274,
but I find it unlikely to be from a later part of the 14th century, as we find no reflexes of the
43 See http://www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de/dokumente/html/obj31577679.
44 Mora-Márquez 2014: 215: 1304. Lohr 1973: 139: 1277–1304. Weijers 2012: 95 prints the explicit
with 1304 as the year. See Grabmann 1933: 24.
45 His commentary on Liber de causis is dated to the first part of 1272 in Weisheipl 1983: 284. For
a discussion of the proliferation of those two texts in a Parisian context in the 13th century, see
Porro 2014.
46 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna 1993: 320–1.
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Figure 5.1: Explicit of Simon Magisters Simon Magister, Leipzig UB 1359: 44r, in in-
frared light. Photo: Michael S. Christensen.
philosophical developments that take place after the early 14th century.
How can we describe the De anima-commentary itself? The text is long, has a wide ambit
of references to authorities, and the author has most likely had good access to several of the
important philosophical authorities in direct copies or good reference works. The extent of
the text is obvious when one looks at the manuscript. It measures 355×260 mm with a text
area of 290×220 mm. The text is set in two columns of 78 lines each in a condensed and
richly abbreviated hand (see the image of the first folio in figure 5.2 on the next page). A
preliminary estimate based on the transcription of some columns of the manuscript indicates
that one column takes up about 1250 words. So the 132 columns may run 165.000 words, which
means about 330 pages of print text (excluding all apparatuses).
Simon also shows knowledge of a broad spectrum of authorities. The range of references
found in a prooemium could be expected to be broader than those of the exposition proper, as
the genre of prologues warrants broader remarks and general references to the known corpus
of philosophy and literature. We thus find Simon to make the following references to some
of the expected authorities within the Aristotelian tradition: Aristotle, Themistius, Alexan-
der, Averroes, and Albert the Great, as well as Liber de causis and Proclus (separately). But
aside from these, he also refers to the following authors: Alain of Lille (De planctu naturae),
Ps.-Augustine (Liber de spiritu et anima), ibn David as the translator of De anima from Ar-
abic to Latin, Boethius (De consolatione philosophiae), Seneca (Epistulae morales), Ovid (with a
mistaken attribution of a quotation actually from Juvenal), Isaac Israeli ben Solomon (Liber de
Definitionibus), and Ptolomy. Not only are several of these not standard Aristotelian authorit-
ies, but also authorities that I have rarely or never seen references to by the commentators.
A quick look at the notes on De anima 3.4, 402a4, where Aristotle describes the enterprise
he is engaging in as a ἱστορία τῆς ψυχῆς, indicates that Simon may have had direct access to
the commentaries of Themistius and Averroes. He raises the question why Aristotle refers to
the practice as a historia, and makes the argument that it is not a scientia, as it is not based on
knowledge of the causes of the essence, but merely observations of its effects. He then notes
the following.
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Figure 5.2: First folio of Simon Magisters Simon Magister, Leipzig UB 1359: 44r. Public
Domain Mark 1.0.
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Unde ubi littera Philosophi habet ‘historiam’ ibi, littera Themistii habet ‘nego-
tium’, Commentator autem ibi habet ‘narrationem’.
Hence, where the text of the Philosopher has ‘presentation’ here, the text of
Themistius has ‘occupation’, but the Commentator here has ‘recounting’.
Simon Magister bk. 1, lect. 1, Leipzig UB 1359: 45ra.
This parallel comparison of the different translations of the authorities gives some reason to
consider whether he had copies of the commentaries at his elbow.
A lectio is generally structured as follows: The main lemma first introduces the initial
words of the text of the lecture. The text is then put into the larger context of the work by
a description of the purpose of the preceding and the current text. A detailed, and at times
somewhat complex, divisio textus is then presented, followed by the exposition proper of the
separate subsections of the text, which may also contain further divisions of the text.47 A lectio
can contain inlaid dubitationeswhich are not necessarily postponed to the last part of the lectio.
5.2.2 The science of the soul in the prooemium
The commentary opens with a longer prooemium of a bit more than three manuscript columns.
It first presents the general outline of the projected science within the general context of the
Aristotelian network of sciences as it is related to other activities, such as that of the meta-
physician and the medical doctor. Typical tropes on the goodness, nobleness and utility of the
science in comparison with its relative difficulty are also touched upon.48 The remaining half
of the prooemium presents a longer discussion of the procedure and basis of the science of the
soul. In this section I will present the doctrines of that discussion and put them in relation
to the material that we have already surveyed in the question commentaries. The discussion
given by Simon basically contains two sections, first a shorter analysis of different ways of
intelligibility, secondly a longer dubitatio on the intelligibility of the intellective soul.
The analysis of intelligibility presents us with a set of different ways something can be
known. The main distinction is between intelligibility by privation or affirmation (positio).
Intelligibility by privation is then split into that which is known through a negative relative
property, such as the point as an non-extended part of a line, and that which is defined wholly
negatively, with God as the prime example. Intelligibility by affirmation is divided into those
things which are known through some essence, and those which are known through a species.
Human experiences and knowledge can be found within both these sub-categories, but the
most typical is intelligibility by an acquired species and by effects and activities (2.2.2. and 2.2.4.
in the following listing). The knowledge by acquired species can either be by the proper species
of an object (such as the species of the stone in our knowledge of it), and the non-proper species
(such as knowledge of one thing through likeness to another). Finally, knowledge by effects
and activities it stated to present both how humans acquire knowledge about the soul and the
separate substances. As both phenomena are not immediately available to sense perception,
47 For an example of what a divisio textus can look like, see SimonMagister bk. 3, lect. 1, app 346.4–21.
48 Leipzig UB 1359: f. 44ra–b.
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theymust instead be known through observation of their effects, which yields knowledge about
their activities.49
Simon’s full schema looks as follows:
1. Privation
1.1. Part of something through which the privation is understood
1.1.1. Point in relation to the line
1.2. Thing defined absolutely different from that which its compared to
1.2.1. God who is impassible, immortal, immaterial, unchangeable, without mag-
nitude, simple by lacking any composition.
2. Affirmation (position)
2.1. By essence
2.1.1. Something essentially known through its own essence
2.1.1.1. God, who knows himself by his own essence and all else through that.
2.1.2. Something essentially known through something else
2.1.2.1. Something known essentially by sense (e.g. light)
2.1.2.2. Something known essentially by intellect (e.g. pain, joy, hope)
2.2. By species
2.2.1. By co-created species (separate substances)
2.2.2. By acquired species.
2.2.2.1. By same species: material objects of knowledge
2.2.2.2. By other species: Father through species of son if he looks like him, or
Hercules through the statue.
2.2.3. By proper and immediate cause, i.e. conclusions of demonstrations, propter
quid knowledge.
2.2.4. By effects and activity, cognitio quia (separate intelligences, the soul)
This distinction into types of intelligibility is by no means unique to Simon. In the texts in-
cluded in this study, five examples have been found of this, along with one peripheral mention
of something similar.50 All other observed examples also contain the distinction into privation
and affirmation, and there are also some categories that they all share, but none of them are
as extensive as Simon in their outline. Anonymus Mertonensis 275 identifies negative intel-
ligibility as the point on a line (= 1.1.1.) and the non-existent, such as the first cause among
49 See Simon Magister bk. 1, prol, app 339.73–340.27.
50 The peripheral note is made by Wyle, who mentions the possibility of knowledge through priva-
tion, but without the type of intelligibility that we recognize in the other commentaries. See Wyle
q. I.1, app 305.26–32.
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created things, which Simon does not mentioned. In the category of affirmative intelligibil-
ity he presents intelligibility by a species, by effects (= 2.2.2., 2.2.4.), or by presence, which is
also not mentioned by Simon. It is however most likely implied by the self-knowledge of the
separate intelligences by their own co-created species (which is always actualized and always
present to themselves).51
The prologue and first question of the anonymous Merton commentary has been described
as a reworking of Anonymus Bernardini.52 Depending on what ‘reworking’ implies it might
be an overstatement, when it comes to the first question. The Merton commentary certainly
shares some material with Anonymus Bernardini, both in rationes principales and the determ-
ination, but not to a degree so striking that it can be concluded to be inspired by the Sienese
commentary with certainty. I suspect that a comparison of the structure and content of the
commentaries will actually reveal that the Anonymus Mertonensis 275 is closer to Anonymus
Vennebusch in structure, but closer to Anonymus Bernardini in content.53 The remaining part
of the Merton commentary is however closely related to (or possibly a witness to) the com-
mentary of Anonymus Vennebusch. The Anonymus Bernardini and Anonymus Mertonensis
275 are completely parallel on this point, although Anonymus Bernardini is more extensive,
and we see that they both contain versions of Simon’s 1.1. and 1.2. as well as his 2.2.2.1.,
2.2.2.2., and 2.2.4., and they also agree with Simon that the soul knows itself by its own effects
(2.2.4.). We find exactly the same distinctions in Anonymus Vennebusch, but his presentation
of the material is ordered differently from the other two. Anonymus Mertonensis 275 however
differs from the others by holding that soul also knows itself by self-presence, while that is
reserved to the separate intelligences according to the others. Despite those minor difference
the three are doctrinally identical and present the listed similarities with Simon’s analysis.54
We also have the two commentaries of Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33. Their out-
line is the most sparse in this group, as they only recognize intelligibility by privation generally
with examples of the point, unity, the indivisible and shadows. Affirmative intelligiblity is only
identified as knowledge through species, either the proper species of the object or another spe-
cies. According to them the soul is intelligible through its effects, just like Simon argues.55
But with all these commentaries two things are worth noticing. Simon’s analysis shares some
material with all of the others (as they also share material among each other), but is not obvi-
ously close to any of them. And furthermore, Simon’s analysis is by far the most extensive in
the group. He includes more reflections of the status and intelligibility of objects that might
fall within the theological domain (in particular of course God), but he also includes categories
that are not found in any other commentators, such as the knowledge of mental phenomena
such as joy, fear and hope. It is difficult, based only on the material we have presented here to
51 See Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. I.1, app 287.12–19.
52 Gauthier 1984: 261-63* and Bernardini 2009: xv–xvii. Also mentioned by De Raedemaeker 1968–
1970: 194–95.
53 I have not investigated the prologue, which however may be inspired by Anonymus Bernardini,
as there is no prologue in Anonymus Vennebusch.
54 Compare Anonymus Vennebusch q. 1 [2], ll. 69–82, Anonymus Bernardini q. I.1, ll. 31–64,
Anonymus Mertonensis 275 q. 1, app 287.12–19.
55 Dinsdale q. I.1, app 311.3–9; Anonymus Orielensis 33 q. I.1, app 292.3–11.
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make any conclusions about the direction of influence or relative chronology of the different
texts. But it is of course tempting to wonder whether Simon’s presentation is the latest in the
group, with its broader as well as deeper analysis.
After the discussion of intelligibility Simon gives a longer dubitatio on how the intellective
soul is intelligible. The dubitatio has a structure similar to that of the questions of this study
with a couple of negative rationes principales, one positive ratio principaliswith reference to the
authority of the Philosopher, a determination, and finally a refutation of the negative rationes
that contradict the determination. In the following paragraphs I will outline how the two main
sections of the determination relate to different parts of some of the question commentaries
included in this study. First we will see how the first part of the determination is conspicuously
close to that of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, and then how a section of the second part shows a
similar closeness to that of Faversham.
In the first part of the determination Simon concerns himself with the general requirements
of any science. According to him, science can refer to the knowledge that is acquired through
definition, division, or demonstration. Something is intelligible by definition when an intellec-
tually meaningful definition (quidditas) can be given for it. Intelligibility by division applies to
that which can be divided into powers and so-called subjective parts (partes subiectivae). The
example of powers of the intellective soul are of course the possible and agent intellect.56 The
subjective parts must signify the existence of multiple instances of the same substance across
separate subjects, as he argues that it is fulfilled by the existence of the intellect of Socrates,
Plato and others. Finally, something is intelligible by demonstration when we have a subject
which has parts and properties that can be shown to belong to the subject by the definition of
the subject. When Simon has argued that all three types of intelligibility applies to the intel-
lective soul, he adds that this is actually also how Aristotle himself proceeds in his presentation
of the science in De anima.57
We have already seen some other examples of such a distinction into three concepts of
science and three types of intelligibility in section 4.2.1.6 on page 125. There we find that two
other commentators present variations on this theme, namely Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I and
Henric de laWyle. A comparison of the texts quickly reveal that the presentation ofWyle bears
no clear connection to that of Simon Magister as the three types of intelligibility he identifies
are slightly different.58 The text of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I does however bear a striking
resemblance with Simon’s text.
Like Simon, the determination by the anonymous commentator also contains two sections.
The first of those two contains the same tripartite specification of the science based on defini-
tion, division, and demonstration. He explains what is meant by each of these three categories
in much the same way as Simon, and he even presents the same point about knowledge by
division that the subject must have both different powers and the concept of subjective parts.
56 The reason he does not single out some of the lower faculties of the soul, such as sensation and
vegetation, might just be to defend the more challenging thesis that the intellective faculty of the
soul itself is also available to the science. I does not have to imply that accepts multiple substances
in the same subject.
57 Simon Magister bk. 1, prol., app 342.1–29.
58 See Wyle q. I.1, app 304.34–305.5.
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Finally, he also makes the same concluding point that this triple view of science reflects the
procedure of Aristotle in his analysis of the soul. But the comparison of the two texts also
clearly reveals that although the two commentators share both the outline and the details of
the argument, Simon gives a more rich and verbose presentation.59
A comparison of the rationes principales also reveals a connection with the commentary
of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I. Simon only presents two rationes where the anonymous com-
mentator gives three, but both of Simon’s rationes are also to be found in the anonymous com-
mentary. This may not be important with regard to one of the two, as that is the most common
objection included in virtually every commentary (N2). They do however also share the less
typical specification that this challenge is particularly pertinent with respect to the intellective
soul, but it may not reveal much in itself, as it is not particularly rare.60 The other argument,
which they also share, is however much more interesting, as the only other place where that
occurs is in the commentary of Jandun. The argument holds that there can be no science of the
soul because there has to be a real difference (differentia realis) between the knowing subject
and the known object of the science, and that this principle would be violated if there were
a science about the soul (N5).61 And also in this case are the points made by Simon Magister
and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I closer to each other than that of the other party, Jandun in this
case. The two commentators solve both their rationes in the same way, with reference to the
distinction between primary and secondary or reflexive knowledge.
As already mentioned above, Simon of Faversham has been suggested as the author of the
commentary. Whereas the first section on the division of the elements of the science and the
rationes principales are conspicuously close to the commentary of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I,
we find a paragraph that seems just as closely connected to the text of Faversham. After the
tripartite division of the science, Simon announces that he wants to describe in which way the
intellective soul is known. That analysis also falls in two parts, as he first describes on which
grounds the intellect is able to reflect on itself, and subsequently he goes into some detail about
what actually happens during a process of intellectual self-reflection. The first of these two is
shared with Faversham.
With a reference to Proclus they argue that every incorporeal intelligible substance is cap-
able of self-reflection. That explicit inclusion of Proclus is to Simon Magister and Simon of
Faversham among the texts investigated in this study. But aside from that they also share a
slightly curious supportive argument. They hold that the intellect must be immaterial from
the impossibility of the opposite. If it were material, they argue, then during the process of
knowing, which is held to be successive and temporal, some parts of it would be in contact
with the object while other parts would not. This would mean that the intellect would both
know and not know the same thing at the same time, which obviously violates the principle of
non-contradiction. It also violates the idea that the intellect knows an object instantly, a view
that Simon ascribes to Aristotle. Not only is the argument a little puzzling, but it is also odd
59 Compare Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I q. I.2, app 295.18–36 and Simon Magister bk. 1, prol, app
342.1–29.
60 Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I q. I.2, app 295.4–8 and Simon Magister bk. 1, prol, app 341.3–22,
cf. 4.2.2.3 on page 129.
61 Presented in section 4.2.1.12 on page 127.
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that they do not use the perfectly fine reason that Aristotle himself gives for why the intellect
must be immaterial, namely that it must be able to know every conceivable object of know-
ledge, and hence must be wholly indeterminate and therefore immaterial.62 Simon Magister
and Faversham are the only two commentators to present this argument of immateriality.63
Finally, the last part of Simon Magister’s determination presents material that we can also
recognize in the other included commentaries, but which does not show any obvious close
connection to any of them. He refutes the idea that the intellect should know itself by its own
species, which includes a discussion of the also well known problem of the infinite regress
that the investigations of self-reflection often involve.64 But he also makes a rare reference to
Averroes’ discussion ofMetaphysica 12.8 where Aristotle declares that the intellect know itself
as a side-effect (ἐν παρέργῳ) when it knows other things.65 This he compares to the divine
intellect, where the inverse is the case, that it knows itself essentially and all other things as a
consequence of that.
We can summarize the different relations that have been outlined between the prooemium
of Simon Magister and the question commentaries. The second half of the prooemium shows
how this particular literal commentary shows no inferiority to the question commentaries in
terms of extensiveness or philosophical ambition. The comparison of the identifications of
types of intelligiblity clearly showed how Simon’s outline was the most extensive that the in-
cluded commentaries have been able to present. The other commentaries contain different sets
of the points that we can also find in Simon’s commentary, but there are a couple of categories
that are found across all the commentaries. They all distinguish between privative and affirm-
ative intelligibility, and within the category of privative intelligibility they all present the point
on a line as the standard example of something known by a negative property. In the category
of affirmative intelligibility they all include the idea of intelligibility by species, which they
agree can either be by the object’s own species or by another species. Simon Magister has a
stronger tendency than any of the others of also including material that might lie within the
theological or metaphysical domain such as the intelligibility of God and the separate intelli-
gences, as well as how human knowledge of those comes about.
The analysis of Simon’s determination showed that the first part of it has a strong and
close parallel in the commentary by Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I. But where both commentaries
also contain a second section in their determination on how the science of the soul is acquired,
there is no clear or close connection to be found between those. We do instead recognize the
first part of Simon’s second section in the commentary of Faversham. The material shared
between the two is not only very close, but also unique to the two among the investigated
commentaries. But as with Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, the second half of that part of the
determination does not correspond to the second half of Faversham’s determination. The last
part of Simon Magister’s analysis has some doctrinal parallels in the other commentaries, but
no clear parallels in language, argument, or structure.
62 Aristotle DA, 3.4, 429a15–27.
63 Simon Magister bk. 1, prol., app 342.30–343.17, Faversham q. I.1, app 333.1–17.
64 SimonMagister bk. 1, prol., app 343.18–31, cf. sections 3.2.2 on page 74 and 3.2.3 on page 87. Some
other variations on the infinite regress are discussed in section 3.2.2.2.3 on page 83.
65 Averroes In Metaph. XII, com. 51, p. 336B–C, cf. Aristotle Metaph. 12.8, 1074b36.
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5.2.3 Intellection and self-knowledge in book three
When we go to Simon’s commentary on book three we also find a whole range of interesting
notes. Some of these have been seen in the question commentaries, while others show a content
or focus that we have not yet seen in this study. In this section I will outline Simon’s general
presentation and highlight these connections and differences with the related commentaries.
Wewill see how Simon is highly attentive to some of his preceding authorities, not leastThomas
Aquinas. Wewill also see that he shares somematerial with Faversham, but also presents points
that might be in conflict with the doctrines of Faversham. In the following section I will thus
argue that there is not yet sufficient evidence to conclude that SimonMagister is actually Simon
of Faversham, and that he might just as well be an separate magister pulling in material from
Faversham as well as many other commentators. We will do this with a focused analysis of a
selection of his treatment of De anima III.4, which stretches over three lectiones.
Simon opens the first lectio of the third book by putting it into the context of the whole
work and notes the main purpose of the preceding and following material. The very first
part of his divisio textus leads him into a discussion of the meaning of the term ‘intellectus’
where he singles out eleven different meanings. The meanings listed are (1) reason in general,
(2) the meaning of a statement, (3) a whole person, (4) the immediate knowledge of principles,
(5) phantasia, (6) a thing known, (7) a concept as the combination of species and genus, (8) the
substance or form of the soul, (9) the intelligible species actualized in the intellect, (10) the act of
knowing, (11) and finally the intellective power of the human soul. There are different sources
for these different meanings, and Simon himself points to al-Fārābī as the authority who notes
that there are many different meanings of the term.66 But al-Fārābī does not present all eleven
meanings listed by Simon, and some of them might be of his own observation (drawn from the
authorities that he indicates), while some also may be reflexes from Philoponus.67 Although
this might just look like a meaningless semantic exercise, it will actually turn out to be a useful
tool for Simon. We will see an example of that in the following paragraphs.
Before moving into the analysis of the lemmata of the first lectio, Simon presents three gen-
eral methodological considerations drawn from two of his most often used authorities, Philo-
ponus and Themistius. The first two ask what the best order of procedure in the science of
the soul is, and how receptivity and change applies to the intellect. These are not irrelevant to
our analysis, but the third is particularly interesting, as it focuses on a fundamental connection
between intellection and self-knowledge.68
In the beginning of his commentary on chapter four Philoponus raises the question how
the intellect can have knowledge about its own substance, if it is supposed to be stripped of
the object of knowledge before it receives it (as of course the intellect cannot loose its own
substance before a reflection on it). Here it is explained in short but clear terms that it would
only be a problem if intellection were a reception of the substance of the object of intellection
in the intellect. But as the receptivity of the intellect does not mean that it is able to become
66 See the translation of his De intellectu in McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 68–78.
67 See for instance Philoponus De intellectu, p. 2.33–4.69 and De intellectu, ad 429a22–25, p. 13.00–
14.26.
68 The first two are not transcribed, but the last is to be found in Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, app
346.24–347.2.
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any substance, but rather that it is able to receive the species of any substance, the problem
does not apply. This means that the intellect can be receptive to its own as well as any other
species without having to loose any substantial properties before the act of intellection. It
cannot merely be actualized as that species.69 Simon mirrors this discussion closely.70
This shows us three things: (1) Simon’s use of Philoponus is true to his source, as a com-
parison with the passage in Philoponus reveals a similarity of structure and argument, but also
wording, which in turn might support the theory that he had direct access to a copy of Philo-
ponus’ text. (2) The doctrine presented reveals that he does not believe that the potentiality
of the intellect involves a completely void, and effectively non-existing, concept of intellect
before the act of intellection. The intellect does have substantial content before intellection,
the possible intellect is just not actualized as an object species yet. (3) Finally, it looks like his
concept of self-knowledge entails a knowledge of the species of the intellect itself. But as he
says himself, the details of the doctrine will be outlined in the following discussion.71
Whenwe look at the first of the twomain passages on self-knowledge inDA, III.4, 429b5–9,
we find some details about how he conceives the process of intellection and self-knowledge.
With references to Aquinas and Philoponus he expands the meaning of the structure of po-
tentiality and two levels of actuality. When the possible intellect has received the intelligible
species of an external object, it reaches the first level of actuality, which is also the second level
of potentiality. This highlights two of the different meanings of ‘intellectus’ (numbers 9 and 9
above): First there is the acquired power and ability to react on existing knowledge, the first
actuality, which is a kind of scientia, and then follows the act of reflection itself which takes
place during engagement with an already acquired intelligible species, the second actuality. Si-
mon puts a special emphasis on the first level of actuality as the level at which the intellect can
engage in reflection of its object according to its own volition.72 Simon also explicitly castig-
ates an Avicennean doctrine that the intelligible species only exists in the intellect during the
act of reflection on that object.73 This implies that the intellect contains (probably in memory,
although that is not specified) a store of intelligible species that it can engage with after their
initial abstraction and reception in the intellect. The similarity between Simon’s exposition
and that of Aquinas of the same section of the text is striking. The emphasis on the free will
of the intellect to engage in reflection and the following critique of Avicenna run parallel in
the two commentaries.74 This analysis paves the way for Simon’s notes on the conditions of
intellectual self-knowledge. Once the intellect has acquired its first level of actuality it is also
able to have knowledge about itself. The details of that are outlined, he adds, in the following
69 Philoponus De intellectu, ad 429a15–16. p. 9.1–21.
70 Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, app 346.24–347.2.
71 In Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, app 346.24–347.2.
72 Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, app 347.23–348.4. Notice his use of the expression ‘absque omni
doctore extrinsico’. Although this has an Augustinian ring to it, it is actually borrowed from the
commentary of Philoponus on this exact passage, cf. Philoponus De intellectu, III.4, ad 429b5–7, p.
18.45.
73 Cf. Avicenna De anima, V.6, p. 147.16–148.39.
74 Compare with Thomas Aquinas Sent. DA, III.2, ad 429b5–10, ll. 20–42. This is of course significant
because the ideas are not immediately apparent from a reading of the Aristotelian text.
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section of the two dubitationes that close off the fourth chapter of Aristotle’s text.75
Simon’s spends his whole third lectio on those two dubitationes. We will therefore have
to leave the analysis of many details, especially on the first dubitatio, as an exercise for the
reader.76 I just want to focus on two points related to this part of his commentary, the location
of the human intellect in the greater chain of being, and the order of intellectual self-knowledge
in the process of intellection. This will lead us into some final considerations on the sources
and doctrines of his commentary.
As we have also seen in the prooemium, Simon is not afraid of including considerations
of a theological nature in his psychological analysis. There we found reflections on the self-
knowledge of separate substances and God in the analysis of different types of intelligibility
(page 181). We also see several examples of this in his treatment of the second dubitatio. The
first reference is made after his outline of the challenge itself, as he says that immaterial sub-
stances have a different kind of intelligibility than material objects. Whereas material objects
can only be known through a process of abstraction of the intelligible species, the separate
substances are known in themselves and by themselves. The intellect is said to take up an in-
termediate place between these essentially self-knowing substances and the material objects
which are neither known in themselves nor by themselves. With reference to Liber de causis
he situates the intellect at the lowest grade of the intelligent beings and the highest level of
the material beings. He says that this particular position provides a good reason to discuss
the intellection and self-knowledge of the intellect, as too great similarity with either of the
two classes result in different types of problems. If the soul is too much like the separate sub-
stances it will result in essential self-knowledge, which is hard to reconcile with Aristotelian
empiricism, while too high similarity with the material objects gives them powers of reason
too, which is of course also problematic.77
His following analysis of the solution to the second challenge goes directly into a discussion
of the same point. There are three types of intellects, Simon says, divine, human, and the
intermediate form of the intelligences. The first, pure, divine intellect, whichAristotle describes
in Metaphysica 12, is the first cause of everything, itself an uninterrupted act, it knows itself
by its own essence, and this knowledge results in a knowledge of all other beings, of which
it is itself the first cause. The human intellect is at the other end of the spectrum, as it is
pure potentiality. It primarily knows the external material objects through their intelligible
species, and from the actualization that yield this knowledge it is able to reflect on and know
itself. Finally, the separate substances take up the intermediate position, as they have essential
self-knowledge but only know other objects through innate species, and thus in a somewhat
indirect or intermediate way.78 We have already seen that this is no unique idea, as four of
the analysed question commentaries present a similar line of reasoning.79 But Simon makes
an ingenious move when he situates the human self-knowledge on the intersection between
materiality and immateriality, and uses that as a way to explain the necessity raising the second
75 Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 1, app 348.14–26.
76 The whole lectio is edited on pages 349.3–354.26.
77 Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, app 350.14–32.
78 Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, app 351.32–352.25.
79 See 3.2.2.1.5 on page 77, cf. 3.2.2.2.2 on page 82.
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dubitatio that closes De anima 3.4. It may partially be a question of differences between the
quaestio and expositio-genres, but in this study we have not seen any other commentator do
this.
In the preceding analyseswe have also seen several discussions of another problem, namely
whether intellectual self-knowledge and knowledge of external objects is simultaneous or suc-
cessive.80 Simon seems to argue that during knowledge a single species results in the know-
ledge of two objects. The species of the primary object of knowledge of course yields a know-
ledge of that object through the process of abstraction, but the intellect also knows itself by that
same species. That knowledge is, as he writes, “modo informationis” by way of information.
This means that when the intellect is actualized, i.e. informed, by the species, it also knows
itself.81
This raises some questions, as we might ask whether these two objects are known simul-
taneously in a single act of knowing, and whether this doubling of objects always takes place
during the act of knowing. Unfortunately, Simon does not answer any of these clearly, but this
paragraphmight imply that this duplication of objects always takes place, as it is a consequence
of the way the intellect works as an actualization of the species of the object. If that is the case,
then it would be easy to see this as an example of a self-knowledge that in effect is vacuous, as
it always occurs as an epiphenomenon occasioned by the knowledge of the primary object.82
However, this does not fit well with his previous remarks on the volitional nature of reflection
and self-knowledge that he makes in his commentary on DA, 3.4, 429b5–9 (see on page 187).
And in the paragraphs on the human intellect in the chain of being that have just been dis-
cussed, he also describes the process of self-knowledge further. He says that once the intellect
has received the intelligible species, it is in act, but it is also still in an active potency (“potentia
passiva”), which clearly matches the first level of actuality. He continues:
[…] et quia virtus est incorporea ideo potest reflectere super suum actum, et ita
potest se intelligere quoniam intelligit. Sed intelligere sive quod intellectus in-
telligat est propria operatio intellectus. Propria autem operatio manuducit in
cognitionem essentialem, ideo ex speciebus aliorum a primo ad ultimum potest
intelligere se ipsum
[…] and because the power is incorporeal, hence it can reflect on its own act, and
thus it can known itself when it knows. But knowing or that the intellect knows
is the essential activity of the intellect. However, an essential activity leads to
essential knowledge, and hence from the species of other things from the first to
the last the intellect can know itself.
Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, app 352.4–19
The quote is not entirely clear, but it should at least show that Simon thinks the intellect can
engage in a act of self-reflection once at the stage of first actuality. This then gives the intellect
80 See 3.2.2.1.6 on page 77 on successive self-knowledge, 3.2.2.1.8 on page 79 on concomitant higher-
order knowledge, and 5.1.1 on page 163 as a detailed analysis of a version of the problem in Jandun.
81 Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, app 352.26–353.6. Some parts of the text are problematic and emend-
ations have to be made, but a consideration of the whole argument support the suggested changes.
82 This would make it similar to what I have seen Jandun argue for in 5.1.1 on page 163.
190 5. selected studies
knowledge about its own essential activity which results in knowledge about its essence. He
does not here address the question of simultaneity explicitly, but it is implied to be a separate
activity.83 So although Simon’s discussion is not without difficulties on this point, such an
interpretation seems to be most consistent with the ideas about self-knowledge that we have
analysed in this section.
5.2.4 Simon’s sources
I will conclude this sectionwith a short note on Simon’s sources and the question of authorship.
One of the first things that strikes a reader of Simon’s commentary is his extensive references
to authorities. In the prooemium alone I have found numerous references to fifteen different
authorities, in some cases to different works by the same author. Some of these lie well beyond
the traditional confines of Aristotelian material, such as Alain of Lille’s De planctu naturae,
Boethius’s De consolatione philosophiae, and Seneca’s Epistulae morales.84 But his use of the
Aristotelian authorities is just as remarkable. I have presented some initial indications that
he may have had copies of the commentaries of Themistius, Averroes, and Philoponus at his
elbow during composition of his own work. In particular in the last lectio we have also seen
how he makes multiple references to Albert and not least Aquinas, both of which he seems to
be intimately familiar with (down to a level of subtle differences in terminology).85 And in the
analysis of the prooemium we have seen how he might also have pulled in material from other
roughly contemporary commentaries on De anima.86 Finally, we also see a strong familiarity
with Proclus and Liber de causis, which he knows very well are two different things.
This leads us to the question of authorship, as the inclusion of Proclus was found to be
unique to Simon of Faversham and the present Simon Magister and could thus be seen as
an indication of shared authorship. Such a hypothesis is difficult to maintain based on what
has been seen in this part of the commentary on book three. While we keep finding regular
references to Proclus as well as Liber de causis in Simon Magister’s commentary, there are no
clear parallels to be found in Faverham’s text. They both present the idea of the location of
the human intellect in the greater chain of being, but that is by no means a doctrine unique
to those two. In the preceding sections, which are referenced in the above discussion, four
commentators have been registered to present such ideas.
Nothing can be concluded from the absence of correspondences, but we might also con-
sider good possible cases for correspondences, between the two. A good candidate for such
a shared unique doctrine could be found when Faversham suggests that the human intellect
83 This would fit with all the other similar cases we have seen of essential knowledge acquired from
analysis of the activities and objects of the intellect through a process of self-reflection. This
is analysed in section 3.2.2.1.2 to 3.2.2.1.3 on pages 75–76. The connection between these doc-
trines and self-knowledge as a successive procedure is connected to the other commentaries in
section 3.2.2.1.6 on page 77. The relevant points in the doctrinal inventory are P2, P5, and P14.
84 Grabmann (1933: 25–6) presents some of the same points.
85 Grabmann (1933: 26–9) also discusses his doctrinal connections to these two, and in particular
Aquinas, at some extent, which may also provide a useful starting point for any further analyses.
86 In the first lectio of book one he also includesmaterial fromGiles of Romewith an explicit reference
(f. 44vb).
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might engage in essential self-knowledge in the afterlife. That idea is not completely unique to
Faversham as also Wyle speculates about its possibility, but had Simon and Faversham shared
the idea, it would present a striking correspondence.87 Similarly, Simon of Faversham’s ana-
lysis includes a longer refutation of the idea that the human intellect knows itself by an innate
species. Simon Magister clearly knows that this model is possible, as that is how he explains
the self-knowledge of the separate substances, but he finds no occasion to go into a discussion
of whether or not the human intellect might also know of itself in that way.
Although the absence of such connections does not provide any positive evidence against
an identical author, they support the general picture that we do not find as many strong con-
nections between the two as we would like if we were to argue in favour of an identical author.
There is thus a tendency that Simon and Favershammay present material that is shared, but not
unique to the two, and without any distinguishing features of doctrine, argument, or language
that might indicate a particularly close connection between the two. This is also confirmed in
a comparison of their critique of the Avicennean idea that the species is only present in the
intellect during an active process of knowing. This subject is shortly mentioned by Simon Ma-
gister in the third lectio (mentioned on page 187), and Faversham devotes a whole question to
this problem (which is not rare).88 His analysis is of course much more extensive than that of
Simon Magister, but although they share the same overall viewpoint, no shared distinguishing
features stick out. In that case Simon Magister actually seems rather to rely on Aquinas.
Finally, there is a single example of a possible conflict of doctrine. In the analysis of types of
intelligiblity SimonMagister is quite clear that the intellect is only known through a knowledge
of its effects and activities, while other commentators have also found to include the idea of
self-presence as a contributing factor in self-knowledge.89 Simon of Faversham’s discussion of
self-knowledge in the afterlife may imply that he also subscribes to that idea of self-knowledge
by self-presence.90 This is however only a weak indication, as it does not follow that Simon
Magister would deny this idea just because he does not mention it explicitly himself. The same
goes for the difference that Simon of Faversham does not find it relevant to his question of self-
knowledgewhether the separate intelligences know their objects through inborn species, while
Simon Magister has no problem answering that question affirmatively in his commentary.91
These small possible differences do not provide a refutation of the identity of the author,
but my analysis has shown that the connection between the two authors is associated with
many uncertainties and few strong connections. The composite character of Simon Magister’s
commentary and the close as well as more loose connections to the different parts of the ex-
isting tradition indicate that we have a commentator who has an intimate knowledge of a big
cross-section of the tradition. It is possible that he had direct access to the commentaries of
Averroes, Themistius, and Philoponus during his work, and it also looks like he might have had
access to a range of contemporary commentaries fromwhich he liberally drewmaterial. One of
the commentaries that he also incorporates into his analysis is that Simon of Faversham, who
87 Faversham III.11, 336–37; Wyle III.10 ad 1.3, app 308.23–27, cf. section 3.2.2.2.2 on page 82.
88 Faversham III.9.
89 On this, cf. section 3.2.2.2.7 on page 85.
90 Faversham q. III.11, p. 336.
91 Compare Simon Magister bk. 3, lect. 3, app 352.20–25 with Faversham q. III.11, p. 336–37.
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is nothing more than a colleague with whom he shares his first name. The material presented
here at least suggests that as a much more economic hypothesis than the identity of the two
Simons.
This will have to be just a preliminary conclusion. The relation between the two texts, as
well as the location of the commentary of Simon Magister within the larger network of late
13th and early 14th century commentaries is yet to be determined more clearly. But these first
steps towards a better knowledge of SimonMagister have at least shown him to be a rich, deep,
and very knowing commentator. The combination of an extensive use of the whole existing
historical and contemporary tradition as well as what looks like occasional strong lights of
originality bode well for any future studies of the text. And I have at also had the opportunity




In this dissertation I have investigated the doctrines on intellectual self-knowledge in the com-
mentaries on Aristotle’sDe anima from 1250 to 1320. This has been donewith a double focus on
the questions concerning the possibility of having a science of the soul in the introductory parts
of the question commentaries, and the questions concerning intellectual self-knowledge that
often occur in the commentary pertaining to De anima 3.4. The doctrines present in the com-
mentaries have been analysed and their variations within the corpus has been mapped, philo-
sophical and quantitative analyses have identified interesting groups and tendencies within
the tradition, and two in-depth studies have put a spotlight on two particular areas of interest.
I will now draw out the main results of the study within three areas of attention, the methods
applied in the analysis, the main philosophical observations, and connections and tendencies
within the tradition.
6.1 Methodological improvements
Distinguishing one complete position or argument from another is a daunting challenge when
the commentators present what at first encounter seems to me almost identical views. By
decomposing a text into smaller constitutive philosophical parts, which I call doctrines, it is
possible to compare and distinguish the texts at a more granular level. This basic assumption
and the consequent procedure has been part of the foundation of this study. Although the ap-
proach is not fundamentally different from how philosophical analysis is commonly conducted,
I have developed the approach conceptually to extend the reach and power of my own mind.
By registering these atomic doctrines as separate, free-floating ideas that can be connected in
a countless number of ways in the registrations of a given text, it is possible to represent my
interpretation of the doctrinal composition of any text.
The mode of registration has made it possible to interrogate the material in ways that
are only theoretically possible with just pen and paper. Answering which doctrines are most
commonly used for different purposes, which ideas are most popular or rare, who has a high
proportion of the most popular material, or which commentators are good representatives of
a tradition are all feasible with the aid of such systematic registrations. We commonly see this
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done in history of philosophy as it has been conducted for ages. But the registrations of the
interpreter’s reading of the texts in this way ensures that the reading of each text is persisted
once the reader takes a step back from the individual text to reach higher level conclusions. This
means that the interpreter’s general impressions and intuitions about the corpus are suppor-
ted, or maybe corrected, by a procedure that makes an objective representation of the readings
possible. This enables the study notes of the reader to speak with each other across an incred-
ible number of dimensions. In this way the notes gain a voice and power that far surpasses
what they can tell you when they are made in the linear format of a notebook. It has been
an enormous help for me to outsource some of this heavy lifting to the responsibility of the
computer. With the expression of a good friend, we can thus use the strengths of modern data
processing as a forklift for the mind. But it is still fundamentally mind-work, and if the basic
readings of the texts, the annotation of the material, the chosen models of analysis, and their
execution are misdirected or wrong, we will still miss the mark just as much as always.
One of results of the present work has been the development of a basic approach to how to
represent and analyse the content of medieval scholastic material in this mind-enhancing way.
I have developed a terminology and model to register and represent authors, texts, structural
sections such as questions, doctrines and instances of doctrines to enable a flexible and highly
granular registration of the presence of doctrines in the different parts of a text. I have also
started the development of a semantic for describing the use a given instance makes of a doc-
trine, and ways to register its context within a traditional question. Finally I have developed
ways of analysing and representing the registered data in ways that supports and enhances
the analysis of the texts. All calculations used in the dissertation, along with a good portion
of additional material, have been made available through an online software repository on the
address https://github.com/stenskjaer/dissertation-notebooks. Many of the technical details
have only been indirectly available to the reader, as it has been the basis for the quantitative
analyses. The mental model and the view of the texts that the analysis is based on is however
outlined in the introduction and in the relevant parts of the dissertation, while more details on
the data model and calculations is documented in the online notebooks.
Although this work is methodological in nature, I still consider it a significant result from
the work, as the theory and approach can be applied more or less directly on any similar texts.
But it can also be generalized for use in countless other contexts where text analysis based on
abstract composite material is a core activity. Such generalizations and further developments
of the approach, both technically and methodologically, surely remain interesting and alluring
avenues of further work.
6.2 The philosophy of self-knowledge
In chapter two present the problem of self-knowledge in Aristotle’s own works and follow
the development of the idea within as well as outside the ancient commentary tradition, the
reception in the Arabic sources and the further development in the medieval sources before
1250. We find two fundamental ways of explaining how intellectual self-knowledge comes
about. The soul can either depend on external stimuli to engage in self-knowledge, or it can
be able to initiate it independently of any external factors, which I refer to as accidental and
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essential self-knowledge respectively. The Neo-Platonic tradition, here in particular represen-
ted by Plotinus, Augustine and to some extent Avicenna, argues that the intellect possesses
essential self-knowledge, while the Aristotelian commentators including Averroes prefer or
lean towards a model of accidental self-knowledge. In the first part of the 13th century those
two strains converge and a preference, conflict or combination of the two models can often be
found in the texts. I argue that some sources, in particular Alexander of Aphrodisias and to
some extent Averroes, seem to argue for a self-knowledge that is always concomitant to any
act of cognition but may not contain any additional information about the soul or intellect it-
self. Other sources will argue that the intellect can engage in a specific activity of reflecting on
or understanding itself that is not concomitant to any other act but constitutes a separate act
that can be realized according to the volition of the intellect. The further we get up through the
history the stronger the tendency will be to also include this latter focused act of self-reflection.
Chapter three, which is the first of the two central chapters, focuses on the doctrines of
intellectual self-knowledge in commentaries to De anima 3.4. This is split into four sections ac-
cording to the different types of problems engaged by the questions, namely the intelligibility
and self-intelligibility of the intellect, the process of self-knowledge through an external spe-
cies, self-knowledge through the intellect’s own species, and how the possible intellect knows
the agent intellect. Based on theses analyses I identify the most common points of doctrines
across these areas. The basic indeterminate condition of the intellect makes direct, or essential,
self-knowledge impossible. All commentators agree on this conclusion which goes directly
against the doctrines that we often see within an Augustine-inspired tradition. This funda-
mental difference is also reflected in one of the most common phrasings of questions of self-
knowledge, whether the intellect knows itself by its own essence or substance, or by something
else. The answer of the commentators is unanimously that it knows itself by being actualized
by an external species. But once it is actualized by an external species many will argue that
the intellect, in virtue of its immaterial nature, is able to reflect directly on itself and from that
get information about itself. Many commentators will highlight the Aristotelian procedure of
acquiring substantial knowledge from the observation of the accidents of a substance. By look-
ing to the objects and activities of the intellect it will get knowledge about its own powers, and
the knowledge of those will then reveal the nature of the substance that is the subject of such
powers. Although I have not seen it addressed explicitly as a doctrinal conflict, one matter of a
difference is whether the intellect has any species or form prior to external actualization. One
commentator, Anonymus Digby 55, unfolds this view clearly, and from that it easily follows
that this partly indeterminate form of the intellect becomes the object of its self-knowledge.
But in spite of an already existing species of the intellect, it still requires an external stimulus
to engage in this self-knowledge.
When it comes to the knowledge of the agent intellect a significant difference in doctrine
has revealed itself. Anonymus Bazán, Siger of Brabant, and Radulphus Brito hold that the
human intellect knows of the agent intellect in the same way as it knows of the possible in-
tellect (or the intellect more generally) by observation of its activity and from that arrive at a
conclusion of its essence. Siger of Brabant and John of Jandun on the other hand support a
monopsychist model of the intellect where both the possible and agent intellect are completely
separate from the individual humans and only connected through processing of phantasms
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belonging to the individual persons. They further maintain that the agent intellect is etern-
ally engaged in self-reflection, and that this activity is reflected in the possible intellect which
therefore is also always engaged in a reflection of the agent intellect. But they deny that this
knowledge ever propagates down to the level of individual humans.
The fourth chapter focuses on the science of the soul and self-knowledge. That restriction
to self-knowledge is important, as the discussion of the possibility, nature, and procedure of the
science of the soul can easily take up the majority of a commentary on book one of De anima.
So the focus on the connection between self-knowledge and science is necessary to restrict the
scope of that chapter and to maintain the focus of the study in general. All question comment-
aries from the investigated period that I have had access to contain a question on whether there
can be a science of the soul, so for the chapter I strive to make a representative selection of rel-
evant texts. But although the chapter contains more texts than the previous on commentaries
to book three it spans a smaller range of doctrines and presents a more homogeneous debate,
as the focus of the question is much clearer. The main challenge for the commentators is the
problem that you cannot see a soul, and in particular the intellect, which makes it difficult to
have a science about it. But they present arguments similar to those seen in the discussion of
the material of book three, that it is possible to acquire a substantial knowledge of a subject by
observation of its accidents. That is also the procedure suggested by Aristotle in the first book
and further established in the second book of De anima. But they also draw in ideas from the
Analytica posteriora that to have a science you need a subject with parts or properties that can
be ascribed to it according to a given principle. Somewill also argue that one of the constitutive
elements in a science of the soul is the ability of the intellect to reflect on itself.
I present a few short analyses of the view of the science and show that some commentators,
most clearly John of Jandun, argue that it is even possible to have a fully demonstrative sci-
ence of the soul. But others, such as Simon of Faversham, will reject that the investigation and
description of the soul can be described as a science in the proper sense. In another analysis I
argue that when we look at the role of intellectual self-knowledge there seems to be a spectrum
of opinions about how important it is for the science. A character like Jandun will keep the
inclusion of self-knowledge to an absolute minimum, while others will maintain that intellec-
tual self-knowledge or self-reflection is a necessary requirement for the science. It is curious to
note that there seems to be a correlation between the degree to which a commentator considers
the science of the soul demonstrative and his view on the role of intellectual self-knowledge
in the endeavour. Conversely, the commentators who argue against a demonstrative science
will also tend to emphasize the importance of intellectual self-knowledge in the description, or
historia, of the soul.
In the final chapter of the dissertation I dive a bit deeper into two selected subjects of
intellectual self-knowledge. Those chapters draw directly on the big repository of information
and material mapped in the two central chapters, and function as two examples of some of the
interesting studies that this dissertation enables.
First I devote more energy to the many different elements that constitute the complete
picture of intellectual self-knowledge in the question commentary of John of Jandun. He de-
votes no less than three extensive questions solely to the problems of self-knowledge, and
at first sight he may seem to present diverging or conflicting doctrines. I argue that first he
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presents an extended defence of a concomitant but contentless self-knowledge that is actual-
ized whenever an intellect reflects on a object of knowledge. This necessary self-knowledge is
nothing more than a reflection of the fact than once the possible intellect is actualized by the
species of an object of knowledge, it becomes itself that thing immaterially, and this actualiza-
tion constitutes an act of knowing. But because the intellect itself also is that which it knows,
it can be considered to know itself in a certain way, but in such a way that it yields absolutely
no additional extra knowledge about the intellect. For that to take place, the intellect must
reflect on its own activities in a separate act of self-reflection. Like most of the commentators
he argues that this is possible, once the intellect is actualize by an external object, and when it
then follows the procedure of acquiring substantial knowledge from accidental properties, it is
even possible to approach useful and informative knowledge about intellect, although it is not
enough to qualify as scientific knowledge. Finally, this type of self-knowledge if fundamentally
different from the way the possible intellect knows the agent intellect in the separate intellect.
The study helps us understand some parts of his doctrines that may be confusing or seem to
be in conflict within the general surveys of the doctrines, but I also want to show how a rich
and strong commentary in this period can get far in the domain of self-knowledge.
In the second study I compare the literal commentary by Simon Magister with the ques-
tions of the tradition, not least those of Simon of Faversham, who has been suggested as the
author of the literal commentary. The study aims to demonstrate that the assumption that lit-
eral commentaries do not contain any content of philosophical interest is false. I demonstrate
how a majority of the interesting and common points of the question commentaries are to be
found in the literal commentary by Simon Magister, and that in most cases the points are more
well-developed in both philosophical depth and doctrinal breadth. The preceding chapters also
enable me to put the doctrines of intellectual self-knowledge into a broad context and thus to
show that the ascription of the text to Faversham is no more than hypothetical. The connec-
tions between the two commentators has many uncertainties and very few strong connections.
I argue that we merely have two commentators who share the same first name, and that the
author of the literal commentary borrowed material across the tradition. Some of those doc-
trines correspond to those of Faversham, but we cannot from that conclude an identity of the
two authors.
The study of intellectual self-knowledge in these commentaries shows how the problems
discussed and the solutions offered centre around the workings of the intellect. Commentators
focus on the nature of the possible intellect, the relation between that and the agent intellect,
and their relation to the individual human. In the case of concomitant self-knowledge we have
seen how reflections on the basic mechanics of general cognition can result in a certain variant
of self-knowledge where the concept of the self is completely reduced to the identity-relation
that follows from the ontology of the intellect. In that act the ‘self’ in self-knowledge imports
absolutely no additional information about the possible ‘I’ or the subject of the activity. But
we have also seen the more common interpretation of self-knowledge as an attentive obser-
vation or investigation of the activities and nature of the intellect itself, where the ‘self’ may
actually tell something about the subject of the activities. Such views include some agency in
the procedural self-analysis of the intellect and the indications that this whole activity includes
a choice, although that is never addressed explicitly. Nonetheless, this has first and foremost
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been a study of some particular mechanisms of Aristotelian epistemology and noetics.
I have not found any examples in these texts of reflections of a more expansive concept of
self that involves any concept of an acting, thinking, feeling and projecting nexus that views
itself as a particular individual with unique traits and properties that persist throughout the
whole lifetime of the subject. In other words, we have not seen any indications that intellec-
tual self-knowledge gives the individual knowledge about itself as a person in a social, ethical,
subjective, and individual sense. Such reflections may exist in the commentary tradition, but
they have not been found in expositions of the Aristotelian psychology. A place to look for
such reflections would be the commentaries on the Ethica Nicomachea, not least the passages
involving self-knowledge that have already been laid out in the historical chapter. Those pas-
sages move more in the direction of such expansive ideas of the self, but that of course all
belongs to an entirely different investigation.
6.3 Connecting some dots
The big central chapters have revealed numerous connections within the included material. In
the third chapter about commentaries on De anima 3.4 some striking connections stood out.
Anonymus Bazán and Brito share great proportions of their material and it seems likely that
Brito used the commentary of Anonymus Bazán (or another very closely related text) in the
development of his own commentary. The big striking group of that part of the dissertation
is however constituted by Anonymus Assisi, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, Dinsdale, Wyle and
Faversham. They share many of the most noticeable doctrines within that chapter, such as the
comparison of the human intellect with the other types of intelligences, and the discussion of
its location on the big scala naturae. They also often compare the possible intellect to prime
matter and point out the complete reflexivity of the intellect once actualized by an external
species. Some may even draw an explicit connection to this doctrine in Liber de causis (a trait
Brito shares with this group). Doctrinally Jandun is closes to Brito and Anonymus Bazán, but
since he also presents a high degree of originality and a high proportion of all themost common
doctrines of the tradition he does not pair directly with any other commentator or group.
Some of these connections are also to be found in the chapter on the science of the soul.
Brito andAnonymus Bazán still havemuch in common, while they also share some connections
with Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II and Faversham who also still follow each other relatively
closely. But the most notable connection is between Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33
who present two doctrinally almost identical texts. They differ at the surface level, and a direct
comparison will quickly reveal that neither of them seems to be a direct exemplar of the other.
But nonetheless they present such striking correspondences that a further study of the relation
between the two texts is destined to give an interesting result. A possible hypothesis that
I have not been able to pursue fully here is that they represent two different versions of a
course on De anima given by Dinsdale, but no conclusions have been drawn to that effect here.
Some of the other commentators who are not included in the preceding chapter are Anonymus
Mertonensis 275, Anonymus Vennebusch, and Anonymus Bernardini. It was already known in
the literature before that the three texts are connected, and that is also confirmed here, but this
study has also revealed that although Anonymus Mertonensis 275 may be closer in structure to
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Anonymus Vennebusch, it shares more doctrinal material with Anonymus Bernardini in their
first question.
6.4 Next steps
In closing I will suggest some of the possible avenues of future work that seem most obvious
to me, both within the analysis of the content and the development of the methodologies em-
ployed here. The present dissertation is consciously designed in a way that should facilitate
further study within the subject. The two central chapters of doctrinal surveys lay out the
atomic doctrines and map them to the commentators in such a way that it should be possible
to expand the list. The generalized list of doctrines in the appendix, the in-depth registration
of which commentators present which doctrines, and the discussions of which doctrines are
more or less common all serve the same purpose, to make it easy to use the present results as
a reference work for any future related studies.
We can suggest three axes along which it would be obvious to pursue this subject further:
breadth, time, and depth. When it comes to the questions on self-knowledge on book three
the material presented here is almost exhaustive with respect to the selected period and the
material available to me. But I believe that further studies of the question commentaries that I
have not been able to include here is certain to reveal interesting results. My suspicion is that
within this period we would see many of the already known doctrines and ideas, but I would
also expect a good portion of new doctrines or new combinations of existing ideas to show up.
Another possible and easy group of questions to dive into are the questions that occasionally
occur that ask how the human intellect or soul is related to the separate intelligences.
As I have shown how the discussion of the science of the soul in questions to the first book
are closely related in doctrine and perspective to the discussions of self-knowledge in book
three, that is also great area of further exploration. I was forced to present only a subset of the
commentaries that I have seen, as every commentary within the period contains some relevant
material on this whole subject, so it would be easy to expand the study to all commentaries of
the period that discuss the possibility of the science of the soul. It would be interesting to see
whether such studies would reveal some breaks or diversions from the tendency we saw here
to present a relatively homogeneous group of arguments and doctrines. If that is not enough
it is always possible to also expand the range of questions that are included. In particular
questions concerning the possibility of acquiring substantial knowledge from accidents would
be expected to contain connected material, but also questions on the difficulty and nobility of
the science give me an expectation of interesting material.
Looking more into the chronology and subsequent history of these problems proves an-
other obvious axis of work. This study has included a good proportion of texts that have are
more fluidly dated, and chronological reflections and studies have therefore played a anec-
dotal role at best. But the presented result could easily be supplemented by further studies to
provide the basis for a more extended chronological narrative. I am however also sure that
it would be just as interesting to move further up in time and see what happens in the 14th
century. As I mentioned in the introduction there is a bit more literature on that period which
indicates that such an expansion will contain many interesting relations and developments. A
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quick review of the existing literature and a few commentaries suggest that there will be many
continuities between the doctrines registered here and the following tradition, but also some
breaks. It would for instance be interesting to look into the tendency that commentators are
less inclined to raise the question on the possibility of the science in book one, while questions
of self-knowledge in book three are at least as common as in our commentators. But we also
see another type of questions discussing the possibility of necessary self-knowledge as part of
every act of knowledge (e.g. utrum omnis cognitio sit cognitio sui).1 Graphing the doctrinal
development in the subsequent tradition would therefore be highly interesting and certain to
yield interesting results.
Finally, further in-depth studies are certain to reveal many new and interesting relations
and complications of what I have presented so far. I have found, and the quantitative analyses
have also indicated, that the commentary of John of Jandun is particularly interesting in both
its breadth and depth. Further studies of his noetics would be certain to reveal interesting
new points, as would further investigations of the traditions of commentators inspired by him.
The same goes for the literal commentary of Simon Magister, a text that in my view is most
deserving of a full edition. An edition of the text would give us access to insights about the
genre and teaching methods around the turn of the 13th century, but it would also provide
us with a rich source of doctrines and authorities that is likely to represent a big part of the
contemporary philosophical tradition. But I am also certain that reading a commentary by a
reader as well read as himwill reach across the ages and also help us to understand the works of
the Philosopher still better. Other virtually unknown commentators that I believe also deserve
further studies and full or partial editions are Anonymus Assisi, Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II,
Henric de la Wyle, and the pair of John Dinsdale and Anonymus Orielensis 33. Each in their
way these commentators present to us strong readings, clever insights, interesting windows
into their tradition, and the occasional stroke of original genius, wit, or genuine humanity that
make it a joy to study their these historical works.
The use of graph theory that I have developed and applied in this study is partially experi-
mental, and I see many ways to develop that much further. My hypothesis is that this provides
a powerful tool for content registration as well as analysis, and it should be developed further
through studies of similar as well as different material. I will just mention two areas where a
lot of low-hanging fruit will make it easy to ascertain the utility of the ideas further. The first
area of focus would be to enrich and solidify the data model. It should be able to handle a wide
range of different texts within the commentary tradition, and testing it on different comment-
aries from different periods will be certain to reveal weaknesses and areas of improvement. It
would be interesting to implement possibilities for including temporal data to analyse devel-
opments over time. Another obvious possibility is to ascribe the different doctrines a weight
according to the relative importance within the domain. Different types of weights, based on
automatic calculations of the graph as well as expert evaluations by the annotator could be
tested. The indication of whether a given instance of a doctrine is endorsed by the comment-
ator would also give an extra dimension of nuance for the philosophical analysis. The model
could also be developed to accommodate amore fine-grained analysis of the constitutive logical
1 Brower-Toland 2017 and Zupko 2007 are two studies on these subjects, both with a certain focus
on Buridan.
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elements of an argument, either as full propositions composed into premises and conclusions
(which is now just merged into a single doctrine node), or with the possibility of evenmore fine
grained analysis into terms, predicators and syncategoremata. Depending on the type of text
and scope and purpose of the application of the method such details may be of high significance
or seem less relevant.
Once the data model acquires more stability and proves sufficiently robust for broader
studies, a user interface needs to be implemented. Currently there is no simple way for a user
who is not intimately familiar with theworkings of the graph store to annotate any information
in the system, and there is also no good way of updating relations or changing the structure
between nodes. So it is absolutely necessary for the success of any further work on these ideas
that a full user interface for the less technical user gets developed. That in itself would imply
many decisions of a theoretical nature, and cannot in my opinion simply be outsourced to
technical personnel. For it to succeed such implementations must either be done by a domain
expert or in very close collaboration with domain experts. Such interface should also facilitate
good methods for presenting and navigating the material in order for users to discover and
explore it in ways that are not only preconceived by the original developers. Optimally this
could also include at connection to a strong backend of presenting the texts themselves, so that
simple navigation between the abstract doctrine analysis and the sources of those doctrines
becomes seamless and natural, both during annotation and exploration. I have just given two
paragraphs of further possible work on this, but in my view this is a domain pregnant with
countless possibilities that are now, through converging developments, becoming ripe for the
picking.
In conclusion, I have with this dissertation sought to map out the philosophical arguments
and positions in the commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima between 1250 and 1320 on intellec-
tual self-knowledge. With the presented results it is now not only possible to identify a range
of different tendencies within the analysed material, but also to use it as a basis for the com-
parison in any future studies of related material to see how other texts relate to the tradition
mapped here. I have shown which doctrines are most commonly used, which are more unique,
and how that relates to each of the included texts. I have identified particular doctrinal clusters
within the corpus, clusters that indicate possible connections between the texts that all may
be subject to much further study, and I have shown how this can be used to identify texts of
particular interest. To facilitate the study I have developed the existing traditional methods of
text analysis by viewing the individual texts as networks (or graphs) of connected ideas and ar-
guments, which in turn partake in a much larger network of highly interconnected texts. This
has made it possible to analyse and visualize the material in ways that are not commonly used




In this dissertation I present qualitative and quantitative analyses of intellectual self-knowledge
in the Latin commentaries of Aristotle’sDe anima from 1250 to around 1320. The study contains
a historical overview of the preceding doctrines of self-knowledge that are relevant to the
selected commentaries, two central chapters where the doctrines of intellectual self-knowledge
are analysed, and a final chapter where two studies exemplify what kind of further studies and
results the presented analysis can facilitate.
The dissertation shows how central doctrines on intellectual self-knowledge can be iden-
tified across two different types of questions, focusing on the possibility and process of self-
knowledge, and the considerations on whether and how it is possible to have a science of the
soul. It has been shown how all included commentators reject an Augustinian model of essen-
tial self-knowledge and support an Aristotelian model where self-knowledge takes place by
actualization of the possible intellect in the reception of an intelligible species. It has also been
shown how such discussions include considerations such as the place of the human intellect
in relation to other types of intellects, how problems of the imperceptibility of the intellect are
solved, and what kind of knowledge about the soul intellectual self-knowledge might provide.
The two detailed studies in the last chapter highlight a complex case of three different views
on self-knowledge in the latest commentator in the corpus, John of Jandun, and preesents an
argument that literal commentaries need not be neither boring nor superficial in comparison
with the contemporary question commentaries through a reading of parts of the commentary
by Simon Magister.
The texts of the tradition are connected in an interrelated network, and by modelling ele-
ments of that network in the reading of the texts, it is possible to register, represent, and analyse
the material in ways that would otherwise be impossible or impracticable. A comparison of
texts is realized through a registration of the doctrines of a text, their context, use, and how they
are related internally. This has provided a powerful tool for revealing numerous quantitative
tendencies, groups, and connections within the material, including clusters of texts and com-
mentators that would be opaque and inaccessible to even the most attentive reader. To reach
such results I have developed models for registering and representing the data, and methods
for analysing the registrations quantitatively.
The dissertation thus paves the way for further studies by presenting methodological in-
novations within the traditional discipline of history of philosophy, and by opening up a sig-
nificant, representative, and mostly unknown part of the Aristotelian commentary tradition of




I denne afhandling presenterer jeg kvalitative og kvantitative analyser af intellektuel selvre-
fleksion i latinske kommentarer til Aristoteles’s De anima fra 1250 til omkring 1320. Studiet
indeholder et historisk overblik over de forudgående doktriner vedrørende selvrefleksion som
er relevante for de udvalgte kommentarer, to centrale kapitler hvor alle doktriner om intellek-
tuel selvrefleksion analyseres, og et afsluttende kapitel hvor to studier eksemplificerer hvilke
nærmere undersøgelser der er mulige på baggrund af de præsenterede analyser.
Afhandlingen viser hvordan centrale doktriner vedrørende intellektuel selvrefleksion kan
identificeres på tværs af forskellige typer af kvæstioner. Jeg har fokuseret på kvæstioner der
behandler hvorvidt og på hvilkenmåde intellektuel selvrefleksion er mulig og overvejelser over
hvorvidt det er muligt at have en videnskab om sjælen. Jeg har vist at alle inkluderede kom-
mentorer afviser en augustinsk forklaring på essentiel selvrefleksion og støtter en aristotelisk
forklaring hvor selvrefleksion finder sted gennem aktualiseringen af det potentielle intellekt
når det modtager en erkendbar former. Jeg har også vist hvordan deres diskussioner omfatter
overvejelser over placeringen af det menneskelige intellekt i forhold til andre typer af intel-
lekter, hvordan det håndteres at intellektet ikke kan sanses, og hvilken slags viden om sjælen
intellektuel selvrefleksion kan bidrage med.
De to detaljerede studier i det afsluttende kapitel viser dels et komplekst tilfælde af tre
forskellige typer af selvrefleksion hos den seneste kommentator i korpusset, John af Jandun,
dels et argument for at såkaldte literal-kommentarer hverken behøver at være kedelige eller
overfladiske i sammenligning med samtidige kvæstions-kommentarer gennem en læsning af
dele af Simon Magisters kommentar.
De analyserede tekster er forbundet i et tæt sammenknyttet netværk, og ved at model-
lere dele af dette netværk i analysen af teksterne er det muligt at registrere, repræsentere og
analysere materialet på måder der ellers ville have været umulige eller upraktiske. Teksterne
sammenlignes på baggrund af registreringen af doktriner og deres kontekst, brug og hvordan
de er internt forbundet. Dette har været et stærkt værktøj til at afsløre talrige kvantitative ten-
dencer, grupper og forbindelser i materialet, inklusive klynger af tekster og kommentatorer
som ellers ville være uklare eller utilgængelige for selv den mest opmærksomme læser. For at
nå disse resultater har jeg udviklet modeller for registreringen og repræsentationen af disse
data, og metoder til at analysere registreringerne kvantitativt.
Afhandlingen baner således vejen for yderligere studier i kraft af metodiske nyskabelser
indenfor rammerne af traditionel filosofihistorie, og ved at blotlægge en betydelig, repræsen-
tativ og hovedsageligt ukendt del af den aristoteliske kommentartradition i det 13. og tidlige
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This as a registry of all doctrines registered within the texts. The purpose of this inventory is
to present the range of general constitutive elements of the arguments of self-knowledge. The
doctrines presented in this inventory do not necessarily reflect exactly phrasing or presentation
all the commentaries, as the collection of arguments into doctrines contains some degree of
abstraction and interpretation. They doctrines recorded here are also not exhaustive of the
doctrines found in the questions investigated here. The level of detail, focus of interpretation
and mind of the interpreter plays a role in what gets registered. It is therefore to some extent a
representation of my selection of themes from the texts rather than a direct representation of
their content. The concept of a piece of doctrine is of also course fluid. But it represents what I
consider a singular, contained statement about an aspect of the worldview of the commentator,
regardless of how many commentators present it.
The list of positive points contains doctrines that are used to establish or constitute an
argument that supports the conclusion of a commentator. These are partly found within the
determination of a question, but a good portion of them also stem from the discussion of the
rationes principales. Positive rationes (supporting the main conclusion) or doctrines used to
refute a negative ratio are also included in the positive list. The list of negative points contains
the points presented to support the opposite conclusion of that which a commentator reaches.
In these lists we see few conflicts of the doctrines within the lists, which is consistent with the
observation that commentators generally agree on the most general position. This overview
of challenges contains some arguments that are weak, simple to refute, or even invalid, while
others may actually present strong objections to our main question, and yet others may look
like duplicates of the same point in different phrasings. The details of this are generally ad-
dressed within the dissertation. Duplicate doctrines occur between the two lists, as the same
doctrine may be used in both a positive and negative context.
When it is appropriate I have tried to present the points in a clear argumentative structure,
and in particular the negative points yield very easily to that ambition. But since the lists do not
only comprise arguments in a strict sense, but also ideas and points more broadly speaking,
it is neither possible nor advantageous to force every doctrinal point into an argumentative
structure.
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A.1 Positive points
P1 Primary and secondary intelligibility Something that is not intelligible in itself
can however be intelligible through its actualization by something else. Generalization
of P8.
P2 Substantial knowledge from accidents Stronger version of the self-observation
thesis. Through a stepwise process the intellect acquires knowledge about its own sub-
stance by (a) first observing its own handling of its primary object of knowledge, (b) in-
forming it about the kind of activity it engages in, (c) this reveals which powers the
intellect possesses (d) which finally yields insights into the substance that possesses
these powers.
P3 Self-knowledge through external species
(a) The possible intellect is completely indeterminate before actualization through an
external species.
(b) The possible intellect must be actualized to be able to engage in self-knowledge.
(c) ∴ The possible intellect engages in self-knowledge through actualization by an
external species.
This is a stronger version of P7. The process of how the self-knowledge comes about
naturally has to be expanded by the commentator.
P4 Possible intellect completely indeterminate before actualization by an external
species
(a) What is known must be in act.
(b) The possible intellect is not in act until is knows something else.
(c) ∴Therefore the possible intellect cannot be known until it knows something else.
P5 An immaterial substance is self-reflexive
(a) An immaterial substance is self-reflexive.
(b) The human intellect is an immaterial substance.
(c) ∴The human intellect is self-reflexive.
This doctrine may be phrased as a complete return to itself (reditio completa) with refer-
ence to Liber de causis. For the human intellect this often includes restriction on external
actualization.
P6 Science about subject, parts or properties, principles A science requires (a) a
subject, (b) properties that are ascribed to the subject, and (c) the principle according to
which the properties are ascribed to it. Positive use: The investigation of the soul fulfills
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all these three requirements. The definition of the soul can be used as the principle by
which the properties are ascribed to the subject.
Negative use: The soul as form is not a subject, because it is not a hylomorphic com-
pound.
P7 The intellect is self-intelligible
(a) The intellect is potentially any intelligible object.
(b) When the intellect is actualized by the species of an intelligible object, it can know
itself.
(c) ∴The intellect is potentially potentially self-intelligible.
This is a stronger version of P8.
P8 Intellect intelligble through external species
(a) The intellect cannot be known before it is actualized.
(b) The intellect is actualized by an external species.
(c) ∴The intellect is known through an external species.
This is not always a sufficient condition for intellectual self-knowledge.
P9 Agent intellect known through its products The agent intellect is known by ob-
servation of its activity and results, namely abstraction of universals.
P10 Possible intellect similar to primematter Thepossible intellect stands to the intel-
ligible species as prime matter stands to forms. The is based on the idea of the complete
potentiality of the intellect before the act of knowing.
P11 Science through self-reflection An incorporeal thing can reflect on itself, and by
virtue of that we can have a science of the soul. This is a necessary, but not always
sufficient, condition for the science.
P12 Great chain of being and the intellect In a hierarchy of being the firstmover knows
itself (and possibly all subordinate beings) essentially. The separate intelligences know
only themselves essentially. The human intellect can only know itself through the ac-
tualization by an external species.
P13 The intellect is intelligible
(a) Any actualized thing can be an object of knowledge.
(b) The intellect is actualized by an external species.
(c) ∴The intellect can be an object of knowledge through actualization by an external
species.
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P14 Successive self-knowledge The self-knowledge does not take place at the same time
as the knowledge of the primary object of knowledge, but subsequent to it. This doctrine
can naturally be combined with the procedure of acquisition of substantial knowledge
from accidents (P2)
P15 Proper and improper science Knowledge acquired through observation of effects
is not a proper science because it does not proceed from explanation of causes, and is
therefore not propter quid knowledge.
P16 Form of particular can be studied as a universal There can be no science about
particulars, but a particular can be viewed as an example of a universal a thus serve as
the object of scientific investigation.
P17 The soul is difficult but not impossible to know The intellect is among the most
obscure things in nature, but they can be known too, it is just more difficult.
P18 Self-knowledge different from the science of the soul Intellectual self-knowledge
does not require the same rigorous investigation as the science of the soul.
P19 Intellect especially difficult to know Knowing the intellect is particularly difficult,
as it not intelligible through observation.
P20 Bodily senses are not reflexive
(a) Only immaterial substances are self-reflexive.
(b) The bodily senses are not immaterial substances.
(c) ∴The bodily senses are not self-reflexive.
P21 Three meanings of science ‘Science’ can be of something in three different ways. It
can be of something (a) as about a subject, (b) as about a conclusion in a demonstration,
or (c) as about a property of a subject.
P22 Identity of knower and known in immaterial substances
(a) Complete certainty when the knower and known are identical.
(b) In the soul the knower is identical with the known.
(c) ∴There must be a science of the soul.
P23 The intellect has essential self-knowledge The intellect has essential self-knowledge
and is hence not known through an external species.
P24 Knowing a blocking activity The intellect cannot know more than one thing at
any time because knowing is a blocking activity. Essential, and thus constant, self-
knowledge would therefore result in the impossibility of any other act of knowing.
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P25 No identity of knower andknownbefore actualization of possible intellect This
is an expansion of P31, as it makes it clear that self-knowledge is self-identity.
P26 Analogy with vision: Only things visible in act can be perceived Just as only
actualized objects of vision are visible, so is only the intellect once actualized.
P27 Soul has parts and properties in virtue of its embodied activities
P28 Perfect mover can move itself A perfect mover is immaterial.
P29 Perpetual self-knowledge of agent intellect not available to humans Although
the agent intellect is in a constant state of self-knowledge, and that knowledge may
be available also to the possible intellect, this never propagates to the level of human
knowledge.
P30 Self-knowledge by own species, once actualized by external species Unlike P4
the intellect does have some sort of species before any external stimulus, and that species
is abstracted and known during self-knowledge.
P31 Intelligibility requires actuality No potential property or substance can be actually
intelligible. This finds support in Aristotle Metaph. 9.10, 1051b30–32.
P32 Infinite regress not a problem in the intellect This solves the potential problem
that self-reflection may result in a regress problem.
P33 The intellect can observe its own activity
P34 Knowledgemayproceed from temporal to atemporalmatters Knowledge starts
from temporal objects but results in atemporal universals.
P35 Knowing a power does not mean knowing its products It is not possible to de-
termine the products of a power a priori.
P36 Not all universals are abstracted from sense perception
P37 Science about a substance which contains parts and properties This is closely
related to P6
P38 The soul is not known through phantasms Only things that have quantity are
known through species and phantasms.
P39 Subsistence is not a requirement as long at it is the subject of properties P6
might presuppose a subsisting subject, which would exclude the soul as simple, non-
hylomorphic form, but a subject with properties is sufficient.
P40 Possible and agent intellect joined in constant knowledge The agent intellect
is in a constant state of self-knowledge; the possible intellect is permanently bound to
the agent intellect; therefore the possible intellect is in a constant state of knowing the
agent intellect.
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P41 Only restriction of identity in physical movement This solves the challenge that
the same thing cannot be mover and moved.
P42 Objects of knowledgeneednot be temporal, but analysis is Theprocess of know-
ing an object may not be confused with the nature of the object. Analysis of atemporal
objects can therefore still be temporal.
P43 Intellect not its own proper object of knowledge
(a) The intellect knows its objects of knowledge.
(b) The intellect is not its own object of knowledge.
(c) ∴The intellect is not intelligible to itself.
P44 The stronger principle of attribution That which is the reason of a property pos-
sesses that same property to at least the same degree, and because the soul facilitates
science about everything other than itself, a science of it must also be possible.
P45 No science of the separate soul As the soul is studied as the actualization of a body,
the study of the soul as a separate substance falls outside the purview of this science.
P46 Essential self-knowledge in the afterlife Once the intellect is no longer encumbered
by the materiality of the body, it may engage in essential self-knowledge.
P47 Intellect is perceptible after actualization Once the intellect becomes actualized
by a species of a material object it becomes available to sense perception itself.
P48 Internal experience of own mental faculties An individual has an internal ex-
perience of his own possible intellect and its difference from the agent intellect and the
intelligible species.
P49 Multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge is possible The intellect can enter-
tain several simultaneous objects of knowledge. This enables a self-knowledge that is
temporally simultaneous with knowledge of an external object.
P50 Science from observations of accidents is also science This counters the idea that
science only proceeds from causes.
P51 Soul does exists as something outside itself (in certain sense) Soul is not differ-
ent from itself, but its being does not depend on its operation.
P52 Three types of knowledge from one species From an intelligible species know-
ledge can be obtained about (a) the primary object of knowledge as a universal, (b) the
particular object giving rise to the knowledge, and (c) the intellect realizing the knowing.
P53 Superiority to sense-perception As the sense perception has an ability of self-
perception, the intellect must have an analogous ability, as it is superior to sense per-
ception and hence more able.
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P54 Concomitant higher-order knowledge When the intellect knows a primary object
of knowledge, it also by necessity knows that act of knowledge. This implies P49 but is
not the only possible instance of P49.
P55 Soul intelligible as object of dubium When it is possible to wonder about some-
thing, intelligibility is implied.
P56 Material objects can never become intellects
P57 Certain science about simple subject The science about a simple subject must be
certain, and as the soul is simple, the science about it must be certain, and (a fortiori) it
must hence be possible to have a science about it.
P58 Atemporal soul the actualization of temporal body The soul itself is atemporal,
but it is the actualization and perfection of a temporal body.
P59 Only material things cannot receive their own species Because material things
are already actualized as their own species.
P60 Self-knowledge by innate species
(a) Some things are known by an innate species
(b) The intellect is one of the things that are known by an innate species.
(c) ∴The intellect knows itself without the need of an external species.
P61 Science by answering (four) scientific questions There can be a science about that
which answers the four basic analytical questions of a science, namely si est, quid est,
quia est, and propter quid.
P62 Diversification only a problem with same mode of being The identity of cat-
egories between object and act only required in same mode of being.
P63 Soul is simple in essence but has different powers (partes potentiales) In itself
the soul is simple, but it actualizes differt powers.
P64 Act and potency with different respects In intellectual self-knowledge the act and
potency are different in respect.
P65 The agent intellect is known like any other object
• The possible intellect is able to know any intelligible object.
• The agent intellect is an intelligible object.
• ∴The agent intellect can be known by the possible intellect
P66 Intellect is incorruptible This is based on the immaterial nature of the intellect, and
means that the entire soul is not corruptible.
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P67 Essential self-knowledge results in no self-knowledge Knowledge requires the
subject being stripped of the object of knowledge, but nothing can be stripped of its own
species.
P68 Transference of properties from agent to patient (e.g. light and the visible ob-
ject)
(a) The efficient cause of a property possesses the property itself.
(b) The agent intellect causes potentially intelligible objects to be actually intelligible.
(c) ∴The agent intellect itself is intelligible.
P69 Soul not available to sense perception
(a) Science can only be about that which can be known, and scientific knowledge can
only be acquired through sense perception.
(b) The soul is not available to sense perception.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
P70 Only physical movement requires difference between mover and moved The
body makes identity of mover and moved impossible.
P71 Vague, incomplete self-knowledge possible Some knowledge about the intellect
or soul is attained, but it does not amount to a full substantial knowledge. It may be
qualified as simple, intuitive, and immediate.
P72 Self-knowledge necessary for a science of the soul Intellectual self-knowledge is
a necessary condition for a universal science about the soul because some parts of the
soul can only be known by introspection.
P73 Soul not intelligible to us
(a) The subject of a science must be intelligible.
(b) A soul is not intelligible.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
P74 The intellect is intelligible like any other thing The intellect can be known in the
same way as any other intelligible thing. This argument implies a reference to De anima
3.4, 430a2–3.
P75 Agent intellect the most venerable object of knowledge If the possible intellect
is disposed towards knowledge about lowly beings such as material objects, it must so
certainly also be disposed towards knowledge about the elevated nature of the agent
intellect.
P76 Science requires intelligible essence or definition
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P77 Intellect not available to sense perception
(a) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
(b) The intellect is not available to sense perception
(c) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
P78 The intellect can know completely immaterial things The knowledge is imme-
diate, as there is no requirement of species reception of immaterial objects.
P79 Four requirements of a science (a) A science is about a subject as a universal,
(b) which, as a universal, is incorruptible, (c) has own parts and properties, (d) and the
science constitutes a knowledge that has an intellectual immediacy in the reflection on
the subject.
P80 Science of form and perfection There can be a science about the form and perfec-
tion of a natural thing, which is the case for the soul.
A.2 Negative arguments
N1 Soul not intelligible to us
(a) The subject of a science must be intelligible.
(b) A soul is not intelligible.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
N2 Soul not available to sense perception
(a) Science can only be about that which can be known, and scientific knowledge can
only be acquired through sense perception.
(b) The soul is not available to sense perception.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
N3 Identity of mover and moved impossible
(a) The same thing cannot be mover and moved at the same time and in the same
respect;
(b) if the intellect knew itself, it would be mover and moved in the same time and in
the same respect;
(c) ∴ the intellect cannot know itself.
N4 Intellect not available to sense perception
(a) Anything that is intelligible is available to sense perception.
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(b) The intellect is not available to sense perception
(c) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
N5 Identity of knower and known impossible
(a) In any knowledge there must be a real difference between the knower and the
known.
(b) In a science of the soul the same thing would be knower and known.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
N6 Knowledge is continuous and temporal, but soul is simple
(a) All human knowledge is a continuous and temporal process.
(b) The soul is neither continuous nor temporal.
(c) ∴The soul cannot be intelligible.
N7 Science about subject, parts or properties, principles A science requires (a) a
subject, (b) properties that are ascribed to the subject, and (c) the principle according to
which the properties are ascribed to it. Positive use: The investigation of the soul fulfills
all these three requirements. The definition of the soul can be used as the principle by
which the properties are ascribed to the subject.
Negative use: The soul as form is not a subject, because it is not a hylomorphic com-
pound.
N8 Similar to separate intelligences
(a) The separate intelligences know themselves by their own substance
(b) The intellect is similar to the separate intelligences
(c) ∴The intellect knows itself by its own substance.
N9 Things most manifest in nature are opaque, so no science of the soul
(a) The things most manifest by nature cannot be known by the intellect.
(b) The soul is among the things most manifest by nature.
(c) ∴The soul cannot be known by the intellect.
N10 Knowing the act of the intellect risks infinite regress
(a) If the intellect knows its own activity, that knowledge constitutes a second order
activity.
(b) If that new activity is intelligible, then the knowledge of that constitutes a third
order activity.
(c) From this an infinite regress arises.
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(d) Infinite regresses are impossible.
(e) ∴ The intellect cannot know itself by a separate activity.
N11 Soul is a particular, so there can be no science about it
(a) A science must be about universals.
(b) A soul as the form of a body is a particular.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
N12 Analogy with sense and sensation
(a) As the senses stand to sensation, so does the intellect stand to knowing.
(b) The senses cannot perceive their own sensation
(c) ∴The intellect cannot know its own knowledge.
N13 No abstraction of the intellect
(a) Human knowledge is based on phantasms abstracted from sense perception.
(b) The intellect cannot be abstracted from matter
(c) ∴The intellect cannot be know through an abstracted species.
N14 No science about corruptible things
(a) There is no science about corruptible things.
(b) The soul is corruptible as the form of a corruptible body.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
N15 Nothing can be stripped of itself
(a) The intellect ought to be stripped of its object of knowledge before knowing it.
(b) Nothing can be stripped of itself.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
N16 Intellect not its own proper object of knowledge
(a) The intellect knows its objects of knowledge.
(b) The intellect is not its own object of knowledge.
(c) ∴The intellect is not intelligible to itself.
N17 Self-knowledge by innate species
(a) Some things are known by an innate species
(b) The intellect is one of the things that are known by an innate species.
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(c) ∴The intellect knows itself without the need of an external species.
N18 All intelligibles become intellects if intellect is intelligible
(a) All intelligibles are intelligible by the same form.
(b) The intellect is intelligible and has reason by one form.
(c) If N18b then all intelligibles are intelligible by the same form as the intellect.
(d) If N18c then all intelligibles have reason.
(e) N18d is false.
(f) ∴The intellect cannot be intelligible.
This could be seen as an interpretation of the argument Aristotle presents against the
idea that the intellect knows itself by itself in De anima 3.4, 429b27–28: “ἢ γὰρ τοῖς
ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ’ ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητός, ἓν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει …”
N19 No universal about the soul, as it requires sense perception
(a) A science is about a universal.
(b) Universals are abstracted from sense perception, but the soul is not available to
sense perception.
(c) ∴There can be no universal (and hence no science) about the soul.
N20 No simultaneous act and potency
(a) The same thing cannot be in act and potency at the same time and in the same
respect.
(b) The object of knowledge is in act with respect to the knowing subject, and the
knowing subject is in potentiality with respect to the object of knowledge.
(c) The intellect cannot know itself.
N21 The possible intellect is not actualized
(a) All that is intelligible is actual.
(b) The intellect is not actual.
(c) ∴The intellect is not intelligible.
N22 Material intelligibles cannot know themselves
(a) The intellect is known in the same way as other objects of knowledge.
(b) Other objects of knowledge are not self-intelligible.
(c) ∴The intellect is not self-intelligible.
N23 No species proportional to the intellect
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(a) When something is known through a species, that must be proportional to the
thing known.
(b) Any external species cannot be proportional to the intellect.
(c) ∴The intellect cannot be known by an external species.
N24 No experience of higher-order knowledge
(a) We sense our state of sensation, so we should also know our states of knowing.
(b) We do not experience any higher order knowledge.
(c) ∴ Higher order knowledge does not take place.
N25 Essential self-intelligibility by self-identity
(a) The intellect is identical with that which it knows when it knows.
(b) That which is known is intelligible.
(c) The intellect knows by its own essence.
(d) ∴The intellect is intelligible by its own essence.
N26 Agent intellect has no positive content
(a) The power of the agent intellect is abstraction of universals.
(b) Abstraction of universals cannot be intelligible, because then the agent intellect
would know the universals itself.
(c) ∴The power of the agent intellect cannot be known.
N27 Accidents cannot affect their own subject
(a) Knowledge takes place by an affection of the intellect.
(b) Accidents cannot affect the subjects in which they are properties.
(c) An act of intellection is an accident of the intellect.
(d) ∴The act of intellection cannot affect the intellect, and hence it cannot be known
by the intellect.
N28 Nothing can move itself (knowledge is being-moved)
(a) What cannot move the intellect cannot be known.
(b) Nothing can move itself.
(c) ∴The possible intellect cannot know the possible intellect.
N29 Diversification of knowledge according to object
254 a. inventory of doctrines
(a) The act of knowing is determined by the nature of the object of knowledge (cf.
Averrois Cordubensis CommentariumMagnum in Aristotelis De anima libros ad III.4
429b10–14, com. III.9, p. 422.36–50).
(b) The primary object of knowledge and the act of knowing have two different natures.
(c) ∴The intellect cannot know both types of objects.
N30 No essential self-knowledge, so not self-knowledge by own species
(a) In immaterial substances the same thing is knower and known.
(b) If the intellect knows itself by its own species, it will know itself by itself.
(c) ∴The intellect cannot know itself by itself, hence it cannot know itself by its own
species.
N31 Science proceeds from causes, so no science about the soul
(a) All science proceeds from causes.
(b) The soul is not known through its causes.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science of the soul.
N32 Essential self-knowledge by self-presence
(a) Knowledge requires presence of the known object to the knowing subject
(b) The intellect is present to itself by itself.
(c) ∴The intellect knows itself by itself.
N33 Intelligibility requires actuality No potential property or substance can be actually
intelligible. This finds support in Aristotle Metaph. 9.10, 1051b30–32.
N34 Intellectual self-knowledge is impossible
(a) If there were a science of the soul the intellect would be able to know itself.
(b) The intellect cannot know itself.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science of the soul.
N35 Nothing simpler than the intellect, hence no species abstraction
(a) A species is simpler than the thing from which it is abstracted.
(b) The intellect does not have a species that is simpler than itself.
(c) ∴The intellect cannot be known by a species.
N36 No science about the non-existent
(a) There cannot be a science about that which does not exist.
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(b) The soul does not exist.
(c) ∴There cannot be a science about the soul.
N37 Knowing agent intellect means knowing all phantasms
(a) If the possible intellect could know the agent intellect, this would be through its
abstraction of phantasms.
(b) The agent intellect abstracts all phantasms.
(c) ∴The possible intellect cannot contain all phantasms at the same time; hence, the
possible intellect cannot know the agent intellect.
N38 Nothing can receive its own species
(a) The possible intellect only has knowledge by reception of the species of the object.
(b) Nothing can receive itself.
(c) ∴The intellect cannot have knowledge of itself.
N39 Power of the agent intellect not intelligible
(a) If the intellect is known, then its power is also known.
(b) The power of the intellect cannot be known.
(c) ∴The intellect cannot be known.
N40 The intellect has essential self-knowledge The intellect has essential self-knowledge
and is hence not known through an external species.
N41 Multiple simultaneous objects of knowledge impossible The intellect cannot be




B.1 Sources with questions on the science of the soul
The survey was made on September 8, 2016 and updated on the February 12, 2018.1 At that
point the database contained 79 commentaries on De anima that were registered to belong in
part of full to the 13th century.
The survey outlines which commentaries contain the question ‘Whether a science of the
soul is possible’ or similar variations thereof among the questions pertaining to the beginning
of book one.
The main conclusion of the survey is that the question ‘Whether a science of the soul is
possible’ or similar variations thereof are very strongly represented in the given section of the
question commentaries. 79 commentaries were reviewed, of those 61 were question comment-
aries, but I did not have access to 24 of those. Of the remaining 37 15 did not contain material
on book 1 (being either fragmentary or partial) and did therefore not contain the relevant sec-
tion of the question. Of the remaining 22 commentaries every one contained such a question.
This is a very strong indication that the majority of the remaining question commentaries from
the period will also contain such a question.
The following tables document the reviewed commentaries. When the relevant part of
a commentary exists in a modern edition, I refer to that. When it only exists in early print
editions or manuscripts, I refer to those.
The first table (B.1 on the next page) lists commentaries that have been found to include
a relevant question in this survey. The commentaries in table B.2 on page 260 do not contain
any question on the science, while the commentaries in table B.3 on page 261, which are not
question commentaries, also have not been found to contain an extensive or focused treatment
of the possibility of a science of the soul. In these cases it is most likely due to the type or genre
of the text. Some of them are tractatus, others are different type of literal commentaries that
only rarely contains such a treatment.
1 Update removed a duplicate entry (of commentary in ÖNB 2319: ff. 83ra–100vb which is a witness
to Brito, Quaestiones in libros De anima) and the addition of Jandun, Quaestiones super libros De
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B.2 Question commentaries possibly of relevance
On the following page I list the question commentaries that I have not been able to inspect, but
which I suspect may be interesting. This evaluation is very naive, as it is only based on the in-
formation available in catalogues. Unfortunately I have not been aware of these commentaries
until too late in the process to incorporate them in the investigation.
The commentaries that are not referred to Mora-Márquez’s catalogue are from is Bern-
ardini’s list of commentaries in the introduction to her edition of Quaestiones super librum De
anima.3
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Here follows excerpts from texts that I have included in this study where no critical edition is
available. They are to be considered working editions, which means that there may still have
some problems and are not all print-ready, but they are good enough to provide a base text to
work with. I therefore also do not endeavour to present extended descriptions of the witnesses,
discussions of dating and other details that would normally constitute the introduction to a full-
fledged edition. In several of the editions many authority references still need to be resolved.
In presenting the drafts below I adhere to the following general principles: I have imposed
my own classicising orthography, and my own paragraphing and punctuation. Section head-
ings and structural numbers (e.g. 1.1, 2.1, Ad 3.1 etc.) are meta-text added by me. Normally I
expand any scribal abbreviations silently.
Sigla
⟨content⟩ The content is not part of the transmitted text, but I have supplied it.
{content} The content is preserved in the transmitted text, but in my best judgement it does
not belong in the text.
†content† The content is part of the transmitted text, but it results in an incoherent text for
which I have found not remedy.
⟨∗∗∗⟩ I find that the transmitted text contains a lacuna at this place. The text leaves no
indication thereof.
n. . . The number n indicates the number of units that are not included in the text.
When n is wrapped in “/” the unit is lines, when it is wrapped in “||” the unit
is columns, otherwise it is characters. When followed by “(rep.)” it is due to
an illegible reproduction, when followed by “(ed.)” it is an editorial decisions,
otherwise it is due to an illegible manuscript witness.
Abbreviations
scr. Scripsi vel scripsit.
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inv. Invertit.




add. et del. Addidit et delevit. Deletion of an a scribal addition made by the same scribe.
del. et scr. Delevit et scripsit. Deletion of a deletion.
a.c. Ante correcturam.
corr. ex Correxit ex.
transp. Transposuit.
suppl. Supplevi vel supplevit.
secl. Seclusi vel seclusit.
coni. Conieci vel coniecit.
ut vid. Ut videtur.
sup. lin. Supra lineam.
in marg. In margine.
These abbreviations can all be exchanged with appropriate plural versions where more than
one witness is referenced.
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C.1 AdamWhitby et al.: Quaestiones in De anima II–
III
This text is preserved in a single manuscript, Kapit Knihovna M.80: ff. 42–78. Rega Wood
has produced an extensive description of the manuscript.1 She dates the codex to the 1250s,
although it is bound in the volume in the 14th century.2
The dating of the text to the middle of the 13th century is supported by Lohr.3 The style
and structure of the questions on De anima also supports that hypothesis, as it does not look
like a text from the last part of the 13th century. Gauthier notes how he in part resembles
the masters of the 1250s, and is also aware of the monopsychist problems discussed about that
time.4
Adam Whitby was probably an English arts master who has been ascribed four works of
Aristotelian natural philosophy, De anima (books II-III), De memoria et reminiscentia, glosses
on De sensu et sensibilibus, and Aristotelis meteorologicorum libri quattuor .5 Weijers is only cer-
tain about the ascription of the glosses on De sensu et sensibilibus and parts of the De anima
questions (as I interpret the note in her catalogue).6
Judging from the manuscript it is unlikely that AdamWhitby is the author of all the ques-
tions, because only a group of the questions (I count seven along with RegaWood) are ascribed
to him, some to a ‘Magister A’ (which could also be him), and yet others to ‘Magister R’ or are
without any ascription.7 Unfortunately the question treated here, the second on book three
on folio 66vb has no ascription, but it follows directly after the first, which has the heading
“Quaestio de intellectu possibili utrum sit unus in omnibus hominibus secundum Magistrum
Adam” (f. 66ra) in the same hand but different ink. The third question begins “Consequens
tertia quaestio de intellectu agente, utrum sit aliquid animae vel non” (f. 67ra) which probably
indicates that at least the first three questions belong together. And if that is the case, the
author of the second question must also be Adam. Although this is only circumstantial, I will
refer here to these parts of the commentary as through Adam Whitby is the author. Taken
together we could refer to the authors of the text as ‘Adam Whitby et alii’ as he is really the
only one of the multiple authors who has a full name in the ascriptions.
Manuscript sigla
P Prague, Kapit Knihovna, M.80: ff. 42–78.
1 As far as I know only published in digital form on http://rrp.stanford.edu/pragM80-xml.html.
2 Podlaha 1922: 314 on the 14th century dating of the volume.
3 Lohr 1967: 324.
4 What Gauthier refers to as the second Averroism, see Gauthier 1984: 267*, n1.
5 Lapidge, Nocentini, and Santi 2000–: I.1, p. 35.
6 Weijers 1994: 31.
7 See also Köhler 2008: 45, n. 147.
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III.2 Utrum intellectus noster intelligit ⟨se⟩ per speciem suam
III.2 Utrum intellectus noster intelligit ⟨se⟩ per speciem suamQuoniam autem aliud est magnitudo et magnitudinis esse. Quaestio est super hoc quod vult P 66vb
Averroes, quod intellectus noster intelligit ⟨se⟩ per speciem suam.
1.1 Contra quod sic: Formae ⟨im⟩materiales, qua ⟨im⟩materiales sunt, non indigunt in-
5 telligi per speciem abstractam ab illis; cum ergo intellectus sit forma immaterialis, non indiget
intelligi per aliquam speciem abstractam ab illo, sed seipso potest intelligi.
1.2 Item intellectus, cum sit forma immaterialis, est abstractus ultima abstractione, quare
non abstrahetur alia species ab illo per quam intelligetur, quare seipso intelligetur.
1.3 Item si intellectus intelligeret se per speciem suam, cum eodem modo intelligat res
10 materiales, tunc non esset differentia intelligendi inter intelligens et intellectum in separatis
a materia et non separatis. Dicit tamen Aristoteles quod differentia est. “In separatis enim a
materia,” ut dicit, “est idem intelligens et intellectum”, quare videtur quod intellectus intelligat
se seipso et non a sua specie, et hoc concedendum est.
Super hoc, cum dubitatur quomodo hoc esse possit quod idem penitus sit intelligens et
15 intellectum, cum intelligens sit motum et intellectum movens, et movens et motum oporteat
differre secundum essentiam, dicendum quod si intellectum esset physicemovens, et intelligens
physice motum, teneret oppositio; sed non est sic; immo communiter est hoc movens et hoc
motum.
1.4 Sed adhuc est quaestio super hoc quod dicit ⟨Philosophus⟩ quod in separatis a materia
20 idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur; tunc enim, cum unus intellectus intelligit †a impossi-
bile†, dicendum quod haec propositio ‘in separatis a materia et cetera’ sic debet intelligi quod
in hiis idem est intelligens et intellectum, cum intelligens convertit se super se, nec est hoc
universaliter verum.
Sed tunc est quaestio quomodo unus intellectus intelligit alium, utrum per seipsum vel per
25 suam speciem. Si per seipsum, ergo unus intellectus erit essentialiter in alio intelligente ipsum,
quod est impossibile. Quod etiam unus non intelligat alium per speciem suam sic videtur: For-
mae materiales, quia materiales sunt, indigent intelligi per speciem abstractam ab illis; cum
ergo ipsi intellectus non sint formae materiales, non indigent intelligi per speciem abstractam
ab illis.
30 1.5 Item intellectus, cum sit forma immaterialis, est abstractus ultima abstratione. Ergo | P 67ra
species non potest abstrahi ab illo per quam intelligatur.
1.6 Item quicquid sit de intelligentibus causatis a primo intellectu, qui est causa prima,
⟨a quo⟩ nihil abstrahi potest, nihil enim ipso est simplicius; abstractum autem simplicius est eo
a quo abstrahitur; causa ergo prima per speciem abstractam ab illa non intelligetur.
35 Forte dicet quod solus intellectus possibilis intelligit per receptionem specierum, nullus au-
tem intellectus alius, sive causatus sive non, intelligit per receptionem specierum; tunc tantum
convertendo se supra se et intelligendo se omnia alia intelligit.
2 Arist., DA III.4 429b10–22 3 Averr. Comm. DA III com. 8, p. 420.19–21. 11–12 Arist. DA III.4
430a3–4.
4 non ] ideo P 12 et non separatis post materia del. P 17 movens ] motum P 22 intelligens2 ]
intelligunt P 28 intelligi ] in marg. P 36 causatus ] causatur P
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Sed tunc non erit diversus modus intelligendi in primo et in intellectibus causatis. Primum
enim intelligit intelligendo se et intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia; sed dicet quod immo diffe-
rentia est; primum enim intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia, et hoc ex natura propria; intellec-
tus ⟨autem⟩ causatus intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia non ex sua natura, sed per virtutem
aliunde receptam. 5
Sed contra hoc sic: In sola causa prima relucent formae exemplares omnium, quia sola
causa prima convertendo se supra se intelligit omnia.
Item omne causatum habet formam completivam qua differt essentialiter ab omni alio,
quare in forma istius causati ⟨non⟩ relucent formae omnium, quare nullum causatum conver-
tendo se supra se intelligit omnia. 10
Forte dicet quod intellectus causatus est propinqua imago causae primae, et ideo intellec-
tus causatus intelligendo se ex consequenti intelligit causam primam in qua intellecta omnia
intelligit.
Et potest adduci exemplum tale: Fantasma imaginatum et est pictura et est imago, et ideo
imaginativa dupliciter potest convertere se super fantasma imaginatum, scilicet vel ut est pic- 15
tura vel imago, si secundo modo, tunc per ipsam imaginem comprehensam comprehendit rem
extra cuius est imago; similiter intellectus causatus est res quaedam in se, et est imago pro-
pinqua primae causae. Potest ergo convertere se super se dupliciter, vel ut est res vel ut est
imago. Si secundo modo, tunc in se intellecto ex consequenti intelliget causam primam in qua
intellecta intelligit omnia. 20
Habito quod sic, lux corporalis exterior pura primo recipitur in visu corporali, quare lux
spiritalis pura primo recipitur in visu spiritali. Cum ergo causa prima sit spiritalis pura, intel-
lectus vero causatus quidam visus spiritalis, quare causa prima primo suscipitur in intellectu
causato, quare intellectus causatus non primo intelligit se et ex consequenti causam primam,
sed magis e converso. 25
Item, lux corporalis pura existens essentialiter in visu corporali non videtur a visu corporali
per imaginem suam, sed per essentiam suam, quare lux pura spiritalis existens essentialiter in
visu spritali non videbitur a visu spiritali per imaginem suam, sed per essentiam suam. Cum
ergo causa prima sit lux spiritalis pura existens essentialiter in intellectu causato, qui est sicut
visus spritalis, non videbitur ab intellectu causato per imaginem suam, sed per essentiam suam. 30
Ad hoc dicendum quod intellectus causatus separatus primo intelligit causam primam et
intelligendo ipsam intelligit omnia in formis exemplaribus omnium quae sunt in ipsa. Et iste est
modus unus intelligendi quem habet huiusmodi intellectus quo cognoscit causata omnia in sua
causa, huiusmodi etiam intellectus habet species omnium aliorum causatorum sibi cognatas
et concreatas, sicut intellectus possibilis habet huiusmodi acquisitas, et intellectus causatus 35
seperatus per species sibi connatas intelligit omnia causata in se ipsis sicut intellectus possibilis
per species rerum acquisitas intelligit res in seipsis.
14 Arist. Mem. 2 450b20–22.
8 omni ] omnium P 21 habito ] hoc P 27 imaginem ] imaginationem a.c. P
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C.2 Adam Buckfield: Sententia super librum De an-
ima
This text is dated to between 1238 and 1249, and may possibly be from before 1245. On the dat-
ing and details of whether there is one or more redactions, see section 2.5.3 on page 49, which
influences the decision here to present the two texts that are considered to be by Buckfield and
Ps.-Adam Buckfield respectively as two different texts.
According to Lohr there are three redactions in the following manuscripts.
Redaction 1 Corpus Christi 111: 252a–294d, Madrid 1067: 73r-76v, Bologna 1180: 24a–53b,
Canon. Misc. 322: 1–63v, BNF Lat. 6319: 112r—114r.
Redaction 2 Ambros. 2° 318: 174ra–225a (new foliation, old: 173ra-223a), Merton 272: 1r–
22r, Jagiellońska 726: 1r–40v, Madrid 9726: 82v, Vat. Urb. 206: 259a–299a,
Marciana Lat. VI.1: 130b–161a.
Redaction 3 Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b
Gauthier thinks there is only one redaction with two so-called redactions that have been mis-
takenly attributed to Adam but are actually not by him. One of those is the last part of the
Merton 272 witness (15v–22r), the other is the full commentary in Berlin SB 906: 115a–173b.8
That analysis is reflected in the presentation of the manuscripts by Weijers and Wood.9
I follow the analysis of Gauthier here and give a transcription of a selection of thewitnesses.
The base text that I have used is in Ambros. 2° 318: 216v–217v. In some places one or more
of the manuscripts BNF Lat. 6319: 130v, Canon. Misc. 322: 53ra, Vat. Urb. 206: 292v, and
Bologna 2344: 48v–49r have been included to help solve textual uncertainties. Bologna 2344:
24r-53v has been transcribed and published online as part of the Richard Rufus Project.10
Manuscript sigla
E Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, CA 2° 318: 174ra–225ra.
B Bologna, Biblioteca universitaria, 2344: 24r–53v.
V Vatican, Vatican Library, Urbinus Latinus 206: 259a–299a.
O Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canon. Misc. 322: 1–63v.
P Paris, Bibliothéque National de France, Latin 6319: 112r–134r.
8 Gauthier 1984: 247*.
9 Weijers 1994: 25, Wood 2018: 59.
10 Buckfield 2017.
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Liber tertius, lectio secunda
Liber tertius, lectio secundaE 216va Consequenter, ibi, Cum autem, declarat quomodo intellectus possibilis egreditur de potentia
accidentali ad actum, intendens ⟨quod⟩ cum iam est intelligens in potentia accidentali sive
secundum habitum, tunc dicitur sciens et intelligens actu, quod quidem contingit cum se ipso
potest ingredi in actum nisi prohibeatur. Verumtamen non simpliciter dicitur ad huc intellectus 5
secundum actum, sed est quodammodo in potentia, sicut fuit dum fuit in potentia essentiali,
scilicet sicut fuit ante addiscere aut ante inventionem, licet non eodem modo ut in potentia.
Adhuc autem cum hoc secundo modo est in potentia, potens est ut intelligit seipsum. Quo
tamen modo intelligit seipsum patebit inferius. Sic igitur cum est in potentia accidentali est
omnino impassibilis in egrediendo in actum. 10
||2||. . . (ed.)
E 217ra | Dubitabit autem. Procedit dubitando ubi sic procedit: Primo movet quasdam dubitationes
secundo ut ibi aut pati eas solvit. Movet autem duas dubitationes circa substantiam intellectus
possibilis. Prima est an intellectus sit substantia simplex et omnino impassibilis, ut praeosten-
sum est, non habens communicationem cum alia forma materiali, quod etiam concessit Anaxa-
goras, potest aliquis dubitare, cum ita sic quomodo intelliget et hoc, si intelligere sit aliquando 15
pati. Quae enim agunt et patiuntur ad invicem videntur habere aliquod commune; cum igitur
intellectus nullam habeat communicationem formis materialibus, ut dictum est, et intelligere
sit pati a formis intelligibilibus, ut videtur intellectus, nullam formam materialem intelliget.
Consequenter cum dicit amplius autemmovet secundam dubitationem, et est si intellectus
autem intelligit se ut praedictum est, tunc est dubium utrum intellectus seipso intelligit a se 20
aut per speciem suam, sicut aliae res intelligibiles intelliguntur per species suas in ipso modo,
scilicet si ipse intelligitur tunc sicut hoc intellectum est, scilicet intelligens. Arguitur ut videtur
E 217rb omnia alia intellecta erint intelligentia, cum omne intelligibile sive intellectum videatur | esse
unum specie, id est uno et eodemmodo intelligibile. Si autem secundo modo, scilicet intellectus
intelligatur per suam speciem, sicut alia intelligibilia, tunc habebit intellectus formam aliquam 25
sibi admixtam per quam intelligetur sicut et alia intelliguntur per suas formas, et si hoc, tunc
sicut alia intelligibilia, cum intelliguntur non intelligunt, similiter nec intellectus cum intelliga-
tur non intelliget, aut si intellectus cum intelligitur intelligat et alia similiter cum intelliguntur
intelligunt.
Consequenter cum dicit aut pati solvit istas quaestiones. Et primam, intendens quod etsi 30
intellectus dicitur pati ab intelligibili, erit hoc consequenter sumendo pati, quoniam dicitur
passio in formis naturalibus; intellectus enim solum patitur in recipiendo et sine omni trans-
mutatione et corruptione; forma autem materialis in patiendo transmutatur et corrumpitur.
Unde comparat intellectum, cum est in potentia ad susceptionem intelligibilium nullum ha-
bens actu, tabulae nudae quae potens est recipere omnes figuras. Sicut enim tabula nuda non 35
patitur, ita autem transmutatur cum recipit picturas creatas in ipsa, sed magis perficitur per
ipsas. Similiter intellectus non patitur a formis intelligibilibus, sed magis per ipsas perficitur
et sic patet quod solvitur illa dubitatio per distinctionem aequivocationis. Verbi huius, scilicet
2 Arist. DA III.4, 429b5. 11 Arist. DA III.4, 429b22. 12 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29. 19 Arist. DA III.4,
429b26. 30 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29.
7 inventionem ] adventionem a.c. E 17 intell post intellectus del. E 25 sicut ] fuit E
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‘pati’, ubi enim dicitur aliquid proprie pati, ibi oportet esse commune agenti et patienti, sicut
est in actione et passione naturali, communiter autem dicendo ‘pati’ ut si dicitur intellectus
pati ab intelligentia nequaquam.
Consequenter cum dicit et ipse autem solvit secundam dubitationem. Et habet illa pars duas,
5 in prima determinat quae pars illius dubitationis est eligenda, secundo ut ibi non oportet autem,
quia videbatur sequi ex illa parte dubitationis quam eligit inconveniens docet ipse vitare. Igi-
tur in parte prima, quod prima pars dubitationis eligenda est, intendens quod intellectus seipso
seipso est intelligibilis sicut nullo mediante comprehensa ab intellectu seipsa intelligitur et non
per suam speciem, aliter enim esset processus in infinitum. Et quod intellectus hoc modo seipso
10 intelligitur et non per speciem suam probat cum dicit in hiis quidem per hoc quod in formis
penitus immaterialibus idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, idem etiam est speculans et
speculatum; in formis autem materialibus non sic est, sed intellectus ⟨est⟩ aliud ab eo quod
intelligitur, et etiam speculans ab eo quod speculatur; cum igitur intellectus | sit forma imma- E 2017va
terialis, ut praeostensum est, intellectus seipso est intelligens, et non per speciem intellectus
15 seipso et non per aliam sui speciem.
Commentator tamen non hoc modo solvit hanc quaestionem, sed manifeste videtur con-
sentire in secundam partem quaestionis. Sed quod debeat solvi ut dictum est, per nostram
translationem manifestum est, et etiam per intellectum Aristotelis in fine huius capituli.
Consequenter cum dicit non autem semper docet vitare inconveniens quod videtur sequi
20 ex illa parte dubitationis quam eligit intendens quod causa propter quam alia intelligibilia,
cum intelliguntur ab intellectu non intelligunt, licet intellectus cum intelligitur intelligat, est
quia unumquodque intelligibile aliud ab intellectu sive a substantiis separatis, quia est forma
materialis, non est intelligibile in actu, neque intellectus in actu, sed solum in potentia. Propter
hoc huiusmodi intelligibilia, licet intelligantur non intelligunt; illud enim quod est in potentia
25 sive virtus intellectus oportet quod sit sine materia cuiusmodi est intellectus, et tali virtuti
inest actu intelligere; cum igitur intellectus, qui huiusmodi est, intelligitur intelligit, licet alia
intelligibilia cum intelliga⟨n⟩tur non intelligant.
4 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2. 5 Arist. DA III.4, 430a5. 10 Arist. DA III.4, 430a3. 19 Arist. DA III.4, 430a5.
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C.3 Ps.-Adam of Buckfield: Expositio in De anima I–
III
This commentary, which is preserved as an integrated part of Buckfield’s commentary, has been
identified as a different text by Gauthier (rather than merely a different redaction). Weijers and
Wood have followed his analysis, and so do I in the historical chapter.11
The text has only been identified in 15v–22r, but I believe to have found another witness
to the text in Ambros. 4° 293: 86r–100v. If that is true, this will provide us with a witness to
the full text of the commentary, unlike the Merton witness, which only contains a fragment on
books two and three. I have not yet had the opportunity to study the hypothesis further, nor
to fully collate the Erfurt witness with the presented transcription of the Merton text, so the
hypothesis still needs to be confirmed.
The text is closely related to that of Buckfield and certainly more or less contemporary with
that commentary, which puts it around 1250.
Manuscript sigla
M Oxford, Merton College Library, 272: 15v–22r.
11 Weijers 1994: 25, Wood 2018: 59, cf. the section on the Buckfields on page 49.
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Liber tertius, lectio secunda
Liber tertius, lectio secundaCum autem unaquaque. Ostenso qualiter intellectus possibilis se habet in egrediendo de poten- M 18vb
tia essentiali ad actum. Hic oportet qualiter se habet cum intelligit in potentia accidentali in
egrediendo ad actum, et intendit quod est immaterialis et impassibilis sicut prius dictum. Ergo
5 quod, cum intellectus sciat res in habitu, et hoc est cum est in potentia accidentali, tunc dicitur
sciens secundum actum primum; et quod sit sciens in habitu accidit cum possit per se operari
et considerare cum vult, verumtamen non est intellectus; tunc simpliciter in actu sed est quo-
dammodo in potentia, scilicet accidentali, sed non est sic in potentia sicut fuit in potentia ante
inventionem et doctrinam; et etiam cum hoc secundo modo sit in potentia, scilicet accidentali,
10 potens intelligere seipsum.
||2||. . . (ed.)
| Dubitabit aliquis. Hic movet duas dubitationes circa praedeterminata et eos dissolvit. Et M 19ra
primo movet eas, et est prima: Cum intellectus sit substantia simplex et omnino impassibilis
non habens communicationem cum aliquam forma materiali, ut praedictum est, sicut etiam
dixit Anaxagoras, quomodo tunc intelliget formas materiales, et hoc si intelligere sit quoddam
15 pati.Quae enim agunt et patiuntur adinvicem videntur habere aliquod commune; et intellectus,
cum forma in materia non communicat quare non patietur ab ea, nec eam intelliget.
Secunda dubitatio ibi amplius autem, et est si intellectus sit intelligibilis a seipso sicut dic-
tum est, aut ergo est intelligibilis per seipsum aut per formam sive speciem existentem in eo. Si
primomodo, tunc eadem ratione omnia alia intellecta erunt intelligentia vel possunt intelligere;
20 illud consequens sit quod tunc eadem ratione alia intelligibilia intelliguntur per seipsa et non
per species suas; omnia enim intelligibilia videntur esse unum specie, et hoc est eodem modo
intelligibilia. Si autem intellectus intelligatur secundo modo, scilicet per speciem existentem in
ipso, tunc habebit intellectus formam aliquam sibi mixtam sive speciem per quam intelligetur
sicut alia intelligibilia intelliguntur per suas species, et ita sicut alia, cum intelliguntur, non
25 intelligunt, similiter intellectus cum intelligitur non intelliget.
Et cum dicit aut pati solvit eas, et primo primam dubitationem dicens quod communiter
dicitur pati quando dicitur quod intellectus patitur ab intelligibili, et communius quoniam sit
pati naturale, quod est inter formas naturales contrarias; passio enim hoc secundo modo est
cum transmutatione et corruptione aliqua, et sic mediante aliquo quod est commune agenti et
30 patienti. Incontinuata enim ut album et dulce non agunt nec patiuntur adinvicem. Passio vero
primo modo est sola recpetio, quae est sine transmutatione et corruptione, nec oportet quod
fiat per aliquod commune. Unde sicut dictum est, intellectus solum est in potentia receptiva re-
spectu intelligibilium, et naturalis ipsorum habet actu antequam intelligat actu, et sicut dictum,
oportet sic esse in intellectu in receptione intelligiblium sicut est in tabula nuda in receptione
35 picturae, ita scilicet quod intellectus non transmutatur nec patitur substantialiter in receptione
intelligibilium, sed magis perficitur per ipsa et solum est in potentia receptiva ad ipsa, sicut
tabula nuda recipit picturas et non transmutatur proprie sed quoddammodo perficitur per eas.
2 Arist. DA III.4, 429b5. 11 Arist. DA III.4, 429b22. 17 Arist. DA III.4, 429b26. 26 Arist. DA III.4,
429b29.
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Et ipse autem intellectus. Hic solvit secundam dubitationem, et primo docet quae pars du-
bitationis est eligenda dicens secundum quasdam quod ipse intellectus seipso est intelligibilis,
sicut species immediatae comprehensae ab intellectu seipsis intelliguntur et non per suas spe-
cies, quia si per species intelligerentur esset processus in infinitum. Et quod intellectus sic
seipso intelligatur et non per suam speciem probat ibi in hiis quidem per hoc quod in formis 5
immaterialibus penitus idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur; idem etiam est speculatio vel
operatio speculativa et speculans; cum igitur intellectus sit forma immaterialis ut praedictum,
tunc idem erit intelligens et intellectum, et ita seipsa intelligatur.
Iste modus legendi satis videtur consonus nostrae translationi et etiam veritati Commen-
tatoris, et quidam famosi manifeste consentiunt in partem aliam, scilicet quod intelliget se per 10
speciem. Ambe tamen expositiones possunt habere veritatem et simul stare hoc modo: Intel-
lectus possibilis intelligit se per seipsum, hoc est non per speciem sui ipsius, proprie autem
sit abstracta a seipso. Item intelligit se non per se tantum, sed per speciem recepetam in ipso.
Unde cum intellexerit aliquid aliud a se per speciem abstractam ab illo alio, tunc per illam spe-
ciem, cum actu habuerit illam praesens se, intelligit seipsum. Sunt ergo aliae res intellectae per 15
species existentes in ipsis in potentia abstractas ab ipsis et stans in actu per intellectum agen-
tem et receptas in intellectu possibili. Intellectus vero possibilis per istam speciem actu in eo
convertendo se supra se seipsum intelligit et fortuite haec species non est causa intelligere, sed
occasio neccessaria.
Non autem semper . Hic docet vitare inconveniens quod videtur sequi ex illa parte dubita- 20
tionis cui consentit dicens quod causa propter quam alia intelligibilia, cum intelligantur, non
intelligant, licet intellectus cum intelligatur intelligat †est quia unde† quod est intelligibile
aliud ab intellectu, et a substantiis separatis est forma quoddammodo materialis, et ideo non
est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod in huiusmodi materia est, nec etiam intellectis est in
actu, et ideo licet intelligatur non tamen intelligit. Oportet enim ratio sive virtus intelligens 25
sit sine materia adminus materiali, cuius est intellectus, et tali virtuti inest actu intelligere, et
propter hoc solus intellectus cum intelligatur intelligit.
1 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2. 5 Arist. DA III.4, 430a3. 20 Arist. DA III.4, 430a5.
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C.4 Anonymus Assisi: Quaestiones in De anima III
The text exists in a single manuscript, Assisi 290, from the 14th century, probably English.
This text is the last in the manuscript, and most if not all of the preceding three texts are by
Bartholomaeus of Bodekisham (Quaestiones super primum Physicorum,Quaestiones super libros
Metaphysicorum (dubious according to Lohr), and Quaestiones in tres libros De anima bk. 2
only).12 It is likely to be roughly contemporary with the commentaries of Bartholomaeus of
Bodekisham. This would place the text in the last quarter of the 13th century, which also aligns
well with the structure and content of the question included here.
Manuscript sigla
A Assisi, Biblioteca Convento di San Francesco, ms. 290: 95r–107v.
12 Cenci 1981: II.447, cf. Lohr 1974: 124–5.
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III.15: Utrum intellectus secundum se sit intelligibilis tamquam
proprium obiectum
III.15: Utrum intellectus secundum se sit intelligibilis tamquam proprium obiectumA 104vb Quaeritur nunc utrum intellectus secundum se sit intelligibilis tamquam proprium obiectum
sui ipsius.
1.1 Et videtur quod sic, nam per Philosophum in littera “unumquodque est intelligi-
bile inquantum a materia separabile”; sed intellectus est omnino separabilis a materia secun- 5
dum essentiam, quia est substantia simpliciter immaterialis; ergo erit per se intelligibilis. Per
consequens potest intelligi a seipso tamquam obiectum.
1.2 Praeterea, per Commentatorem in isto tertio: “ex intellectu et intellecto fit verius
unum quam ex materia et forma”, et Philosophus similiter: “intellectus in actu et intellectum
in actu sunt unum secundum actum.” Ex hoc arguo: intellectus est illud idem quod intelligitur; 10
quod intelligitur est intelligibile; ergo intellectus est intelligibilis.
1.3 Praeterea per Philosopum in quinto “duplex est actio, una quae manet in agente, alia
quae transit in rem extrinsecam”; unde dicit quod intelligere est actio manens in agente, sed in
tali actione oportet id quod agitur esse unitum cum agente, illud ergo quod intelligitur oportet
esse unitum ipsi intellectui; si enim esset seperatum ab intellectu, iam eius actio transiret in 15
aliud, quod negat Philosophus; cum igitur intellectus sit maxime sibi un⟨it⟩us, et eius intelligere
recipitur in ipso maxime, ergo erit quod intelligitur et per consequens intelligibile.
1.4 Praeterea intelligentia separata intelligit suam essentiam; ergo intellectus noster.
Consequentia apparet quia intellectus noster est in eodem genere cum intelligentiis.
2 Ad oppositum. 20
2.1 Intellectus est in potentia; ergo est in potentia intelligibilis. Consequentia apparet
quia sicut aliquid est sic intelligitur.
2.2 Praeterea, si intellectus esset per se intelligibilis, cum una sit ratio omnium intelligi-
bilium, sequeretur quod alia intelligibilia intelligerent sicut intellectus.
3.1 Ad quaestionem dicendum quod intellectus noster, inquantum est forma et perfec- 25
tio corporis, non est intelligibilis nisi in potentia solum. Et ratio huius est per Philosophum
in isto tertio: “intellectus noster est in potentia receptiva omnium formarum intelligibilium.”
Unde dicit Commentator quod “est in potentia ad formas intelligibiles ut materia prima ad for-
mas individuales”, nunc autem unumquodque est intelligibile secundum quod est actu, ut dicit
Philosophus nono Metaphysicae; intellectus ergo non erit intelligibilis cum sit ens in sola po- 30
tentia respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis; unde, sicut materia prima ex hoc quod est in potentia
receptiva omnium formarum de se nullam habet, sed formam recipit ab extra, sic intellectus
quia est in potentia receptiva omnium intelligibilium nullum sibi determinat, nec etiam recipit
4–5 Arist. DA III.4 429b21–22 (?). Cf. DA III.4 429b4–5 et III.8.431b28–29. 8–9 Aver. Comm. DA com.
III.5 ad III.4 429a21–24, p. 404.501–512 (ed. Crawford). 9–10 Arist. DA III.4 430a2–3. 12–13 Locus
non inventus, sed num ad Arist. Metaph. IX.8 1050a30–b2 aspicit? 26–27 Arist. DA III.4 429a14–15
28–29 Aver. Com. in DA com. III.5 ad III.4 429a21–24, p. 387–88.27–32 (ed. Crawford). 29–30 Arist.
Metaph., IX.10 1051b30–32. Cf. Arist. Metaph., IX.9 1051a29–31 et Auct. Arist. (ed. Hamesse), 6.234.
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aliquid intelligibilium nisi cum movetur ab extra; est igitur intellectus inquantum est forma
corporis humani intelligibilis solum in potentia.
Ista autem potentia reducitur ad actum, nam sicut dicit Philosophus superius in littera “in-
tellectus intelligit seipsum aliquando”, nam in hoc differt a sensu, nam sensus non sentit seip-
5 sum. Similiter dicit auctor De causis “omnis substantia sciens vel intelligens intelligit seipsam”,
sed statim post dicit “ergo redit supra seipsum reditione completa”. Oportet tunc ponere quod
intellectus quamvis sit in potentia intelligibilis, aliquando seipsum intelligit actu, et propter
hoc dicit Commentator “intellectus intelligit se sicut et alia” et similiter Philosophus.
3.2 Sed per quemmodum ista potentia reducitur ad actum, ut intellectus actu intelligatur
10 a seipso, dubium est. Et propter hoc intelligendum quod intellectus intelligens proprium ob-
iectum intelligit se intelligere, et ita redit ab obiecto supra actum suum. Cognoscit enim quod
talis est suus actus intelligendi. Actus autem procedit a virtute et substantia, et ideo ultimo re-
dit supra suam substantiam, et sic eam cognoscit. Unde illa eadem species quae est principium
intelligendi obiectum extra est etiam principium intelligendi substantiam intellectus, et etiam
15 singulare materiale aliter tamen et aliter.
3.3 Propter hoc intelligendum est quod per eandem speciem acquiritur triplex cognitio in
nobis, scilicet obiecti et singularis materialis et ipsius intellectus. Istud apparet sic: nam intel-
lectus agens illuminans | phantasma abstrahit speciem, quae quidem species actuat vel informat A 105ra
intellectum possibilem, et tunc actu intelligit rem cuius est illa species; quia specie existente
20 in intellectu possibili, cum ista species sit assimilatio rei statim per hanc speciem fit res in-
telligibilis actu, unde impossibile est speciem actu informare intellectum, nisi statim res simul
intelligatur per eam; et propter hoc dicit Philosophus quod intellectus in actu et intellectum
in actu sunt unum secundum actum, et ita species est principium immediatum cognoscendi
obiectum. Sed si fiat reditio ab obiecto ad speciem, et a specie ad phantasma, et iterum ad
25 singulare sensibile, a quo primo exivit illa species, per hunc modum intelligitur singulare sen-
sibile, ut prius dictum est. Si autem ab obiecto usque ad actum intelligendi fiat reditio, sicut
intellectus intelligit seipsum sit cognitio, hoc modo vel illo semper una species est principium
cognoscendi. Prius tamen et immediate est principium cognoscendi obiectum, per posterius et
mediate est principium cognoscendi alia. Unde dicendum est quod intellectus non est intelligi-
30 bilis in actu nisi per hoc quod informatur prius aliqua specie rei extra, sicut nec materia prima
aliquem actum habet nisi a forma quam recipit per transmutationem agentis. Et ista vera sunt
de intellectu coniuncto, utrum tamen intellectus separatus a corpore intelligat se isto modo alia
ratio est, nec pertinet ad naturale considerare.
Ad 1.1 Ad primum argumentum. Cum dicitur “unumquodque est intelligibile et cetera”,
35 dicendum est quod unumquodque ens actu est intelligibile inquantum seperatur a materia; sed
iam dictum est quod intellectus est in potentia intelligibilis; ideo non concludit.
Ad 1.2 Ad secundum. Cum dicitur “ex intellectu et intellecto et cetera”, dicendum est
quod ex intellectu et intellecto fit verius unum quam ex materia et forma. Hoc dicit Commen-
3–4 Arist. DA III.4 429b5–9 (?) 5–6 Liber de causis, XV.124. 8 Aver. Com. in DA com. III.15 ad III.4
430a2–5, p. 434.6– 17 (ed. Crawford). 8 Arist. DA III.4.430a2–3. 22–23 Arist. DA III.4 430a2–3.
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tator, quia ex hiis fit simplicius unum quam ex materia et forma. Non autem intelligit quod in-
tellectus secundum suam naturam sit res intellecta ita quod de ratione sui possit intelligi, nec
etiam (cum dicit Philosophus quod intellectus et intellectum sunt unum) non intelligit quod
intellectus de ratione sui et per se sit illud quod est intellectum, quia ut praedictum est non est
intelligibile, nisi per hoc quod recipit speciem ab extra, sed pro tanto dicit hoc quia unus est 5
actus numero intelligibilis in actu et intelligentis in actu, quia impossibile quod intelligibile sit
in actu nisi simul sit intelligens in actu, et ita unico actu actuatur et intelligibile et intelligens.
Et propter hoc dicit quod sunt unum et actum, et cum dicitur ulterius “intellectus est id quod
intelligitur”, verum est, sed non de se; immomulto posterius intelligitur quam ipsum obiectum,
ut visum est. 10
Ad 1.3 Ad tertium. Cum dicitur “duplex est operatio”, dicendum quod intellectus est ma-
xime sibi ipsi un⟨it⟩us et etiam praesens; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod seipsum intelligit per se,
quia nihil intelligit nisi per receptionem ab extra; unde quantum ad cognitionem dicitur de eo
quod est velut tabula nuda, unde est in potentia ad intelligere seipsum sicut et alia, vel magis.
Ad 1.4 Ad quartum. Cum dicitur “intelligentia intelligit et cetera,” concedatur, et tunc 15
dicendum quod non est simile de intellectu nostro, quia natura intelligentiae separatae est ens
completum, et respectu esse et respectu operationis, et ideo de se habet quod possit intelli-
gere unumquodque intelligibile, sed sic non est de intellectu nostro, nam intellectus unitus
corpori intelligit secundum suum modum essendi in corpore, et ideo intelligit mediante vir-
tute sensitiva a qua haurit species intelligibiles, et propter hoc est solum in potentia respectu 20
intelligibilis.
1 Aver. Comm. in DA com. III.5 ad III.4 429a21–24, p. 404.501–512 (ed. Crawford) (?) 3 Arist. DA III.4
430a2–3. 8–9 Locus non inventus, sed confer Philoponus Com. in DA, ad III.4 429b9, p. 21.11–18.
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C.5 Anonymus Digby 55: Quaestiones in De anima
III
This short text stretches over three folios in the only witness of the text, Digby 55: 114r–117r.
It is an English manuscript from the last half of the 13th century.13 According to Thomson
the text extends over the folios 114r–125v, but as it is a section of heterogeneous questions
on different subjects (as he also notes), I have chosen to let the commentary conclude on folio
117r, although it does not look like a complete text. The codex is a collection of different texts
from the arts faculty, including quite a bit of Aristotelian commentaries. On folios 72r–82v it
contains an anonymous expositio on De anima (not included in this study).
Manuscript sigla
D Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 55: 114r–117.
13 Thomson 2011: 125.
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III.12: Utrum intellectus possit intelligere se
III.12: Utrum intellectus possit intelligere seD 115vb Quaeritur utrum intellectus possit intelligere se.
1 Et quod non.
1.1 Probatio: Impossibile enim est idem esse movens et motum et cetera.
2.1 Ad oppositum est Aristoteles, qui dicit quod “intellectus intelligit seipsum”, et postea 5
dicit quod “intellectus est intelligentia”.
3.1 Arguitur quod cum intellectus possibilis est aliquo modo in actu, potest seipsum
intelligere. Intellectus autem possibilis numquam intelligit se antequam sit in actu, sed non est
in actu quando est sicut tabula nuda, et ideo tunc non potest intelligere se. Sed est in actu cum
receperit aliquam formam in actu intellectam, idem enim est actus intelligentis et intellecti, et 10
tunc potest se ipsum intelligere. Unde sic seipsum intelligens acquisitione alicuius intellecti, et
sic intellectus intelligit se per posterius, quia intelligit se per rem intellectam.
Ad 1.1 Ad obiectionem dicitur quod intelligere est actio simplicissima, sed moveri non
est actio simplex, sed procedit ab uno ad aliud; non sic est de actione quae est intelligere; unde
non est simile de movente et moto et de intelligente et intellecto. 15
Contra: Intellectus possibilis nihil intelligit nisi per receptionem, iste enim modus intel-
ligendi solum debetur intellectui possibili; sed impossibile est intellectum possibilem intelli-
gere se per receptionem, cum nihil possit seipsum recipere, quia omne quod recipit aliud caret
eodem; igitur intellectus possibilis per nullam actionem quantumcumque simplicem seipsum
potest intelligere, cum omne suum intelligere sit per receptionem. 20
Solutio per se et primo.
5 Arist. DA III.4 429b9 6 Arist. DA III.4 430a1–4
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III.13: Utrum intellectus intelligat se per speciem
III.13: Utrum intellectus intelligat se per speciemQuaeritur utrum intellectus intelligat se per speciem. D 115vb
1 Et quod non.
1.1 Probatio: Nam in non habentibus materiam idem est intelligens et intellectum; ergo
5 si intellectus intelligat seipsum per speciem, intelliget seipsum per se, quod falsum est.
1.2 Item non habet aliquam speciem simpliciorem se per quam possit intelligi.
2.1 Ad oppositum est Commentator qui dicit quod intellectus possibilis intelligitur per
speciem sicut alia intellecta.
3.1 Dicitur quod intellectus intelligit se per speciem vel intentionem sicut omnia alia
10 intellecta, sicut dicit Commentator, melius quam per seipsum.
Ad 1.1, 1.2 Ad obiectionem dicitur quod haec propositio “in ⟨non⟩ habentibusmateriam et
cetera” intelligenda est in hiis quae nec habent materiam nec conditionem materiae, et quia in-
tellectus possibilis habet conditionem materiae, ideo de ipso non habet intelligi ista propositio.
Immo bene potest se intelligere per speciem quae est alia ab ipso intellectu.
15 Contra: Si intellectus possibilis intelligeret se mediante specie, quae esset alia a se, tunc
ipsa species aut esset abstracta a se aut ab alio. Non a se, quia tunc ista species semper esset
praesens intellectui, et sic posset intellectus possibilis seipsum intelligere semper; nec ab alio
constat quia non a phantasmate; | ergo nullo modo potest per huiusmodi speciem seipsum 116ra
intelligere.
20 Dicitur ad hoc quod species qua intellectus possibilis intelligit se, licet sit ei semper prae-
sens sicut aliae species intelligibiles, tamen haec species non est principium intelligendi nisi
reducatur in actum; sed quam cito haec species reducitur in actum, tunc seipsum intelligit
intellectus per speciem.
Contra: Quocumque modo haec species abstrahatur vel ad actum reducatur, hoc est nec-
25 cesarium quod species mediante qua res intelligitur sit simplicior ipsa re intellecta; sed spe-
cies propter quam intellectus intelligit se non est simplicior ipso intellectu, quia intellectus est
materiae penitus impermixtus; ergo et cetera.
Ad hoc dicitur quod quanto aliquid est magis in actu, tanto est simplicius eo quod est in
potentia; unde intellectus in actu simplicior est seipso existente in potentia; unde possibile est
30 isto modo abstrahere speciem simpliciorem. Et si arguatur non est permixtus corpori, dicitur
quod non est permixtus corpori sicut sensus et aliae virtutes materiales et ita debet intelligi
cum dicitur quod est impermixtus corpori. Et si ulterius arguatur quod haec species numquam
fuit abstracta a phantasmate, dicendum quod bene verum est, nam iste modus est per quem
intelligit alia a se.
35 Secundum tamen quod intelligit seipsum sciendum est quod intellectus agens abstrahit spe-
ciem ab intellectu possibili existentem in seipso in potentia; unde intellectus intelligit seipsum
per speciem abstractam a seipso. Haec tamen abstractio, licet non sit a phantasmate, non ta-
7–8 Averroes Comm. DA III, c. 15, p. 434 10 Averroes Comm. DA III, c. 15, p. 434
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men est sine phantasmate penitus, quia non possit intelligere nisi receperit speciem vel formam
aliunde, ut a phantasmate.
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C.6 AnonymusMerton 275: Quaestiones inDe anima
I
This commentary is preserved in a single manuscript, Merton 275: 88r–101r (new foliation)
from the 13th or 14th century of Parisian origin according to Thomson.14 It is a manuscript
dedicated almost exclusively to Aristotelian material and contains no less than five comment-
aries on De anima-manuscript. Three of them are those byThomas Aquinas, Anonymus Steen-
berghen, and Anonymus Giele, while the latter two are yet unpublished and anonymous.
This is a commentary on book one.15 The text is closely connected with Anonymus Ven-
nebusch. In passages of the first question the text is virtually identical, but this text is more
expansive in passages (q. 1a differs most from Anonymus Vennebusch). De Raedemaeker and
Gauthier consider it a witness to the text of Anonymus Vennebusch, and this very well may be
true.16 But in the first question there are considerable differences in phrasing, and the Merton
text contains more material. So at least for that part of the text it may be profitable to analyse
them in tandem but with an eye for the differences. Gauthier has also pointed out substantial
connections in the preface and first question (where the Merton text in particular differs from
Anonymus Vennebusch) with the text of Anonymus Bernardini.17
Manuscript sigla
M Oxford, Merton College Library, 275: 88r–101r.
14 Thomson and Luscombe 2011: 326.
15 Not the whole text as indicated by Mora-Márquez (2014: 248).
16 De Raedemaeker 1968–1970: 194–5, Gauthier 1984: 261*.
17 Gauthier 1984: 261*–263*, cf. Bernardini 2009: xv–xvii.
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Quaestiones in primum De anima
Quaestiones in primum De anima⟨Tres quaestiones circa scientiam de anima⟩
⟨Tres quaestiones circa scientiam de anima⟩⟨1. Utrum nos habeamus cognitionem de anima⟩
⟨1. Utrum nos habeamus cognitionem de anima⟩M 87ra Circa ingressionem huius scientiae: De motivis tria quaeruntur externis: Primum est utrum
nos habeamus cognitionem de anima, secundum utrum sit nobis innata, tertium utrum per 5
substantiam animae aut per speciem.
1 Circa primum arguitur sic:
1.1 Nihil cadit in intellectu nisi quod prius fuit in sensu. Cum ergo anima intellectiva non
cadit sub sensu eo quod immaterialis est, manifestum est quod non cadet in intellectu; sed de
illo quod non cadit in intellectu non est scientia; ergo de anima non poterit esse scientia. 10
1.2 Item arguitur. In libro De memoria et reminiscentia dicit quod omne nostrum intel-
ligere est cum continuo et tempore; sed anima non est quid continuum vel temporale sive
subiectum tempori; ergo anima non poterit intelligi, et sic adhuc de anima non poterit esse
scientia.
1.3 Item arguitur in tertio huius nostrum intelligere vel est fantasma vel non est sine fan- 15
tasmate; sed anima nec est {est} fantasma, nec cum fantasmate, quoniam est substantia simplex
cui nihil admixtum est de fantasmate; quare adhuc de anima non poterit esse scientia.
M 87rb 1.4 Item omnis scientia est per causam; sed scientia de | anima non est per causam; igitur
vera scientia non est de anima. Probatio minoris est quod operationes, ut signat Aristoteles, co-
gnoscuntur per obiecta, ex operationibus vero cognoscuntur potentiae, ex potentiis ipsa anima, 20
et sic adhuc non prodit per causam, quare adhuc scientia vera non est de aliqua.
1.5 Item si scientia esset de anima, hoc non esset nisi quia seipsam cognosceret; sed ipsa
seipsam cognoscere non potest, quoniam sicut se habet virtus sensitiva non scit se reflectere
supra se ut visus supra videre; quare et cetera.
1.6 Item sic⟨ut⟩ se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, sic intellectus noster ad ma- 25
nifestissima naturae; sed oculus noctuae nullo modo potest recipere lumen solis; ergo nec
intellectus manifestissima naturae, sed talium est anima, ergo et cetera.
2.1 Oppositum arguitur sic: Propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis; si ergo per
animam et propter animam scimus unumquodque, igitur de anima erit scientia.
2.2 Praeterea cuius sunt causae, ⟨de eo potest esse scientia⟩; sed anima est huiusmodi, ut 30
patet in hoc libro; ergo et cetera.
2.3 Item omnis substantia simplex nata est existere per se ⟨et⟩ nata est cognoscere per
se; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.
11 Arist.Mem. 2, 450a7–9. 15–16 Arist. DA III.8, 432a7–14. Cf. Arist. DA I.1, 403a8–10. 19 Arist. DA
I.1, 402b9–22. Cf. Arist. DA II.4, 415a14–22.
9 sub ] sup. lin. M 10 est ] corr. ex M 12 vel ] et vel M 15 arguitur ] dicitur Gauthier 19
signat ] dicit a.c.M 23 quoniam probatio s post potest del.M 25 solis ] sup. lin.M 32 et ] suppl.
Gauthier; om. M
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2.4 Item nulla propositio est verior illa in qua idem de se dicitur; ergo similiter nulla
scientia est verior illa in qua idem est sciens et scitum; sed scientia de anima est huiusmodi,
ergo et cetera.
⟨2. Utrum eius cognitio sit nobis innata⟩
⟨2. Utrum eius cognitio sit nobis innata⟩5 Iuxta hoc quaeritur de secundo utrum eius cognitio sit nobis innata, et arguitur quod sic.
3.1 Omnis cognitio ⟨in qua⟩ cognitum naturaliter est coniunctum cognoscenti est innata;
in cognitione animae cognitum est nobis naturaliter coniunctum; ergo et cetera. Major patet de
se. Minor declaratur quoniam in cognitione animae a nobis idem est cognoscens et cognitum;
anima enim est illud quo scimus ⟨et⟩ intelligimus, ut habetur tertio huius.
10 3.2 Praeterea, quanto virtus cognoscitiva est simplicior et subtilior causato, tanto faci-
lius potest in suam propriam operationem ⟨procedere⟩; virtus intellectiva est simplicior quam
sensitiva; ergo et cetera. Sed virtus sensitiva potente praesente sensibili naturaliter procedit ad
suam propriam operationem; potente enim sensibili nullo impediente oculus naturaliter videt
illud; ergo virtus intellectiva potest intelligere ipso intelligibili [?] potente. Hoc autem non es-
15 set, nisi cognosceret ⟨naturaliter [?]⟩. Cum ergo, si ipsi sit praesens seipsam cognoscet, in hoc
autem consistit complectio, quoniam ipsa seipsam cognoscit; ergo cognitio animae est nobis
innata.
4.1 Oppositum arguitur: Omnis cognitio quae est in nobis per adiutorium sensus est
acquisita, non innata, quoniam sit per abstractionem intellectus a fantasmate; sed cognitio in
20 nobis sit per adiutorium sensus (tertio huius), quoniam sit procedendo ab obiectis ad opera, ab
operationibus ad virtutes, a virtutibus ad substantiam; ergo est acquisita et non innata.
⟨3. Utrum cognitio ipsius fiat immediate per suam substantiam
vel per aliud medium⟩
⟨3. Utrum cognitio ipsius fiat immediate per suam substantiam vel per aliud medium⟩Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum cognitio ipsius fiat immediate per suam substantiam vel per aliud
medium.
25 5 Arguitur quod immediate.
5.1 In separatis a materia unumquodque id quod est statim est intelligibile et intellectum
(tertio huius); anima aliquid separatum est | a materia sicut ibidem dicit; {aut} ergo ipsa est M 87va
intelligibile et intellectum simul; et si sic, scientia de anima quam ipsa habet de se est immediate,
et non per aliud medium.
30 5.2 Praeterea quanto intelligibile magis approximatur intellecti, tanto magis ab ipso haec
intelligit, quoniam intellectus perficitur ex unitate intelligibilis cum intelligibilia; sed anima
20 Arist. DA III.7, 430a14–17. 27 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2–5. 27 Arist. III.4 429a22–b5.
7 coniunctum ] cognitum M 9 huius ] huiusmodi M 11 virtus post quam del. M 12 potente ]
in marg. M 14 illud ] illum M 14 intelligibili ] intellectuali M 15 naturaliter ] om. M 18 est
in ] inest a.c.M 27 aliquid ] quid M 28 intelligibile ] intellectus M 28 intellectum ] intellectus
M 30 praeterea ] prima M
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in cognitione sui de se magis sibi approximatur quam aliquid aliud; ergo in cognitione sui
cognoscit immediate, non per medium.
6.1 Oppositum patet per hoc quod dicit Aristoteles inferius de cognitione animae de qua
determinatur hic, quod obiecta prima sunt operationibus, et opera potentiis secundum cogni-
tionem, et quod potentiae procedunt substantiam; sed obiecta, operationes et potentiae non 5
sunt idem quod substantia animae; ergo anima in cognitione sui quam habet de se cognoscat
per huiusmodi media.
⟨Ad primam quaestionem⟩
⟨Ad primam quaestionem⟩Ad primam quaestionem dicendum quod de anima potest esse scientia, quoniam cum sit quod
simplex per suam potentiam, nata est cognoscere se; unde in separatis a materia statim est idem 10
cognoscens et cognitum, et intelligens et intellectum, sciens et scitum.
Et sciendum quod aliquid cognoscitur dupliciter, vel per privationem vel per positionem.
Per privationem dupliciter, vel per privationem cuius nihil est, ut prima causa in creaturis;
vel cuius aliquid est ut punctus in linea. Per positionem tripliciter, vel per effectus sicut per
creaturas devenimus in cognitionem creatoris, et hocmodo procedit scientia de anima; secundo 15
modo per species, et hoc dupliciter quia aut per speciem propriam ut aliquis per idolum sui quod
est in anima, vel per speciem alienam, ut Herculem per imaginem; tertio modo per praesentiam
ut intelligentia alterius {potens} cognoscit alterum. Anima ergo cognoscit se per effectus suos
et per sui praesentiam, et hoc modo habet esse scientia de anima.
Ad 1 Ad rationes. 20
Ad 1.1 In oppositum dicendum ad primam quod licet anima per se non cadat in sensu,
cadit tamen per accidens, ut per suos effectus.
Ad 1.2 Ad secundum dicendum quod anima secundum suam essentiam non sit res con-
tinua et temporalis, tamquam ad suos operationes est continua et temporalis.
Ad 1.3 Per hoc patet ad tertium. 25
Ad 1.5 Ad quintum dicendum quod non valet prior quia sensitiva [?] ⟨est⟩ virtus mate-
rialis et ligata organo, et ideo non potest se convertere supra se; sed anima intellectiva non est
sic ligata.
Ad 1.4 Ad aliud quod arguitur quod ‘omnis scientia est per causam’ et cetera, dicendum
quod duplex est scientia: ‘quia’ et ‘propter quid’; auctor autem tenet de scientia ‘propter quid’; 30
scientia autem posita est scientia ‘quia’, et propter hoc non valet ratio.
Ad 1.6 Ad ultimam rationem dicendum quod illa ratio nihil aliud potest includere nisi
quia sicut est imposibile oculum noctuae videre lumine solis, sic difficile nos cognoscere ma-
nifestissima naturae mediante intellectu.
3 Arist. DA II.4, 415a18–21.
5 obiecta ] obiectumM 6 idem ] idM 9 quaestionem ] quaestioneM 15 secundo ] alio Gauthier
17 ut herculem ] et Hercules O 17 praesentiam ] coni. Gauthier; potentiam O 18 potens ] 19




⟨Ad secundam quaestionem⟩Per hoc patet solutio ad secundam quaestionem dicendo quod cognitio animae de qua est hic
sermo, non est innata nobis, ⟨sed⟩ mediante sensu et mediante abstractione facta a fantasma-
tibus sensualibus, et hoc loquendo de cognitione animae de qua est hic sermo in hac scientia,
5 quamquam habet de se, immo verius totum coniunctum inquantum est actus et perfectio totius
corporis; loquendo enim de eius cognitione a se ipsa in statu suae separationis naturaliter se
ipsam cognoscit per sui praesentiam.
Ad 3.1 Ad illud quod arguitur primo in oppositum, ‘omnis argumentatio in qua cogno-
scens naturaliter est coniunctum cognito est innata’, dicendum quod verum est. Cum autem
10 assumitur quod sic est in cognitione de anima, dicendum quod falsum est, nisi considerando
ipsam secundum statum suae separationis quem habet ipsa de se sit intelligibile, quia cum | M 87vb
intelligere non convenit ei secundum quod est coniuncta nisi per adminiculum sensus abstra-
hendo species sensibiles a fantasmatibus, cum sit sicut tabula nuda in qua nihil et cetera, huiu-
smodi sic est cognoscens seipsam ⟨ut⟩ non est cognitum coniunctum cognoscenti immediate
15 eo quod non cognoscit se per se, sed per obiecta suarum operationum.
Ad 3.2 Ad illud quod arguitur secundo, ‘sensus naturaliter potest in propriam operatio-
nem potentia sensibilis, ergo et intellectus’, potest dici quod verum est. Cum autem assumitur
quod intellectus semper est sibi praesens, dicendum quod falsum est inquantum est coniunc-
tus, quoniam nihil est cognoscibile ab intellectu coniuncto, ut per abstractionem iam dictam.
20 Aliter potest dici quod sensus non potest naturaliter super suam operationem presente sensi-
bili, quo ad hoc quod sua cognitio non fiat acquisita. Immo praesente sensibili nullo impediente
posito potest supra suam operationem in apprehendendo sensibile, et hoc non nisi per speciem
quam acquirit a sensu ex eius potentia; sed dicitur naturaliter quo ad hoc posse suam opera-
tionem potente sensibili, quia de se habet potentiam naturalem, ut per speciem quam acquirit
25 per sensibile potest speciem apprehendere; et similiter est dicendum de intellectu respectu in-
telligibilis ita quod per speciem quam acquirit sibi ab intellectu convertendo se supra speciem
habet naturalem potentiam ipsum intelligendi, sed hoc non ponit scientiam naturaliter innata,
quoniam scientia naturaliter innata ponit speciem innatam, quando fit cognitio per speciem.
⟨Ad tertiam quaestionem⟩
⟨Ad tertiam quaestionem⟩30 Per hoc etiam de tertia quaestione patet dicendo quod cognitio de anima de qua hic agitur non
est per eius substantiam immediate acceptam sed mediantibus obiectis operationibus et poten-
tiis, ut procedit ultima obiectio, licet cognitio in statu suae separationis sit per suam substantiam
immediate, ut patet similiter ex dictis.
Ad 5.1 Ad primum cum dicitur ‘in separatis amateria idem est intelligibile et intellectum’,
35 verum est sub ratione qua separatum amateria, et sic concedendum esset quod cognitio animae
de se esset per immediationem, sed quoniam intellectus non intelligit sub ratione qua separa-
tus ⟨non contingit⟩; sed quia non intendimus hic de ipsa anima nisi prout est coniuncta cum
7 praesentiam ] potentiam M 12 adminiculum ] adnim per adminiculum M 21 sensibili ] sensi-
biliter M 26 convertendo ] convertende O 32 separationis ] operationis M 37 nec post anima
del. M
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intelligere, quod proprie debetur coniuncto, illud non oportet; et de tali cognitione cognoscet
anima, sed verius ipsum cognitum, ut determinatur in hac scientia.
Ad 5.2 Similiter patet ad secundum quod illud verum est considerando intelligibile sub
ratione qua intelligibile, nunc autem, licet anima per suam scientiam intelligibile sit, quid sit a
se ipsa ⟨intellectum⟩, et magis approximatum sibi ipsi illud quod est quantum est de cognitione 5
eius, ut est coniuncta sui, verius est de cognitione coniuncti ipsa sub ratione qua intelligibile
non se habet immediatius ad intelligens. Immo obiecta operationis magis haberent rationem
intelligibilis eo quod in tali cognitione nihil fit intelligibile nisi per sensum cuius sunt obiecta
et opera, et non eius obiecta, ut visum est.
7 operationis ] operationes M
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C.7 Anonymus Orielensis 33: Quaestiones in De an-
ima I–III
This text precedes the commentary of Dinsdale in the Oriel manuscript (ff. 120r–162v), which
is the only text in the codex that has an attribution (although it also contains his questions on
Ethica Nicomacheawithout any ascription). Ebbesen presents the possibility that this anonym-
ous commentator might also be the author of the questions onDe memoria et reminiscentia that
he has edited.18
This text is very close to that of Dinsdale, which has been dated to between 1274 and 1289.
It is not possible to clarify the exact relation between the two texts, so the best we can do is to
assume that the two texts are roughly contemporary.
Manuscript sigla
O Oxford, Oriel College Library, 33: 120–162v.
18 Ebbesen 2016: 130.
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I.1: An cognitio de anima sit nobis possibilis
I.1: An cognitio de anima sit nobis possibilis
O 120rb,
O 120va Iuxta cuius introitum primo quaeratur an cognitio de anima | sit nobis possiblis.
1.1 Videtur quod non, nam cum scientia sit habitus intellectualis, omne scibile oportet
esse intelligibile; anima autem non est aliquid intelligibile; ergo nec scibile. Minor probatur ex
hoc quod anima sub sensu non cadit, quare nec sub apprehensione intellectus. Praeterea anima 5
non facit fantasma, fantasia enim est motus factus secundum actum.
1.2 Praeterea omne intelligere nostrum est cum continuo et tempore, ut dicitur in De me-
moria et reminiscentia; anima autem continua non est nec temporalis; non ergo erit intelligibilis,
et per consequens nec scibilis.
1.3 Praeterea Philosophus secundoMetaphysicae dicit: “sicut oculus ad lucem diei se ha- 10
bet, sic intellectus noster ad ea quae sunt manifestissima in rerum natura”, de quorum numero
est anima saltim humana, ergo ipsa non magis apprehendetur ab intellectu nostro quam lux
diei ab oculo nycticoracis; sed apprehensio lucis diei ab oculo noctuae est impossibilis, ergo sic
erit ex parte ista.
1.4 Praeterea impossibile est idem esse movens et motum, nam sic idem esset in actu et 15
in potentia respectu eiusdem. Quod autem cognoscitur ab aliquo movens est respectu cogno-
scentis. Igitur impossibile est idem simul esse cognitum et cognoscens. Hoc tamen contingeret
si anima de seipsa scientiam haberet.
2.1 Ad oppositum est determinatio Philosophi.
3 Dicendum quod ⟨cognitio⟩ de anima possibilis est nobis; et proprie dicta et extensive. 20
3.1 Primum apparet sic: Scientia propriissime dicta est habitus quidem intellectus per
demonstrationem acquisitus. De quocumque igitur contingit habere demonstrationem de eo-
dem erit scientia. Ad demonstrationem vero tria sufficiunt: subiectum, passio, et principium
per quod ostendatur passio de subiecto. Quod quidem principium ab Aristotele dicitur propo-
sitio immediata a privatione medii inter extrema cui notius attribuatur predicatum vel notius 25
subiecto attribuatur.. Haec tria contingit reperire circa animam. Est enim anima quoddam su-
biectum scibile cuius suntmultae proprietates et passiones, ut intelligere, speculari et cetera. Est
etiam animae alia certa definitio per quam, ut per medium, heae proprietates de anima possunt
concludi. Tunc arguo: Cuicumque possibilis est cognitio principii, eidem possibilis est etiam
cognitio conclusionis. Sed intellectui nostro possibilis est cognitio huius principii sive proposi- 30
tionis immediatae qua proprietas animae attribuitur eius definitioni, illius etiam qua definitio
animae de ipsa anima praedicatur; ergo possibilis erit haec conclusio qua passio animae de
anima concluditur, et haec est habere certam cognitionem de anima, et sic patet primum.
3.2 Secundum patet sic: Accidentia, eo quod non sunt entia nisi in alio, ipsa praecognita
manuducunt in cognitionem eius cuius sunt. Sed multae sunt operationes artificiales nobis 35
manifestae quae non possunt procedere nisi a potentia intellectiva. Haec enim immediate fluit
a substantia animae, propter quod huiusmodi operationes nobis manifestae statim ducent in
6 Cf. Arist. DA III.3 429a1–2; Auct. Arist. 6.111. 7 Arist. Mem. 1 450a7–8 10–11 Arist. Metaph. II.1,
993b9–11. 19 Arist. DA I.1 402a1–22. 24–26 Locus non inventus.
13 noctuae ] noctutae B 26 attribuatur ] atebuatur a.c. B 32 praedicatur ] ut vid. O
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cognitionem animae. Sed scientia de anima sic acquisita per effectus non est proprie scientia,
quia ex causa haec procedit.
Ad 1.1 Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod minor est falsa, et ad eius probationem
dicendum quod aliquid sub sensu cadere est dupliciter: Aut per privationem sicut negationes
5 et privationes, ut tenebrae, aut per positionem, sicut illa quae sentiuntur per speciem; et hoc
dupliciter, quaedam enim per speciem propriam sentiuntur, quaedam autem per speciem alio-
rum (per propriam sicut color per propriam speciem sentiuntur, per alterius sicut Diari filius);
anima igitur sentitur per positionem, sed non per sui ipsius speciem, sed alterius, et sic etiam
facit fantasiam. Per hoc enim quod operationes animae nobis manifestae sensum immutant,
10 anima quae est immediate principium huius immutationis quodammodo sentitur, et sic facit
fantasma per aliud, et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod intelligatur.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliud dicendum quod intelligere nostrum incipit a continuis et temporalibus,
| sed ex eis procedit ad separata, et sic cognitio nostra de anima a quibusdam temporalibus O 120vb
procedit in quibus non sistit, sed ulterius transit ad substantiam animae quae est supra omne
15 tempus. Vel potest dici quod non ideo dicitur intelligere nostrum cum continuo et tempore,
quia omne quod intellegimus sit continuum et temporale, sicut ratio deducit. Sed quia nihil
intellegimus nisi prius existens in virtute fantastica, fantasma autem non est sine continuo,
quia non sine organo. Iterum intelligere nostrum est discursivum, et ita cum tempore, propter
quod sine hiis non intelligimus.
20 Ad 1.3 Ad aliud dicendum secundum Commentatorem quod illud exemplum non ad-
ducitur propter impossibilitatem, sed propter difficultatem, ita ut sicut difficile est tali oculo
inspicere lumen solis, ita difficile est intellectum nostrum inspicere et cognoscere separata.
Manifestum est enim quod licet oculus noctuae non possit directe in apprehensionem solis,
poterit tamen in apprehensionem alicuius effectus luminis solis. Volat enim in vesperis. Quod
25 si oculus eius esset ab effectu ad causam lumen solis, posset apprehendere. Nunc autem intel-
lectus noster apprehendens quosdam effectus substantiarum separatarum est, propter quod eis
cognitis surgit in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum ad discursum quoddam, sed quia ef-
fectus animae humanae sunt nobis manifestiores quam alicuius alterius substantiae separatae,
ideo operationes animae sunt magis adaequate substantiae animae. Ideo magis cogniscimus de
30 anima humana quam de aliqua alia anima.
Ad 1.4 Ad aliud dicendum quod est motus duplex.Quidam qui est actus entis imperfecti,
et proprie dictus est actus perfecti sicut intelligere et speculari. Motu primo impossibile est
idem simul movere et moveri, nisi valde per accidens, ut homo movens navem etiam movetur
motu eodem per accidens. Sed motu secundo possibile est hoc, immo neccessarium, et {hoc}
35 ideo quod movetur isto motu, ut quod intelligit aut speculatur, neccessario est substantia im-
materialis, et ita aliquid indivisibile. Sed indivisibile potest reflecti supra seipsum totaliter, quod
tamen impossibile est de habente partem extra partem, propter quod omnis substantia intelli-
gens potest seipsam intelligere. Sed hoc est differenter. Est enim aliqua substantia semper actu
intelligens, sicut prima causa et intelligentiae, et talis per se et primo seipsam potest intelligere
40 sine adiutorio alterius. Est autem aliqua substantia intelligens nunc in potentia nunc in actu,
et quia omne tale reducitur de potentia in actum per quid aliud a se, ideo ut se intelligat quid
24 tamen post apprehensionem del. B
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aliud exigit. Huiusmodi autem est intellectus noster, qui existens in potentia ad actum intelli-
gendi non reducitur nisi per speciem alterius. Cum autem aliud intelligit per speciem seipsam
percipit intelligere et sic reflectitur supra suam propriam operationem et per consequens supra
suam substantiam apprehendens se esse substantiam intellectivam, et sic anima intelligit se.
294 c. texts
C.8 Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 I: Quaestiones in De
anima I–II
This text is preserved in Vat. Lat. 2170: 6v–25v (14th century), which, as the name implies, also
contains the commentary of Anonymus Vaticani 2170 II, but also a witness to the questions of
Faversham.
Based on the doctrinal analyses I estimate that the text belongs to the later quarter of the
13th or early 14th century. Doctrinally this commentary is closest to that of Anonymus Giele,
but also with some connections to Jandun, Brito, and Faversham, which are all from 13.4 or 14.1.
That the text also occurs in the same manuscript as a witness to the commentary of Faversham
also puts it in historical proximity to that text.
Manuscript sigla
V Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2170: 6v–25v
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I.2: Utrum de anima possit esse scientia
I.2: Utrum de anima possit esse scientiaV 6vb Consequenter quaeritur utrum de anima possit esse scientia.
1 Et videtur quod non. Et hoc praecipue de intellectiva.
1.1 De illo quod nullomodo est sensibile non potest haberi scientia, quia per Philosophum
tertio huius intellectus intelligit per fantasmata; fantasmata autem fiunt per sensum; anima 5
intellectiva nullo modo est sensibilis, quia nec per se, quia non est quid corporeum, nec per
suas operationes, quia nullus sensus percipit intelligere quod est operatio intellectus; ergo et
cetera.
1.2 Item arguitur hoc sophistice: corruptibilium non est scientia quia scientia est habitus
intransmutabilis et ideo non potest esse corruptibilium; anima autem est transmutabilis quia 10
corrumpitur ad corruptionem corporis, scilicet vegetativa et sensitiva; ergo et cetera.
1.3 Item inter sciens et scitum oportet esse aliquam diversitatem, cuius probatio est quia
sunt relativa, idem autem non refertur ad se ipsum; sed si de anima esset scientia, tunc non
esset diversitas inter sciens et scitum, immo idem esset sciens et scitum, quia anima sciret se
ipsam; ergo de anima non posset esse aliqua scientia. 15
2.1 Oppositum patet per Philosophum. Patet per Philosophum qui nobis tradit scientiam
de anima.
3.1 Ad hoc dicendum est quod diversimode contingit habere scientiam de aliquo, large
accipiendo scientiam pro cognitione qua aliquid certe cognoscitur, scilicet per definitionem,
per divisionem, per demonstrationem. 20
3.1.1 Modo dicendum est quod esse illud quod habet quod quid est sive essentiam quam
intellectus potest apprehendere potest cognosci, quia definitio ad hoc ordinatur quod indicet
quod quid est rei; sed anima habet quod quid est sive essentiam, quia non est quid privatorium
neque figmentorium, quare de anima potest esse scientia per definitionem.
3.1.2 Item ad hoc quod fiat divisio sive scientia per divisionem de aliquo exigitur quod 25
habeat partes sub se contentas in quibus salvetur, quia divisim salvatur in dividentibus, et non
exigitur nisi quod habeat partes, quia divisio est in partes; sed anima habet partes, scilicet
subiectivas et etiam potentiales, quare de anima est scientia per divisionem.
3.1.3 Iterum ad habendum scientiam de aliquo per demonstrationem exigitur quod ha-
beat passiones quae de ipso habeant probari per definitionem illius cuius sunt, quia quod est 30
principium subiecti est causa accidentium eius, et intelligendum est hoc de accidentibus pro-
priis; sed anima habet passiones quae de ipsa possunt probari per eius definitionem; quare de
ipsa potest esse scientia per demonstrationem.
3.1.4 Et sic de anima potest haberi scientia istis tribus modis sciendi, qui traduntur in
logica, et illo modo tradit Philosophus scientiam de anima quia dedit definitionem animae et 35
divisit eam in partes integrales et subiectivas et potentiales, et probavit de ipsa passiones.
3.2 Considerandum tamen est quod difficultas est in isto et in aliis qualiter intellectus
consurgit in cognitione⟨m⟩ quod quid est, et videtur esse altera istarum duarum viarum ad hoc.
4–5 Arist. DA III.8, 432a7–9.
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Intellectus enim percipit quod ex aliqua re procedunt operationes, tunc facit quandam coniec-
turationem, et videt in quo habet esse et in quo non, et resolvit illa accidentia in illa ex quibus
possunt procedere, scilicet in illa principia ex quibus habet causari, et ideo, quia coniecturat
in quo habent ⟨esse⟩ huiusmodi accidentia et in quibus non, et sic devenit in cognitionem ip-
5 sius quod quid, ita quod ex virtute illius rei †alias† innotescit genus, et ex diversitate accipitur
differentia.
Est tamen intelligendum quod intellectus habet aliquem intellectum essentialem qui non
est intellectus | accidentis, †et hoc est quod intellectus entis, quia sicut dicit Avicenna “intel- V 7ra
lectus entis entis in est dubius ”†, et ideo, quia habet intellectum essentialem ex accidentibus,
10 potest devenire in cognitionem quod quid est ubi et illud oportet, id est quod habeat aliquem
intellectum essentialem, quia aliter esset abire in infinitum; sed quia habet intellectum essen-
tialem ex accidentibus in virtute ipsius quod quid est nec est mirum, quia in naturalibus ita
est quod accidens in virtute substantiae generat substantiam, sicut calidum quod agit in vir-
tute ignis, non solum generat calidum sed etiam ignem, et ideo simili modo ex cogitatione
15 accipiendo per coniecturationem intellectus consurgit ad cognoscendum quod quid est.
3.3 Alia via est quia virtutes inter se habent connectionem ita quod virtus inferior quo
adiuvat superiorem et ei subministrat suum cognoscibile ita quod superior incipit ubi inferior
dimittit, sicut sensato lupi et reservato simulacro in fantasia {est} imaginativa, ex hoc elicit
aliquid insensatum, scilicet inimicitiam; similiter per connexionem ex accidentibus devenietur
20 ad cognoscendum quod quid est, ita quod ex accidentibus per hoc quod se faciunt in sensu
intellectus accipiat aliquid quod non est accidentale, scilicet ipsum quod quid est, et differunt
istae viae quia una habet intellectum essentialem, alia autem non.
3.4 Tertio est intelligendum quod potentia aliqua per se non vadit ad actum, sed oportet
quod reducatur per aliquid existens in actu; unde actus similiter praecedit, unde illud quod
25 reducit potentiam ad actum oportet quod sit actu tale quale illud fuit in potentia. Anima autem
est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, et ideo non potest produci ad intelligendum per se ipsam,
sed per aliquid quod sit in actu, et cum ita est educta, est ad actum. Amplius non est virtus
passiva sive in potentia, sed magis in actu, et ideo potest sibi aliquid facere quod prius non
posset. Unde cum anima ita est in actu quod est virtus reflexiva, potest converti et iterare super
30 se ipsam, et ita potest intelligere seipsum, non primo actu intelligendi, sed actu secundario sive
reflexo.
Ad 1 Per haec aliqualiter apparet solutio ad argumenta.
Ad 1.1 Primo cum dicitur “De eo quod non est sensibile” et cetera, verum est ⟨de⟩ primo
actu intelligendi, quia sicut arguitur: intellectus accipit ex fantasmatibus, tamen quia est virtus
35 reflexiva, per reflexionem potest haberi de alio.
Vel etiam in aliquibus sine reductione sicut per accidens intelligit subiectum, et cum sub-
stantia non cadit in sensu, quia sola accidentia sunt sensibilia, et ulterius anima intellectiva non
8–9 Locus non inventus.
1 enim ] sup. lin. V 2 in3 illa2 ] in marg. V 4 habent ] libet O 5 alias ] fortasse corruptum,
num ‘eius’ scribendum sit? 7 intellectum ] intelligentium ut vid. V 9 in ] post ‘in’ fenestra 5 litt.
praebuit V 13 ita post est del. V 13 in1 ] fortasse expunctum 18 sensato ] sensata V 20 se ] si
O 27 ad ] a a.c. V 30 actu2 ] quoniam V
anonymus uaticanus 2170 i: quaestiones in de anima i–ii 297
est sensibilis, nec per se, nec ⟨per⟩ suas operationes, verum est, et ideo cum concludit quod de
ipsa non habetur scientia primo, per intellectum, et hoc est concessum.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliud cum dicitur ‘corruptibilium’ et cetera, dicendum quod rerum non est
scientia sub illa ratione sub qua sunt corruptibiles sive singular⟨i⟩a, modo singularium non
est scientia, quia illis abeu⟨n⟩tibus ab occulis amplius non haberet in certitudine ⟨utrum sint 5
an non⟩, sicut dicitur septimo Metaphysicae, et sic non est scientia, quia scientia est habitus
intransmutabilis; modo si Socrates recedit ab oculo et habeatur de ipso alia opinion quam ha-
beatur dum erat praesens, non est scientia quia habitus transmutatur; si eadem ⟨de⟩ Socrate,
hoc est falsum, quia iam mutatus est; scientia autem est habitus verus, sed ab istis singularibus
corruptibilibus abstrahitur universale, et istud est incorruptibile, quia illud est incorruptibile, 10
ut dicitur primo posteriorum; et sub ratione universalis est scientia de rebus propter quod cum
V 7rb dicitur ‘corruptibilium’ et cetera, | verum est sub illa ratione sub qua sunt corruptibilia, sed
⟨non⟩ sub illa ratione sub qua sunt incorruptibilia, et ulterius: anima est corruptibilis verum est
in singulari, et hoc modo non est scientia de illa, sed ⟨non⟩ in universali sub illa ratione sub
qua est intelligibilis. 15
Ad 1.3 Ad aliud est intelligendum quod aliquid esse scitum hoc est dupliciter, aut primo
actu intelligendi sive primo intellectu, aut secundario et reflexo sive reditivo; si sic primo in-
tellectu, hoc modo inter sciens et scitum oportet esse diversitatem realem, per hoc quod unum
dicitur respective ad alterum; si reflexivo intellectu non oportet, quia reflexio est alicuius supra
ipsum vel supra suum actum. Et ideo cum dicitur “inter sciens et scitum oportet esse diversita- 20
tem”, verum est si sit scitum primo intellectu. Est ulterius si de anima esset scientia, non esset
aliqua diversitas; immo idem esset sciens et scitum, verum est, quia anima non habet scien-
tiam de se ipsa primo intellectu sive primo actu intelligendi; sed per reflexionem et reditionem
quandam.
6 Auct. Arist. 1.182. Cf. Arist. Metaph. VII.15, 1040a2–4.
1 cum ] fortasse ‘bene’ scribendum sit 4 sive ] sui V 5 certitudine ] certitudo V 6 sicu post
quia del. V 8 socrate ] forte V 13 incorruptibilia ] corruptibilia a.c. V
298 c. texts
C.9 Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II: Quaestiones in De
anima I–III
This is the same manuscript as the preceding text. I also date this similarly broadly to the late
13th or early 14th century. This text shares the greatest doctrinal similarity with the texts of
Dinsdale, Faversham, and Wyle. In the catalogue entry on this manuscript Maier notes that
this text may share material or doctrines with Faversham’sQuaestiones in De anima I–III which
follow immediately after this text in the codex, and in the parts analysed here that hypothesis
has been confirmed.19
Manuscript sigla
V Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2170: 51r-62v
19 Maier 1961: 142–53, cf. Vennebusch 1965: 28–9.
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I.1: Utrum de anima sit scientia
I.1: Utrum de anima sit scientiaV 51rb Sed circa dicta quaeritur utrum de anima sit scientia.
1 Arguitur quo non.
1.1 De illo non potest esse scientia cui non contingit ratio subiecti; anima est huiusmodi;
ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia de ratione subiecti est quod habeat partes et passiones quibus 5
subsistet, quas anima non habet cum sit forma simplex et posset esse per se subsistens; igitur
et cetera.
1.2 Item scientia habet causatum extra sensu de illo, ergo quod nec per se nec per accidens
potest cadere sub sensu non est scientia; anima saltim intellectiva est huiusmodi, quod non per
se patet quod non per accidens, quia hoc esset per operationem aliam, sed eius operatio est 10
separata sicut eius substantia, quia non transit extra; ergo et cetera.
2.1 Oppositum patet per Philosophum.
3.1 Dicendum quod de anima potest esse scientia, sed tota difficultas est de anima intel-
lectiva. Constat enim quod operationes sensitivae sunt eius et experimur, ideo in cognitionem
eius possumus devenire, sed intellectus non quomodo cadere sub sensu, nec per se nec per 15
accidens.
Sed probo [?] quod de intellectu possit esse scientia, quia de omni eo quod est natum intelligi
potest esse scientia, quia tale habet partes et passiones; anima quaecumque est huiusmodi quia
substantia quaedam est ut est actus; ideo potest intelligi, quia est ens perfectum cum sit actus.
Item est ens tale quod de se est non individuatum, sed est regularibus communicatum [?], 20
tale autem habet partes subiectivas quae ad subiectum scientiae requiruntur.
Item anima habet principium per se.
Item in ea est principium materiale et formale per quae multarum operationum causa
reditur, scilicet intellectus agens et possibilis; ergo et cetera.
3.2 Sed est difficultas, cum intellectus non cadat sub sensu, quomodo de eo est scientia, et 25
per huius tertio huiusmodi solvit quia dicit “intellegit se ut alia”, iuxta quod est intelligendum
quod intellectus de se est ut tabula nuda in qua nihil depingitur, et nihil est actu intelligibilium
ante intelligere.
Non {non} intelligit Philosophus quod intelligit se ut alia abstrahendo a sensibus, quia tunc
esset alius intellectus qui ipsum intelligeret et illum alius et sic non similiter, quod est impossi- 30
bilie, sed sic intelligit: per speciem alienam reducitur ad actum et tunc se intelligit per propriam
V 51va speciem. Et tu dices “quomodo se per propriam?” Dicendum quod species aliena | ducit de po-
tentia ad actum quae facit unum cum eo, non facit forma cum eo {non} sicut formamateriae nec
ut accidens cum subiecto, sed sic⟨ut⟩ lumen cum perspicuo. Ideo fit unum ex specie, et ipse ideo
dicitur per propriam speciem intelligere, et quia intelligere ⟨∗∗∗⟩; nisi iudicare se intelligere, et 35
per hunc actum necessaria se intelligit per speciem suam quae cum ducit in actum ⟨∗∗∗⟩.
Ad 1 Ad rationes.
26 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2–3. 27–28 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29–30a2.
17 probo ] ut vid. V 19 potest ] per V 19 intelligi ] ut vid. V 20 item ] ut vid. V 32 per ]
sup. lin. V 33 cons post forma del. V
300 c. texts
Ad 1.1 Ad maiorem primae conceditur. Ad minorem dicendum quod simplicitas animae,
cum non sit, non repugnat ei ratio subiecti, quia tali non potest inesse passio ut primo; et tu
dicis “non est per se subsistens, ideo non habet passiones”, non valet quia haec non oportet ad
hoc quod {quod} aliquid sit subiectum, sed sit subiectum respectu passionum; sed intellectus
5 est aliquo modo hoc aliquid ut patebit, ideo non valet.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliam concedo maiorem, et cum dicitur “illud quod non cadit sub sensu” et
cetera, non oportet, sed sufficit quod movetur ab illo vel sicut illud quod cadit sub sensu, et sic
est in proposito ut ostensum est.
7 illud ] illius V
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III.11: Utrum intelligat se per suam substantiam
III.11: Utrum intelligat se per suam substantiamV 61ra Consequenter quaeritur utrum intelligat se per suam substantiam.
1.1 Arguitur quod sic, quia in separatis a materia idem est intellectus et intellectum, ut di-
cit Philosophus; sed intellectus est separatus amateria, igitur idem est intellectus et intellectum;
sed intellectus ⟨est⟩ sua substantia, ergo intelligit se per suam substantiam. 5
1.2 Item, quae sunt eiusdem generis habent eundem modum cognitionis; sed intellectus
est eiusdem generis cum intelligentiis quae intelligunt se per suas substantias; igitur et cetera.
1.3 Item, quia si non non esset nisi quia intelligit se per operationem, scilicet reflectendo
se super causam; hoc non stat, quia tunc non est obiectum eius, quod non est verum quia
procedit operatio in obiecto; igitur et cetera. 10
1.4 Item, ⟨si⟩ intelligeret reflectendo se super suum actum et per hoc se intelligeret et
suam substantiam; tunc se reflecteret iterum super secundum actum, et sic secundus actus esset
obiectum eius, et tunc eadem ratione se reflecteret super tertium actum, et sic in infinitum, quod
est impossibile.
2.1 Oppositum: Intellectus intelligit se sicut alia, ut dicit Philosophus; sed alia non intel- 15
ligit per substantias suas; igitur et cetera.
3.1 Dicendum quod intelligit se non per suam substantiam, quia quod est in potentia
intelligibile non cognoscitur actu et per se, sicut visibile in potentia non videtur per se, et
similiter materia prima.Modo quidam sunt qui sunt puri actus, ut primum ipsum, et tale oportet
neccesario quod intelligat per suam substantiam. Alia autem separata, scilicet intelligentiae, 20
intelligunt se per suas substantias vel per influentiam a primo, intellectu quia sunt actus et
actus in eis. Sed intellectus noster est in pura potentia in genere intellectualis naturae, et ideo
non potest intelligi; sed oportet quod per alia intelligibilia fiat actu per intelligibile propter
suam operationem.
Sed quomodo per suum actum intelligat se est difficile intelligere, sed quaedam sunt quo- 25
rum intelligere est sua substantia, ut primum ipsum, quia in eo nullum est accidens, et intel-
V 61rb ligentiae quia recedunt a simplicitate primi, intelligere earum non est | sua substantia, sed est
prima perfectio sui obiecti primi, scilicet suae substantiae, quia sunt actus. Dico autem quod
hoc est intelligere intelligentiarum realiter est substantia earum, tamen differunt secundum
modum essendi, sicut ens et esse ita quod intelligere similatur ipsi esse et substantia intelligen- 30
tiae enti, sed in primo modo differunt, et intelligere et sua substantia. Sed intellectus noster,
cum sit in potentia, intelligere non est perfectio eius obiecti primi, quia eius obiectum primum
est aliud ab eo. Sed cum factus est in actu per obiectum aliud, inflectitur se super suum actum
iterum et intelligit se, non alia, quia non intelligit se per suam substantiam, et quia per speciem
aliquo modo propriam, quia species ipsius quod quid est, quod cum obiectum fecit eum in actu, 35
et sic est unum cum ipso in actu, et ideo est ei propria aliquo modo ei per illam se intelligit,
ideo per speciem propriam se intelligit.
3–4 Arist. DA III.4 430a2–3. 15 Arist. DA III.4 430a2–3.
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3.2 Sed dicas si intellectus se reflectendo cognoscat, tunc quilibet intellectus se reflectet
suum actum et intelliget substantiam sui intellectus intelligens, et sic non tot errarent circa
intellectum. Et dicendum quod actum intellectus reflecti et ipsum intelligere est duplex, uno
modo confuse et quantum ad hoc quod intelligit et cognoscit se intelligere et habere intellectum
5 aliquo modo et esse intellectum; Alio modo quod cognoscat qualitatem actus intellectus intel-
lectus perfecte et distincte et substantiam intellectus, et hoc non est facile, sed multum difficile,
quia per multa⟨s⟩ inquisitiones fit, et sic Philosophus procedit in determinando de intellectu –
primo assimulando eum sensui, deinde investigando propriam eius naturam et distinguendo
eum a sensu.
10 Ad 1 Ad rationes.
Ad 1.1 Ad maiorem primae: Verum est si sit actu; tamen non est in actu de se, quia si sic,
bene concluderet.
Ad 1.2 Ad secundam conceditur maior. Et ad minorem: falsum est, quia intelligentiae
sunt totaliter separatae a corpore; intellectus autem non.
15 Ad 1.3 Ad tertiam: Ad maiorem conceditur. Ad minorem: falsum est, quia licet operatio
in prima operatione sit ab obiecto, tamen in secundo actu fit †alterum† scilicet in reflectione.
Ad 1.4 Ad quartam: De infinito concedo, quia infinitum se convertere potest super suam
operationem, et hoc non est inconveniens cum sit immaterialis sed neccessarium.
1 reflectendo ] reflectendi V 14 sunt ] sint V 16 tamen ] tunc V 16 alterum ] num ‘a termino’
scribendum?
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C.10 Henric de la Wyle: Quaestiones in De anima I–
III
This text is preserved in Magdalen 63: 57r-94v. The manuscript is English and from the first
quarter of the 15th century.20 Henric de la Wyle is a fellow at Merton College from 1284 and
registered as arts master in 1285, and by 1308 he has become doctor theologiae. So this text is
most like from between 1285 and 1308.21 Most likely the end of the 13th century, if we also
take into account some time to become a theological doctor.22
Manuscript sigla
M Oxford, Magdalen College Library, 63: 57r-94v
20 Thomson 2011: 289–91.
21 Lohr 1968: 233, Emden 1957: I.565, Little and Pelster 1934: 286.
22 Lohr 1968: 233, cf. Mora-Márquez 2014: 214.
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I.1: An de anima possit esse scientia
I.1: An de anima possit esse scientiaBonorum honorabilium notitiam opinantes. Quaeritur an de anima possit esse scientia. M 57ra
1.1 Videtur primo quod non, quia illud de quo est scientia per se oportet esse aliquod
universale; anima non est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.Maior ostenditur primo Posteriorum. Minor
5 probatur sic: Universale sit per abstractionem a multis singularibus sensibus; sed anima non
est singulare et sensibilis.
1.2 Item illud de quo est scientia oportet esse intelligibile; sed anima non est intelligibile;
ergo et cetera. Minor patet ex tribus.
1.2.1 Quod intelligit inquantum intelligit est patiens et motum; quod intelligitur inquan-
10 tum tale est agens et movens; sed nihil idem est agens et patiens, movens et motum, quia tunc
idem eodem respectu esset in potentia et in actu; sed si anima esset intelligibilis, idem esset
quod intelligit et quod intelligitur, et per consequens idem esset et eodem respectu agens et
patiens, movens et motum.
1.2.2 Idem secundo ostenditur sic: Nostrum intelligere vel est fantasma vel non est sine
15 fantasamate; quod ergo non facit fantasma non est intelligibile; anima est huiusmodi; ergo et
cetera. Minor huius ostenditur quia per Aristoteles secundo huius “fantasma est motus factus a
sensu”, quare manifestum est quod anima non cadit sub sensu; ergo fantasma facere non potest,
et per consequens non est intelligibilis.
1.2.3 Illud idem ostenditur tertio sic: Per Aristoteles tertio huius nostrum intelligere est
20 cum continuo et tempore; sed anima nec est continua nec temporalis; ergo et cetera. Quod
non sit continua manifestum est quia non est divisibilis; quod non sit temporalis patet per
Aristoteles secundo huius ubi vult quod anima separatur a corpore tamquam perpetuum a
corruptibili, sed nihil inquantum perpetuum est temporale.
1.3 Item illud de quo est scientia neccesarie est habere aliquam proprietatem per se quae
25 possit ostendi de eo; sed anima non est talis proprietas; ergo et cetera. Minor ostenditur si eius
esset aliquam proprietas per se, haec maxime esset intelligere et sentire, sed per Aristoteles
istae proprietates non sunt per se ipsius animae, sed coniuncti; unde habetur quod nihil aliud
est dicere animam gaudere vel tristari quam texere vel aedificare et cetera.
2.1 Oppositum ostenditur sic: de forma et perfectione rei naturalis potest esse aliquam
30 scientia, sed anima est perfectio rei naturalis et forma, quia corporis animati ⟨perfectio est⟩ de
ipsa, ergo potest esse scientia. Maior ostenditur sic per Aristoteles primo Physicorum: “materia
est solum scibilis secundum analogiam.” Quod ergo materia sit scibilis, hoc est per respectum
ad formam; forma ergo est magis per se scibilis.
3.1 Ad illud dicendum est quod differenter dicitur de aliquo esse scientia, quia alium
35 dicitur esse scientia de aliquo sicut de subiecto; alium dicitur esse scientia de aliquo sicut de
conclusione in demonstratione; alium dicitur esse scientia de aliquo sicut de passione quae
scitur de subiecto. Inter istos modos maxime proprie est scientia quando | de alio scitur sicut M 57rb
2 Arist. DA I.1, 402a1–2. 4 APo I.4, 73b25–27. 16–17 Aristoteles DA III.4, 429a1–2. 19 Aristoteles
DA III.6, 430b16–20. 22–23 Aristoteles DA II.2, 413b26–27. 27–28 Aristoteles DA I.4, 408b11–13.
31–32 Arist. Phys. I.7, 191a7–12.
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de subiecto, quia proprie est illud quod scitur. Passio est illud quod solum de alio scitur, et
obiectum appropriato est illud de quo scitur aliud. Quaerere igitur utrum de anima possit esse
scientia est quaerere an ipsa possit esse subiectum scientiae, non ita quod sit illud in quo est
scientia sicut in obiecto, quia tunc omnis scientia esset de anima, quia omnis scientia est in
anima tamquam in obiecto. 5
3.2 Est tunc intelligendum scientiam esse de anima ita ipsa possit esse obiectum de quo
probatur alia passio per medium, quod est causa vel effectus. Dici ergo potest quod anima po-
test esse subiectum illud de quo probari potest alia proprietas per se per medium quod est
causa vel effectus, quia licet forma constituat unum secundum essentiam cum ipsa materia,
adhuc essentia formae, inquantum cognoscitur ut simplex, alia est ab essentia formae inquan- 10
tum compositum, et per consequens alia definitio formae inquantum simplex et {compositum}
inquantum [?] compositum. Sed ubi alia est essentia et alia definitio, alia potest esse definitio
per se; alia ergo potest esse scientia de anima et alia de corpore animato, quia illa tria videntur
sufficere, scilicet subiectum scibile, et proprietas per se, et definitio. Dici potest igitur quod de
anima potest esse scientia tamquam de subiecto. 15
Ad 1.1 Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod sicut in composito est assignare univer-
sale et particulare, sic quoddamodo in formis in composito ex hoc habemus universale quod
illud quod est compositum consideramus praeter significationem, quia intelligere illud quod est
Socrates non ut Socrates est est intelligere universale. Consimiliter est in formis, intelligendo
formam non ut haec forma est intelligere modo universali, et ideo modo de anima tamquam 20
de subiecto universali potest esse scientia. Unde ad rationem dicendum est quod anima, licet
non sit singulare et sensibile, ipsa tamen considerari potest modo universali; unde non opor-
tet deinde considerationem universalis esse per abstractionem a singulari sensibili et compo-
sito, quia universale respectu huius quod est sensus vel species habet modum universalis et
abstracta, et tum manifestum est quod nec genus nec species est particulare vel sensibile. 25
Ad 1.2 Ad aliud dicendum est quod minor est falsa, quia anima est intelligibilis prout
sufficit ad dubium cognoscibile, unde difficultas in intelligendo immateriales formas non est
ex parte intelligibilis, quia ipsa sunt maxime intelligibilia, sed ipsa est ex parte intelligentis.
Unde in aliquibus cognoscibilibus difficultas est ex parte cognoscibilis, et propter hoc quoddam
cognoscitur per privationem, sicut punctus est illud cuius pars non est. Similiter in eo quod est 30
ens in potentia, ibi est difficultas ex parte cognoscibilis, sed formae immateriales sunt difficiles
M 57va ad cognoscendum, et illa diffi|cultas est ex debilitate intellectus nostri.
Ad 1.2.1 Ad primum dicendum est quod loquendo de motu qui est actus entis imperfecti
non est possibile idem eodem respectu esse movens et motum, agens et patiens. Sed nunc est
ita quod intelligere aliquo modo debeat dici motus, et erit motus entis perfecti et propter hoc 35
aequivoce erit motus ab eo quem definit Aristoteles, et propter hoc in tali non est inconveniens
idem respectu sui esset movens et motum. Propter aliud quod tangitur dicendum quod etsi
intellectus in intelligendo dicatur pati, hoc est aequivoce, unde Aristoteles vult quod suum
recipere magis est salus quam passio.
Ista ratio videtur adhuc esse dubia quia quocumque modo sumatur motus, non videtur 40
unde esse intelligibile quod idem posset esse movens et motum respectu sui ipsius. Ista dubi-
1 quod2 ] sup. lin. M 5 in ] de a.c. M 12 inquantum ] ut vid. M 35 et1 ] sup. lin. M
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tatio non habet locum si intelligamus quod Socrates habeat mentem de intellectu Platonis, sed
illa dubitatio habet locum de eodem intelligente respectu sui intellectus, an Socrates posset in-
telligere suum intellectum, propter quam dicitur ulterius quod cum intellectus intelligit suum
intellectum, hoc non est per se et primo, immo est per quemdam discursum quia in hoc quod
5 intelligit rem aliam percipit actum suum et in hoc quod percipit actum quodammodo percipit
substantiam cuius est iste actus, et ideo ex consequenti intelligit suum intellectum; unde quod
id sit sic movens et motum ita quod non primo non est inconveniens.
Ad 1.2.2 Ad aliam probationem dicendum est secundum nunc dicta quod intellectus sive
anima non est illud quod primo ⟨intelligitur⟩, nec est {per} tamquam per se obiectum intellectus
10 nostri, et propter hoc non oportet quod primo faciat fantasma a sensu. Unde de eis quae primo
et per se intelliguntur intellectu nostro verum est quod oportet intelligibile primo immitare
virtutem sensitivam a qua possit causari fantasma.
Ad 1.2.3 Ad aliud argumentum dicendum est quod illud quod per se et primo intelliguntur
intellectu nostro oportet esse cum continuo et tempore, sed secundum nunc dicta anima non
15 est primum intelligibile nisi per discursum.
Aliter dicitur ad illud idem quod licet anima intellectiva non sit continua quantum est de
se nec etiam per accidens nec etiam sit temporalis, est tamen perfectio alicuius continuus et
alicuius temporalis propter quod intelligi potest sicut aliae formaemateriales. Istae dubitationes
de intelligibili non faciunt vere difficultatem de anima, immo solum de anima intellectiva.
20 Ad 1.3 Ad ultimum argumentum dicendum est quod quamvis huiusmodi proprietates –
gaudere et cetera – non fiunt per se et primo ipsius animae potentiae, tamen est aliquam esse
proprietatem per se et non primo.
19 vere ] ut vid. M 22 non ] sup. lin. Mc
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III.10: Utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat se per essentiam.
III.10: Utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat se per essentiam.M 86vb Quaeritur utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat se per essentiam.
1.1 Et videtur quod sic quia per Aristoteles in littera “in separatis a materia idem est quod
intelligit et quod intelligitur”; sed intellectus possibilis separatus a materia quia non determi-
nat sibi organum; in eo igitur idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur, sed per essentiam est 5
intelligens, ergo per essentiam suam intelligitur.
1.2 Item, si intelligeret se per aliud aut igitur per speciem eius aut alterius; non per
speciem eius, quia facet tunc speciem in virtute fantastica, nec per speciem alterius, ut videtur,
quia cum species sit illud quo res cognoscitur, oportet eam esse proportionale cogniti, sed rei
alterius species non est proportionalis intellectui; intellectus ergo possibilis non intelligit se 10
per speciem, intelligit igitur se per essentiam.
1.3 Item in substantiis separatis ita est quod substantia est intelligens et est intelligibi-
lis, sic scientia est ex parte intellectus possibilis, sed in substantiis separatis ita est quod ipsa
intellectu se per essentiam suam ⟨intelligit⟩; ergo similiter dicit de intellectu possibili.
2.1 Oppositum videtur Aristoteles determinare in littera. 15
3.1 Dicendum est secundum quod innuit Aristoteles in littera quod “intellectus noster in-
telligit se sicut alia;” sed alia intelligit per speciem; se igitur intelligit per speciem aliquam. Ex
hoc dicendum est quod intellectus noster possiblis coniunctus se non intelligit per essentiam.
Illud ostenditur sic inter substantias intelligentes: intellectus noster est sicut materia prima
quia tenet infimum gradum, quia prima causa quae est substantia intelligens est actus purus. 20
Intelligentia {et} quae est substantia intellectus est actus, sed non purus, quia in omnibus se-
cundum Boethium [?] citra primum differt quid est et quo est, quia in omnibus huiusmodi est
aliqua compositio potentiae et actus. Intellectus noster respectu praedictarum substantiarum
intelligentium est sicut potentia prima, sed omnino sicut res se habent ad actum sic ad intel-
lectum, quia quicquid intelligitur intelligitur ut actu prima, igitur causa quae solum est actus 25
se intelligit per essentiam et solum se, quia ut vult in duodecimo: alia intelligit intelligendo se.
Intelligentia, quia distat ab actu puro, se intelligit et etiam alia, sed illa alia quae intelligit non
intelligit per speciem, quia huiusmodi substantia est separata a materia secundum essentiam.
Properter hoc de illis dici potest quod quae intelligunt intelligunt per essentiam propriam. In-
tellectus noster, cum sit sicut potentia pura et in hoc multum distat ab actu, se non intelligit 30
per essentiam, quia potentia per se non vadit ad actum, sed intellectus noster inter substantias
intelligibiles et inteligentes est sicut potentia.
3.2 Istud oportet ex alio: Potentiae distinguuntur per actus et cognoscuntur, intellectus
igitur possibilis, ut nominat potentiam, cognoscitur per actum suum secundum quem intelligit
alia. Unde intelligendo illum actum per speciem rei extra se ipsum cognoscit et intelligit. Unde 35
non videtur intelligere nisi per reflexionem, quia species intelligibilis extra primo ducit in co-
gnitionem intelligibilis extra, et ex consequenti in cognitionem actus intelligendi, et deinde in
cognitionem sui.
3–4 Arist. DA III.4 430a3–4. 16–17 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2–3. 26 Arist. Metaph XII.9 1074b21–36 (?)
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3.3 Ad illud ostenditur: assumit Aristoteles in littera quod in separatis a materia idem
est quod intelligit et quod intelligitur secundum essentiam; in propsito vocat Aristoteles ‘spe-
ciem’ qua intellectus fit actu intelligens; unde quia illa species est eadem cum intellectu nostro
possibili quoddammodo separato, ideo intellectus noster se intelligit per illam speciem.
5 3.4 Ulterius videndum est quod contingit intellectum habere cognitionem sui | secundum M 87ra
essentiam, quia supponitur quod de anima potest esse scientia; sed scientia de aliquo est secun-
dum cognitionem quantum ad essentiam; sed istam cognitionem habet de se ipso per multas
reflexiones. Iste modus cognoscendi sive intelligendi non est ad propositum.
Ad 1.1 Ad primum argumentum dicitur secundum iam dicta quod si recte accipitur intel-
10 lectus litterae, sic magis ad oppositum quam ad propositum, quia sicut in scientiis speculativis
idem est scientia et scitum, consideratur de intellectu nostro: quoddammodo separato dicen-
dum est quod est idem cum specie rei intelligibilis extra, et quia sibi est idem, ideo per ipsam
se intelligit.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliud argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus noster potest se intelligere
15 per speciem cuiuscumque intelligiblis extra, quia sicut materia fit actu existens sub quacumque
forma substantiali, consimiliter intellectus noster possibilis potest fieri actu per quamcumque
speciem rei intelligibilis extra, et proper hoc quacumque specie informatur per illa potest se
intelligere. Unde dicendum est quod se intelligit per speciem alterius. Et ulterius ad argumen-
tum dicendum est quod oportet speciem esse proportionalem illi in cuius cognitionem primo
20 ducit, sed secundum iam dicta illud species rei intelligibilis extra non ducunt in cognitionem
intellectus noster nisi ex consequenti et per reflexionem, et propter hoc non oportet quod sit
proportionalis sibi.
Ad 1.3 Ad ultimum argumentum dicendum est quod aliter est intellectus noster intelli-
gens et intelligibilis quam substantia separata, quia sicut est dictum, cum intellectus noster est
25 coniunctus est sicut potentia pura inter substantias intelligentes, et propter hoc per se non intel-
ligit sicut substantia separata secundum esse. Supposito tamen quod possit separari secundum
esse et manere separatus, tunc forte se intelligeret sicut substantia separata vel intelligibilia.
Ad 1.4 Contra praedicta aliquis diceret quod intellectus noster potest habere aliquam
speciem sibi innatam quae solum ducit in cognitionem eius, et quod propter hoc intelligit se
30 per speciem, sed non per speciem alterius sed ex illo. Videtur sequi inconsideratio, scilicet quod
intellectus noster semper se intelliget, quia semper ipso manente manet species sibi innata, et
ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod alia non intelliget quia intellectus noster ad quod se convertit
totaliter se convertit.
1–2 Arist. DA III.4, 430a3–5.
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C.11 John Dinsdale: Quaestiones in De anima I-III
This text is preserved in two manuscripts, Balliol 311: 148r–181v (late 13th century) and Oriel
33: 164r–182v (early 14th century), both English. The Oriel witness is deemed to present the
strongest text and is preferred when possible (it only covers book one and part of book two).
The commentary is probably from the 1280’s, possibly slightly earlier. The text reproduced
here is identical to the edition that I have already published.23
JohnDinsdale became a fellow atMerton College in 1284–85 andwas appointed subwarden
in 1286. He died around 1289. Aside from the questions on De anima, he also wrote questions
on Nicomachean Ethics I–IV and Metaphysics I–XII.
Manuscript sigla
O Oxford, Oriel College Library, 33: 164r–182v.
B Oxford, Balliol College Library, 311: 148r–181v.
23 For information about Dinsdale, the witnesses, and the text, see Christensen 2017.
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I.1: Utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia
I.1: Utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientiaItem quaeratur primo utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia.
B 148va,
O 164rb
1.1 Videtur quod non.
1.2 Illud de quo est scientia est intelligibile, quia cum scientia sit habitus intellectus, de
5 quo est scientia oportet esse intelligibile; sed anima non est intelligibile, quia omnis nostra
cognitio ortum habet a sensu, unde ipsum intelligere non est sine phantasmate, sed anima sub
sensu non cadit, nec phantasma facit; ergo et cetera.
1.3 Praeterea, unum et idem non potest esse simul movens et motum, quia sic idem
esset actu et potentia respectu eiusdem; sed cognitum est movens respectu cognocentis; ergo
10 unum et idem non potest esse cognoscens et cognitum, hoc tamen contingeret si de anima esset
scientia.
1.4 Praeterea, sicut oculus nycticoracis ⟨se habet⟩ ad lumen solis, sic intellectus noster
ad ea quae sunt manifestissima in natura, de quorum numero est anima, saltim humana; sed
oculus nycticoracis non potest apprehendere lumen solis; ergo et cetera.
15 1.5 Praeterea, nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore; sed anima, cum sit indi-
visibilis et perpetua, nec est continua nec temporalis; ergo et cetera.
2.1 Oppositum patet per determinationem Philosophi.
3.1 Dicendum quod cum scientia sit habitus acquisitus per demonstrationem, et ad de-
monstrationem tria requirantur (scilicet subiectum, passio, et principium per quod ostenditur
20 passio de subiecto), ubi est invenire ista tria, ibi contingit ponere scientiam. Nunc autem anima
quoddam subiectum est cuius sunt multae proprietates et passiones, ut patebit inferius. Sunt
etiam principia per quae istae passiones probari possunt de anima. Si enim accipiatur quod
quid est animae pro medio, per ipsum concludi potest propria passio eius de anima, et ita de
anima potest aliquid sciri sive esse aliqualis scientia.
25 3.2 Praeterea, accidentia non sunt per se entia, sed in alio.Qui ergo cognoscit accidentia,
manuduci potest in cognitionem eius cuius sunt. Nunc autem multa accidentia ipsius animae
nobis sunt manifesta: Operationes enim artificiales nobis notae sunt, quae tamen non fiunt
absque intelligere, et intelligere procedit ab aliqua potentia, et potentia fluit ab essentia; et
sic est de aliis operationibus quae procedunt ab irascibili. Unde per multa quae nobis nota sunt
30 devenire possumus in cognitionem animae.Quia tamen scire est causam rei cognoscere, et talis
12–13 Cf. Arist. Metaph. II.1 993b9–11 (νυκτερίς).
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cognitio de anima procedit per effectus et non per causam, ideo Philosophus talem cognitionem
tradens de anima istam cognitionem nominat “historiam”. Extensive tamen dici potest scientia.
Ad 1.1 Ad primum argumentum dicendum quod minor est falsa. Et ad probationem di-
B 148vb cendum quod aliquid cadit | in sensu dupliciter: aut per positionem aut per privationem. Per
privationem sicut tenebra et indivisibilia, ut punctum et unitas. Per positionem contingit du- 5
pliciter, aut per speciem sui, aut per speciem alterius; per speciem sui sicut color videtur, per
speciem alterius sicut videtur Diari filius. Unde, licet anima non cadat sub sensu per se, cadit
tamen sub sensu per alterum, ut per sui effectus, et eodem modo, licet per se phantasma non
faciat, aliud tamen phantasma facit, quod in eius cognitionem ducere potest.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliud dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur motus: uno modo est actus imperfecti, 10
et sic definitur a Philosopho in tertio Physicorum; alio modo est actus perfecti; sic intelligere
et cognoscere dicuntur motus: Primo modo non potest idem esse movens et motum per se,
per accidens tamen nihil prohibet, sicut nauta movet navem per se, qua mota movet seipsum.
Secundo modo nihil prohibet idem movere se ipsum. Sed tamen differentia est: aliqua enim
est substantia semper actu intelligens, et talis substantia potest intelligere se per se, sicut est 15
de prima causa et intelligentiis; sed aliqua est non semper actu intelligens, sicut est anima
humana, et talis substantia non intelligit se per se, quia nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod
actu est, et talis substantia, cum sit in potentia intelligens non est in actu nisi per alterum,
ut per speciem intelligibilem, ideo per alterum potest se intelligere. Per hoc enim quod anima
intelligit obiectum per speciem potest intelligere suum actum, et per actum potest reflectere se 20
supra suam essentiam; unde anima nostra quodammodo intelligit se sicut nauta movet navem.
Ad 1.3 Ad aliud dicendum quod licet oculus nycticoracis non possit apprehendere directe
lumen solis, potest tamen indirecte aliquam claritatem apprehendere, et si visus eius esset di-
scursivus, posset cognoscere lumen solis. Nunc autem, etsi intellectus noster non potest in
cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, tamen aliqui effectus earum apparent no- 25
bis, per quos manuducimur in earum notitiam, et quia intellectus noster est discursivus, ideo
2 Arist. DA I.1 402a4. 6–7 Arist. DA II.6 418a20–22. 11 Arist. Phys. III.2 201b31–33.
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potest in aliqualem cognitionem earum ut per effectus. Magis | tamen cognoscimus de anima O 164va
quam de substantiis separatis, quia effectus ipsius animae nobis apparentes magis adaequant
virtutem eius quam effectus substantiarum separatarum nobis apparentes adaequant virtutem
earum.
5 Ad 1.4 Ad aliud dicendum quod intelligere nostrum non est sine continuo et tempore,
quia non est sine phantasmate. Non tamen oportet omne intelligere esse continuum et tempo-
rale.
1 potest ] per effectus possumus B 1 aliqualem ] aliqualiter O 1 earum ut per effectus ] sub-
stantiarum separatarum B 2 substantiis ] aliis O 2 ipsius ] om. B 2 nobis apparentes ] om. B
3 quae post effectus O 3 nobis apparentes ] om. B 3–4 adaequant virtutem earum ] om. O 5
intelligere nostrum ] inv. B 5 phantasmate post sine B 6 quod post oportet B 6 intelligere esse ]
quod a nobis est quocumque modo intelligibile sit B 6–7 temporale ] temporalis B
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III.15: Utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per
aliud sicut intelligit alia
III.15: Utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit aliaB 174va Supposito nunc quod intelligat se per suam essentiam. Quaeritur utrum intellectus intelligat
se per suam essentiam an per aliud sicut intelligit alia.
1.1 Quod per suam essentiam videtur.
1.2 Quia quae intelliguntur ab intellectu intelliguntur per aliud quam per suam essen- 5
tiam, ut per speciem; sed intelligibile, inquantum intelligibile, est unum specie; si ergo intellec-
tus esset intelligibilis per aliud sicut et alia, cum intellectus, praeter hoc quod est intelligibilis,
intelligit, et omnia alia, praeter hoc quod sunt intelligibilia, intellige⟨re⟩nt.
1.3 Praeterea, in separatis a materia idem est intelligens et quod intelligitur; sed intel-
lectus separatus est a materia; ergo idem est in ipso intelligens et intellectum, ergo per suam 10
essentiam intelligit seipsum.
1.4 Praeterea, intelligentia et intellectus humanus conveniunt in genere intelligibilium;
sed intelligentia intelligit se per suam essentiam; ergo intellectus humanus.
1.5 Praeterea, actio intelligendi provenit ex unione intelligibilis cum intellectu; sed nihil
magis unitur intellectui quam ipse sibi; ergo non potest intelligere per aliud quam per se. 15
1.6 Praeterea, intellectus intelligit se: aut ergo per suam essentiam aut per speciem aut
B 174vb per suum actum; sed nec per speciem | nec per suum actum; ergo per suam essentiam. Proba-
tio assumpti: Nec per speciem, quia intelligibilis abstracta est a phantasmatibus, et intellectus
phantasma non facit; nec per actum, quia si actum suum intelligeret, aliquo actu ipsum intel-
ligeret. Illum ergo actum aut intelliget aut non. Si non, eadem ratione nec primum, si sic, ergo 20
alio actu, et ita erit procedere in infinitum. Praeterea sensus particularis non sentit suum actum,
ergo nec intellectus intelligit suum actum.
2.1 Oppositum dicit Philosophus in tertioDe anima. Dicit enim quod “intellectus intelligit
seipsum sicut et alia”; sed alia non intelligit per suas essentias, sed per suas species; ergo eodem
modo intelligit se. 25
31.1 Dicendum est quod intellectus non intelligit se per suam essentiam, et huius ratio
est: Nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod actu est, unde nihil est verum quod sub cognitione
intellectus cadit, nisi secundum quod est actu, per Philosophum in nono Metaphysicae. Immo,
23–24 Arist. DA, III.4 430a2 28–2 Arist.Metaph., IX.9 1051a29–31, cf. Auct. Arist. (ed. Hamesse), 6.234.
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sicut visus non videt vel non cognoscit coloratum in potentia, sed coloratum in actu, sic nec
intellectus intelligit, et ideo, quia materia est ens in potentia, materiam non cognoscit nisi per
formam per quam est in actu. Sed intellectus humanus secundum se non est in actu. Ad cuius
evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquis est intellectus qui est actus purus et perfectus, ut
5 intellectus Dei, et ipse cognoscit se vel intelligit per suam essentiam et omnia alia per se; alius
est intellectus qui est in actu sed non est actus perfectus, ut intellectus intelligentiae, quia ipse
intelligit se per suam essentiam, alia tamen non intelligit per se, sed per eorum similitudi-
nes. Sed intellectus humanus non est in actu secundum se, et propter hoc vocatur possibilis,
quia secundum se in potentia est, et ideo ex se non habet quod intelligatur. Ex se tamen ha-
10 bet quod intelligat; immo, sicut Plato posuit intelligibilia entia separata et intellectum nostrum
intelligibilem secundum quod participat ipsa intelligibilia, sic, cum Philosophus ponit species
abstractas a phantasmatibus intelligibiles, habet ponere intellectum nostrum intelligibilem se-
cundum quod istas species participat, et hoc sic: Secundum quod intellectus noster intelligit
obiectum per speciem potest redire super suum actum, et ab actu potest procedere ad suam
15 potentiam, et a potentia ad essentiam, et ita per hoc quod actu est per speciem alterius potest
suum actum intelligere et per actum seipsum. Unde illud quod primo intelligitur ex parte in-
tellectus est eius actus, qui est ultima eius perfectio.Quia intelligere non est operatio transiens
in extrinsecum sicut calefacere vel aedificare, sed manens in operante, ideo intelligere non est
perfectio alicuius extrinsici sicut aedificare, sed est perfectio ipsius intellectus.
20 32.2 Sed istum actum potest intelligere dupliciter. Uno modo in particulari, ut cum actu
percipit se intelligere, et alio modo in universali, ut cum per obiectum investigat propriam eius
operationem. Et eodemmodo per actumpotest intelligere suam essentiam dupliciter: Unomodo
in particulari, ut cum intelligit quod habet, ut cum Socrates percipit se habere intellectum per
hoc quod actu intelligit, et alio modo in universali, ut cum inquirit naturam intellectus per suam
25 operationem. Et isti modi differunt, quia ad primam cognitionem sufficit praesentia intellectus
actu operantis, sed ad secundam cognitionem requiritur subtilis et diligens inquisitio, et ideo
multi naturam intellectus ignoraverunt et multi circa ipsam erraverunt.
Ad primum argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus et intellectum in actu sunt idem,
et non intellectus et intellectum in potentia. Modo species intelligibilis est immediatum prin-
30 cipium intelligendi. Unde in quocumque est species actu intelligibilis, illud potest intelligere,
sed quaecumque species est in lapide vel in re materiali extra intellectum, solum est intelligibi-
lis in potentia, et ideo nullum intelligibile extra intellectum nostrum habet in se immediatum
principium intelligendi, et propter hoc non potest intelligere. Sed species quae est in intellectu,
intelligibilis actu est, | et ideo, cum intellectus noster habeat in se immediatum principium B 175ra
35 intelligendi, potest intelligere praeter hoc quod intelligibilis est, et ita non est in aliis.
38–39 Cf. Aquinas, ST I q. 87, a. 1, resp. p. 429a. 39–40 De anima III.7 431b2–3, cf. Aquinas, Sent. de
anima lib. 3, cap. 7, p. 236, ll. 72–89; lib. 3, cap. 4, p. 218, ll. 8–23 and p. 220, ll. 101–121; id. ST q. 84, a. 7,
resp., p. 414b.
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Ad secundum argumentum dicendum est quod ista dicuntur separata a materia quae sunt
actu intellecta, unde Philosophus dicit in tertio De anima quod omnino sicut res sunt sepa-
rabiles a materia sic sunt circa intellectum. Sed intellectum in actu et intellectus sunt idem,
sicut sensibile in actu et sensus; sensibile vero in actu et sensus non sunt idem nisi quia eadem
est forma utriusque, quia species quae causata est a sensibili ⟨ut⟩ ab agente est in sensu ut in 5
subiecto, et eodem modo in proposito: Intellectum in actu et intellectus dicuntur idem, quia
species intellecti in actu est forma perficiens et informans intellectum, et per istam formam
intelligit intellectus se discurrendo et non per suam essentiam.
Ad tertium argumentum dicendum est quod intellectus intelligentiae est actus perfectus,
quia semper actu est. Habet enim in se species innatas. Sed intellectus noster secundum se est 10
in potentia ut possibilis, et ipse intellectus agens, etsi sit actus, est actus intelligibilium, et non
intellectus, antequam intelligat.
Ad quartum dicendum est quod actio intelligendi causatur ex unione obiecti cum intellectu,
sed licet nihil magis uniatur intellectui quam ipse sibi, non tamen unietur sibi ut obiectum, quia
obiectum intellectus nostri est natura rei quae est extra animam, et ipsa non unitur intellectui 15
nisi per speciem.
Ad ultimum argumentum dicendum est quod intelligit se et per speciem et per actum, sed
non per speciem propriam, ut ratio probat, sed per speciem quae alterius est. Similiter per ac-
tum suum intelligit se, et illum actum adhuc intelligit alio actu. Propter quod intelligendum est
quod aliquis est intellectus qui est suum intelligere, et ideo unico actu intelligit suam essen- 20
tiam et suum intelligere, quia idem sunt, ut intellectus Dei. Et alius est intellectus qui non est
suum intelligere, sua tamen essentia est obiectum sui intelligere, ut intellectus intelligentiae,
et licet suum intelligere et sua essentia differant, tamen unico actu intelligit suam essentiam et
suum intelligere, quia intelligere est perfectio suae essentiae, et unico actu intelligitur res et sua
perfectio. Sed intellectus humanus nec est suum intelligere, nec sua essentia est obiectum sui 25
intelligere, sed obiectum eius est res extra intellectum, et ideo unico actu non potest intelligere
obiectum et suum intelligere, quia suum intelligere non est perfectio obiecti. Intelligere enim
lapidem non est perfectio lapidis, sed est perfectio intellectus, et ideo unico actu non contingit
intelligere lapidem et ipsum intelligere. Unde per hoc dicendum est ad argumentum quod alio
actu intelligit suum actum et suum obiectum, et actu intelligit illum actum, et sic in infinitum, 30
nec est inconveniens procedere in infinitum in actibus intellectus et rationis.
Ad aliam probationem dicendum est quod sensus sentit per immutationem organi corpo-
ralis, et nihil corporale mutat seipsum, et ideo sensus non immutatur nisi ab extrinseco. Sed
intellectus non immutatur per immutationem organi corporalis, sed spiritualiter, et spirituale
bene potest reflectere se supra se, et ideo posuit Plato primum movens movere seipsum quia 35
primum movens posuit esse animam et operationes eius, sicut amare et gaudere et huiusmodi,
posuit esse motum eius.
2–3 Arist. De anima III.4 429b21–2.
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C.12 John of Jandun: Quaestiones in De anima
The texts of Jandun are preserved in numerous manuscripts and incunabula spread across two
redactions.24 The editions presented here are based on one of the early incunabula from 1480,
printed in Venice. In some problematic passages themanuscript Vat. Lat. 2156 has been consul-
ted for further assistance. For that reason the apparatus to these editions are positive, meaning
that all consulted readings are reported.
Manuscript sigla
V1 Venice 1480 incunabulum. Exemplar preserved in the Bibliothèque nationale de France,
Italian books before 1601; no. 48.3.
Available online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58493v
V2 Venice 1483 incunabulum. Published by F. de Hailbrun and N. de Franckfordia socii.
Exemplar preserved in the Bibliothèque national de France, département réserve des
livres rares, D-1841.
Available online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5403731v
A Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2156: 1r–115r.
24 For the full list of manuscripts, see Lohr 1970: 212–3.
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I.1: Utrum de anima possit esse scientia
I.1: Utrum de anima possit esse scientia
V1 4b,
V2 2ra,
A 2rb Omissis autem omnibus partibus philosophiae, solum de naturali est praesens intentio et non
de quocumque, sed de illa quae scientia de anima nominatur. Et primo circa ipsam quaeritur
utrum de anima possit esse scientia.
1 Et arguitur quod non. 5
1.1 Primo quia de singularibus non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et ce-
tera. Maior patet primo Posteriorum et septimoMetaphysicae. Minor patet quia anima est forma
corporis animati, quod est singulare, talis autem forma est singularis, ut dicit Philosophus sep-
timo Metaphysicae in illo capitulo: “Eorum autem quae fiunt omnis vero talis species et in his
carnibus et ossibus Callias et Socrates et diversa propter materiam” quare et cetera. 10
1.2 Item de corruptibilibus non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.
Maior patet primo Posteriorum et per Boethium in primo suae Aritmethicae. Minor patet quia
V1 5a corpus animatum cuius forma est anima est corruptibile, ut patet secundo huius cum | sit com-
positum ex materia et forma; compositum autem sic corrumpitur, quia corruptio tangit essen-
tiam formae, licet nonmateriae, ut satis patet primo Physicorum et septimoMetaphysicae; quare 15
et cetera.
1.3 Item de non intelligibili non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera.
Maior patet quia scientia est habitus intellectus, ut dicit Philosophus sexto Ethicorum, et ideo
scibile debet esse intelligibile per locum a coniugatis. Minor patet tripliciter. Primo quia non
est sensibilis, cum anima sit substantia, et sensus non se profundat usque ad substantiam rei, 20
ut dicit Commentator secundo huius, modo intellectus nihil intelligit eorum quae sunt extra
suum sensum, ut dicit Philosophus in De sensu et sensato et etiam tertio huius; quare et ce-
tera. Secundo quia intellectus debet esse denudatus ab eo quod intelligit, ut dicunt Philosophus
et Commentator tertio huius; modo anima non potest denudari a seipsa; quare et cetera. Ter-
tio si sic sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum; consequens est falsum; ergo et ante- 25
cedens. Falsitas consequentis patet quia implicat contradictionem, ut ostendit Commentator
nono Metaphysicae. Consequentia est manifesta quia anima movetur ab eo quod intelligit, ut
dicit Commentator tertio huius, et ideo si anima intelligit seipsam movebit seipsam; quare et
cetera.
1.4 Item de non ente non est scientia; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et ceterea. Maior 30
patet primo Posteriorum. Minor probatur quia omne ens vel est in anima vel extra animam, ut
patet sexto Metaphysicae; sed anima non est ens in anima, quia nihil est in seipso, ut patet per
Philosophum quarto Physicorum neque est ens extra animam, quia nihil est ens extra seipsum;
qaure et cetera.
1.5 Item si de anima esset scientia sequeretur quod eius scientia esset eadem cum eius 35
substantia; consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet quia anima
est de genere substantiae et scientia de genere qualitatis, et ista sunt impermixta, ut patet primo
7 Arist. APo I.31, 87b33–37. 7 Arist. Metaph. VII.15, 1039b27–40a7. 8–10 Arist. Metaph. VII.8,
1034a5–8. “Omnis vero iam talis species in hiis carnibus et ossibus, Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem
propter materiam (diversa namque), idem vero specie (nam individua species).”
9 in illo ] A; et decimo V1 V2 9 vero talis ] vero materialis A; autem materialis V1 V2 10 et3 ] A;
om. V1 V2 15 ut ] et V1 V2 33 ens1 ] V2 A; eius V1
318 c. texts
Posteriorum; consequentia declaratur quia in separatis a materia eadem sunt scientia et scibile,
ut dicunt Philosophus et Commentator tertio huius et duodecimo Metaphysicae; sed anima
adminus intellectiva est separata a materia, ut probant Philosophus et Commentator tertio
huius; quare et cetera.
5 2.1 In oppositum est Philosophus et Commentator et Themistius et Avicenna et omnes
qui nobis tradunt scientiam de anima; quare et cetera.
3.1 Ad istam quaestionem, omissis opinionibus Heracliti et Platonis, dicendum quod de
anima potest esse scientia, quia de eo potest esse scientia quod est ens intelligibile universale et
habet partes et passiones et principia per quae passiones de ipso e suis partibus possunt probari;
10 sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Maior patet quia istae sunt proprietates eius de quo
potest esse scientia, ut patet per Philosophumprimo Posteriorum; sed ex omnibus proprietatibus
rei colligitur descriptio rei, ut dicit Commentator quarto Physicorum, et cui competit descrip-
tio et descriptum, ut dicit Boethius secundo Topicorum. Minor patet, est enim ens anima quia
anima est actus et forma, ut patet secundo huius; modo cum ens et | unummultipliciter dicatur, V1 5b
15 quod vere est est actus, ut dicit Philosophus ibidem; quare et cetera. Est etiam intelligibilis quia
intellectus possibilis est omnia fieri, ut patet tertio huius; sed anima est de numero omnium ut
probatum est paulo prius; quare et cetera. Habet etiam partes quia anima est quid universale ad
vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam, ut patet secundo huius; sed universale continet multa
ut partes, sicut dicit Philosophus primo Physicorum; quare et cetera. Habet etiam passiones se-
20 cundum suas operationes, scilicet vegetare, sentire et intelligere. Habet etiam principia per
quae istae passiones possunt de ipsa et suis partibus demonstrari, quia principium demonstra-
tionis accidentium est quod quid est sive definitio, ut patet in prooemio huius, et anima habet
definitionem non solum communem sed specialem secundum unamquamque partem suam, ut
patet secundo huius; quare et cetera.
25 3.2 Item de illo potest esse scientia de quo potest haberi certificatio quaestionis scien-
tificae; sed anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Maior patet quia quaestiones sunt aequales
numero his quaecumque vere scimus, ut dicit Philosophus secundo Posteriorum. Minor patet
quia quaestiones scientificae sunt quatuor, ut dicit Philosophus ibidem, scilicet ‘si est’, ‘quid
est’, ‘quia est’, ‘propter quid’, et rationes istae de anima possunt certificari. Certificatur enim
30 ‘si est’ per hoc quod est principium vivendi, ut patet ex secundo huius, cum vivere viventi-
bus est esse, ut etiam patet ibidem; quare et cetera. Certificatur etiam ‘quid est’ quia ‘quid est’
scitur per definitionem, cum definitio sit sermo certificativus quidditatis et essentiae, ut dicit
Commentator septimo Metaphysicae; sed definitio habetur de anima non solum in communi
sed etiam in speciali, ut patet ex secundo huius. Certificatur etiam ‘quia est’ quia ‘quia est’ cer-
35 tificatur per hoc quod scitur inhaerentia passionis; multae autem sunt passiones quae sciuntur
in esse animae, ut esse principium vivendi, sentiendi et huiusmodi, cum per haec differt anima-
tum ab inanimato, ut patet in erroribus huiusmodi. Scitur insuper ‘propter quid’ quia ‘propter
quid’ scitur cum scitur causa inhaerentiae passionis ad subiectum; talis autem causa scitur
per definitionem, ut patet secundo Posteriorum et in prooemio huius et quarto Physicorum per
40 Philosophum et Commentatorem; quare et cetera.
11 Arist. APo I.28, 87a38–87b4. 27 Arist. APo II.1, 89b23–24. 28 Arist. APo II.1, 89b24–25.
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3.3 Sed est intelligendum propter solutiones quarundam rationum quod aliquid est sen-
sibile dupliciter, uno modo per se, alio per accidens. Per se sunt sensibilia propria et communia,
et isto modo anima non est sensibilis, cum sit substantia. Alio modo aliquid est sensibile per
accidens sicut quando est subiectum alicuius accidentis sensibilis vel causa alicuius operationis
sensibilis, et isto modo anima vegetativa est sensibilis et etiam sensitiva, quia eius operationes 5
sunt sensibiles, scilicet nutrire, augmentare, sentire. Anima autem intellectiva nec per se nec
per accidens videtur sensibilis esse, cum nec secundum se nec secundum operationes suas ap-
V1 6a prehendatur a sensu nisi forte | vellemus vocare sensibile per accidens quod habet habitudinem
ad aliquod per se sensibile, sicut octavum caelum dicimus locari per accidens quia habet ha-
bitudinem ad centrum quod per se locatur, ut patet quarto Physicorum, et isto modo anima 10
intellectiva posset dici sensibilis cum habeat habitudinem ad fantasmata, ut patet tertio huius;
quare et cetera.
Sed dubitaret aliquis circa dicta quod sicut aliquod esset sensibile ita esset intelligibile;
sed anima est sensibilis per accidens; ergo intelligibilis per accidens, quod est falsum, quia si
solum esset intelligibilis per accidens, tunc de ipsa solum esset scientia per accidens, quod est 15
manifeste falsum. Maior patet per Commentatorem secundo huius capitolo de odore.
Ad hoc dico quod de anima est scientia, et cum dicitur est intelligibilis per accidens, dico
quod aliquid intelligi per accidens potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quia intelligatur in alio,
sicut partes in toto vel oppositum in opposito vel simile in simile, et non in propria specie, et
de tali intelligibili non est scientia per se, sed per accidens. Aliud est intelligibile per accidens, 20
quod non intelligitur per propriam speciem, sed intelligitur ex intellectione alterius quod in-
telligitur in propria forma, et de tali est bene scientia per se. Modo dico quod anima non est
intelligibilis per accidens primo modo, sed secundo modo. Et tunc ad probationem quae va-
dit directe contra verba Commentatoris, “sicut aliquid est sensibile et cetera.” Dico quod haec
propositio Commentatoris solum veritatem habet quantum ad bonitatem vel malitiam, ut sit 25
sensus quod illud quod est bene vel male sensibile sit bene vel male intelligibile, sed non habet
veritatem quantum ad per se et per accidens; quare et cetera.
Ad 1 Per hoc ad rationes in oppositum.
Ad 1.1 Ad primam cum dicitur ‘de singularibus’ et cetera, verum est ut singularia sunt
et singulariter concepta. De singularibus vero universaliter conceptis bene potest esse defini- 30
tio, cum de talibus possit esse definitio ut dicit Commentator in prooemio huius dicens quod
“definitiones sunt rerum particularium extra materiam existentium.” Sed intellectus est qui agit
universalitatem in eis, et cum dicitur anima est huiusmodi, verum est haec vel illa, tamen anima
universaliter accepta non; quare et cetera.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliam de corruptibilibus et cetera, verum est de corruptibilis per se, de corrup- 35
tibilibus autem per accidens potest esse scientia. Et cum dicitur anima est huiusmodi, dico quod
verum est sed valde per accidens, quia anima in universali non corrumpitur nisi ad corruptio-
nem suorum suppositorum qui quidem corrumpuntur per accidens, cum generatio et corruptio
sint solius compositi per se, ut dicit Philosophus octo Metaphysicae; quare et cetera.
Ad 1.3 Ad aliam de non intelligibili et cetera, dico quod verum est et cum dicitur anima 40
24 commentatoris ] Commentatorem V1 30–31 esse definitio ] A; om. V1 V2 31 cum … definitio ]
V1 V2; om. A 36 esse scientia ] A; om. V1 V2
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est huiusmodi, falsum est. Et cum probatur tripliciter, dico praeintelligendo quod aliquid in-
telligitur dupliciter, uno modo aliquid intelligitur primo sicut | quid habet proprium fantasma V1 6b
mediante quo potest fantasiari, et de tali procedunt omnes tres probationes. Alio modo aliquid
intelligitur non primo sed ex intellectione alterius, quod primo intelligitur, et de tali non pro-
5 cedunt probationes. Modo anima non est intelligibilis primo modo adminus intellectiva, sed
solum secundo modo, ut patet tertio huius quare et cetera.
Ad 1.4 Ad aliam de non ente et cetera verum est, et cum dicit anima est huiusmodi, dico
quod falsum est; et cum probatur quod vel esset ens in anima vel extra animam, dico quod est
extra; et cum dicitur vel est extra et cetera, dico quod aliquid esse extra animam potest intelligi
10 dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse extra animam omne illud quod est diversum ab anima, et isto
modo anima non est extra seipsam. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse extra animam quod in suo
esse ab operatione non dependet, et istomodo animam esse extra seipsamnon est inconveniens;
quare et cetera.
Ad 1.5 Ad aliam ‘non de anima’ et cetera, dico quod falsum est, et cum probatur ‘quia in
15 separatis’ et cetera, aliqui dicunt quod verum est in separatis quae primo cognoscunt se, et alia
ex consequenti sicut in Deo et intelligentiis, sed in aliis non; modo anima non est huiusmodi;
quare et cetera. Sed istud non valet. Primo quia sequeretur quod scientia duodecimi Metaphy-
sicae, quae est de Deo et intelligentiis, esset eadem cum ipso, quod est falsum. Secundo, quia
secundum istam solutionem sequeretur quod adminus scientia quae est de anima intellectiva
20 agente esset eadem cum ipsa, quod est falsum, et probatur consequentia quia intellectus agens
est substantia separata in actu, quae semper intelligit se et primo, sicut aliae intelligentiae, ut
dicit Commentator tertio huius; quare et cetera. Et ideo alii dicunt quod in separatis et cetera,
quod verum est in separatis quae sunt in actu, sed non in illis quae sint in potentiae; cuiusmodi
est intellectus, ut patet tertio huius. Sed istud non valet propter intellectum agentem, qui est
25 substantia actu ens, ut dicit Philosophus tertio huius. Et ideo aliter dico exponendo illam auc-
toritatem sic: ‘in separatis a materia et cetera’ verum est de scientia quam habet de seipsis, et
hoc solum in illis quae prius cognoscunt se quam alia, sed de scientia quam nos habemus de
ipsis non est verum; modo anima est huiusmodi; quare et cetera.
Alio modo potest dici quod verum est in separatis totaliter, scilicet quantum ad substantiam
30 et operationem eius primam, sed in separatis solum quoad substantiam et non operationem dico
quod non oportet: modo intellectus non est separatus totaliter quia sua prima operatio, quae est
intelligere, non est sine corpore, ut patet primo et secundo huius. Et si dicatur quod intellectus
agens separatus est totaliter, et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad eius primam operatio-
nem, quae est intelligere, cum nihil intelligat eorum quae sunt hic, ut dicit Commentator tertio
35 huius, dico quod intellectus agens non | est totaliter separatus quantum ad istam operationem, V1 6a
quia licet non coniungatur corpori quantum ad istam operationem in primo acquisitionis scien-
tiarum, tamen nobis coniungitur in postremo post acquisitionem intellectorum speculationem,
ut dicit Commentator tertio huius; quare et cetera.
24 DA III.4 429a21–22. 25 Arist. DA III.5 430a18.
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III.13: Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam intel-
lectionem existentem in eo
III.13: Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam intellectionem existentem in eo
V1 217a,
V2 62ra,
A 76vb ⟨C⟩um autem sic singula fiant et cetera. Quaeritur hic utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelli-
gere suam intellectionem existentem in eo.
1.1 Arguitur primo quod non, quia sicut se habet sensus ad sensationem sic intellec-
tus ad intellectionem per convenientem similitudinem; sed sensus non potest sentire suam 5
V1 217b sensa|tionem, ut plane dicit Aristoteles in De somno et vigilia et Commentator in De substantia
orbis, non enim visu videt aliquis quem videt; similiter autem et in aliis, quare et cetera.
1.2 Item, illud quod non est sensibile non est intelligibile, cum anima nihil intelligat sine
phantasmate, ut dicit Aristoteles in isto tertio; phantasma autem non est nisi rei sensibilis ut
patet ex secundo hoc et tertio; sed ipsa intellectio non est sensibilis, ut manifestum est, quare 10
et cetera.
1.3 Item, omne quod intelligitur agit in intellectum, cum intelligere sit quoddam pati ab
intelligibili aut aliquod huiusmodi alterum, scilicet consequens passionem; sed intellectio non
agit aliquod in intellectum, quia accidens non agit in suum subiectum, et universaliter forma
non agit in suam materiam in qua existit; quare et cetera. 15
1.4 Item, si intellectus intelligeret intellectionem existentem in eo, verbi gratia intellec-
tionem lapidis, sequeretur quod simul intelligeret diversa intelligibilia, quod reputatur impos-
sibile secundum Aristotelem quartoMetaphysicae ubi dicit quod quis unum non intelligit nihil
intelligit. Et probatur consequentia quia cum intellectio lapidis sit in intellectu, oportet quod
intellectus intelligat lapidem sicut cum visio coloris est in visu, necesse est tunc quod visus vi- 20
deat colorem, si igitur intellectus intelligeret intellectionem lapidis existentem in ipso, dum est
in ipso cum ipsa intellectio lapidis sit aliud lapide, sequeretur inconveniens praedictum; quare
et cetera.
2.1 Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Aristotelis in isto capitulo ubi dicit quod intellec-
tus intelligit se per suum actum, quod non contingeret nisi posset intelligere suum actum, ut 25
manifestum est.
3.1 Ad quaestionem dico breviter quod intellectus bene potest intelligere suam intellec-
tionem et universaliter suum actum quiscumque sit, sive primus sive secundus. Et probatur
quia intellectus potest intelligere omne ens; sed actus ipsius intellectus est aliquod ens; igitur
et cetera. Maior est manifesta ex isto tertio cum intellectus sit in potentia omnia fieri et Com- 30
mentator dicit in suo libro De generatione quod nullum ens est ignotum naturaliter; et minor
similiter apparet de se; quare et cetera.
3.2 Sed de modo secundum quem intellectus intelligit intellectionem existentem in ipso
est magna difficultas. Si enim intellectus cognoscit intellectionem lapidis existentem in ipso,
quaero utrum intellectio illa quae intelligit intellectionem lapidis sit per se eadem cum ipsa 35
intellectione lapidis aut diversa. Si dicatur quod sit eadem, hoc videtur esse falsum, quia in-
telligere diversificatur secundum naturam rei intellectae, ut dicit plane Commentator in isto
2 Arist. DA III.4 429b5. 8–9 Arist. DA III.7, 432a7–14. 18–19 Arist. Metaph IV.4 1006b10. 24–25
Arist. DA III.4 429b5–9. 30 Arist. DA III.4 429a21–23. 37–1 Averr. Comm. in DA ad III.4 429b10–14,
comm. III.9, p. 422.36–50 (ed. Crawford).
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tertio commento nono; cum igitur lapis sit alia natura a sua intellectione et econverso, quo-
modo potest esse unum et idem intelligere quo intelligit utrumque? Si autem illa intellectio
sit alia ab intellectione lapidis, sequitur unum inconveniens manifestum, scilicet quod intellec-
tus simul potest intelligere infinita sub rationibus suis propriis, | quia qua ratione intellectus V1 218a
5 intelligit intellectionem lapidis existentem in eo intellectione alia ab ipsa eadem ratione intel-
ligere poterit intellectionem illius intellectionis per aliam intellectionem, et illam per aliam, et
sic in infinitum, et unamquamque istarum intellectionum simul intelligeret intellectus secun-
dum rationem suam propriam, sicut simul ponitur intelligere lapidem et intellectionem lapidis
existentem in eo secundum rationem suam propriam. Hoc autem videtur omnino absurdum,
10 scilicet quod intellectus intelligat infinita acta, quia infinitum est ignotum secundum Aristote-
lem primo Physicorum et secundo Metaphysicae, quare inconveniens videtur quod intellectus
intelligat intellectionem existentem in eo intellectione diversa ab illa.
3.3 Qualiter ergo intelliget eam? Et ad istam difficultatem solvendam invenio paucos
laborasse manifeste. Unde ad praesens sufficit mihi probabiliter transire, salva mihi libertate
15 aliter dicendi alias, si mihi melius apparebit. Possem itaque dicere quod intellectus intelligit
intellectionem lapidis existentem actu in eo, sed non alia intellectione simpliciter sed eadem,
ita quod intellectio lapidis existens in intellectu est intellectio lapidis et intellectio sui ipsius,
et intellectus ista intellectione denominatur intelligens lapidem et ipsammet intellectionem. Et
quodammodo simile sicut albedo non dicitur alba per aliam albedinem superadditam sibi, sed
20 dicitur alba eo modo quo potest dici alba per seipsam, quia ipsa est illud quo formaliter aliquid
est album; sic intellectio lapidis dicitur intellecta non quidem per aliam intellectionem sed per
seipsam inquantum est id quo aliquid dicitur intellectum et intelligens.
3.4 Et si quis quaeret quare intellectio lapidis est aliud a lapide, et intellectio intellectionis
lapidis non est aliud ab ipsa, forte causa huius est quia lapis est res materialis et non abstracta,
25 et talia non sunt de se actu intellecta nec intellectiones, ut dicit Aristoteles in isto tertio. In
habentibus autem materiam potentia est unumquodque intelligibilium, sed ipsa intellectio est
res abstracta a materia, scilicet actus universalis; omnis autem talis actus est de se intellectus,
et habens huiusmodi actum in se est actu intelligens; quare et cetera.
3.5 Et ad auctoritatem Commentatoris, cum dicitur “intelligere diversificatur secundum
30 diversitatem naturae intellectae”, possum dicere quod verum est si illae res sint eiusdem or-
dinis, verbi gratia intellectiones duarum formarum materialium sunt diversae, et similiter in-
tellectiones duorum diversorum actuum immaterialium sunt diversae; sed si intelligibilia sunt
diversorum ordinum, scilicet quod unum illorum sit materiale et aliud abstractum ab illo ma-
teriali, sic non oportet quod eorum sint diversae intellectiones, et sic est in proposito, nam
35 intellectio lapidis est in alio ordine entium a lapide et e contrario; lapis enim est res materia-
lis, et eius intellectio est quid immateriale et abstractum et causatum ab ipso lapide et quoquo
modo, scilicet median|te suo phantasmate, una cum intellectu agente, quare non valet. V1 218b
Ad 1.1 Ad primam rationem dico quod est simile de sensu et intellectu quoad hoc, quia
sicut sensus est subiectum sensationis sic intellectus intellectionis; sed est difficile in hoc,
40 quia sensus est virtus organica et corporea, et ideo non est nata cognoscere suum actum, sed
intellectus est virtus abstracta et incorporea, et ideo potest cognoscere suum actum.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliam cum dicitur “quod non est sensibile et cetera” potest dici quod verum est
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quod nec est sensibile nec habet habitudinem ad aliquod sensibile, licet si habet habitudinem
per se ad aliquod sensibile sic potest intelligi, modo licet intellectio non sit sensibilis per se,
tamen habet habitudinem ad sensibile per se, scilicet ad illud a quo causatur in intellectu quoquo
modo, sicut causatum habet habitudinem ad suam causam, et hoc dicitur sufficere. Quomodo
enim aliter possemus intelligere substantias separatas, nisi quia habent habitudinem ad aliquae 5
sensibilia, scilicet ad motus caelestes?
Ad 1.3 Ad aliam potest concedi rationabiliter quod intellectus bene potest simul intelli-
gere diversa saltem una intellectione, et sic erit in proposito. Intelligens enim intelligit lapidem
et intellectionem lapidis unica intellectione, et cum dicit Aristoteles quod “unum non intelligit
et cetera”, potest dici sicut communiter exponitur quod quis unum non intelligit secundum 10
unam intellectionem nihil intelligit. Utrum autem possint intelligi plura diversis intellectioni-
bus simul ab eodem individuo bona difficultas est, sed magis habet locum alibi, scilicet in quarto
Metaphysicae et sic de isto.
9–10 Arist. Metaph IV.4 1006b10.
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III.27: Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere seipsum




1.1 Et arguitur primo quod non, quia sicut se habet sensus ad sentire sic intellectus ad
intelligere per convenientem similitudinem; sed sensus non sentit seipsum immo neque suam
5 cognoscit sensationem, ut vult Aristoteles in de somno et vigilia, non enim visus sentit seipsum
quando videt.
1.2 Item, quod non est sensibilie non est intelligibile, cum intelligere vel sit phantasia vel
non est sine phantasia, et intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasma aliquod speculari;
sed intellectus possibilis non est sensibilis, ut patet ex isto tertio; quare et cetera.
10 1.3 Item, si sic tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem, quod est im-
possibile quia ista sunt valde opposita, ut patet nono Metaphysicae et habetur a Commentator
in primo huius; et patet consequentia quia intelligere est actus respectu intellectus agentis, et
intellectus est in potentia respectu intellectionis, ut patet ex isto tertio; quare et cetera
1.4 Item, si sic aut intelligeret seipsum | per suam essentiam seu substantiam aut per A 98ra
15 aliquid aliud per sufficientem divisionem; non per seipsum, quia intelligibilia et intellectus
possibilis sunt eiusdem rationis, quia aliter intellectus possibilis non esset potentia una; si ergo
intellectus possibilis est intellectus a seipso per seipsum sequitur quod etiam alia intelligibi-
lia | essent intelligibilia per seipsa, et tunc sicut intellectus possibilis intelligit se sic et alia V1 263a
intelligerent, quod est absurdum – lapis enim et lignum non intelligunt; si autem ipse intel-
20 lectus possibilis est intelligibilis per intentionem aliam sive per | aliquid aliud, tunc cum alia V2 78vb
intelligibilia, scilicet entia materialia, sint intelligibilia per aliquid aliud et ipsa non intelligunt,
sequitur quod intellectus possibilis etiam non intelligeret, quod est absurdem, et haec est ratio
Aristotelis in littera.
1.5 Item, quod non potest movere intellectum non potest intelligi, intelligibile enim mo-
25 vet intellectum sicut sensibile sensum, et propter hoc intelligere est sicut sentire secundum
Aristotelem hoc; sed intellectus possibilis non potest movere intellectum possibilem, cum ni-
hil moveat seipsum, et amplius semper aestimabitur species aliquae movens tertio Physicorum,
ipse autem intellectus possibilis non est species aliquae, immo est ens pure potentiale secundum
se.
30 2.1 Oppositum vult Aristoteles in littera ibi “et ipse autem seipsum potest intelligere.”
3 Ad quaestionem primo dico breviter quod intellectus possibilis potest seipsum intelli-
gere, secundo ostendetur quod non intelligit seipsum per seipsum, scilicet per suam propriam
substantiam, tertio videbitur modus per quem contingit ei seipsum intelligere.
3.1 Primum breviter probari potest quia intellectus possibilis potest intelligere omne il-
35 lud quod continetur sub eius obiecto primo, sicut visus potest videre omne illud quod conti-
netur sub suo obiecto primo; modo intellectus possibilis continetur sub ente quod est primum
obiectum intellectus, quare et cetera
25–26 Arist. DA III.4, 429a13–18 30 Arist. DA III.4, 429b9.
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Item, intellectus possibilis enuntiat aliquae de seipso secundum affirmationem et negatio-
nem, ut quod ipse sit substantia incorporea et est in potentia ad intelligibilia et huiusmodi
multa, sicut patet ex prius dictis.
3.2 Secundum ostenditur quia si intellectus possibilis esset intellectus per seipsum sine
quacumque intellectione sibi superaddita, sequeretur quod in ipso sua intellectio esset idem 5
cum sua substantia, quod videtur impossibile.
Istam rationem tangit Commentator in commento quinto ubi dicit “et si iste intellectus es-
set intellectus per se, contingeret in scientia speculativa quod scientia et scitum essent idem,
quod est impossibile.” Consequentia non est omnino manifesta nec etiam impossibilitas conse-
quentis, et ideo considerandum est in istis. 10
Medium est propinqius extremis quam extrema inter se – hoc bene manifestum est; cum
ergo intellectus et intelligibile se habeant sicut extrema, et intellectio sit sicut medium inter
ea, sequitur quod si intellectus et intelligibile sint omnino unum et idem, sequitur quod intel-
ligere fit idem cum eis, et sic si intellectus possibilis secundum seipsum est intelligens et quod
intelligitur, necesse est quod intellectio sua sit substantia sua, et sic patet consequentia. Sed 15
falsitas huius consequentis potest sic probari: nam si intellectus possibilis esset sua intellectio
essentialiter, numquam reciperet de novo intellectionem suae propriae substantiae, nihil enim
V1 263b est per se rece|ptivum alicuius quod est eiusdem speciei cum eo; omnis autem intellectio pro-
pria secundum quam intelligitur substantia propria intellectus possibilis est eadem secundum
speciem per se, loquendo sicut “et ipse est unus secundum speciem”; si ergo intellectus possi- 20
blis esset sua intellectio, numquam reciperet suam intellectionem eo quod recipiens debet esse
A 98rb denudatum essentialiter a tota | specie ipsius recepti, sicut pulchre docet Commentator in isto
tertio commento quinto et septimo. Ridiculum enim esset dicere quod aliquid eiusdem speciei
cum aliquo esset per se receptivum illius, ut quod una albedo esset per se receptiva alterius
albedinis. Inconveniens autem videtur omnino quod intellectus possibilis numquam recipiat 25
de novo intellectionem propriam suae propriae substantiae, quia quilibet intelligens experitur
in seipso se intelligere propriam substantiam intellectus possibilis et eius differentiam a sua
potentia quoquo modo, et ab intellectu agente et a specie intelligibili recepta in intellectu; ergo
sequitur quod intellectus possibilis non est intellectus a seipso per seipsum.
Et ex hoc sequitur unum correlarium quod etiam prius positum est, scilicet quod intel- 30
lectus possibilis non est substantia aliquae intellectualis actu de se formaliter, quia omnis talis
substantia est de se intelligens et intellecta intellectione quae est sua substantia secundum doc-
trinam Aristotelis et Commentatoris in isto tertio. Sed diceret aliquis contra istud correlarium
quod non sequitur, et cum dicitur “omnis substantia intellectualis actu existens de se intelligit
seipsa et cetera”, verum est si sit talis substantia actu quae non sit dependens in operatione sua 35
ab aliquo existente in materia, scilicet a phantasmate. Hoc non proficit quia secundum istam
positionem ipse intellectus possiblis erit substantia actu naturaliter priusquam moveatur ab
aliquo phantasmate humano, et sic naturaliter prius habebit aliquam operationem, quod non
esset nisi prius naturaliter intelligeret suam propriam substantiam. Et confirmatur: omne quod
de se formaliter est ens actu antequam moveatur et informetur ab aliquod de se est intelligibile 40
7–9 Averroes, Comm. Magn. in DA, ad 430a2–5, comm. III.15, p. 434.20–22 (ed. Crawford).
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ab ipso intellectu possibili priusquam ab aliquo moveatur, si ergo intellectus possibilis est sub-
stantia actu de se formaliter antequam immutetur ab aliquo | existente in materia, necessario V2 79ra
prius est intelligibilis sive intellectus a seipso, quare ergo prius naturaliter intelliget seipsum
quam moveatur a phantasmate, cum ibi est prius intellectus et intelligibile secundum seipsum.
5 Sed ad hoc respondetur hic quod intellectus possibilis bene est actu de se intellectus naturali-
ter antequam moveatur a phantasmate, sed non est intellectus secundum seipsum, nec potest
intelligere seipsum potentia propinqua nisi cum receperit speciem a phantasmate qua quidem
specie disponitur ad recipiendum cognitionem suiipsius. Sed illud non est rationabile omnino,
quia postquam intellectus possibilis esset substantia ens actu de se for|maliter antequam mo- V1 263a
10 veatur ab aliquo alio, ipse debeat aliter et magis esse dispositus ad recipiendum cognitionem
suiipsius quam ad recipiendum cognitiones aliorum entium; unde cum ad recipiendum cogni-
tiones entium naturalium disponatur per species eorum, non esset rationabile quod eisdem
speciebus proficeatur ad cognitionem suiipsius, quod ergo intellectus possibilis indigeat ad co-
gnitionem suiipsius disponi per species aliorum. Hoc non est nisi quia ipse secundum se est
15 ens pure in potentia receptiva et non actu de se formaliter.
3.3 Nunc videndum est modus per quem intellectus possibilis perveniat ad intelligere
seipsum, et breviter credo quod modus est quod prius intelligat aliquod intelligibile per eius
speciem receptam quodcumque sit illud, deinde considerat istam speciem in se receptam de
novo, et postmodum considerat potentiam receptivam illius speciei, et tandem considerat sub-
20 stantiam subiectam illi potentiae et illi speciei receptae; nec oportet dicere quod simul intelligat
omnia illa, sed cognitio rei cuius species informat intellectum continuabitur per aliquod tem-
pus, et in fine illius temporis incipiet considerare speciem illam receptam, et illa consideratio
erit per aliquod tempus, deinde in fine illius temporis incipiet intelligere potentiam suscepti-
vam illius specei, et postea continget ut intelligat substantiam subiectam illi potentiae et specei
25 et sic intelliget seipsum.
Et si quis quaerat quid sit principium effectivum illius intellectionis qua intellectus | pos- A 98va
sibilis seipsum intelligit, credo sine dubio quod illud sit intellectus agens, et credo quod illa
eadem species quae prius disponit intellectum ad intelligere quiditatem eius cuius est species
etiam disponit ipsam ad suscipiendum intellectionem suiipsius, sed diversimode; nam illa spe-
30 cies est conformis quiditati quam repraesentat et eius effectus quoquo modo; et secundum hoc
disponit et perficit intellectum possibilem ad intelligere quiditatem illam, et illa species est in
intellectu sicut forma ei inhaerens et ipsum perficiens; et est effectus ipsius intellectus possi-
bilis tamquam subiecti et materiae in qua, ut prius apparvit, et secundum istam conditionem
ipsa perficit intellectum ad intelligendum seipsum, et ipsa etiam est quodam ens in se, et sic
35 perficit intellectum ad cognitionem suiipsius, scilicet speciei intelligibilis.
Et credo quod hoc voluit dicere Commentator in isto tertio commento octavo ubi dicit quod
“cum intellectus fuerit in hac dispositione,” scilicet ubi erit actuatus specie intelligibili quiditatis
alicuius, “tunc intelligit seipsum per quod ipse non est aliud nisi formae rerum inquantum ab-
strahit eas a materiis” id est secundum quod ipse est dispositus et perfectus speciebus intelligi-
40 bilibus abstractis a materia, “cum ergo intelligit seipsummodo accidentali, ut dicit Alexander, id
est secundum quod accidit intelle|ctis rerum quae fuerunt ipsae, id est essentia eius.” Haec sunt V1 263b
40–41 Averroes, Comm. Magn. in DA, ad 429b5–10, comm. III.8, p. 420.19–24 (ed. Crawford).
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verba Commentatoris quae sic intelligo quod intellectus intelligit seipsum modo accidentali, id
est disponitur ad intelligendum seipsum per aliquod accidens, scilicet per speciem intelligibi-
lem receptam in eo, et hoc est quod subdit ‘secundum quod accidit’, id est contingit intellectis
rerum, id est speciebus intelligibilibus ‘rerum quae fuerint ipsae’, id est essentia eius, id est
quae fuerunt receptae in essentia eius. Non ergo est intelligendum quod ipse intelligit seip- 5
sum per species rerum pro tanto quia illae species sint idem essentialiter cum substantia ipsius
intellectus (hoc absit), sed quia huiusmodi species accidunt ei et recipiuntur in eius essentia.
Bene tamen verum est quod huiusmodi species sunt essentia intellectus possibilis secundum
quod ipse non est dispositus et praeparatus ad intelligere sine illis, sed tunc illae species non
sunt idem essentialiter cum substantia intellectus possibilis absolute, et haec expositio hoc est 10
consideranda.
Considerandum etiam quod quamvis intellectus possibilis secundum communem doctri-
nam non intelligat seipsum in eodem instanti in quo intelligit rem cuius species est apud eum,
sed in alio instanti, et in tempore medio continuatur intellectio illius rei, cum contingit quod il-
lud tempus est multum breve et parvum et propter eius parvitatem putatur nullum esse, et ideo 15
V2 79rb in eodem instanti creditur utraque intellectio contingere; immo audivi aliquis dicere | se expiri
in seipsis quod ipsi intelligerent simul rem et ipsum suum intellectum; hoc autem est bene dif-
ficile et forte inquiretur a modo in consequentibus an intellectus possit simul intelligere plura
intelligibilia diversis intellectionibus.
3.4 Notandum etiam quod intellectus possibilis non solum potest intelligere seipsum 20
modo praedicto intellectione simplici et intuitiva quae est de primis eius operationibus quoquo
modo, sed etiam ipse potest se intelligere enuntiando aliquae de seipso secundum affirmatio-
nem et negationem, ut quod ipse sit substantia ⟨im⟩materialis et incorporea et receptiva specie-
rum et alia huiusmodi quae etiam de ipso demonstrative cognoscit, sicut patet ex ista scientia
de anima, et in hac scientia est delectatio mirabilis et sincera quam non percipiunt nisi pauci. 25
Ad 1 Ad rationes in oppositum.
A 98vb Ad 1.1 Ad primam dicendum quod simile | est in hoc quod sicut sentire est actus ip-
sius sensus ita intelligere intellectus et in aliis multis; sed difficile est in hoc quia sensus est
virtus corporea et ideo non potest reflectere se supra seipsum secundum communem modum
loquendi, quare non cognoscit se; intellectus autem est incorporeus, ideo potest redire supra 30
seipsum se cognoscendo postquam cognoverit alia. Si autem aliquis sibi quaereret demonstrari
istam conclusionem, scilicet quod virtus corporalis non potest recipere cognitionem suiipsius,
hoc esset difficile, sed dimitto propter brevitatem, et in liber de causis debet esse speculatio de
hoc.
V1 264a Ad 1.2 Ad aliud cum dicitur | “quod non est sensibile non est intelligibile et cetera”, dico 35
quod verum est quod illud quod non est sensibile non est intelligibile primo, id est non praece-
dente cognitione alicuius alterius; sed quod non est sensibile potest esse intelligibile secunda-
rio, scilicet praecedente cognitione alterius, et sic est in proposito, ut patet ex modo dicto, quia
autem dicit Aristoteles quod “intelligentem quemcumque necesse est et cetera” non sic est in-
telligendum quod illud phantasma universaliter sit species individualis repraesentans rem quae 40
intelligitur, sed sufficit quod sit phantasma alicuius alterius ad quod illud quod intelligitur ha-
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beat habitudinem per se. Sic autem est in proposito, nam intellectus possibilis, dum seipsum
intelligit, potest uti phantasmate alicuius rei sive quiditatis ad quam se habet sicut mobile ad
motum ita quod quiditas phantasiata movet intellectum ad suam speciem per quam seipsum
intelligit modo praedicto.
5 Ad 1.3 Ad aliud potest dici quod bene concludit intellectum non intelligere se per seipsum
omnino sed per speciem alterius entis. Considerandum tamen est quod idem esse in actu et in
potentia respectu eiusdem et secundum idem sui non est possibile, sed secundum aliud et aliud
bene est possibile, ut patet in animali movente seipsum; dicam ergo quod anima intellectiva
intelligens seipsam est in actu et in potentia simul respectu sui intelligere, sed hoc est ratione
10 diversorum quae sunt in ea. Est enim in potentia receptiva ratione suae naturae possibilis, et
est in potentia activa respectu intellectu agentis ut prius dictum fuit.
Ad 1.4 Ad aliud dico breviter quod intellectus intelligit seipsum per aliquid aliud, scili-
cet per speciem alicuius alterius modo prius dicto, non autem per suam substantiam proprie.
Et cum dicitur “ergo entia quae sunt intelligibilia per suam speciem erunt intelligibilia sicut
15 intellectus”, dico quod non est simile quia species rerum materialium quibus intelliguntur non
sunt in eis in actu subiective et inhaerenter, sed in potentia activa pro quanto movent intellec-
tum ad suas species, et ideo non intelligunt secundum eas; sed huius species sunt in intellectu
secundum actum, id est inhaerentes ei formaliter, et sic perficiunt eum ad intelligere. Et haec
est intentio Aristotelis et Commentatoris in littera, dicit enim Aristoteles quod in habentibus
20 materiam unumquodque intelligibilium est in potentia, scilicet ad species intelligibile modo
praedicto, et ideo illis, scilicet rebus materialibus, non inhaereat intellectus in intelligere, et
subdit sine materia, enim est intellectus talium, id est intelligere talium est in potentia immate-
riali, scilicet in intellectu, illud autem, scilicet ens materiale, cuius species est in intellectu, est
intelligibile et non intelligens, et hoc etiam voluit dicere Commentator ibidem ubi sic loquitur.
25 Dissolutio ergo quaestionis est quod intentio per quam intellectus materialis sit intellectus
actu est quantum est intellectu actu, id est species intelligibilis per quam intellectus materialis
fit actu intellectus, est in ipso intellectu actu, scilicet sicut forma ei inhaerens. Inten|tio vero V1 264b
per quam res quae sunt extra animam sunt entia est quia sunt intellectae in potentia, id est
species intelligibilis per quam res extra animam est intelligibilis est in ipsa in potentia modo
30 praedicto. Vel sic intentio, id est forma per quam res extra animam est intellecta in potentia, id
est in potentia ad speciem intelligibilem modo praedicto, et non habens eam in se formaliter,
et si haberet eam in actu, tunc esset intelligens ut ipse subiungit ibidem.
Ad 1.5 Ad aliam rationem patet ex dictis quia | intellectus non movet seipsum ad intel- V2 79va
lectum per speciem sui sed alterius.
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III.30: Utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum
agentem eadem intellectione numero
III.30: Utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem eadem intellec-tione numero
V1 273a,
V2 81rb,
A 101vb Consequenter potest quaeri utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum agentem
eadem intellectione numero.
V2 81va 1.1 Et arguitur primo quod non, quia si ita esset, tunc anima humana haberet | opera- 5
tionem omnino sibi propriam quae non dependeret a corpore nec tamquam a subiecto nec
tamquam ab obiecto, quod videtur impossibile secundum Aristotelem in prooemio huius, et in
isto tertio. Dicit enim in prooemio huius:“Si autem est hoc, scilicet intelligere, phantasia quidem
aut non sine phantasia non contingit, itaque neque hoc sine corpore esse”. Et in isto tertio dicit
quod intelligentem quemcumque necesse est phantasma aliquod speculari. Consequentia patet 10
quia nihil quod est aeternum et unum numero dependet ab aliquo corpore tamquam ab agente,
nec aliquo existente in corpore, et constat etiam quod illud intelligere quo intellectus possibilis
intelligeret agentem non esset in corpore ut subiecto, sicut videtur; nullum enim intelligere est
in corpore, ut patet hoc; igitur et cetera.
2.1 Oppositum dicit Commentator super istam particulam “Sed non aliquando quidem 15
intelligit aliquando vero non intelligit”. Ibi enim dicit Commentator quod “cum intellectus fuerit
acceptus simpliciter et secundum quod intelligit formas abstractas et liberatas a materia, tunc
non invenitur quandoque intelligens quandoque non, sed invenitur in eadem forma; verbi gra-
tia, in modo per quem intelligit intellectum agentem cuius proportio est ad ipsum, ut diximus
sicut lucis ad diaphanum.” 20
3 Ad quaestionem dico breviter primo quod intellectus possibilis natus est intelligere
intellectum agentem, secundo quod intelligit ipsum semper eadem intellectione in numero.
3.1 Primum probo ratione Commentatoris quam tangit hoc: Nam minus videtur quod
A 101vb intellectus possibilis sit natus | intelligere formas materiales quam intellectum agentem, quia
formae materiales non sunt de se intellectae actu, sed potentiae sunt intellectae; fiunt autem 25
intellectae per intellectum agentem. Intellectus autem agens, cum sit substantia immaterialis,
actu ens est de se intellectus, et ideo rationabile est, cum ipse intellectus possibilis sit natus
perfici per formas materiales et intelligere eas, ut sit natus perfici per intellectum agentem et
intelligere ipsum. Et haec ratio similiter concludeat quod ipse natus est intelligere alias formas
abstractas, et ratio huius potest esse quia illud quod habet naturale desiderium ad inferiorem et 30
minus nobilem perfectionem alicuius generis multo magis debet habere naturale desiderium ad
perfectionem altiorem, quia natura non consistit in imperfectio. Constat autem quod perfectio
per formas immateriales longe nobilior est quam perfectio per formas materiales.
3.2 Secundum ostenditur sic: Illud cui semper est coniuncta vel unita intellectio alicuius
intelligibilis eadem numero semper intelligit illud intelligibile intellectione eadem numero – 35
haec est omnino manifesta; sed ipsi intellectui possibili semper est unita intellectio intellectus
agentis, quia ipse intellectus agens est suamet intellectio sui ipsius secundum Aristotelem et
8–9 Arist. DA I.1 403a8–10. 9–10 Arist. DA III.8 432a7–8. 15–16 Arist. DA III.5 430a22. 16–20
Averr. Comm. magnum in DA com. 19 in III.5 430a17–20, p. 450.193–198 (ed. Crawford). 23 Cf. Averr.
Comm. magnum in DA com. 19 in III.5 430a17–20, p. 450.198–205 (ed. Crawford).
9 in isto ] V2; isto | in V1 (273b)
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Commentatorem hoc: In ipso enim scientia est eadem rei scitae. Cum igitur intellectus agens sit
semper unitus intellectui possibili, sicut perfectio naturalis suo perfectibili, ut patet ex praeo-
stensis, sequitur quod semper est unita intellectio intellectus agentis, et per consequens semper
ipsum intelligit.
5 Ex hoc autem videtur correlarie posse concludi quod ipse intellectus possibilis per seipsum
et per suam propriam substantiam non intelligit intellectum agentem intellectione eadem nu-
mero alia ab illa qua intellectus agens intelligit seipsum. Nam si sic, sequeretur quod unum et
idem haberet diversas intellectiones unius intelligibilis simul, quod non videtur possibile, prae-
cipiue quia | cum intellectus possibilis sit substantia pure in potentia, non est bene rationabile V1 273va
10 quod ex sui propria natura habeat aliquem actum sine aliquo alio actu. Unde cum intelligere in-
tellectum agentem sit quidam actus et operatio, non bene viderem qualiter intellectus possibilis
per seipsum sine alio actu informante intelligeret intellectum agentem.
3.3 Propter quod videturmihi ad praesens esse tenendum quod intellectus possibilis sem-
per intelligit intellectum agentem modo praedicto, scilicet quia semper est ei unita intellectio
15 intellectus agentis qua seipsum intelligit. Illa tamen intellectio non est substantia nec essentia
intellectus possibilis nec e contrario.
3.4 Si quis autem diceret quod non solum intellectus possibilis intelligit intellectum agen-
tem intellectione qua ipse intellectus agens intelligit seipsum, et quae est substantia intellec-
tus agentis perficiens intellectum possibilem, sed etiam quadam alia intellectione quae sequi-
20 tur immediate unionem intellectus agentis ad possibilem, quae quidem intellectio non est ipsa
substantia intellectus agentis, sed consequens unionem intellectus agentis cum possibili, tunc
inquaerendum est quae esset neccesitas essendi huius intellectionem, cum intellectus possibilis
sufficienter intelligat intellectum agentem per eius substantiam. Hoc autem tibi perficiendum
reliquo.
25 3.5 Sed considerandum est quod quamvis intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intel-
lectum agentem per eius substantiam modo praedicto, modo ista intellectio non denominat
| aliquid individuum hominis, ut puto, quia non dependet a phantasmate alicuius hominis, V2 81vb
nec omnium. Immo etiam intellectio similis huic intellectioni, scilicet qua intelligit intellec-
tus agens, non contingit nobis perfecte in principio generationis philosophiae nec in medio,
30 sed forte in complemento, et de hoc debet | inquaeri in consequentibus. A 102ra
Ad 1.1 Ad rationem dico quod anima nostra nullam habet operationem propriam no-
vam et differentem a tota sua substantia sine corpore obiecto, et sic intelligit Aristoteles. Unde
intelligentem quemcumque, supple de novo, neccesse est phantasma et cetera. Sed non nega-
vit Aristoteles animam intellectivam humanam habere operationem aeternam non per corpore
35 et operationem quae non est aliud realiter a sua substantia, et huiusmodi est intelligere prae-
dictum. Non enim est realiter diversum a tota substantia animae intellectivae, cum sit ipsa
substantia intellectus agentis. Immo huius intelligere non est operatio propria nisi secundum
modum intelligendi et significandi, quare et cetera.
1 Arist. DA III.430a19–20. Cf. Arist. DA III.430a2–3.
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C.13 Simon of Faversham: Quaestiones in De anima
I–III
Faversham’s questions to book three are published by Sharp.25 The present working edition
only seeks to make a readable version of the first question available and is therefore only based
on one manuscript, Vat. Lat. 2170: 63r–114r. Reading the manuscript provides quite some
problems (not least due to the reproduction that I have used), but I have not been able to com-
pare it with the other witnesses. It should also be noted that for some parts of the commentary
the Vatican manuscript may not be the best witness, as it differs from the other manuscripts.26
The known witnesses are Vat. Lat. 2170: 63r–114r, Vat. Lat. 10135: 87r–118r, Merton 292:
355r-361v (364r-370v in old fol.) Kassel 2° Phys. 11: 56r–77r, Cambrai 486: 2ra, BNF Lat.
16170: 53r–53v.
Manuscript sigla
V Vatican, Vatican Library, Vaticanus Latinus 2170: 63r–114r.
25 Sharp 1934.
26 See Vennebusch 1965: 28–31.
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I.1: Utrum de anima possit esse scientia
I.1: Utrum de anima possit esse scientiaQuaeritur utrum de anima possit esse scientia. V 63rb
1 Et arguitur quod non.
1.1 De eo quod non habet speciem vel formam intelligibilem non potest esse scientia; sed
5 anima non habet speciem vel formam intelligibilem; et cetera. Maior patet quia scientia | non V 63va
est nisi de intelligibili. Minor patet: Philosophus enim dicit tertio huius quod intellectus noster
nihil est actu eorum quae sunt, ergo nullam speciem intelligibilem habet, et cetera. Item, si quis
temptet considerare materiam et substantiam animae, statim apperebit ei quod non potest eam
intelligere nisi per opera sua {hoc non est nisi per opera sua}. Hoc non est nisi quia ipsa anima
10 nullam formam intelligibilem habet in actu. De anima ergo non potest esse scientia.
1.2 Item, de singularibus non est scientia; sed animae humanae sunt singulares et nume-
ratae numeratione corporum; et cetera.
1.3 Item, de eo non potest esse scientia cui non competit ratio subiecti; sed animae non
competit ratio subiecti, et non est per se subsistens; et cetera. Maior patet de se. Minor probatur
15 quia de ratione subiecti {quia de ratione subiecti} est quod habeat partes et passiones quibus
subsistet; anima autem non est huiusmodi, cum sit forma simplex.
1.4 Item Avicenna: scientia nostra habet ortum a sensu. De illo ergo quod nec per se nec
per accidens cadere potest sub sensu, non est scientia; anima solum intellectiva est huiusmodi;
et cetera. Quod non per se patet, sed quod non per accidens probatio quia hoc esset per actum
20 suum; sed eius operatio est separata, sicut et substantia, quia non transit in materiam extra; et
cetera.
1.5 Item, omnis scientia est de bono. Anima non est quid bonum, quare et cetera. Maior
patet quia omnis scientia est de bono et difficili. Minor patet quia illud quod est bonum movet
appetitum, anima non movet appetitum nec aliud obiectum appetitus, quare et cetera.
25 2.1 Oppositum patet per Philosophum et arguitur: De eo quod habet diffinitionem, pro-
prietates et passiones, quae possunt probari de ipso, potest esse scientia. Nunc autem anima
habet diffinitionem, ut patet ex secundo huius. Habet etiam proprietates et passiones quae pos-
sunt probari de ipsa; anima enim est motrix corporis, et per animam sentimus et intelligimus,
et haec possunt praedicari de anima et cetera. Et hoc etiam patet inducendo in singulis partibus
30 animae, in vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva. Vegetativa enim partes habet, scilicet potentiam,
generativam, augmentativam et nutritivam. Habet etiam passiones quae sunt augere, nutrire et
generare. Similiter anima sensitiva habet partes sicut potentiam visivam, auditivam et cetera.
Habet etiam passiones quae sunt audire, videre et cetera. Similiter anima intellectiva, de qua
maior est difficultas, habet partes, scilicet intellectum agentem et possibilem. Habet etiam pro-
35 prietates, scilicet intelligere, quae convenit intellectui possibili, et abstrahere, quae inest agenti
et cetera.
3 Intelligendum est quod de anima potest esse scientia.
6–7 Arist. DA III.4, 429a22–24, cf. 429b30–31.
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3.1 Sicut enim probat Proclus:“omne incorporeum est conversivum sui ipsius ad se ip-
sum.” Hoc est quia non habet distantias partium, corporeum autem non, et hoc est quia habet
distantias partium, incorporeum autem cum sit indivisibile est conversivum, et cetera. Anima
autem est incorporeum aliquid, quia non est magnitudo nec magnitudinem habens. Si enim
nos poneremus quod anima esset magnitudo, tunc sicut nos videmus quod mobile pertransit 5
unam partem magnitudinis et postea aliam, et sic pertransit totam magnitudinem in tempore
et succesive, sic, si intellectus esset magnitudo, tunc intelligibile tangens intellectum, sive per
speciem sive per aliquid aliud, prius pertransiret unam partem intellectus quam aliam, et ita
actus completus intelligendi non fieret in nobis, nisi in generatione magni temporis, et ex hoc
sequeretur quod intellectus esset sciens et ignorans, quia secundum unam partem cognosceret 10
aliquid et secundum aliam illud idem ignoraret. Sic etiam sequeretur quod intellectus posset
simul multa et contraria intelligere quod est inconveniens. Non enim est possibile quod in-
tellectus noster simul intelligat plura et contraria. Intellectus igitur noster est incorporeus, et
V 63vb per consequens est conversivus sui ipsius ad se ipsum. | Ipsa autem anima non est conversiva
sui ipsius ad se ipsam nisi intelligendo suam substantiam et proprietates sibi inhaerentes, et 15
ideo anima nostra se et alias res intelligere potest. Sic autem intelligendo cognitionem habet
de anima. Et ideo per animam nostram possumus habere cognitionem de anima.
3.2 Sed advertendum quod licet anima nostra possit habere cognitionem de se ipsa, prius
tamen oportet quod habeat cognitionem de aliis quam de se ipsa, et ratio huius est quia anima
nostra nullam cognitionem habet sibi innatam. Sed omnis cognitio quae est in anima est sibi ac- 20
quisita et istam cognitionem quam habet immmediate, acquirit ex sensibilibus et singularibus,
quia quicquid intellectus intelligit in fantasmatibus sensibilibus intelligit. Est enim intellectus
in prima sui creatione sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, nata autem sunt omnia de-
pingi. Omnis enim cognitio in anima est acquisita et istam acquirit ex fantasmatibus. Intellectus
igitur in actu praesupponit fantasiam in actu, fantasia autem in actu praesupponit sensum in 25
actu. Fantasia enim est modus factus a sensibilibus secundum actum, ut dicitur secundo huius.
Sensus autem in actu praesupponit ea quorum est sensus in actu. Verum est ergo quod quam-
cumque cognitionem habet intellectus noster, illius scibilis primo erit sensus in actu. Si ergo
anima non cadat sub sensu, manifestum est quod anima non potest habere primo cognitionem
de se ipsam, sed oportet quod prius habeat cognitionem ipsorum quae cadunt sub sensu. Sed 30
ulterius, quando anima sic acquisivit cognitionem de aliis sensibilibus, postea scit se habere
cognitionem de illis, cognoscit operationem sibi propriam, et quia operatio ducit in cognitio-
nem substantiae, ideo ex hoc quod anima cognoscit operationem sibi propriam cognoscit suam
substantiam. Sic igitur anima ex cognitione aliorum entium devenit in cognitionem sui ipsius,
et hoc est quod dicit Albertus in libro suo de anima. Dicit enim quod licet omnis cognitio nostra 35
incipiat a sensibilibus, non tamen semper stat et terminatur ad sensibilia, sed anima ulterius
extollitur ad cognoscendum se ipsam, et hoc in quantum se cognoscit negotiari circa quidita-
tes sensibilium intelligendo et cognoscendo quiditates eorum, et quia anima cognoscit se sic
1–2 Proclus Elementatio theologica §15. 35–2 Albertus Magnus, De anima, Lib. 1, tract. 1, cap. 1, pp.
2–3, ll. 52–5
8 pertransiret ] pertransit a.c. V 9 generatione ] ut vid. L 25 fantasiam … praesupponit2 ] in
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negotiari circa quiditates sensibilium, percipit suam operationem et deinde veram habet sui ip-
sius cognitionem. Isto ergo modo devenit anima in cognitionem sui ipsius, et hoc necessarium
fuit ponere, quia secundum Themistium anima de se incerta de aliis conno verificabitur quasi
dicens quod nullo modo. Unde cognitio eorum dependet ex cognitione ipsius animae, propter
5 quod etiam Philosophus concludit quod utilis est haec scientia ad omnium veritatem et cetera.
3.3 Ulterius intelligendum quod Philosophus tertio huius dicit quod intellectus intelligit
se ut alia, et hoc non est intelligendum quod intellectus intelligat se ut alia abstrahendo a sen-
sibilibus, quia tunc esset alius intellectus, qui ipsum intelligerit et illum alius, et sic in infinitum
quod est impossibile, sed sic intelligit quod per speciem alienam ducitur in actum, et tunc se
10 intelligit per speciem propriam.
Et tu dices “quomodo intelliget se per speciem propriam”, dicendum quod, ut visum est,
species aliqua ducit ipsum ad actum de potentia quae species facit unum cum ipso, non sicut
forma cum materia, nec ut accidens cum subiecto, sed sicut lumen cum perspicuo, ut infra
dicet Commentator, quia igitur fit unum ex specie intelligibili et ipso intelligibili. Ideo dicitur
15 se intelligere per propriam speciem et cetera.
Ad 1 Ad rationes.
Ad 1.1 Ad primam cum arguitur ‘de eo quod non haberi formam’ et cetera, dico quod de
illo quod | de se non habet formam intelligibilem in actu, non potest esse scientia. Et quando V 64ra
dicitur quod ‘intellectus non habet formam intelligibilem’ et Themistius similiter illud verbi
20 Philosophi: “Intellectus nihil est actu eorum que sunt ante addiscere vel invenire” dicit redicu-
lum erit intelligere quia anima nihil sit in actu eorum que sunt, ac si intellectus non sit illud
quod ipsum erit, planum est enim quod intellectus est illud quod est, quia est natura aliqua, et
substantia non ergo dicitur sic non esse {in} in actu, quia non sit aliqua substantia, et natura
est enim substantia in actu, sed intellectus noster se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut ma-
25 teria se habet ad formas sensibiles. Materia autem secundum se et secundum suam naturam
considerata non est aliquod sensibilium in actu nihilominus materia, ut consideratur in actu,
et sub forma est aliquid sensibilium. Similiter est de intellectu, quod intellectus noster non est
aliquid intelligibile in actu, sed hoc solum quod potest recipere omnes formas intelligibiles, hoc
enim solum habet quod sit possibilis vocatus, ut dicit Philosophus tertio huius, sed statim cum
30 acquisiverit formam intelligibilem propter speciem quam habet penes se, tunc etiam quod per
eandem speciem ipsa anima fit anima intelligibilis et ideo non est intellectum nisi per speciem
aliorum intelligibilium, et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus tertio huius. Anima ergo, quantum
est de se, non est aliquod intelligible in actu. autem est aliquod intelligibile in actu per ipsam
speciem, ipsa fit in actu intelligibilis, et cum de eo quod est in actu inelligibile sit scientia, ideo
35 de ipsa est scientia propter quod bene dictum est a principio quod ipsa anima numquam est
intelligibilis primo, sed postquam apprehendit alias res apprehendit se ipsam.
Ad 1.2 Ad aliam, cum dicitur ‘de singularibus non est scientia’, verum est ut sic, et tu
dices ‘animae humanae’ et cetera, verum est. Et ideo de eis ut sic non est scientia, tamen de
6–7 Arist. DA III.4 430a2–3 20 Arist. DA III.4, 429a22–24, cf. 429b30–31.
3 conno ] in marg. ut vid. V 3–4 quasi dicens ] q·d· V 4 cognitio ] in marg. V 5 d post ad del. V
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singularibus animabus ut conveniunt in natura communi animae, est scientia, et sic patet ad
illud.
Ad 1.3 Ad aliam dicendum concedendo maiorem. Ad minorem dicendum quod simplici-
tas animae, cum sit visum [?] simplicia, non repugnat ratio subiecti, ut patiat, neque etiam opor-
tet ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum quod sit per se subsistens, sed sufficit quod sit subiectum 5
respectu passionum.
Ad 1.4 Ad maiorem ultimae dicendum quod verum est primo, et cum dicitur ‘illud ergo
quod non cadit sub sensu’ et cetera non oportet, sed sufficit quod moveatur ab illo vel specie
illius, quod cadit sub sensu, et sic est proposito ut ostensum est prius et cetera.
Ad 1.5 Ad aliud ‘omnis scientia est de bono’ et cetera, verum est ad minorem. Dico quod 10
duplex bonum /2/. . . (rep.) apparentia /4/. . . (rep.) 2. . . (rep.) bonum /1/. . . (rep.)
5 Et notandum quod secundum Averroem in prooemio isto Philosophus intendit nos in-
vitare ad amorem scientiae huius libri, ut ei studium impendamus, et hoc philosophus facere
nititur per quatuor quae hic inducit. Ostendit enim primo dignitatem et mirabilitatem et ho-
norabilitatem huius scientiae. Secundo ostendit eius utilitatem ibi “videtur autem” et in hiis 15
duobus ipse reddit auditores benevolos. Tertio ostendit modum procedendi circa huius libri
scientiam, et in hoc ipse reddit auditores dociles ibi “inquirimus autem”.Quarto autem inducit
nos ad amorem huius scientiae per huius scientiae difficultatem, et in hoc ipse reddit auditores
attentos ibi “omnino autem”.
Et intelligendum quod prius ad praesens duobus modis dicitur uno modo ordine dignitatis, 20
et sic scientia libri de anima in primis debet poni, secundum quod dicit Philosophus super
V 64rb excepta metaphysica quia, ut dicit Averroes, illa ordine dignitatis | prima est. Alio modo dicitur
aliquid prius ordine doctrine, et sic liber de anima primus non est, immo sextus.
Primus enim inter libros naturales est liber Physicorum, qui dictus est liber de mobili secun-
dum quod mobile absolute, et de omnibus hiis quae attribuuntur motui secundum quod motus. 25
Secundus autem liber est liber De caelo qui sit, ut dictus, de mobili in communitate accepto, sed
de mobili contracto ad ubi sive ad motum localem, qui prior est inter omnes motus alios secun-
dum quod apparet in praedictis, multa enim moventur hoc motu quae non moventur aliquo
alio motu, sicut patet in motu celi, sed hoc non est econverso. Tertius liber est De generatione
qui dictus de ente mobili ad formam elimenti secundum quod elementum est. Quartus autem 30
est Meteorum, qui dictus de ente mobili ad formam elimenti sub ratione qua tale et speciale
elementum, ut aqua vel ignis et cetera. Quintus est liber De mineralibus, quem non habemus
a Philosopho sed ab altero, in quo determinatur de ente mobili ad formam mixti secundum
quod mixtum est, ut de natura et generatione lapidum et metallorum et cetera. Sextus autem
est liber De anima qui dictus de ente mobili ad formam mixti non absolute sed mixti animati, 35
ut apparet. Propter quod etiam in hoc libro Philosophus supponit aliqua a libro Physicorum, De
generationes et aliis, licet raro et cetera.
Et quod ille sit debitus ordo patet quia secundum Philosophus secundo Physicorum innate
in nobis ut a communioribus ad magis specialia procedamus. Modo motus ad formam mixti
animati praesupponit motum mixti absolute, et hoc presupponit motum elimenti talis, et hoc 40
10–11 ad … bonum2 ] in marg. V 12 Averroi post secundum del. V 24 physicorum post liber del. V
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ulterius motus ad formam elimenti unde elementum est, et ultimus motus ad formam elimenti
praesupponit motum localem, et motus localis motus simplicter et cetera. Et propter hoc liber
De animaAvicennae, cum sextus sit in ordine, vocatur communiter Sextus naturalium et cetera.
Ulterius notandum quod de passionibus propriis et communibus tripliciter exponitur. Uno
5 modo ita quod per passiones proprias intelligere possumus illas quae insunt animae principa-
liter, ut speculatio et intelligentia. SecundumThemistium communes autem quae principaliter
attribuntur corpori sicut delectatio tristitia et cetera, et hoc modo videtur exponere Themi-
stius. Aliis modis exponit Averroes, ita quod passiones proprias possumus intelligere quae non
sunt permixtae organo corporeo, ut intelligere, speculari. Per communes autem illas quae fiunt
10 et exercentur organo corporali, ut sensus, fantasia. Tertio modo per passiones communes in-
telligimus illas quae incipiunt a corpore et terminantur ad animam, ut sompnus et vigilia. In
dormiente enim primo ligatur cor, quod est principium vitae, et ex consequenti omnes sen-
sus exteriores cordi deservientes et cetera. Passiones autem proprie dicuntur quae insipiunt ab
anima et terminantur ad corpus, ut intelligere, speculari et cetera.
15 Et nota quod dicit Philosophus “notitiam” et non scientiam, quia scientia proprie habet
esse per causam, ut patet primo Posteriorum, et quia anima solum cognoscitur per effectus et
cetera. Iterum, propter eandem causam dixit “historia animalium” et propter hoc etiam quod
ante tempus suum historiate fuit scripta et cetera.
17 animalium ] ut vid. V
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C.14 Simon Magister: Expositio in De anima
This text is witnessed in Leipzig UB 1359: 44r–77v. As per the comparative analysis of the text
in section 5.2 on page 175 this is here not ascribed to Simon of Faversham. The text is from the
end of the 13th or beginning of the 14th century. See the relevant section for more information
about this text and manuscript.
Manuscript sigla
L Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Ms 1359: 44r–77v.
Lh2 Secondary hand in L, black ink.
Lh3 Tertiary hand in L, light brown ink.
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Prooemium
ProoemiumPhilosophus scribit in primo De partibus animalium quod plus delectamur et diligimus scire de L 44ra
rebus incorruptibilibus et aeternis, quamvis solum probabiliter et topice sciamus quam scire
omnia reliqua quae apud nos sunt necessarie et demonstrative. Et ratio huius propositionis est
5 quia secundum Philosophum tertio Topicorum et secundum Alanum in libro suo De planctu
naturae illa quae cum maiore difficultate et labore acquiruntur cum maiori delectatione et di-
lectione possidentur, eo quod delectatio nihil aliud est quam quies iure amata. Unde et Alanus
in praedicto libro dicit “praemia quidem laboribus comparata ceteris muneribus dulcius eluce-
scunt, munera enim empta laboribus, iucundius omnibus clarescunt gratuitis, labor enim an-
10 tecedens quamdam consequenti praemio infundens dulcedinem, maiori favore praemiat labo-
ranten.” Sed nunc ita quod aeternorum et incorruptibilium cognitio etiam probatur cum labore
et difficultate acquirimus, quia secundum Philosophum secundo Metaphysicorum: “Ad talia se
habet noster intellectus sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis.” Eo sequitur quod plus diligimus et
delectamur modicum scire de rebus aeternis et incorruptibilibus, etsi probabiliter et topice scia-
15 mus, quam alia apud nos necessarie et demonstrative, quod erat propositio primo proposita.
Cum igitur anima intellectiva sit incorruptibilis et aeterna secundum Philosophum in tertio
De anima et ab eodem in secundo expressius, ubi dicit quod intellectus est quodam alterum
genus animae, separatur enim ab aliis sicut perpetuum a corruptibili, et hoc idem vult Augu-
stinus duodecimo capitulo libri sui De anima et spiritu, ubi dicit quod immortalis est anima ne
20 a creatoris sui similitudine discrepare videatur. Non posset enim et imago et similitudo Dei
esse, si mortis timor clauderetur. Sequitur autem quod plus delectamur et diligimus aliquid
scire de anima intellectiva etiam probabiliter quam omnia alia hoc inferius apud nos existentia,
cuiusmodi sunt plantae, elementa et cetera, si necesse sciantur.
Advidendum est autem quod licet omnia aeterna et incorruptibilia habeant huiusmodi
25 praestantiam seu praeeminentiam, in hoc oportet quod plus delectamur et diligimus ipsa scire
aliis, ut dictum est, tamen inter aeterna et incoruptibilia naturaliter plus diligimus cognitionem
animae nostrae quam alicuius alterius. Cuius ratio est quia illud plus delectamur et diligimus
scire et cognoscere quod a nobis plus est dilatum, quia secundum Philosophum ibidem, sci-
licet in primo De partibus animalium, magis diligimus et delectamur videre modicam partem
30 alicuius dilati a nobis ut manum aut faciem quam totam partem alterius non sic dilati, et hoc
docet experientia; sed nunc est ita quod anima intellectiva a nobis est maxime diligenda ut
probabo, quare sequitur quod maxime delectemur ipsam scire et cognoscere.
Propositio assumpta declaratur per Philosophum in nono Ethicorum. Ibi vult quod unu-
squisque maxime se ipsum diligit, praecipue quod est honorabilissimum et praecipuum in ipso,
35 nam ut ibidem vult, amicitia et delectatio debet esse ordinata, et quod omne delectabile seu
amicale, quod est ad alterum, causatur ex animacibili ad se ipsum, propter quod et Seneca: “Si
prudens es incipiat a te consideratio tua, ut aliquos non promoveas re neglecto.” Unde et pro-
2–4 Arist. PA I.5, 644b31–35 7–11 Alanus De planctu naturae, p. 443D–44A. 12–13 Arist. Metaph.
II.1, 993b9–11. 16–17 Arist. DA III.5, 430a22–23. 17–18 Arist. DA II.2, 413b24–27.
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verbium: “Qui sibi non parcit mihi quomodo parcit?” quod dicit nullo modo. Unusquisque ergo
maxime se ipsum diligit et praecipue honorabilissimum et optimum in ipso, sed anima intel-
lectiva est huiusmodi, ut declarabo, quare unusquisque eam maxime diliget et per consequens
maxime delectabitur aliquid scire de ipsa, quod ostendere intendebamus.
Quod autem anima intellectiva sit honorabilissima in homine declaratur primo per Themi- 5
stium suu [?] in capitulo de anima ubi dicit quod natura usque ad intellectum progressa cessavit
tamquam nihil habens honorabilius cui utique faceret ipsum subiectum.
Item, secundo hoc declaro per Philosophum primo De anima capitulo de erroribus con-
spectu Empedoclis ubi dicit anima quidem aliquid esse antiquis et melius, impossibile est ad hoc
autem impossibilius intellectu rationale enim est hunc esse scilicet intellectum nobilissimum 10
et divinissimum secundum naturam.
Tertio hoc idem declaro per ibn-David Israelitam, id est iudaeus qui fuit translator libri
De anima Avicennae de arabico in latino. Dicit enim “omni paene creatura homo corpore est
inferior, sola vero anima aliis antecellit simulacrum sui creatoris quam expressius ante cetera
gerit.” Hoc etiam vult Boethius secundo De consolatione philosophiae, ubi dicit quod homines 15
mente Deo sunt consimiles: “Quid vero, si ad corpus spectes (id est videas), homine imbecillius
(id est debilius) reperire queas, quod saepe homines muscularum morsus vel in secreta quoque
reptantium (id est introitione uncium) necat introitus?”. quo nihil [?] unde Ovidius “mors sola
fatetur quantula fiut hominum corpuscula” quam est caduca.
Quarto hoc declaro per Senecam qui dicit: “Non deformitate corporis foedatur animus, sed 20
pulchritudine animae corpus ornatur.” Nihil enim aliud est animus quam pars quaedam divini
spiritus in corpos immersa. Unde etiam Expositor sententia quintum Ethicorum dicit quod licet
intellectus careat magnitudine molis, excedit tamen omnia alia quae sunt in homine quantitate
virtutis.
L 44rb /30/. . . (ed.) |/32/. . . (ed.) 25
Ex hiis quae dicta sunt possumus accipere quid sit subiectum libri de anima quem habe-
mus prae manibus, et quae causa efficiens et sic de aliis, scilicet causis. Notandum tamen quod
anima de qua determinatur in praesenti libro tripliciter considerari potest. Uno modo ut habet
rationem entis et substantiae, et sic de ea considerat metaphysicus. Secundomodo potest consi-
derari inquantum est actus er perfectio naturalis corporis et quantum ad partes et operationes 30
naturales quas excercet in corpore physico, et sic de ea considerat naturalis philosophus in
praesenti libro. Tertio potest considerari inquantum per diversas eius potentias est subiectum
virtutuum moralium et intellectualium et quantum ad eius operationes morales et voluntarias
quas excercet in corpore, et sic de ea considerat moralis philosophus. Et sic est visum quomodo
anima sit de consideratione philosophi naturalis. 35
Secundo vero intelligendum quomodo ipsa anima sit cognoscibilis et est notandum quod
aliquid est cognoscibile dupliciter. Uno modo per privationem, alio modo per positionem.
53–55 Boethius Cons. phil. II, pros. 6.5. Cf. ibid. II, pros. 5.26. 55–56 Juvenal Sat. 10.171–172. 57–58
Seneca, Ep. 66.4.
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Si per privationem, hoc est dupliciter, vel quia est pars vel aliquid illius per cuius priva-
tionem cognoscitur, et hoc modo punctus cognoscitur per privationem continui, cuius tamen
continui, ut lineae, ipse punctus est aliquid; unde dicit Philosophus tertio huius “punctum et
omne indivisibile monstratur divisione continui”. Ultimo, cognoscibile per privationem non est
5 aliquid illius per cuius privationem ipsum cognocitur, sed penitus diversum ab illis vel ab illo,
et sic Deus sive causa prima intelligitur. Dicimus enim quod Deus sit impassibilis, immortalis,
immaterialis, intransmutabilis, nullam habens magnitudinem quantitativam, et dicimus Eum
esse simplicitatem privatione compositionis.
Secundo autemmodo aliquid est cognoscibile positione, quod estmultismodis. Primomodo
10 contingit hoc per essentiam, et hoc est dupliciter; vel enim aliquid positione cognoscitur per
essentiam suam a se ipso vel ab alio. A se ipso autem ut solus Deus cognoscit se ipsum per
essentiam, et per illam cognoscit omnia alia quasi relucentia in sua⟨m⟩ essentiam. Si autem ali-
quis cognoscitur per suam essentiam ab alio, hoc est dupliciter; vel enim apprehenditur sensu
per essentiam suam, et sic a visu lux apprehenditur, vel cognoscitur ab intellectu, et sic dolor,
15 gaudium, spes, et huiusmodi quae non solum per species suas cognoscuntur, immo per essen-
tiam. Secundo vero aliquid positione cognoscitur per speciem, et hoc est dupliciter; vel enim
per species concreatas, et sic substantiae separatae cognoscunt et intelligunt27 (unde in Libro de
causis dicitur “omnis intelligentia plena est formis)”, vel illud contingit per species acquisitas,
et sic nos homines aliquae cognoscimus, et utrumque illorum modorum potest distingui, quia
20 aliqua sunt cognoscibilia in propria species, ut lapis, vel in specie aliqua, sicut pater cognosci-
tur specie filii, si ei filius similis sit, et Hercules cognoscitur per statuam Herculis. Tertio modo
cognoscitur aliquid positione, scilicet per causam propriam et immediatam, et sic cognoscuntur
conclusiones demonstrationum, et talis cognitio ‘propter quid’ dicitur scientia secundum Phi-
losophum primo Posteriorum. Quarto modo aliquid cognoscitur per effectus et per operationes
25 et hoc cognitio dicitur a Philosopho primo Posteriorum ‘cognitio quia’, et hoc modo cognosci-
mus substantias separatas et animam. Unde ille erit modus Philosophi, quis prius cognoscet
operationes et potentias et per consequens animam.
Ita ex superius positis palam est animae cognitionem et scientiam esse appetendam a nobis,
tum propter ipsius saltem humanae animae incorruptibilitatem et perpetuitatem sive propter
30 eius diligibilitatem, tum propter eius mirabilitatem, tum propter eius proficuitatem et utilita-
tem, et sub illis dictis omnibus suppositum est animam esse scibilem sive intelligibilem.
⟨Dubitatio: Utrum anima intellectiva sit scibilis et intelligibilis⟩
⟨Dubitatio: Utrum anima intellectiva sit scibilis et intelligibilis⟩
27 Above ‘cognoscunt’ and ‘intelligunt’ something is written that is difficult to decipher.The readings
of the two words as active is also dubious. They may actually read ‘cognoscun/cognoscuntur’ and
‘intelliguntur’, and maybe the notes correct that. The correct reading must be active.
3–4 Arist. DA III.6, 430b20–21. Punctum autem et omne diuisio et sic indiuisibile monstratur sicut
priuatio. 17–18 Liber de causis IX.92. 23–24 Arist. APo I.13, 78a22-23. 25 Arist. APo I.13, 78a22-39.
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Dubitaret aliquis forte praecipue de anima intellectiva, de qua minus videtur, utrum sit scibilis
et intelligibilis.
1.1 Et videretur alicui quod non hac ratione, et suppono quod omnis nostra cognitio
sumat exordium a sensu, quia dicit Philosophus Primo posteriorum “omnis doctrina et omnis
disciplina et cetera”. Videtur et idem per dictum Philosophus in tertio huius ubi dicit quod “in- 5
telligentem quemque neccesse est fantasmata speculari”, ad quod idem Philosophus loquens in
prohemio huius quod intellectus, scilicet illa virtus qua scimus et intelligimus et cognoscimus,
vel est fantasia vel non est sine fantasia. Et secundum Philosophum secundo huius “fantasia
est motus factus post sensum”, propter quod bene supponere possumus intelligere nostrum
sumere exordium a sensu. 10
Ex illo arguitur sic: Illud non est intelligibile nec scibile per consequens quod non est sen-
sibile, nec per se nec adminus per accidens; sed anima intellectiva non est sensibilis, nec per
se nec per accidens, ut declarabo; quare et cetera. Maior patet ex suppositione. Minor declara-
tur in utroque membro. Planum autem est quod anima intellectiva per se non est sensibilis eo
quod est incorporea, sed secundum Philosophum in libroDe sensu et sensato “solum corporeum 15
et sensibile erit”, ergo anima intellectiva non est per se sensibilis, nec est etiam per accidens
sensibilis, scilicet ut per effectus eius qui sunt operationes eius. Sicut enim secundum Philo-
sophum in tertio huius essentia {huius} animae est immaterialis et sempiterna et abstracta, sic
et eius operatio, eo quod illa non transit in materiam exteriorem sed manet intus secundum
L 44va Philosophum secundo |Metaphysice. Manifestum enim est ex istis quod intelligere et speculari 20
et alia huiusmodi opera animae intellectivae non sunt sensibilia, quare nullo modo scibilis et
intelligibilis erit anima intellectiva.
1.2 Secundo idem ostenditur sic, et praesuppono quod inter sciens et scitum et intelli-
gens et intellectum debet esse realis diversitas quia secundumPhilosophum quintoMetaphysice
sciens et scitum ad se invicem referuntur, sed nihil idem ad seipsum refertur, cum relatio non 25
ponat unum extremum sed duo, quare suppositio haec est vera. Et ex hac arguitur sic: Si ipsa
anima intellectiva sive intellectus esset intelligibilis sive scibilis, iam sequeretur quod inter in-
telligens et intellectum non sit realis diversitas, sed consequens est falsum per suppositionem,
ergo et antecedens. Probatio consequentiae: quia non est dubium ⟨quin⟩ anima intellectiva sit
sciens et intelligens, sic igitur, cum hoc etiam esset intelligibilis et scibilis, iam sequeretur quod 30
idem esset ibi sciens et scitum, ad quod deducere intendebamus, quare cum illud falsum sit,
oppositum erit verum, scilicet quod intellectiva anima non sit scibilis.
2.1 Oppositum autem huius declaratum fuit heri, et patet ex auctoritate Philosophi qui
potissime et principaliter tradidit hanc scientiam et cognitionem de anima intellectiva.
3 Ad cuius evidentiam duo sunt praeintelligenda. Primo quod ipsa est scibilis et intelli- 35
gibilis, secundo intelligendum est per quem modum ipsa sit scibilis et intelligibilis.
4–5 Arist. APo I.1 71a1–2 5–6 Arist. DA III.8 432a7-8. 6–8 Arist. DA I.1, 403a8–10. 8–9 Arist. DA
III.3 429a1-2. 15–16 Arist. ⁇ . 17–18 Arist. DA III.5, 430a18–19 19–20 Metaph⁇ 24–25 Arist.
Metaph. V.15, 1021a14–19.
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3.1 Ad evidentiam autem primi est notandum quod ipsa est scibilis triplici modo sciendi
tradito in logica, scilicet definitione, divisione, demonstratione.
3.1.1 Ratio autem primi est ista, scilicet quod sit scibilis definitione. Illud enim per defi-
nitionem est scibile quod habet quiditatem ab intellectu apprehensibilem, quia secundum Phi-
5 losophum quinto Metaphysice definitio est sermo quiditatis et essentiae, et in sexto Topicis [?]
definitio est significans quid est esse rei.Sed ⟨anima⟩ intellectiva habet essentiam ab intellectu
apprehensibilem ut heri declarabatur in tertio notabili; quare anima intellectiva erit definitione
scibilis.
3.1.2 Secunda ratio est. Illud enim est scibile divisione quod habet partes potentiales et
10 subiectivas in quas est divisibile; sed anima intellectiva habet huiusmodi partes. ⟨Pro⟩ partibus
enim potentialibus habet intellectum agentem et possibilem; ⟨pro⟩ partibus vero subiectivis
intellectum Sortis, Platonis et aliorum, quare et cetera.
3.1.3 Tertii ratio est: illud est scibile demonstratione quod habet proprietates et partiones
de ipsa per definitionem mediam demonstrabiles; quia secundum Philosophum secundo Poste-
15 riorum definitio est medium in demonstrando propriam passionem de suo proprio subiecto;
sed anima intellectiva habet huiusmodi proprietates, scilicet quod sit motrix corporis humani,
et quod ea vivimus et intelligimus quantum ad intellectum possibilem et abstrahamus quoad
intellectum agentem; quare et cetera.
3.1.4 Et si anima intellectiva istis tribus modis sciendi est scibilis, multo fortius et anima
20 vegetativa et sensitiva. Habent enim etiam huiusmodi partes potentiales. Et partes vegetativae
sunt nutritivum et generativum, augmentativum, sensitivae vero auditiva, olfactiva et huiu-
smodi. Animae proprietates autem vegetativae sunt nutrire, augere, generare, sensitivae vero
audire, videre et huiusmodi. Est igitur omnis anima scibilis, illo triplici modo tradito in logica
quod declarare et ostendere intendebamus. Et si modus Philosophi procedendi intuetur ratione,
25 ipse istis modis tradet scientiam de anima, scilicet definitione, divisione et demonstratione. De-
finit igitur animam in secundo huius et dividit eam per potentias suas et demonstrat eam sic: illo
nos vivimus vel sentimus et intelligimus quod est primus actus corporis organici physici et ce-
tera; sed anima est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Ecce qualiter de anima demonstrantur huiusmodi
proprietates.
30 3.2 Secundo notandum circa modum ipsam intelligendi, ad quod intelligendum secun-
dum Proclum qui probat quod omne incorporeum cognoscitum est reflexivum sui ipsius super
seipsum, quod declarat ex hoc: Virtus enim incorporalis et indivisibilis non habens distan-
tiam partium. Similiter illud patet per oppositum: In virtutibus cognoscitivis corporeis, sicut
in oculo: Oculus enim seipsum non videt, cuius non est alia causa nisi quia solum est virtus
5–6 Arist.APo II.3, 90b3–4. “Diffinitio enim indicat essentiam rei.” Locus non inventus in Topica. 31–32
Proclus Elementatio theologica §15.
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corporea non reflexiva sui ipsius super se ipsam. Sed anima intellectiva est virtus incorporea
cognoscitiva, quia nec est magnitudo nec habens magnitudinem ut declaratur, ergo et cetera.
Maior patet per Proclum. Minor declaratur quia si ipsa esset magnitudo aliqua vel habens ma-
gnitudinem, tunc sicut mobile quod movetur supra magnitudinem vel supra spatium aliquid,
primo movetur supra unam partem spatii illius, et deinde supra aliam, ita quod ille motus fiat 5
in tempore et successive. Modo si ita esset de intellectu, ipsum intelligibile intelligendum suc-
cesive et in tempore attingeret ipsam animam sive intellectum primo secundum unam partem
magnitudinis animae, deinde secundum aliam, et sic actus intelligendi non esset simpliciter in
instanti, quod vere probat Philosophus in tertio huius; sequeretur etiam quod ipsa anima esset
sciens et ignorans, quia si ipsa haberet magnitudinem secundum illam partem, esset sciens se- 10
cundum quam intelligibile attingeret ipsam, et secundum aliam ignorans secundum quam non
attingeret. Sequeretur etiam quod simul et semel contraria intelligeret, quia secundum aliam
partem magnitudinis posset intelligere unum contrariorum, secundum aliam autem non, quod
falsum est secundum Philosophum in tertio Topicorum, qui dicit quod contingit unum solum
intelligere ⟨vel⟩ scire vero plura vel multa; patet igitur quod ipsa non sic habens magnitudi- 15
nem aliquam omnino sed sit virtus cognoscitiva incorporea. Omnis autem talis est reflexiva sui
ipsius super se ipsam, quare anima intellectiva se ipsam reflexive poterit intelligere et scire.
Secundo ad idem est notandum dictum Philosophi in tertio huius, scilicet quod intellectus
intelligit se sicut alia, quod non est ita intellectum quod intellectus sit intelligibilis hoc modo
ut ipse a semet abstrahat unam speciem sui sicut oportet alia intelligi. Hoc enim modo in intel- 20
lectibus abstrahentibus esset processus in infinitum quod declaro sic: Ponas enim unum intel-
lectum intelligibilem modo dicto Philosophi sic intellecto sicut iam recitavimus oportet ponere
alium intellectum abstrahentem †sumi habet† quo abstrahit ab illo intellectu intelligibili unam
speciem. Si modo talem intellectum negaveris, iam habeo propositum quod intellectus non est
intelligibilis, ut ab ipso species abstrahitur. Si autem aliquam virtutem haec agentem posueris, 25
ego quaero utrum ille intellectus, quem tu ponis, sit intelligibilis vel non. Non autem poteris di-
cere quod non sit intelligibilis, quia omnis intellectus intelligibilis est secundum Philosophum
in tertio huius. Si autem dicis quod sit intelligibilis, aut habet ipsum esse per speciem ab illo
vel non, ergo eadem ratione qua ille intellectus non est per speciem propriam intelligibilis, nec
primus. Si autem dicis quod sic, quaeram iterum et eodem modo de illo intellectu abstrahente 30
procedendo in infinitum, quod quidem procedere sic omnes artifices abhorrent.
Intelligit igitur Philosophus quod intellectus intelligit se per species aliorum. Est enim in-
tellectus, secundum Philosophum tertio De anima, in pura potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, et
dicit ibidem quod hoc habet intellectus de sua natura quod est potentialis vocatus. Ad actum
autem intelligendi de potentia intelligendi reducitur per species intelligibiles quas in se gerit 35
postquam intellexit; est igitur in actum reductus. Tunc quando est informatus speciebus, et cum
ita sit in actu existens, scilicet intelligendo res et habendo rerum species, tunc revertendo se ad
se percipit et intelligit se intelligere.
18–19 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2–3.
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Sed intelligere est propria operatio ipsius intellectus, sed non ita quod nobis congruit talis
modus intelligendi secundum quem quidem possumus, secundum Philosophum in prooemio
De anima, ex propria alicuius operatione devenire in cognitionem substantiae ipsius et quod
quid est, quare ipse intelligit ita ipsas res aspiciens et operationem suam. Secundum intentio-
5 nem Procli speciebus rerum in actu factus manuducitur et vadit in cognitionem ipsius, sed per
quemmodum ex accidentium cognitione deveniamus in cognitionem substantiae? Postmodum
dicemus super litteram loco suo.
3.3 Patet igitur quod anima intellectiva habet essentiam ad intelligendum apprehensi-
bilem cognoscibilem et quomodo sit scibilis et intelligibilis, quod ostendere intendebamus, ad
10 quam intentionem Commentator duodecimoMetaphysicae loquitur quod intellectus noster est
aliorum per se, sui ipsius autem per accidens et accessorie, et ex | hoc idem sumit differentiam L 44vb
inter intellectum divinum et nostrum qui sunt oppositorum modorum intelligendi se et alia,
et patent isti modi ex iam dictis. Intellectus enim divinus intelligit se primo modo et alia ex
consequenti, ut relucent in se ipso tamquam in speculo et exemplari. Patet etiam ex dictis quod
15 dupliciter est aliquid scibile, vel actu intelligendi primario et directe, vel actu intelligendi sive
sciendi secundario et per quandam reflexionem et conversionem.
Ad 1.1 Ad rationem primam dicendum quod verum est de actu intelligendi primario, quo-
niam tamen secundario non oportet. Adminoremdicendumverum est, et ideo optime concludis
quod intellectus nullo modo scibilis est actu sciendi sive intelligendi – primario.
20 Ad 1.2 Similiter ad secundam est dicendum quod verum est de actu sciendi primario inter
sciens et scitum, tunc debet esse realis diversitas. Si autem convenit intelligere per reflexionem,
non oportet illa esse diversa, ut patet per definitionem reflexionis. Est enim reflexio nihil aliud
nisi conversio alicuius supra se ipsum, et ita conversive intelligendo aliquid non oportet ipsum
intelligens et intellectum esse diversa realiter.
2–4 Arist. DA I.1, 402a10–25.
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Liber tertius, lectio prima
Liber tertius, lectio primaDe parte autem animae.
De parte autem animae.L 70va Secundum Iohannem Grammaticum et secundum communiter loquentes, hoc incipit tertius
liber de anima. Continuat ipsum ad libros praecedentes sic: Supra determinat Philosophus de
parte animae irrationali, sicut de vegetativo et sensitivo, hoc intendit determinare de parte 5
rationali, sicut de intellectu, et dividitur in duas. Primo enim de intellectu praemittit suam
intentionem, secundo intentum suum exsequitur ibi si igitur intelligere.
Primo igitur intendit de parte animae rationali, sicut de intellectivo, ad cuius evidentiam
est notandum quod ‘intellectus’ multis modis dicitur secundum Alfarabium in libello suo De
intellectu et intelligibili. 10
Primo potest accipi pro quamcumque rei apprehensione secundum quod dicimus aliquem
boni intellectus, id est bonae comprehensionis. Alio modo ‘intellectus’ sumitur pro ‘sententia’,
ut hic dicam tibi intellectum Aristotelis, id est sententiam. Tertio modo accipitur pro ‘homine’
sive est idem quod ‘homo’, et sic dicit Philosophus quarto Ethicorum quod totus homo dici-
tur intellectus, et dicit illi Eustathius: “totus Aristoteles intellectus dicitur.”Quarto ‘intellectus’ 15
idem est quod ‘habitus principiorum’ et eorum quae per se nota sunt, et sic Philosophus innuit
‘intellectum’ primo Posteriorum, et hoc modo dicitur quod intellectus semper est verorum, sive
sint agibilia sive spectabilia. Quinto modo dicitur ‘intellectus’ pro ‘fantasia’, quae dicitur intel-
lectus materialis et passivus, et de tali intellectu dicetur posterius, quod intellectus materialis
et passivus est corruptibilis et sine hoc nihil intelligit anima. Sexto ‘intellectus’ idem est quod 20
res intellecta secundum quod intellecta est, et sic sumitur in libro Peri hermeneias ubi dicitur
“est autem quod aliquid aliquotiens quidem intellectus sine vero et sine falso, aliquotiens al-
terum inesse, sic est et in voce.” Septimo modo accipitur pro ‘conceptu’ et hoc modo dicimus
logice quod genus et species sunt intellectus, id est sunt secundum rerum conceptus, et se-
cundum hoc etiam Porphyrius dicit quod species est composita ex genere et differentia, id est 25
ex conceptu et intellectu utriusque. Octavo modo intellectus sumitur pro ipsa substantia sive
essentia animae intellectivae, et hoc modo dicimus quod anima intellectiva est forma corporis
humani. Nono ‘intellectus’ acciditur pro specie intelligibili quae est recipiendo intellectu pos-
sibili, et est idem quod ratio intelligendi, et secundum Albertum talis intellectus dicitur ratio
formalis, et est ille quo intelligimus. Et de hoc intelligitur propositio Commentatoris, quod ex 30
specie intelligibili et intellectu magis fit unum quam ex materia et forma, quam etiam ex su-
biecto et accidente, et hoc modo Philosophus saepe ‘intellectum’ sumit pro ‘specie intelligibili’.
Decimo ‘intellectus’ sumitur pro ‘actu et operatione intellectiva’, sicut etiam sensus quandoque
acciditur pro operatione sensitiva. Ultimo modo ‘intellectus’ accipitur pro quacumque virtute
et potentia animae intellectivae, et de hoc Philosophus specialiter intendit determinare in hoc 35
capitulo, et de hoc praemittit dicens quod “considerandum de parte potentiali animae qua ipsa,
scilicet anima, cognoscit et sapit”, et talis virtus sive potentia animae intellectivae subdividitur,
2 Arist.DA III.4, 429a10. 7 Arist.DA III.4, 429a13. 21–23 Arist. Int. 1, 16a9–11. 29 Albertus Magnus
De intellectu et intelligibili Lib. I, tr. 3, cap. 5, p. 510b (ed. Borgnet). 36–37 Arist. DA III.4, 429a10–11.
19 tali ] ali a.c. Lh3
346 c. texts
quia quaedam potentia intellectiva est practica, et quaedam speculativa, sicut etiam inferius
distinguetur intellectus in practicam et speculativam.
/50/. . . (ed.) | /3/. . . (ed.) L 70vb
Deinde cum dicit si igitur intelligere, exsequitur de suo intento, et dividitur in duas secun-
5 dum quod duo consideranda et determinanda. Praemissit primo determinare primum, scilicet
quam differentiam intellectus habet ad sensum et fantasiam. Secundo autem determinat quo-
modo fiat intelligere, et quale quidem sit illud ibi indivisibilium quidem intellectu. Prima in
quatuor secundum quod de quadruplici intellectu declarat, ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum
quod quidam intellectus est vocatus possibilis qui recipit omnes species intelligibiles. Alius
10 autem dicitur intellectus agens per cuius virtutem intellectus possibilis talis species recipit.
Tertius est quidem intellectus in actu vocatus. Quarto est intellectus materialis et passivus, et
secundum hoc dividitur pars in quatuor determinat enim primo de intellectu primo, secundo
de secundo ibi quoniam sicut in omni natura, tertio de tertio ibi idem autem secundum actum,
quarto de quarto ibi passivus vero intellectus. Prima in tres. Primo enim determinat de intellectu
15 possibili per compositionem ad sensum, secundo determinat de intellectu⟨s⟩ possibilis obiecto
ibi quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo, tertio movet quasdam dubitationes circa ipsum ibi Du-
bitabit autem aliquis. Prima in duas. Primo enim determinat de intellectu per compositionem ad
sensum secundum convenientiam, secundo determinat de intellectu possibili secundum com-
positionem ad sensum secundum differentiam ibi unde et misceri. Prima in duas, secundum
20 quod duo sunt praesens, quae sensus et intellectus possibilis conveniunt, secundum ibi necesse
itaque./35/. . . (ed.)
⟨Dubitatio: quomodo intellectus possibilis possit intelligere se se-
cundum ipsius substantiam ex quo receptum oportet esse denu-
datum a natura recepti.⟩
⟨Dubitatio: quomodo intellectus possibilis possit intelligere se secundum ipsius substan-tiam ex quo receptum oporte esse denudatum a natura recepti.⟩Et est advertendum quod Iohannes Grammaticus movet hoc dubium, quomodo intellectus pos-
25 sibilis possit intelligere se secundum ipsius substantiam ex quo receptivum oportet esse denu-
datum a natura recepti. Ipse respondet et dicit quod si ita esset quod intellectus esset in potentia
ad rerum substantias quas deberet intelligere ita quod rerum intelligibilium substantias reci-
peret, tunc illa dubitatio locum haberet. Sed modo non est ita. Sed pro tanto intellectus dicitur
recipere res quia recipit species rerum noscibiliter. Et ex hoc trahitur distinctio quod intellec-
30 tum recipere intelligibilia dupliciter intelligitur. Uno modo quod sit in potentia receptiva, ad
intelligibilia, id est ad substantias intelligibilium, et talis intellectus est falsus; alio autem modo
intellectus potest intelligi in potentia ad intelligibilia, id est ad species et rationes rerum intelli-
gibilium quas noscibiliter recipit et sic bene habet veritatem. Unde Philosophus huic concordat
postea dicens “lapis non est in anima, sed species eius,” et hoc modo est intelligendum quod
4 Arist. DA III.4, 429a13. 7 Arist. DA III.6, 430a26. 13 Arist. DA III.5, 430a10. 13 Arist. DA III.5,
430a19. 14 Arist. DA III.6, 430a24. 16 Arist. DA III.4, 429b10. 16–17 Arist. DA III.6, 429b10. 19
Arist. DA III.4, 429a24. 20–21 Arist. DA III.4, 429a18. 24 Philoponus In De anima III.4, ad 429a15–16.
p. 9.1–10.21. 34 Arist. DA III.8, 431b29–32a1.
6 intellectus habet ] inv. a.c. L 25 se ] sup. lin. L
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intellectus possibilis est in potentia receptiva sui ipsius, scilicet specie et ratione, eo modo quo
patebit.
L 71rb ||2||. . . (ed.) |
Quoniam autem sic singula
Quoniam autem sic singulaDeterminata triplici differentia inter sensum et intellectum, consequenter intendit ponere quar- 5
tam, quae sumitur ex comparatione sensus et intellectus ad species sensibiles et intelligibiles, et
est talis:Quia ex speciebus intelligibilibus agregatur in nobis habitus eo quod in nobis firmatur
sicut aliquis dicitur prudens vel sciens, sed ex speciebus sensibilibus alicui sensui non agge-
neratur sive acquiritur habitus ita quod dicatur sciens. Littera ita posita est differentia triplex
inter sensum et intellectum. Sed cum intellectus actu fiat singula, id est cum species singulo- 10
rum actu receperit, tunc intellectus sic, scilicet receptus speciebus et habitis, dicitur sciens, id
est habens scientiam secundum quod sic est inhabituatus vel informatus, supple singulorum
entium speciebus.
Et est advertendum secundum Expositorem quod sicut pupilla est quodammodo omnis
color eo quod est receptiva omnium colorum, sic dicit Philosophus quod anima est quodam- 15
modo omnia eo quod per intellectum est nata recipere quodammodo omnia intelligibilia. Dicit
Philosophus quod sicut manus est organum organorum eo quod deservit singulis organis, sic
intellectus dicitur esse species specierum intelligibilium, et sensus dicitur quodammodo omnis
species specierum sensibilium eo quod aptus est recipere omnes species. Sed anima per intellec-
tum aut per receptionem specierum dicitur in potentia omnia intelligibilia; sed postquam ipsa 20
receperit dicitur quodammodo omnia intelligibilia, quia non oportet quod si habuerit habitum
intelligibilium, quod secundum actum conservaverit.
Ad cuius evidentiam est notandum secundo quod secundum Iohannem Grammaticum et
secundum Philosophum supra, intellectus dicitur dupliciter. Quidam primus sicut scientia vel
habitus alius, secundus sicut considerare. Modo dicit Philosophus quod cum intellectus acqui- 25
sierit species intelligibilium, est in actu, id est in actu primo, nihilominus est in potentia ad ac-
tum secundum, et subdit intellectus sic habet secundum suum habitum, et accipit ipsum posse
per se ipsum operari ⟨et⟩ intelligere. Unde dicit Commentator: “Habitus est illud quod quis
habens facile operari potuit quando voluit.” Intellectus igitur habituatus et informatus intelli-
gibilibus potest se ipsum considerare et intelligere quando velit, et in littera supra Philosophus 30
posuit sensum differe ab ipso, et dicit ‘per se ipsum’, quia operari potest absque omni doctore
extrinseco. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus, quod, supple intellectus, dicitur secundum actum.
4 Arist. DA III.4, 429b5. 14–15 Aquinas Quaest. disp. de anima art. 2, resp. Aquinas writes: “Hunc
igitur intellectum possibilem necesse est esse in potentia ad omnia quae sunt intelligibilia per hominem,
et receptivum eorum, et per consequens denudatum ab his: quia omne quod est receptivum aliquorum,
et in potentia ad ea, quantum de se est, est denudatum ab eis; sicut pupilla, quae est receptiva omnium
colorum, caret omni colore.” 15–16 Arist. DA III.7, 431b20–21. 17–19 Arist. DA III.7, 432a1–3. 23
Philoponus In De anima III.4, ad 429b8–9. p. 19.59–62. 24 Arist. DA III.4, 429b5–9. 28–29 Averroes
In DA III.18, in 430a14–17, p. 438.25–29 (ed. Crawford).
8 non post sensibilibus del. L 8–9 aggeneratur ] aggeneretur L 10 id est ] 19 sensibilium ]
intelligibilium L 24 a post vel del. L
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Hoc accidit statim cum possit per se ipsum considerare, et ex isto manifeste reprehenditur error
Avicennae qui voluit quod species intelligibiles non sunt in intellectu nisi quando intellectus
actu intelligat. Immo Philosophus hoc praesupponit considerari actualiter ipsum habitum unde
et quo consideretur.
5 Deinde cum dicit Et quidem igitur , dicit quomodo intellectus secundum habitum sit in po-
tentia et in actu, et cum hoc ponens quandam differentiam inter intellectum et sensum, et dicit
⟨quod⟩ quando intellectus est informatus speciebus, tunc est in potentia, sed non est eodem
modo, sicut erat intelligere sive hoc fiat per inventionem sive per doctrinam. Et subdit quod
quando intellectus sit sub habitu specierum, tunc se ipsum potest intelligere. Advertendum est
10 quod omnis scientia acquisita, sive omne quod quis novit, vel habetur per doctrinam vel per in-
ventionem secundum Philosophum secundo Elenchorum. Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus “non
sicut ante {non} addiscere”, designans acquisitionem scientiae per doctrinam, “aut invenire”,
designans scientiam per inventionem.
Advertendum est ulterius secundum Philosophum supra: dupliciter aliquod est in poten-
15 tia ad actum, scilicet in propinquo et remoto. Modo ante addiscere et ante invenire aliquid est
in potentia remota ad considerare, sive quando habet habitum ante addiscere et invenire, et
quando habuerit habitum, ⟨est in potentia propinqua⟩. Et subdit quod intellectus existens se-
cundum habitum potest se ipsum intelligere, et hoc patebit per Philosophum inferius, cum dicit
quod intellectus intelligit seipsum ⟨sicut⟩ alia, id est per species aliorum, postquam est infor-
20 matus et actu existens intelligibili. Et per hoc intellectus differt a sensu, quia sensus non sentit
nisi mediante organo, et quia inter sensum modo et suum actum nullum est organum medium,
sicut inter obiectum ⟨et sensum⟩ [?]; ideo bene potest sentire suum proprium obiectum, nullo
autemmodo suum actum, nec per consequens se ipsum, et hoc etiam vult Proclus, dicens omnis
virtus corporea non potest esse reflexiva sui ipsius super se ipsum propter transmutationem
25 partium in organo. Intellectus autem, propter causam oppositam, bene potest intelligere suum
actum et per consequens se ipsum.
Littera: Ita dictum fuit quod quando intellectus recipit species singulas, tunc dicitur habi-
tuatus et secundum actum, ergo, supple tantum talem actum intellectus habuerit, tunc est in
potentia ad actum secundum, et non primum, et propter hoc dixit quodammodo eo quod non
30 in potentia simpliciter, nec in actu simpliciter, et est quod subdit dicens: Non tamen similiter in
potentia sicut ante addiscere, id est ante acquisitionem habitus per doctrinam, aut ante invenire,
et ipse, supple intellectus postquam est ita habituatus, potest se ipsum intelligere quod, supple,
sensus nullo modo facere potest.
2–3 Avicenna DA V.6, p. 147.16–148.39 5 Arist. DA III.4, 429b7. 10–11 Arist. SE⁇? 11–12 Arist.
DA III.4, 429b8–9. 12 Arist. DA III.4, 429b9. 19 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2.
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secundum philosophum ] ulterius ante secundum Philosophum transp. L 15 ante1 ] autem L 15
et2 ] est L 16 et1 ] est L 20 intelligibili ] intelligibilia a.c. L 21 actum ] actuum a.c. L
simon magister: expositio in de anima 349
Liber tertius, lectio tertia
Liber tertius, lectio tertiaDubitabit autem aliquis
Dubitabit autem aliquisL 72ra Superius Philosophus determinavit de obiecto intellectus posibilis. Hic circa dicta movet dubi-
tationes, et dividitur in duas. Primo enim ipsas movet, secundo dissolvit ibi aut pati.
Prima adhuc in duas secundum quod duae sunt dubitationes quas movet, secunda ibi Am- 5
plius si intelligibilis, ex quo Philosophus ostendit quomodo intellectus fertur in cognitionem
quod quid est, ⟨∗∗∗⟩ et hoc recta linea, et ideo illud est obiectum eius directe, ex quo autem fertur
in singulare indirecte et per accidens, ideo tale est obiectum ipsius per accidens. Hic subiungit
duas dubitationes quarum prima est utrum possibile sit intellectum intelligere, et supponatur
quod intelligere sit quodam pati. Ex hoc sic activa et passiva communicant in materia, et sunt 10
unum in genere naturali. Sed nunc ita est quod intellectus, cum sit immixtus et immaterialis, ad
hoc quod omnia cognoscat immaterialiter, nulli quicquam habet commune, quare non potest
pati, et si non potest pati, {quare} necque intelligere.
Littera: Ita determinatum est de obiecto intellectus. Sed utique aliquis dubitabit si intellec-
tus videtur esse simplex et impassibilis, et nihil enim nullam habet materiam communem ulli, 15
sicut dixit Anaxagoras interrogative quomodo tunc intelligeret intellectus. Sed si, supple intel-
ligere, est pati, quia inquantum utique, id est agenti et patienti, est aliqua materia communis,
tunc hoc quidem, id est agens videtur agere, et patiens videtur pati.
Deinde cum dicitAmplius autemmovet secundam dubitationem, quaesito quomodo sit pos-
sibile quod intellectus intelligat, consequenter quaeritur quomodo intellectus sit intelligibilis. 20
Et probatur primo quod non, quia si esset intelligibilis, aut per se et per suam essentiam est in-
telligibilis, aut per aliud aliquid essentiae additum.Modo quodcumque illorumdederis, sequetur
impossibile ut declaro, quare non est intelligibilis intellectus, et fundatur haec ratio super illam
maximam Philosophi Primo posteriorum: “Illud est impossibile quod consequitur impossibile.”
Probatio minoris:Quoad utrumque eius membrum sic: Unumquodque est intelligibile eiusdem 25
speciei cum alio intelligibili, omnia enim intelligibilia in eo quod sunt intelligibilia sunt eiusdem
speciei et in omni materia; si igitur intellectus sit intelligibilis, erit eiusdem speciei cum aliis
L 72rb in|telligibilibus. Si sic, sequetur quod alia intelligibilia intelligant sicut intellectus, supple, isto
supposito quod intelligibilia sint eiusdem speciei; vel sequetur quod intellectus non intelligat
sicut alia intelligibilia non intelligunt, et stat ista virtus illationis in hoc quod omnia intelligiblia 30
in eo quod sunt habent eundum modum, quod Philosophus supponit. Ita patet quod intellectus
saltem de se non est intelligibilis, et patebit ulterius.
Littera: Ita aliquis dubitabit quomodo intellectus, cum sit immaterialis, possit intelligere,
sed amplius, supple dubitabit aliquis, si (pro ‘utrum’) et ipse intellectus noster est intelligibilis.
2 Arist. DA III.4, 429b22. 4 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29. 5–6 Arist. DA III.4, 429b26. 19 Arist. DA III.4,
429b26.
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Hoc enim non videtur possibile. Autem (pro ‘quia’) intelligibile est unius speciei, vel uniforme
vel secundum unum modum, quia inquam hoc ita etenim (pro ‘tunc’) universali [?] (pro ‘ergo’)
aut aliis, supple inerit intellectus et intelligunt, quod est impossibile, et hoc potissime contingit
si intellectus ⟨non⟩ sit intelligibilis per aliud sibi additum, sed per se.
5 Et est advertendum quod esse illud quod per se intellectum est, abstractum est a materia,
sed in abstractis a materia est idem intelligens et intellectum, quare cum intellectus sit eiusdem
speciei cum aliis intelligibilibus, et cum ipse sit quid abstractum a materia, sicut ipse cum in-
telligat, intelligitur; sic et alia intelligunt cum intelliguntur, ex quo autem illud sequitur ⟨quod⟩
suppositum est; et tunc deducit ad membrum minoris essentiae rationis duas. Sed si intellectus
10 immixtum addi⟨tur⟩, id est aliquod habet annexum et additum suae essentiae per quod intel-
ligatur, tunc habebit quod facit ipsum intelligibile sicut alia materialia {non intelligunt}; sed,
supple alia materialia, non intelligunt; sic intellectus noster non intelliget ex quo ita est quod
intellectus, cum sit intelligibilis, sit eiusdem speciei cum aliis intelligibilibus.
Advertendum quod substantiae separatae, cum sint entia immaterialia et purae formae, alio
15 modo sunt intelligibiles quam materialia. Materialia enim non sunt intelligibilia nisi per spe-
ciem abstractam ab ipsis virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis. ⟨∗∗∗⟩ intellectum possibilem
repositam lapidis essentia species novi imprimitur speculo; sed species eius modi, si speculum
esset cognoscitiva per talem speciem, utique intelligeret tamquam per similitudinem, sed nunc
ita est quod materialia non sunt in intellectu essentiis, simul enim per intentiones quibus in-
20 tellectui sunt proportionalia ⟨∗∗∗⟩. Substantiae autem separatae quae sunt purae formae, cum
sint actu abstractae a conditionibus materialibus non oportet quod aliud intelligendum eas fiat
abstractio, sed intelligantur per seipsas. Patet igitur quod ipsae essentialiter sunt intellectae, et
cum hoc intelligentes; sed ipsa materialia se habent ex opposito modo. Talia quidem sunt intel-
ligibilia seu intellecta, non tamen intelligunt, sed ipse intellectus inter huiusmodi entia, scilicet
25 substantias separatas, et materialia, tenens medium gradum, propter quod in libro De causis
dicitur quod “anima est in horizonte aeternitatis et temporis”, ita quod teneat infimum gradum
intelligentiarum aeternarum et supremum gradum inter materialia. Rationabiliter igitur dubi-
tatur quomodo anima intellectiva sit intelligibilis vel intelligit; sicut substantiae separatae quae
intellectae intelligunt, vel sicut entia materialia quae intellecta non intelligunt.Quodcumque il-
30 lorum detur, habetur impossibile: Si autem primo modo dicatur cum intelligibilia sunt eiusdem
speciei, alia materialia intelligerent; si secundo modo cum intelligibilia sint eiusdem speciei,
sequitur sicut materialia non intelligunt quod intellectus non intelligat.
Deinde cum dicit Aut pati quidem quid, ad dubitationes motas solvit, et primo ad primam,
secundo ad secundam ibi et ipse autem. Prima dubitatio fuit ista: Quomodo sit possibile quod
35 intellectus intelligat cum tamen sit impassibilis et intellectus fiat cum passione. Philosophus re-
25–26 Liber de causis II.22 33 Arist. DA III.4, 429b29. 34 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2.
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spondet et dicit quod duplex est passio, uno modo secundum opposita et contraria, et talis est
propria passio, alia est sicut salus et perfectio, et illa est in propositione dicta. Modo dicendum
quod sufficit quod intellectus existens impassibilis ipse intelligit passione{m} improprie. Ad
formam argumenti dicendum concedatur suppositio. Ad maiorem dicendum quod non oportet
in activis et passivis mathematicis. Ad minorem quod verum est, et ideo concludit quod intel- 5
lectus non patitur propria passione, non autem concludit quod non patiatur improprie, et hoc
sufficit ad intelligere littera ‘aut nota solutionis est pati proprie’ dictum secundum communem
materiam est prius scilicet in libro De generatione distinctum contra pati improprie acceptum;
sed, supple intelligere, non est pati, quod declarat, dimitatur ‘quoniam’, intellectus est quo-
dammodo in potentia intelligibilium, sed nihil est ante intelligibilia, antequam ipse intelligat, 10
quoniam ita est autem (pro ergo) illud quod accidit in intellectu debet se similiter habere sicut
in, supple tabula, rasa vel nuda in qua nihil, supple est scriptum, sed quando in illa aliquid
scribitur, ab ipsa nihil abiicitur, sed magis perficitur. Ergo simili modo quando species intel-
ligibiles depinguntur in intellectu, nihil ab intellectu tunc abiicitur, sed ipse magis perficitur,
ideo patitur non proprie. 15
Expositor autem primam litteram sic aliter legit aut dicit ipse. Pati, supple dictum et accep-
tum, secundum commune aliquid id est communiter, est divisum prius, scilicet in se, huiusmodi
in pati proprie dictum vel in pati improprie dictum, et, supple intellectus, non patitur proprie, et
cetera. Ex littera huius partis deprehenditur Plato qui voluit ⟨quod⟩ ante coniunctionem intel-
lectus cum corpore creatus sub duabus stellis comparibus sibi ⟨∗∗∗⟩ concreatae species omnium 20
intelligibilium, sed ex imperio sui creatoris iungitur mole corporis quo obumbratur a sui ipsius
conscientia proprii, quod dicit animam intelligere in corpore quasi reminisci. Sed Philosophus
dicit quod ipse intellectus quasi ⟨est tabula⟩ rasa; ex hoc enim deprehenditur error dicentium
animam esse compositam ab omnibus ut omnia cognosceret.
Deinde cum dicit et ipse autem intelligibilis, solvit secundam dubitationem quae duas tenuit 25
difficultates. Una fuit ad quam deduxit, scilicet si intellectus est intelligibilis cum intelligibilia
unius speciei sint, sicut intellectus intelligibilis intelligit sic alia quaecumque intelligibilia in-
telligunt. Alia difficultas est eodem modo, cum intelligibilia sint eiusdem speciei sicut alia in-
telligibilia non intelligunt, sic neque intellectus. Ideo circa illud dua facit. Primo ostendit quod
intellectus sit quodammodo intelligibile quod tamen intelligat, secundo ostendit quomodo alia 30
sunt intelligibilia quod tamen non intelligant ibi non autem semper .
Advertendum quod triplex est intellectus: divinus, humanus, medio modo se habens sicut
intellectus intelligentiarum. Humanus quidem intellectus omnino contrario modo se habet ad
intellectum divinum, et e converso intelligentiarum vero intellectus mediomodo se habet. Divi-
nus namque intellectus est purus actus nihil habens de potentialitate admixtum secundum Phi- 35
losophum duodecimoMetaphysice, simili modo huiusmodi intellectus versatur circa universale
totius entis, sicut causa omnium quae sunt in universo et inde. Primo et principaliter intelligit
sui ipsius essentiam et per illam in qua re lucent omnia tamquam in speculo aeternitatis intel-
ligit omnia alia, verbi gratia. Si enim esset aliquod speculum in quo omnes species apparerent
16 Aquinas Sent. DA III.3, ad 429b29, p. 215–16 (ed. Gauthier). 25 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2. 31 Arist.
DA III.4, 430a5. 35–36 Arist. Metaph. XII.7 and XII.9.
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et illud, cum esset hoc causa omnium, per se ipsum intelligeret omnia. Unde intellectus divi-
nus, quia et substantia est neccesaria unica pura et simplex et aeterna, ideo aeterna cognoscit
aeterne materialia immaterialiter multa une et contingentia neccesario totum simpliciter.
Contrarium autem est de intellectu nostro humano, qui non habet aliam naturam nisi quia
5 est possibilis vocatus, et in hoc iam opponitur intellectu divino qui est purus actus. Similiter
cum ipse intellectus humanus sit creatus et causatus, non versatur circa universale totius entis,
simili modo etiam ipse primo et per se intelligit aliorum species quibus in actu ductus potens est
per huiusmodi species se ipsum intelligere, sic enim quod intellectus noster est potentia pura
in genere intelligibilium, sed talis non vadit ad actum, nisi ab aliquo actuetur; modo ad actum
10 reducitur per species aliorum, quasi per species aliorum vadit ad actum se ipsum intelligendi.
Et hoc etiam vult Commentator duodecimoMetaphysice, dicens “intellectus est aliorum per se,
sui autem ipsius per accidens.” Unde tali modo est imaginandum quod virtus intellectiva, post-
quam recipit species obiectorum, est in actu, est amplius non in potentia passiva, sed activa, et
quia virtus est incorporea ideo potest reflectere super suum actum, et ita potest se intelligere,
15 quoniam intelligit. Sed intelligere sive quod intellectus intelligat est propria operatio intellec-
tus. Propria autem operatio manuducit in cognitionem essentialem, ideo ex speciebus aliorum
a primo ad ultimum potest intelligere se ipsum, et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit, et ipse est | 72va
{est} intelligibilis sicut intelligibilia, id est per species aliorum intelligibilium, et ita declaratum
est de intellectu humano, et ex incidenti de intellectu divino.
20 Restat determinare de intellectu medio modo se habente sicut est intellectus intelligen-
tiarum. Intelligentia quidem omnis intelligit se ipsam per essentiam suam, ut dicit Albertus
Libro de causis. Dicit enim quod “intelligentiae redeunt super se ipsas reditione completiva”,
sed intelligentia intelligit alia a se per species concreatas sibi. Dicit enim auctor De causis quod
“intelligentia est plena formis”, id est speciebus concreatis. I⟨a⟩m Philosophus dicit in littera
25 quod in ⟨im⟩materialibus idem sit intellectus et quod intelligitur.
Advertendum quod illa species quam virtus intellectiva intelligit est una, {duo} et duo sunt
quae intelligunt⟨ur per⟩ unum intelligibile; illorum est materiale obiectum quod intelligit⟨ur⟩,
ut parum prius dictum est, ⟨et intellectus⟩ qui speciebus aliorum intelligitur a se ipso. Modo hoc
tamen est aliter et aliter: Materiale enim obiectum intelligitur modo abstractionis, sed intellec-
30 tus se intelligit per istam speciem materialis obiecti modo informationis, et ita illa una species
11–12 Averr. Comm. magn. in Metaph XII, cap. 4, com. 51, p. 336B–C (ed. Junct.). Averroes writes:
“Deinde dicens sed semper videmus quod alterius est scientia et sensus et cetera, id est sed videmus co-
gnoscere et sentire et existimare et intelligere esse aliud ab eo cuius sunt, id est ab intellecto, cognito,
et sensato, et existimato in nobis. Hae enim actiones ex istis virtutibus sunt aliorum, non sui ipsorum,
nisi per accidens, scilicet quia sensus et existimatio et intellectus sunt intellecti et sensati et existimati
non per se, sed per accidens, id est quod intellectus in nobis non intelligit se nisi per accidens, scilicet
quia accidit intellecto quod fit forma intellectus, et similiter accidit existimato quod fit existimatio, et
sensato similiter quod fuit sensus sentire, et hoc fuit quando intellectus non est in nobis intellectum
omnibus modis, et magis remotum hoc est quod sensus fit sensatum.” 17–18 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2.
22 Albertus Magnus De causis Lib. II, tr. 2, cap. 43, p. 542b (ed. Borgnet). 23–24 Liber de causis IX.92.
24–25 Arist. DA III.4, 430a2–3.
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qua intellectus intelligitur et qua materiale obiectum intelligitur est quid abstractum ab obiecto
materiali. Sed illa species eadem materiali immo in tantum quod secundum Commentatorem,
“ex ipso magis fit unum quam ex subiecto et accidente, et materia et forma,” immo ex hiis,
scilicet specie intelligibili et intellectu, sicut ex lumine et peruio, luce et perspicuo. Unde dicit
Commentator quod in corporalibus nihil similius invenire possumus intelligibili quam lumen 5
multiplicans se in medio peruio.
Et nota quod hic Expositor variat suam sententiam aequivocando, intellectum etenim, sicut
lumen est actus et perfectio diaphani, sic species intelligibilis est perfectio intellectus. Modo ad
propositum, supposito quod intellectus aliquando sumatur pro specie intelligibili (sive pro in-
tellectu formali secundum Albert⟨um⟩), unde secundum hoc dicit quod in seperatis a materia 10
est idem intellectus et intelligibile. Ista littera non est retorquenda ad intelligentias, quia de
illis non loquitur Philosophus in proposito, sed sumamus quod intellectus, qui a nobis intel-
ligitur, est separatus a materia. Materia in talibus separatis idem est intellectus, id est species
intelligibilis, est, inquam, ille idem cum eo quod intellectus in separatis a materia, id est in no-
stro intellectu qui est materialis, sed in coniunctis materiae sicut est obiectum materiale ab hoc 15
species separata non est idem tali obiecto.
Advertendum est modo propter solutionem primae distinctionis quomodo dictum Philoso-
phi applicetur ad propositum. Sicut enim nulli competit actus calefaciendi nisi habeat formaliter
calorem in actu, et in istis inferioribus sic etiam nihil intelligitur nisi habeat intellectum in actu;
sed nunc intellectus possibilis habens species intelligibiles habet intellectum in actu, quare ille, 20
cum intelligitur, intelligit quare si sic est quod talis intellectus in actu est abstractus a talibus
materialibus, ideo materialia intellectu carentia sic sunt intelligibilia ita quod non intelligant.
Et ponatur exemplum ut si aliquid infrigidetur infrigiditate quae non est in seipso sed in alio,
7 Aquinas Sententia in De anima III.3, ad 430a2, p. 216, ll. 75–86 (ed. Gauthier). 10 Albertus Magnus
De intellectu et intelligibili Lib. I, tr. 3, cap. 5, p. 510b (ed. Borgnet). He writes: “⟨Intellectus formalis⟩ est
forma omnis intellectus secundum esse quod habet intelligibile. Hic autem formalis intellectus, non est
ille quem quidam formam rei intellectivam arbitrantur: quia, sicut jam ostensum est, ille non est formalis
ad intellectum possibilem: eo quod species est possibilis intellectus talium specierum et locus, et omne
formale esse potius accipit id quod intelligitur ab intellectu in quo est, quam quod det sibi esse formale,
sicut species et locus formalia sunt ad ea ad quae comparantur [etc.]” First introduced in the context of
the intellect in Lib. I, tr. 3, cap. 3, p. 501a: “Est autem intellectus diversitas quam multi Philosophorum
posuerunt quantum ad ipsas partes animae, quod est intellectus possibilis et intellectus agens, de quibus
in libro de Anima dictum est. Tertius autem est, qui est formalis intellectus, quando scilicet forma sciti
vel operandi per lucem intellectus est apud animam.” Cf. also idem Summa theologiae Pars II, tr. 15, q.
93, m. 2, p. 201b (ed. Borgnet): “Est etiam in anima intellectus formalis sive speculativus, qui est adeptio
specierum intelligibilium.” It does not occur as a term inDe homine orDe anima, but it may be connected
with ‘intellectus speculativus’, cf. Summa theologiae Pars II, tr. 4, q. 14, m. 3, p. 169b (ed. Borgnet): “Cum
multae sunt differentiae intellectus, scilicet agens, possibilis, speculativus sive formalis, speculativus
practicus, adeptus sive possessus, et non adeptus . . . (ed.)”
1 intellectus ] intelligit L 2 e post quod del. L 5 quam ] quod L 5 lumen ] unum L 7 aequivo-
cando ] aequivoco L 9 supposito ] suppositam L 15 hoc ] hic a.c. L (in scribendo) 19 sed post
inferioribus del. ut vid. L 20 intelligibilis post inferioribus del. L 21 intelligit ] ‘intelligit’ is followed
by two meta-marks that might indicate the insertion of some material, but the margins are empty. 22
intellectu ] intellectum L 22 non ] sup. lin. L
354 c. texts
planum est quod aliud non infrigidat, sed oportet quod frigus formaliter habeat; sed nunc ita
est quod obiecta materialia intelliguntur per id quod est in alio, et non in ipsis formaliter, quare
ipsa, cum intelligantur, non intelligunt et sic patet secunda difficultas determinata.
Littera: Ita fuit secunda dubitatio quomodo intellectus esset intelligibilis vel sicut substan-
5 tiae separatae, id est per sui ipsius substantiam, vel sicut materialia, id est per speciem. Philoso-
phus respondet et, supple intellectus, intelligibilis non per se et secundum suam essentiam, sed
est intelligibilis sicut intelligibilia, id est per species intelligibilium, et cum intellectus intelligit,
licet, supple alia, non intelligant, et bene est hoc quia intellectus, id est species intelligibilis, et
quia intelligitur, supple per talem speciem, in hiis quae sunt sine materia, cuiusmodi est noster
10 intellectus, est idem. In coniunctis autem et cetera, et subdit quia ita est quod intellectus et quod
intelligitur sunt idem, ipse subdit quod scientia speculativa et suum scibile, id est speculativum,
idem, sed [?] grammatica est scientia et est aliud quod scitur, et naturalis scientia est scientia et
est aliud quod scitur; et sicut semper scibile est suae scientiae, vel idem vel aliter est, scientia est
unio specierum scibilium in anima, quia secundum Commentatorem duodecimo Metaphysice
15 nostra scientia causata est a rebus eo quod nihil intelligitur nisi per abstractionem specierum a
rebus, ergo idem iudicium est de speciebus intelligibilibus et est etiam de scientia. Sed auditum
est quod sunt species in intellectu, ergo etiam est scientia.
Littera: scientia speculativa et scibile, id est speculativum, sicut et noster intellectus, sunt
idem, sed ista causa est consideranda cum non semper intelligit, id est quare obiecta materia-
20 lia, cum sint intelligibilia, non etiam intelligunt. Autem, pro ‘quia’, in habentibus materiam, id
est in obiectis materialibus, unumquodque est de numero intelligibilium in potentia eo quod
secundum se non sunt abstracta a materia. Ideo subdit quare quidem illis, id est obiectis mate-
rialibus, non erit potentia intellectiva nec species intelligibilis quae vero intelligit in actu, quia
intellectus potentia de numero, supple talium que sunt sine materia, et ideo intellectus erit in
25 actu quid immateriale, et quia obiecta materialia non sunt separata a materia quare, supple et
ex hoc licet non intelligat ipsum, materiale autem, pro ‘tamen’, ipsum est intelligibile.
14–16 Non inventus, sed cf. Comm. in Metaph XII, com. 39, p. 322E–F and com. 50, p. 336B–C (ed.
Juncta).
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1.1 Utrum intellectus possibilis possit esse differentia ipsius
intellectus
D 114ra–b
1.2 Utrum possibile sit differentia essentialis ipsius intellectus. D 114rb
1.3 Utrum intellectus dicatur possibilis ratione sui totius D 114rb–114va
1.4 Utrum intellectus dicatur possibilis in comparatione ad
intellectum agentem et non in comparatione ad formas quas
recipit.
D 114va
1.5 Utrum intellectus possibilis ante addiscere sit in potentia
essentiali.
D 114va–b
1.6 Utrum illae potentiae sint una potentia vel diversa. D 114vb
1.7 Utrum intellectus recipiat omnes species vel formas una
potentia.
D 114vb–115ra
1.8 Utrum intellectus sit unus et idem numero in omnibus. D 115ra
1.9 Utrum intellectus possit uniri cum corpore. D 115ra–115va
1.10 Utrum intellectus possibilis sit eadem virtus cum
imaginativa.
D 115va
1.11 Utrum idem sit modus intelligendi organica et natrualia. D 115va–b
Table D.1: List of questions in Anonymus Digby 55, Quaestiones
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1.12 Utrum intellectus possit intelligere se. D 115vb
1.13 Utrum intellectus intelligat se per speciem. D 115vb–116ra
1.14 Utrum intellectus prout est unitus possit cognoscere
substantias separatas.
D 116ra
1.15 Utrum intellectus in aliquo statu possit cognoscere causam
primam.
D 116ra–b
1.16 Utrum intellectus possibilis recipiat omnes sensus ab
imaginatione ita quod non habeat sensus concreatas.
D 116rb–116va
1.17 Utrum species recepta in intellectu sit eadem cum ipso
intellectu.
D 116va
1.18 De origine animae rationalis humanae, utrum a primo
oriatur immediate an mediante aliqua intelligentia.
D 116vab–117rab
Table D.1: List of questions in Anonymus Digby 55, Quaestiones
in De anima III .
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D.2 Anonymus Oriel 33: Quaestiones in De anima I-
III
No. Title Witnesses
1 Prooemium O 120ra
Liber primus
1.1 Utrum cognitio de anima sit nobis possibilis. O 120rb–120vb
1.2 Utrum ista scientia sit de anima ut de subiecto vel de corpore
animato.
O 120vb–121rb
1.3 Utrum omnis scientia sit bona. O 121rb
1.4 Utrum scientia de anima excedat alias nobilitate subiecti. O 121vb–122rb
1.5 Utrum universale sit nihil aut per posterius. O 122rb–122vb
1.6 Utrum accidens sit principium cognoscendi substantiam. O 122vb–123rb
1.7 Utrum intelligere sit propria operatio animae. O 123rb–124ra
Liber secundus
2.1 Utrum anima sit actus simplex aut sit quid compositum. O 124ra–124v
2.2 An sit actus, supposito quod forma. O 125ra
2.3 Utrum sit actus primus alicuius corporis. O 125r–132ra
2.4 Utrum in animatis sit ponere plures formas. O 132r–134va
2.5 Utrum principium intellectivum convenienter uniatur
corpori organico ut actus eius.
O 134v–135r
2.6 Utrum anima intellectiva uniatur corpori humano ut forma
substantialis eius.
O 135rb–137va
2.7 Utrum vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sint tres animae in
homine substantialiter distinctae vel tres potentiae eiusdem
animae.
O 137r–137va
2.8 Utrum virtus quae est in semine hominis possit producere
intellectivam.
O 137v–138ra
2.9 Utrum intellectiva secundum se totam sit in qualibet parte
corporis.
O 138r–138va
2.10 Utrum intellectiva quae est forma substantialis hominis
uniatur corpori humano mediantibus dispositionibus
accidentalibus.
O 138v–139ra
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2.11 Utrum in homine sit aliquae alia forma substantialis ab
intellectiva.
O 139r–140r
2.12 Utrum anima sit sua potentia. O 140rb–140v
2.13 Utrum potentiae animae sint in anima ut in subiecto. O 140vb
2.14 Utrum potentiae animae fluant ab eius essentia. O 140vb–141ra
2.15 Utrum inter potentias animae sit ordo. O 141ra–b
2.16 Utrum potentiae distinguantur per actus et obiecta. O 141rb–141v
2.17 Utrum sint tantum quinque genera potentiarum animae. O 141vb–142va
2.18 Utrum vegetativae sunt tantum tres potentiae, scilicet
nutritiva, augmentativa et generativa.
O 142va–b
2.19 Utrum alimentum sit obiectum cuiuslibet partis vegetativae. O 142vb–143r
2.20 Utrum inanimata possit augeri et nutriri. O 143rb–143v
2.21 Utrum sensitiva potentia sit virtus passiva aut activa. O 143vb–144ra
2.22 Utrum sensus possit decipi circa proprium sensibile. O 143vb–144ra
2.23 Utrum sensibilia communia sint per se sensibilia. 144r–144va
2.24 Utrum Diarii filius et talia sint sensibilia per accidens. O 144v–145ra
2.25 Utrum sensus sit per se singularis. O 145r–145va
2.26 Utrum color per se sit visibilis, et hoc est quaerere an lumen
requiratur propter necessitatem medii.
O 145v–146r
2.27 Utrum lux sit de essentia coloris. O 146rb–147ra
2.28 Utrum lumen multiplicet se in medio subito vel succesive O 147r–147v
2.29 An corpus luminosum posset se multiplicere per totum
medium, posito ipso medio infinito
O 148ra–b
2.30 Utrum ipsum lumen sit corpus. O 148rb–149ra
2.31 Utrum coloratum sicut lucentium lux de die videri possit et
color de nocte, et quod lux eorum videatur de die.
O 149r–149va
2.32 Utrum visus sit per se cognitivus visiblis et non visibilis. O 149va–b
2.33 Utrum visibile positum supra visum immediate videatur. O 149vb–150r
2.34 Utrum sonus soneretur ex percussione corporum adinvicem. O 150rb–150v
2.35 Utrum sonus habeat esse in percutiente. O 150vb–151r
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2.36 An sonus multiplicetur usque ad auditum cum motu aeris. O 151rb–151va
2.37 Utrum sonus habeat esse reale in medio. O 151vb–152ra
2.38 An sonus primo et proprio causatus sit unus numero. O 152ra–b
2.39 An odor in medio existat realiter vel intentionaliter. O 152rb–153ra
2.40 Utrum distantia rei visibilis impendiat visionem. O 153ra–b
2.41 An visus sit cognoscibilis visibilis et non visibilis. O 153rb
2.42 Utrum solius hominis sit odorare cum respiratione aeris. O 153rb–153va
2.43 Utrum gustus sit quidam tactus. O 153va–b
2.44 Utrum gustus prius sentiatur sapor quam humidum. O 153vb–154ra
2.45 Utrum sensus tactus sit unus. O 154r–154v
2.46 Utrum omnia tangibilia sufficienter reducantur ad has duas
contrarietates, calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci.
O 154vb–155ra
2.47 Utrum caro sit medium in tangendo. O 155r–155v
2.48 Utrum ad tactum necessario requiratur medium extraneum. O 155va–b
2.49 <Utrum aqua possit frigoriferi.> O 156ra
2.50 Utrum omne recipiens speciem sive materiam sit cognoscens. O 156ra–b
2.51 An possibile sit plures esse sensus quam quinque. O 156vb–157va
2.52 Utrum perceptio operationis sensitivae pertineat ad eundem
sensum vel ad alium, et hoc est an visus videat se videre.
O 157v–158ra
2.53 Utrum necessarie sit ponere sensum communem O 158ra
2.54 Utrum sensus communis sit unus virtus formaliter. O 158ra–b
2.55 Utrum necessarie sit ponere sensum agentem. O 159vb–160r
Liber tertius
3.1 Utrum intellectus possibilis sit essentia intellectivae animae
an potentia.
O 160rb
3.2 Utrum intellectus possibilis sit potentia passiva. O 160rb–160v
3.3 Utrum ad cognitionem habendam de omnibus naturalibus
oporteat intellectum secundum se privari omni re corporea.
O 160vb–161r
3.4 Utrum oporteat intellectum privari organo corporeo ad hic
quod omnia cognoscit.
O 161rb–161va
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3.5 Utrum intellectus noster sit incorporalis. O 161v–162ra
3.6 Utrum intellectus habens penes se speciem intelligibilem
possit intelligere absque conversione eius ad fantasma.
O 162ra
3.7 An clausis omnibus sensibus exterioribus ut in dormientibus
possit intellectus in suam operationem <venire>, et hoc est
an intellectus dormientis possit actu intelligere.
O 162ra–b
Table D.2: List of questions in Anonymus Orielensis 33, Quaes-
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1.1 Utrum anima principaliter per hoc quod habeat scientiam de
seipsa possit habere scientiam et cognitionem de aliis rebus.
V 5va–b
1.2 Utrum de anima possit esse scientia. V 6vb–7r
1.3 Utrum de anima sit scientia una vel plures. V 7rb–7va
1.4 Utrum scientia de anima sit scientia naturalis. V 7va–b
1.5 Utrum ista scientia de anima sit difficillima. V 7vb–8ra
1.6 Utrum scientia de anima sit certior allis naturalibus. V 8r–8va
1.7 Utrum accidens ducat in cognitionem substantiae. V 8v–9r
1.8 Utrum sit aliqua operatio animae quae sibi sit propria. V 9rb–10ra
1.9 Si contingat aliquas passiones esse circa materiam scilicet
quod non sunt naturales passiones materiae sed ei contingit,
ideo quaeritur utrum hoc sit verum.
V 10r–10va
Liber secundus
2.1 Cum autem Philosophus inquirit quod quid est eadem
animae dicit quod est substantia. Ideo quaeritur utrum hoc
sit verum.
V 10v–11r
2.2 Utrum materia includatur in natura animae. V 11rb–12ra
2.3 Utrum anima sit corpus. V 12r–12va
2.4 Utrum ex materia et forma fiat unum essentialiter. V 12v–13r
2.5 Utrum ex materia et forma fiat unum in essentia per aliquod
medium.
V 13rb–14ra
2.6 Utrum in partibus animalium analosorum [?] de similis sit
anima.
V 14r–14v
2.7 Utrum anima sit tota in toto corpore. V 14vb–15va
2.8 Utrum potentia animae sit aliud ab ipsa anima. V 15v–16ra
2.9 In quo sit potentia animae sicut in subiecto. V 16r–16va
2.10 Utrum potentiae animae fluant ab anima. V 16v–17ra
2.11 Utrum potentiae definiantur per actus et actus per obiecta. V 17ra–b
Table D.3: List of questions in Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, Quaes-
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2.12 Utrum vegetativa, nutritiva et generativa sint una potentia
vel plures.
V 17v–18ra
2.13 Utrum nutritio, generatio et augmentatio sint opera animae. V 18r–18va
2.14 Utrum augmentum sit in infinitum. V 18va–b
2.15 Utrum nutritio sit possibilis. V 18vb–19ra
2.16 Utrum augmentatio sit possibilis. V 19r–20ra
2.17 Utrum generet ex aliquo sui. V 20r–20v
2.18 Utrum corpus vivens per alimentum possit se continere ut
est in numero [?] per totum aeternum.
V 20vb–21ra
2.19 Utrum alimentum moveatur naturaliter cum movetur ad
contraria loca.
V 21rb–21va
2.20 Utrum virtus passiva sit passiva vel activa. V 21v–22va
2.21 Utrum sensitiva virtus reducatur ad actum a sensibili
exteriori.
V 22v–23ra
2.22 Utrum in eductione sensus de potentia ad actum sit alteratio
et similiter a parte intellectus.
V 23r–23va
2.23 Utrum universale habet esse in re vel in anima. V 23v–24v
2.24 Utrum hoc sit verum quod sensus non decipitur circa
propium sensibile.
V 24vb–25r
2.25 Utrum sensibile commune sit sensibile per accidens vel per
se.
V 25rb–25va
2.26 Utrum sit sensibile per accidens. V 25va–b
Table D.3: List of questions in Anonymus Vaticani 2170 I, Quaes-
tiones in De anima I–II .
anonymus uaticanus 2170 ii: quaestiones in de anima i–iii 363
D.4 Anonymus Vaticanus 2170 II: Quaestiones in De
anima I–III
No. Title Witnesses
Liber primus de anima
1.1 Prooemium V 51ra–b
1.2 Utrum de anim sit scientia. V 51rb–51va
1.3 Utrum ista scientia sit vera. V 51va–b
1.4 Utrum in ista scientia videtur [?] anima vel corpus animatum. V 51va–b
1.5 Utrum ista scientia sit utilis. V 51vb–52ra
1.6 Utrum ista scientia sit difficillima. V 52ra
1.7 Utrum ex accidentibus possimus cognoscere quod quid est et
substantiam rei.
V 52ra–b
1.8 Utrum sit aliquae propria operatio animae. V 52rb–52va
Liber 2
2.1 Utrum anima sit materia. V 55vb
2.2 Utrum anima sit forma substantialis corporis. V 55vb–56ra
2.3 Utrum definitio data de anima, scilicet quod est actus
corporis et cetera, sit sufficiens.
V 56ra–b
2.4 Utrum anima immediate corpori uniatur. V 56rb
2.5 Utrum anima sit una et eadem existens in omnibus corporis
partibus.
V 56rb–56va
2.6 Circam illud capitulum potentiarum autem animae et primo
utrum potentiae animae aliquid addant super essentiam
animae.
V 56va–b
2.7 Utrum potentiae animae fluant ab essentiam animae. V 56vb–57ra
2.8 Utrum qinque sint potentiae animae, scilicet vegetativum,
sensitivum, intellectivum, motivum secundum locum et
appetitivum.
V 57ra–b
2.9 Utrum generativum et nutritivum et augmentativum sint
potentiae vegeativae
V 57rb–57va
2.10 Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva. V 57va–b
2.11 Utrum res sensibilis extra existens possit per se deducere
sensum de potentiae ad actum.
V 57vb–58ra
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No. Title Witnesses
2.12 Utrum universalia sint solum in anima. V 58r–58va
2.13 Utrum sensibile commune sit sensibile per se. V 58va–b
2.14 Utrum sit aliquid sensibile per accidens. V 58vb–59ra
2.15 Uttrum sint plures sensus particulares quam quinque. V 52va–b
2.16 Utrum sensus particularis directe suam sensationem percipit. V 52vb–53ra
2.17 Utrum sensus indirecte possit percipere suam sensationem. V 53ra–b
2.18 Utrum excellentiae sensibilium corrumpant sensum. V 53va–b
2.19 Utrum sensus communis sit una et idem qui iudicat
differentiam diversorum sensibilium, scilicet et album et
dulcis.
V 53vb–54va
2.20 Utrum caelum possit imprimare in intellectum et voluntatem. V 54ra–b
2.21 Utrum phantasia sit virtus differans a sensu communi. V 54rb–54va
2.22 Utrum phantasia sit motus factus ab actu sensus. V 54va–b
2.23 Utrum secundum phantasiam contingit agere et pati. V 54vb
Liber 3
3.1 Utrum intellectus sit passiva virtus. V 54vb–55ra
3.2 Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus omnia intelligat oportet esse
eum ab omni natura denudatum et format materialiter.
V 55ra–b
3.3 Utrum intellectus a materia differat prima. V 55rb
3.4 Utrum intellectus possibilis antequam intelligat sit aliquid
eorum quae sunt actu
V 55rb–55v
3.5 Utrum intellectus speculativus sit aeternus. V 59ra
3.6 Utrum intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus. V 59r–59v
3.7 Utrum species intelligibiles influantur in intellectum
nostrum a substantiis separatis ut voluit Avicenna et Plato.
V 60ra–b
3.8 Utrum intellectus per species in habitu existens ad ipsum
possunt [?] intelligere in convertendo ad phantasmata.
V 60rb–60va
3.9 Utrum intellectus possit intelligere per quod quid
abstrahendo ipsum a phantasmatibus.
V 60va–b
3.10 Utrum idem intellectus possit intelligere singulare ut
universale est.
V 60vb–61ra
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Table D.4 – continued
No. Title Witnesses
3.11 Utrum intelligat se per suam substantiam. V 61ra–b
3.12 Circa capitulum de intellectu agente, et primo utrum sit
neccesarium ipsum ponere.
V 61rb–61va
3.13 Utrum intellectus sit substantia separata vel potentia aliqua
animae nostrae.
V 61v–62ra
3.14 Utrum intellectus agens sit substantia intellectus. V 62ra–b
3.15 Utrum intellectus agens sit unus. V 62va–b
3.16 Utrum post mortem et meminiscemur. V 62vb
3.17 Utrum intellectus intelligat componendo et dividendo. V 62vb
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D.5 Henric de laWyle: Quaestiones in De anima I-III
No. Title Witnesses
Liber primus
1.1 An de anima possit esse scientia M 57r–57va
1.2 Utrum de anima possit esse scientia naturalis. M 57v–58ra
1.3 Utrum scientia sit bonorum. M 58ra–b
1.4 Utrum in omnibus substantiis et quod quid est sit unus
modus cognoscendi.
M 58rb–58v
1.5 Utrum universale sit posterius particulari. M 58vb–59va
1.6 Utrum intelligere sit proprio operatio animae et per se. M 59vb–60va
Liber secundus
2.1 Utrum anima sit actus corporis physici. M 60v–61ra
2.2 Utrum anima sit actus corporis organici. M 61r–61va
2.3 Utrum ex corpore et anima fit vere unum. M 61v–62r
2.4 Utrum in eadem re possibile sit esse duas formas
substantiales.
M 62rb–64ra
2.5 Utrum vegitativam, sensitivam et intellectivam sint diversae
secundum formam.
M 64r–65ra
2.6 Utrum pars animalis decisi sit actu animata. M 65ra–b
2.7 Utrum potentia anima sit de essentia animae. M 65rb–66ra
2.8 Utrum potentiae distinguuntur per obiecta. M 66r–67v
2.9 Utrum unum sit obiectum omnium potentiarum animae. M 67vb–68va
2.10 Utrum potentia sensitiva sit potentia activa. M 68v–69ra
2.11 Utrum sensus decipiatur circa proprium sensibile et per se. M 69ra–b
2.12 Utrum sensibile commune sit sensibile. M 69rb–70r
2.13 Utrum aliqua substantia sit sensibilis per se. M 70rb–70va
2.14 Utrum color sit per se visibilis. M 70v–71r
2.15 Utrum lux sit de essentia coloris. M 71rb–71v
2.16 Utrum multiplicatio lucis sit in instanti M 71vb–72r
2.17 Utrum lux sit in medio secundum esse realis vel secundum
esse intentionalis.
M 72rb–72va
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Table D.5 – continued
No. Title Witnesses
2.18 An visibilia de nocte videantur mediante colore. M 72vb–73r
2.19 Utrum sonus causetur ex percussione corporum adinvicem. M 73rb–73va
2.20 Utrum sonus sit in corpore percusso sicut in subiecto. M 73v–74ra
2.21 Utrum sonus sit in medio realiter. M 74r–74va
2.22 Utrum omnis vox sit sonus significativus. M 74ca–b
2.23 Utrum olfactus in hominibus sit peior quam aliis animalibus. M 74vb–75r
2.24 Utrum ex bono tactu habeat hoc dici boni intellectus. M 75rb–75va
2.25 Utrum odor sit in medio realiter. M 75v–76ra
2.26 Utrum gustus sit quid tactus. M 76r–76va
2.27 Utrum sensus tactus sit sensus unus. M 76v–77ra
2.28 Utrum caro sit organum tactus. M 77r–77va
2.29 An imitatio tactus fiat per medium extrinsice M 77v–78r
2.30 Utrum sensus sit susceptio speciei sine materia. M 78rb–78v
2.31 Utrum excellens sensibile corrumpat sensum. M 78vb–79r
2.32 Utrum sensus particularis directe cognoscat actionem suam. M 79rb–79v
2.33 Utrum necesse sit ponere aliquem sensum communem. M 79vb–80va




3.1 An intellectus sit de novo aut sit ab aeterno. M 81r–81va
3.2 Utrum intellectus humanus ab agente particulari fiat. M 81v–82r
3.3 Utrum intellectus sit forma substantialis materiae. M 82rb–82v
3.4 Utrum intellectus sit forma materialis. M 82vb–83r
3.5 An intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus. M 83rb–84ra
3.6 Utrum intellectiva secundum se essentiam [?] sit in qualibet
parte materiae quam perficit.
M 84r–85r
3.7 An intellectus sit aliqua potentia passiva. M 85rb–85va
3.8 Utrum intellectus possibilis habeat aliquod intelligibile sibi
innatum ante actu intelligere.
M 85v–86r
3.9 Utrum species rei intelligibilis maneat in intellectu cum actu
non intelligat.
M 86rb–86v
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No. Title Witnesses
3.10 Utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat se per essentiam. M 86vb–87ra
3.11 Utrum necesse sit esse aliquem intellectum agentem. M 87r–88r
3.12 Utrum omnia intelligibilia actu fiant intellecta per
intellectum agentem.
M 88r–88va
3.13 Utrum intellectus agens intelligat. M 88v–89ra
3.14 Utrum intellectus agens faciat universale. M 89r–91ra
3.15 An intellectiva hominis differat specie ab intelligentia. M 91ra–b
3.16 Utrum intellectiva hominis separata secundum esse possit
intelligere.
M 91rb–91va
3.17 Utrum in intellectiva hominis separata maneat potentiae
sensitivae.
M 91v–92ra
3.18 Utrum intellectus noster prius intelligat indivisibile quam
divisibile.
M 92r–93ra
3.19 Utrum intellectus noster unitus corpori possit intelligere
substantias separatas.
M 93r–94v
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D.6 John Dinsdale: Quaestiones in De anima I-III
No. Title Witnesses
1 Prooemium B 148rb–148va, O
164ra–b
Liber primus
1.1 Utrum de anima possit nobis acquiri scientia. B 148va, O
164rb–164va




1.3 Utrum scientia sit quid bonum et honorabile. B 149ra–b, O
164vb–165ra
1.4 Utrum scientia de anima sit dignior aliis secundum
certitudinem et subiecti dignitatem.
B 149rb–149va, O
165ra–b
1.5 Utrum universale nihil sit aut per posterius. B 149va–150ra, O
165rb–165va
1.6 Utrum accidentia magnam partem conferant ad
cognoscendum quod quid est.
B 150ra–b, O
165va–b




1.8 Utrum naturalis differat ab aliis artificibus in definiendo. B 150vb–151ra, O
166rb–166vb
Liber secundus
2.1 Utrum anima sit forma simplex vel compositum. B 151ra–151va, O
166vb–167ra
2.2 Utrum omni animae conveniat esse actum corporis. B 151va–152ra, O
167ra–167vb
2.3 Utrum corpus cuius actus est anima sit in actu per aliam
formam quam per animam.
B 152ra–154r, O
167vb–170r
2.4 Utrum anima debeat uniri corpori organico. B 154rb–154v, O
170rb–170va
2.5 Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum. B 154vb–155ra, O
170va–b
2.6 Utrum in homine sensitivum, vegetativum et intellectivum
sint tres animae aut tres potentiae animae.
B 155ra–155vb, O
170vb–171v
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No. Title Witnesses
2.7 Utrum in parte animalis vel plantae decisae sit anima. B 155vb, O
171vb–172ra
2.8 Utrum anima sit sua potentia. B 155vb–156rb, O
172ra–b
2.9 Utrum potentiae distinguantur per actus et obiecta. B 156rb, O
172rb–172va




2.11 Utrum potentiae distinguntur per actus et obiecta. B 156va–b, O
172vb
2.12 Utrum potentiae animae sint quinque. B 156vb–157rb, O
172vb–173r








2.15 Utrum alimentum convertatur in veram naturam rei. B 157va–b, O
173vb–174rb




2.17 Utrum virtus in semine sit productiva sensitivae. B 158ra–b, O
174va–b
2.18 Utrum virtus in semine sit productiva intellectivae. B 158rb–158va, O
174vb–175ra
2.19 Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva. B 158va–b, O
175ra–175va
2.20 Utrum sit ponere sensum agentem. B 158vb–159rb, O
175va–176ra
2.21 Utrum sensus decipiatur circa proprium sensibile. B 159rb–159va, O
176ra–b
2.22 Utrum sensibilia communia sint sensibilia per se. B 159va–b, O
176rb–176va
2.23 Utrum Diarii filius et huiusmodi sint sensibilia per accidens. B 159vb, O
176va–b
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Table D.6 – continued
No. Title Witnesses
2.24 Utrum color sit visibile per se sive secundum se. Utrum color
sit visibile secundum se et hoc est quaerere utrum lumen
requiratur propter neccesitatem coloris vel medii.
B 159vb–160rb, O
176vb–177va
2.25 Utrum lux sit de essentia coloris. B 160rb–160va, O
177va–b




2.27 Posito quod medium sit infinitum, utrum corpus luminosum
possit totum medium illuminare.
B 161ra–b, O
178rb–178va
2.28 Utrum lux sit substantia vel accidens. B 161rb, O
178va–b
2.29 Utrum aliqua de nocte visa habeant videri tantum de nocte,
ut lucerna, et de die, ut colorata.
B 161rb–161va, O
178vb–179ra
2.30 Utrum visibile supra organum positum videatur. B 161va–b, O
179rb–179va
2.31 Utrum sonus causetur ex percussione corporum ad invicem. B 161vb–162ra, O
179va–b
2.32 Utrum sonus sit in aere vel in percutiente aut percusso. B 162ra–b, O
179vb
2.33 Utrum sonus multiplicetur ad auditum cum motu aeris. B 162rb–162va
2.34 Utrum sonus sit in medio secundum esse intentionale vel
rationale.
B 162va–b
2.35 Utrum sonus directus et refluxus ut ecco sit unus. B 162vb–163ra
2.36 Utrum vox generetur a virtute imaginativa. B 163ra–b
2.37 Utrum homo habeat peiorem olfactum aliis. B 163rb–163va
2.38 Utrum odor multiplicetur in medio tantum intentionaliter vel
cum fumili evaporatione.
B 163va–b
2.39 Utrum gustus sit quidam tactus. B 163vb–164ra
2.40 Utrum sapor multiplicet se per se. B 164ra
2.41 Utrum sapor multiplicet se intentionaliter vel materialiter. B 164ra–b
2.42 Utrum tactus sit unus sensus. B 164rb–164va
2.43 Utrum caro sit organum an aliud. B 164va–b
2.44 Utrum in tactu requiritur medium extrinsecum. B 164vb–165ra
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No. Title Witnesses
2.45 Utrum sensus sit susceptivus specierum sensibilium sine
materia.
B 165ra–b
2.46 Utrum excellens sensibile corrumpat sensum. B 165rb
2.47 Utrum sint tantum quinque sensus. B 165va–b
2.48 Utrum sensu particulariter percipimus nos sentire ut visu
videre aut sensu aliquo aut sensu communi.
B 165vb–166rb
2.49 Utrum oporteat ponere sensum communem propter
distinctionem vel participationem inter sensibilia diversa
animae.
B 166rb–166va
2.50 Utrum sensus communis sit unicus an plures. B 166va–167ra
2.51 Utrum organum sensus communis sit internis iuxta cor vel
non.
B 167rb
2.52 Utrum sensus communis simul apprehendat sensibilia diversi
generis.
B 167ra–167va
2.53 Utrum phantasia differat a sensu. B 167va–b
2.54 Utrum phantasia sit motus factus a sensu secundum actum. B 167vb–168ra
2.55 Utrum fantasia insit omni animali. B 168ra–b
2.56 Utrum opinio pertineat ad sensum vel ad intellectum. B 168rb
2.57 Utrum convenienter distinguantur istae quatuor, scilicet
sensus communis, imaginativa, aestimativa et memorativa.
B 168rb–168vb
Liber tertius
3.1 Utrum intellectus sit essentia animae vel potentia. B 168vb–169ra
3.2 Utrum intellectus sit potentia passiva. B 169ra–b
3.3 Utrum oporteat intellectu esse immixtum ita quod nullam
naturam corpoream habeat ad hoc ut omnia cognoscit.
B 169rb–169va
3.4 Utrum oporteat intellectum privari organo ut omnia
cognoscit.
B 169va–b
3.5 Utrum intellectus humanus sit unus numero in omnibus
hominibus.
B 169vb–170va
3.6 Utrum intellectus sit incorruptibilis. B 170va–171ra
3.7 Utrum anima intellectiva in qualibet parte corporis sit tota. B 171ra–171va
3.8 Utrum intellectus intelligat rem corpoream et sensibilem. B 171va–b
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No. Title Witnesses
3.9 Utrum intellectus intelligat per species a sensibilibus
acceptas an per species innatas aliunde adquisitas vel per
essentiam vel qualitercumque.
B 171vb–172r
3.10 Utrum species possint manere in intellectu cum actu non
intelligit.
B 172v–173ra
3.11 Utrum intellectus per species quas praesens se habet, possit
intelligere absque hoc quod convertat se ad phantasmata.
B 173ra–b
3.12 Utrum intellectus intelligat res corporales et materiales
abstrahendo a phantasmatibus.
B 173rb–173v
3.13 Utrum species abstracta sit illud quod intelligitur primo et
per se aut res cuius est species.
B 173vb–174r
3.14 Utrum intellectus intelligat singulare per se. B 174rb–174va
3.15 Utrum intellectus intelligat se per suam essentiam an per
aliud sicut intelligit alia.
B 174v–175ra
3.16 Utrum intellectus possibilis sit actu aliquid eorum quae sunt
antequam intelligat.
B 175ra–b
3.17 Utrum neccesse sit ponere intellectum agentem. B 175rb–175v
3.18 Utrum intellectus agens sit pars animae nostrae. B 175vb–176ra
3.19 Utrum intellectus agens abstrahendo intelligat. B 176ra–b
3.20 Utrum omnia a nobis intellecta fiant intellecta per
intellectum agentem.
B 176rb–176va
3.21 Utrum substantia quae est huius intellectus obiectum faciat
ex re speciem per quam cognoscat sicut et a materia.
B 176va–177ra
3.22 Utrum intellectus noster intelligat componendo et dividendo. B 177ra–b
3.23 Utrum intellectus per prius intelligat divisibile quam
indivisibile.
B 177rb–177va
3.24 Utrum intellectus possit esse falsus. B 177va–b
3.25 Utrum verum et falsum primo et principaliter sit in intellectu
componente et dividente.
B 177vb–178ra
3.26 Utrum intellectus practicus et speculativus sint diversae
potentiae.
B 178ra–b
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No. Title Witnesses
3.27 Utrum sit ponere plures potentias in parte intellectiva quam
possibilem et agentem.
B 178rb–178va
3.28 Utrum intellectus noster magnitudine coniunctus possit
cognoscere vel intelligere.
B 178va–179ra
3.29 Utrum appetivum sit distinctum ab aliis potentiis animae. B 179rb–179va
3.30 Utrum appetitus dividatur in rationalem et sensitivum. B 179va
3.31 Utrum appetitus sensitivus dividatur in irascibilem et
concupibilem.
B 179va–b
3.32 Utrum appetitus rationalis dividitur in irascibilem et
concupibilem.
B 179vb–180ra
3.33 Utrum voluntas quae est appetitus rationalis sit nobilior
potentia quam intellectus.
B 180ra–b
3.34 Utrum appetitus rationalis quae est voluntas moveat
intellectum.
B 180rb–180va
3.35 Utrum appetitus sensitivus oboediat intellectu et rationi. B 180vb–181ra
3.36 Utrum intellectus et appetitus et appetibile moveant. B 181ra–b
3.37 Utrum potentia motiva ab aliis sit distincta. B 181rb–181va
3.38 Utrum animalis moti ex se neccesse est a materia partem
quiescere et immobilem esse.
B 181va–b
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D.7 John of Jandun: Quaestiones in De anima Aris-
totelis, redactio secunda
No. Title Witnesses
1 Prooemium V1 2r–3v
Liber I
1.1 Utrum de anima potest esse scientia V1 3vb–5ra
1.2 Utrum scientia de anima sit naturalis V1 5r–5v
1.3 Utrum anima sit subiectum in hac scientia vel corpus
animatum
V1 5vb–6v
1.4 Utrum scientiae speculativae sint de numero bonorum
honorabilium
V1 6vb–8r
1.5 Utrum ista scientia sit utilis ad alias scientias V1 8rb–9r
1.6 An ista scientia sit difficillima V1 9rb–10va
1.7 Utrum sit una communis methodus investigandi quod quid
est omnium quorum est quod quid est investigandum
V1 10v–11va
1.8 Utrum universalia sint priora singularibus aut posteriora V1 11v–17v
1.9 Utrum universalia sint priora singularibus vel posteriora V1 17vb–18r
1.10 Utrum accidens conferat ad cognoscendum substantiam V1 18rb–21ra
1.11 Utrum anima habeat aliquam operationem sibi propriam V1 21r–22ra
1.12 Utrum logicus definiat per formam V1 22r–23va
1.13 Utrum naturalis definiat per materiam sensibilem V1 23v–24v
Liber 2
2.1 Utrum anima sit substantia V1 25r–25v
2.2 Utrum anima sit substantia quae est forma sive forma
substantialis
V1 25vb–28v
2.3 Utrum definitio animae sit bene assignata V1 28vb–30v
2.4 Utrum ex anima et corpore fiat unum per se V1 30vb–32ra
2.5 Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis V1 32r–34r
2.6 Utrum in partibus animalis annulosi decisi remaneat anima V1 34r–35ra
2.7 Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corpori animati V1 35r–36v
2.8 Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur per actus suos V1 36vb–37v
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No. Title Witnesses
2.9 Utrum potentiae animae sint idem essentialiter cum ipsa
anima
V1 37vb–39ra
2.10 Utrum potentiae fluant ab essentia animae V1 39r–40r
2.11 Utrum generare sibi simile sit opus naturalissimum
viventibus
V1 40rb–41v
2.12 Utrum generare sibi simile et nutriri et augeri sint ab anima V1 41vb–43ra
2.13 Utrum potentia generativa et augmentative sint diversae
potentiae animae
V1 43r–44va
2.14 Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva V1 44v–46ra
2.15 Utrum sensibile reducat sensum de potentia ad actum V1 46r–47r
2.16 Utrum praeter speciem rei sensibilis in sensu receptam et
praeter sensum qui est subiectum sensationis sit aliqua alia
virtus activa sensationis naturalis existens in anima
sensitiva, et hoc querere utrum in anima sensitiva sit aliquis
sensus agens
V1 47rb–56ra
2.17 Utrum sensus particularis possit decipi circa suum proprium
sensibile
V1 56r–57v
2.18 Utrum sensibilia communia sint sensibilia per se V1 57vb–61ra
2.19 Utrum lux conferat colori formam vel habitum per quam vel
per quem moveat medium et visum
V1 61r–62ra
2.20 Utrum lumen sit corpus V1 62r–63ra
2.21 Utrum color sit primum obiectum visus V1 63r–64r
2.22 Utrum sonus sit realiter in aere ut in subiecto V1 64rb–65r
2.23 Utrum echo sit idem sonus cum primo sono V1 65rb–65v
2.24 Utrum odor sit in medio realiter V1 65vb–67va
2.25 Utrum homo habeat peiorum odoratum ceteris animalibus V1 67v–68v
2.26 Utrum animalia respirantia et non respirantia habeant
eundem odoratum
V1 68vb–69ra
2.27 Utrum tactus sit unus sensus V1 69r–70ra
2.28 Utrum tactus indigeat medio extrinseco V1 70r–72ra
2.29 Utrum sensibile positum supra sensum facit sensationem V1 72ra–b
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2.30 Utrum ista propositio sit vera, omnis sensus est receptivus
specierum sine materia
V1 72v–73r
2.31 Utrum species non sensibilis recepta in sensu sit idem
essentialiter cum ipso sentire
V1 73rb–74ra
2.32 Utrum sensus sint quinque et non plures neque pauciores V1 74r–75va
2.33 Utrum sensus particularis cognoscat suam propriam
operationem ut visus visionem et sic de ceteri
V1 75v–76va
2.34 Utrum sensibile agat in sensum V1 76v–77ra
2.35 Utrum excellens sensibile corrumpat sensum V1 77r–77va
2.36 Utrum sensus communis sit unus sensus V1 77v–78va
2.37 Utrum phantasia sit idem cum sensu V1 78v–81ra
Liber 3
3.1 Utrum naturalis philosophus debeat considerare de intellectu V1 81r–81v
3.2 Utrum intellectus sit virtus passiva ab intelligibili V1 82r–82v
3.3 Utrum potentia animae intellectivae ad speciem
intelligibilem vel ad intelligere sit idem essentialiter cum
substantia animae
V1 82vb–83v
3.4 Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat aliquod intelligibile
oporteat ipsum esse denudatum ab illo intelligibile
V1 83vb–86ra
3.5 Utrum anima intellectiva sit forma substantialis corporis
humani
V1 86r–90v
3.6 Utrum intellectus possibilis sit aliquod ens actu de se aut sit
ens in pura potentia receptiva
V1 90vb–94va
3.7 Utrum intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus V1 94v–99ra
3.8 Utrum potentia intellectiva sit potentia organica V1 99r–101r
3.9 Utrum cognitio intellectus possibilis sit necessaria ad
intelligendum multitudinem in formis abstractis
V1 101rb–102r
3.10 Utrum intellectiones quibus diversi homines intelligunt
unum intelligibile sint diversae numero aut una numero
V1 102rb–104v
3.11 Utrum ex intellectu et specie intelligibili fiat magis unum
quam ex materia et forma
V1 104vb–105va
Table D.7: List of questions in Jandun,Quaestiones super libros De
anima.
378 d. qestion lists
Table D.7 – continued
No. Title Witnesses
3.12 Utrum anima sensitiva et intellectiva sit una et eadem
substantia in homine aut sint diversae formae substantiales
V1 105v–107ra
3.13 Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere suam
intellectionem existentem in eo
V1 107r–107v
3.14 Utrum species intelligibilis differat realiter ab intellectione
seu intelligere
V1 107vb–109va
3.15 Utrum phantasma sit principium activum speciei intelligibilis V1 109v–111r
3.16 Utrum species intelligibilis remaneat in intellectu cessante
omni intellectione
V1 111rb–112v
3.17 Utrum species intelligibilis sit principium activum
intellectionis
V1 112vb–114r
3.18 Utrum scientia sit idem quod species intelligibilis rei scitae V1 114r–116r
3.19 Utrum quidditas sit primum obiectum intellectus V1 116rb–117r
3.20 Utrum intellectus noster intelligat substantiam materialem
per eius speciem propriam
V1 117rb–119ra
3.21 Utrum anima cogitativa possit cognoscere substantias
materiales
V1 119r–119v
3.22 Utrum intellectus possit intelligere singulare seu individuum
sensibile
V1 119vb–123r
3.23 Utrum neccesarium sit esse intellectum agentem V1 123rb–128r
3.24 Utrum intellectus agens sit principium activum speciei
intelligibilis
V1 128rb–131v
3.25 Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae humanae V1 132r–134v
3.26 Utrum intellectus possibilis humanus sit in qualibet
intelligentia qua intelligit aliquid extra se
V1 134vb–135r
3.27 Utrum intellectus possibilis possit intelligere seipsum V1 135rb–136v
3.28 Utrum intellectus sit perpetuus V1 136vb–139va
3.29 Utrum intellectus intelligat post mortem V1 139v–140ra
3.30 Utrum intellectus possibilis semper intelligat intellectum
agentem eadem intellectione numero
V1 140ra–140va
3.31 Utrum veritas et falsitas sint in intellectu V1 140v–141r
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3.32 Utrum intellectus possit intelligere plura simul V1 141rb–142v,
V1 279b–282
3.33 Utrum non ens possit intelligi V1 142vb–144v
3.34 Utrum illud dictum Aristotelis sit verum, scilicet quod anima
humana nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima
V1 144vb–146r
3.35 Utrum intellectus practicus et speculativus sint diversae
potentiae animae
V1 146r–147ra
3.36 Utrum intellectus humanus possit intelligere substantias
abstractas a materia et magnitudine ut sunt illae substantiae
quae dicuntur intelligentiae
V1 147r–153ra
3.37 Utrum potentiae animae sint infinitae V1 153r–153v
3.38 Utrum intellectus et appetitus sint diversae virtutes seu
potentiae animae nostrae
V1 153vb–155r
3.39 Utrum appetitus et intellectus practicus sint principia motus
localis processivi
V1 155rb–156ra
3.40 Utrum voluntas vel homo per voluntatem possit non velle
bonum quod ab intellectu iudicatur esse bonum simpliciter
cum intellectus habet tale iudicium secundum actum
V1 156r–156va
3.41 Utrum vivens aliquando sit in tempore status ita quod nec
augeatur nec diminuatur
V1 156v–157ra
3.42 Utrum gustus et tactus sint neccesarium omnibus animalibus V1 157r–157v
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